Political Revolution Revolutions are commonly understood as instances of fundamental socio-political transformation. Since “the age of revolutions” in the late 18th century, political philosophers and theorists have developed approaches aimed at defining what forms of change can count as revolutionary as well as determining if and … Continue reading Political Revolution →.

Martin Heidegger gilt als einer der bedeutendsten und zugleich umstrittensten Philosophen des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts. Werk und Person üben bis heute diesseits und jenseits philosophischer Diskussionen eine erhebliche Faszination aus. Dies liegt nicht allein an der außergewöhnlichen Originalität seines Denkens und der Kraft seiner Sprache, sondern auch an seinen schwerwiegenden politischen Verstrickungen im Zusammenhang mit der Machtergreifung Hitlers. Florian Grosser zeichnet die wesentlichen Stationen und Entwicklungslinien von Heideggers verschlungenem Denkweg aus einem halben Jahrhundert nach. Dabei arbeitet er die spezifische (...) Gefährlichkeit von Heideggers politischem Denken klar heraus, insbesondere sein radikal revolutionäres und überzogen antagonistisches Verständnis des Politischen, das ihn hindert, reale politische Phänomene angemessen zu verstehen. Grosser geht der Frage nach, ob Heideggers Denken, wie vielfach unterstellt, tatsächlich eine innere Verwandtschaft mit dem Nationalsozialismus aufweist. Die Differenzen immerhin sind gravierend. Die essayistisch gehaltene Darstellung, die im Grenzbereich zwischen Philosophie und Politikwissenschaft angesiedelt ist, erweckt die festgefahrene, seit Jahrzehnten in den starren Mustern von Anklage und Verteidigung verharrende Kontroverse um den "Fall Heidegger" zu neuem Leben. (shrink)

The paper aims at showing the potential of a phenomenologically informed approach for contemporary debates on democratic legitimacy and community. While the role of affectivity has recently been reconsidered in social and political theory, phenomenological insights into affective moments of subject- and community-formation can contribute to further methodological refinement. Inversely, it is suggested that phenomenological analyses on subjectivity and intersubjectivity should be broadened so as to include what often remained a blind spot: the political dimension. Drawing on descriptive resources offered (...) by Levinas, Waldenfels, and Esposito, the paper sets off to rehabilitate the concept of Betroffenheit, of concernedness or being concerned, which, historically, was at the center of conceptions of democratic politics before being removed from it. Questioning its unreserved ‘juridization’, it is argued that an affective understanding of being concerned is relevant for re-describing the emergence of collective political agents: The shared response to an initial experience of being concerned opens up an alternative account of political processes that, venturing beyond issues of legitimacy and sovereignty, outlines the perspective of democracy out of shared concernedness. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung: Die für diesen Schwerpunkt ausgewählten Beiträge setzen sich aus sachlich, methodologisch sowie disziplinär vielfältigen Perspektiven mit dem Thema der Grenze, der Grenzziehung und des Grenzregimes auseinander. Während Grenzen in der normativen politischen Philosophie und Theorie kaum als eigenständiges Problem behandelt bzw. zumeist traditionell, d. h. als für territorial verankerte staatliche Zuständigkeitsbereiche konstitutive statische Trennlinien begriffen werden, wird in den hier versammelten Texten der Versuch unternommen, diese präziser und detaillierter in ihrer gegenwärtigen Gestalt und Wirkungsweise zu bestimmen, um auf dieser (...) Grundlage alternative grenztheoretische Modelle zu entwickeln. Im Zentrum steht dabei die Frage, in welcher Weise sich die zunehmende Beweglichkeit von Grenzen – eine Beweglichkeit, die nicht nur neu konfigurierten politisch-rechtlichen Maßnahmen und Institutionen, sondern auch neuen Kontrolltechnologien geschuldet ist – auf das Verständnis von staatlicher Souveränität, von demokratischer Legitimität oder von Menschenrechten auswirkt. In dieser Einleitung werden zum einen einige maßgebliche rezente Grenzziehungsphänomene erörtert, die im Licht der Covid-19-Pandemie in besonderer Deutlichkeit zutage treten; zum anderen werden Grundzüge eines veränderten politiktheoretischen Nachdenkens über Grenzen skizziert. Daneben werden die sieben Beiträge des Schwerpunkts überblicksartig vorgestellt. (shrink)

In jüngerer Vergangenheit haben sich Flucht und Vertreibung als wichtige neue Herausforderungen sowohl für liberale politische Ordnungen als auch für liberales politisches Denken erwiesen. Dies ist nicht allein darauf zurückzuführen, dass die Zahl der Flüchtlinge und Vertriebenen weltweit auf über 70 Mio. angestiegen ist und sich damit innerhalb der letzten Dekade verdoppelt hat. Zu diesem quantitativen Faktor kommt hinzu, dass sich selbst in vermeintlich gefestigten liberal-demokratischen Ordnungen gewisse qualitative Veränderungen beobachten lassen, die in Zusammenhang mit diesen Migrationsbewegungen stehen, ja sich (...) in unmittelbarer Reaktion auf diese einstellen: So sind es zuwanderungsskeptische bzw. -feindliche Positionen, die z. B. in den Vereinigten Staaten, in Großbritannien, Ungarn oder Italien im Zentrum neuer Populismen stehen und unter der Wählerschaft erhebliche Resonanz erzeugen. (shrink)

This volume traces the ways in which Heidegger’s philosophical thinking has been taken up, critically re-appropriated, and disseminated in literary and poetic writing since the middle of the 20th century.

This article examines Niccolò Machiavelli’s central political writings by means of asking whether his thinking is structured by an underlying concept of the political. In exploring the ways in which Machiavelli (a) addresses some of the basic conditions that determine the political realm and (b) reflects upon the conditions for practical success in this domain, the contours of an implicit, yet consistent concept of the political become apparent. It will be argued that, with regard to its content, this concept is (...) irreducible to the aspect of power. Instead, it is an element of care – or more specifically: ‘care of many’ – that is characteristic of Machiavelli’s understanding of the political and that decisively informs his considerations on both principalities and republics. (shrink)

Political Revolution Revolutions are commonly understood as instances of fundamental socio-political transformation. Since “the age of revolutions” in the late 18th century, political philosophers and theorists have developed approaches aimed at defining what forms of change can count as revolutionary as well as determining if and … Continue reading Political Revolution →.

This volume traces the ways in which Heidegger's philosophical thinking has been taken up, critically re-appropriated, and disseminated in literary and poetic writing since the middle of the 20th century.

The paper aims at showing the potential of a phenomenologically informed approach for the contemporary debate on democracy. While the role of affectivity has recently been reconsidered in social and political theory on various levels, the phenomenological insights into the affective side of subject- as well as community-formation can offer a precious tool for methodological refinements, so the argument. Inversely, the paper suggests that these analyses on subjectivity and inter-subjectivity should be enlarged so as to include what often remained a (...) blind spot of phenomenology: the political dimension. The paper sets off to rehabilitate a concept – being concerned – that was at the center of conceptions of democratic legitimacy before being removed from it. Against the ‘juridization’ of concernedness and its limits (Habermas), the point is to show how, by drawing on the descriptive resources offered by Husserl, Levinas, Waldenfels, and Esposito, concernedness becomes relevant for re-describing the emergence of individual and collective political agents. The shared response to an initial experience of being concerned opens up an alternative account of democratic processes that, venturing beyond issues of legitimacy or sovereignty, outlines the perspective of a radical democracy out of shared concern. (shrink)

Tatjana Noemi Tömmel and Florian Grosser speak with Peter Trawny, the philosopher whose editions and interpretations of Martin Heidegger's work have strongly and lastingly shaped the view of Heidegger's thought.

Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample (...) – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward. (shrink)

This paper provides a comprehensive review of the experimental philosophy of action, focusing on the various different accounts of the Knobe Effect.

Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people (...) spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross‐cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general. (shrink)

In the past decade, experimental philosophy---the attempt at making progress on philosophical problems using empirical methods---has thrived in a wide range of domains. However, only in recent years has aesthetics succeeded in drawing the attention of experimental philosophers. The present paper constitutes the first survey of these works and of the nascent field of 'experimental philosophy of aesthetics'. We present both recent experimental works by philosophers on topics such as the ontology of aesthetics, aesthetic epistemology, aesthetic concepts, and imagination, as (...) well as research from other disciplines that not only are relevant to philosophy of aesthetics but also open new avenues of research for experimental philosophy of aesthetics. Overall, we conclude that the birth of an experimental philosophy of aesthetics is good news not only for aesthetics but also for experimental philosophy itself, as it contributes to broaden the scope of experimental philosophy. (shrink)

We challenge an argument that aims to support Aesthetic Realism by claiming, first, that common sense is realist about aesthetic judgments because it considers that aesthetic judgments can be right or wrong, and, second, that becauseAesthetic Realism comes from and accounts for “folk aesthetics,” it is the best aesthetic theory available.We empirically evaluate this argument by probing whether ordinary people with no training whatsoever in the subtle debates of aesthetic philosophy consider their aesthetic judgments as right or wrong. Having shown (...) that the results do not support the main premise of the argument, we discuss the consequences for Aesthetic Realism and address possible objections to our study. (shrink)

Studying the folk concept of intentional action, Knobe (2003a) discovered a puzzling asymmetry: most people consider some bad side effects as intentional while they consider some good side effects as unintentional. In this study, we extend these findings with new experiments. The first experiment shows that the very same effect can be found in ascriptions of intentionality in the case of means for action. The second and third experiments show that means are nevertheless generally judged more intentional than side effects, (...) and that people do take into account the structure of the action when ascribing intentionality. We then discuss a number of hypotheses that can account for these data, using reactions times from our first experiment. (shrink)

If feeling a genuine emotion requires believing that its object actually exists, and if this is a belief we are unlikely to have about fictional entities, then how could we feel genuine emotions towards these entities? This question lies at the core of the paradox of fiction. Since its original formulation, this paradox has generated a substantial literature. Until recently, the dominant strategy had consisted in trying to solve it. Yet, it is more and more frequent for scholars to try (...) to dismiss it using data and theories coming from psychology. In opposition to this trend, the present paper argues that the paradox of fiction cannot be dissolved in the ways recommended by the recent literature. We start by showing how contemporary attempts at dissolving the paradox assume that it emerges from theoretical commitments regarding the nature of emotions. Next, we argue that the paradox of fiction rather emerges from everyday observations, the validity of which is independent from any such commitment. This is why we then go on to claim that a mere appeal to psychology in order to discredit these theoretical commitments cannot dissolve the paradox. We bring our discussion to a close on a more positive note, by exploring how the paradox could in fact be solved by an adequate theory of the emotions. (shrink)

Deep neural networks have become increasingly successful in applications from biology to cosmology to social science. Trained DNNs, moreover, correspond to models that ideally allow the prediction of new phenomena. Building in part on the literature on ‘eXplainable AI’, I here argue that these models are instrumental in a sense that makes them non-explanatory, and that their automated generation is opaque in a unique way. This combination implies the possibility of an unprecedented gap between discovery and explanation: When unsupervised models (...) are successfully used in exploratory contexts, scientists face a whole new challenge in forming the concepts required for understanding underlying mechanisms. (shrink)

One of the goals of computerized tutoring systems is to optimize the learning of facts. Over a hundred years of declarative memory research have identified two robust effects that can improve such systems: the spacing and the testing effect. By making optimal use of both and adjusting the system to the individual learner using cognitive models based on declarative memory theories, such systems consistently outperform traditional methods. This adjustment process is driven by a continuously updated estimate of the rate of (...) forgetting for each item and learner on the basis of the learner's accuracy and response time. In this study, we investigated to what extent these estimates of individual rates of forgetting are stable over time and across different materials. We demonstrate that they are stable over time but not across materials. Even though most theories of human declarative memory assume a single underlying rate of forgetting, we show that, in practice, it makes sense to assume different materials are forgotten at different rates. If a computerized, adaptive fact-learning system allowed different rates of forgetting for different materials, it could adapt to individual learners more readily. (shrink)

Manipulation arguments that start from the intuition that manipulated agents are neither free nor morally responsible then conclude to that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. The Zygote argument is a special case of Manipulation argument in which the manipulation intervenes at the very conception of the agent. In this paper, I argue that the Zygote argument fails because (i) very few people share the basic intuitions the argument rests on, and (ii) even those who share this (...) intuition do so for reasons that are unrelated to determinism. Rather, I argue that intuitions about the Zygote argument (and Manipulation arguments in general) are driven by people's intuitions about the deep self, as shown by the fact that intuitions about manipulated agents depend on the moral value of the agent's behavior. (shrink)

We challenge an argument that aims to support Aesthetic Realism by claiming, first, that common sense is realist about aesthetic judgments because it considers that aesthetic judgments can be right or wrong, and, second, that becauseAesthetic Realism comes from and accounts for “folk aesthetics,” it is the best aesthetic theory available.We empirically evaluate this argument by probing whether ordinary people with no training whatsoever in the subtle debates of aesthetic philosophy consider their aesthetic judgments as right or wrong. Having shown (...) that the results do not support the main premise of the argument, we discuss the consequences for Aesthetic Realism and address possible objections to our study. (shrink)

Do laypeople think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Recently, philosophers and psychologists trying to answer this question have found contradictory results: while some experiments reveal people to have compatibilist intuitions, others suggest that people could in fact be incompatibilist. To account for this contradictory answers, Nichols and Knobe (2007) have advanced a ‘performance error model’ according to which people are genuine incompatibilist that are sometimes biased to give compatibilist answers by emotional reactions. To test for this hypothesis, we (...) investigated intuitions about determinism and moral responsibility in patients suffering from behavioural frontotemporal dementia. Patients suffering from bvFTD have impoverished emotional reaction. Thus, the ‘performance error model’ should predict that bvFTD patients will give less compatibilist answers. However, we found that bvFTD patients give answers quite similar to subjects in control group and were mostly compatibilist. Thus, we conclude that the ‘performance error model’ should be abandoned in favour of other available model that best fit our data. (shrink)

Experimental philosophy has blossomed into a variety of philosophical fields including ethics, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of language. But there has been very little experimental philosophical research in the domain of philosophical aesthetics. Advances to Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics introduces this burgeoning research field, presenting it both in its unity and diversity, and determining the nature and methods of an experimental philosophy of aesthetics. Addressing a wide variety of empirical claims that are of interest to philosophers and psychologists, a team (...) of authors from different disciplines tackle traditional and new problems in aesthetics, including the nature of aesthetic properties and norms, the possibility of aesthetic testimony, the role of emotions and moral judgment in art appreciation, the link between art and language, and the role of intuitions in philosophical aesthetics. Interacting with other disciplines such as moral psychology and linguistics, it demonstrates how philosophical aesthetics can integrate empirical methods and discover new ways of approaching core problems. Advances to Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics is an important contribution to understanding aesthetics in the 21st century. (shrink)

‘Frankfurt-style cases’ (FSCs) are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy (J Philos 105:223–239, 2008) has recently argued that FSCs fail because we are not entitled to suppose that the agent is morally responsible, given that the mere presence of a counterfactual intervener is enough to make an agent lose responsibility-grounding abilities. Here, I distinguish two (...) kinds of Frankfurt counter-arguments against the PAP: the direct and the indirect counter-arguments. I then argue that Levy’s argument, if valid, can shed doubt on the indirect argument but leaves the direct argument untouched. I conclude that FSCs can still do their job, even if we grant that the mere presence of a counterfactual intervener can modify an agent’s abilities. (shrink)

The debate over whether free will and determinism are compatible is controversial, and produces wide scholarly discussion. This paper argues that recent studies in experimental philosophy suggest that people are in fact “natural compatibilists”. To support this claim, it surveys the experimental literature bearing directly or indirectly upon this issue, before pointing to three possible limitations of this claim. However, notwithstanding these limitations, the investigation concludes that the existing empirical evidence seems to support the view that most people have compatibilist (...) intuitions. (shrink)

One of the goals of computerized tutoring systems is to optimize the learning of facts. Over a hundred years of declarative memory research have identified two robust effects that can improve such systems: the spacing and the testing effect. By making optimal use of both and adjusting the system to the individual learner using cognitive models based on declarative memory theories, such systems consistently outperform traditional methods (Van Rijn, Van Maanen, & Van Woudenberg, 2009). This adjustment process is driven by (...) a continuously updated estimate of the rate of forgetting for each item and learner on the basis of the learner's accuracy and response time. In this study, we investigated to what extent these estimates of individual rates of forgetting are stable over time and across different materials. We demonstrate that they are stable over time but not across materials. Even though most theories of human declarative memory assume a single underlying rate of forgetting, we show that, in practice, it makes sense to assume different materials are forgotten at different rates. If a computerized, adaptive fact‐learning system allowed different rates of forgetting for different materials, it could adapt to individual learners more readily. (shrink)

Computer simulations are nowadays often directly involved in the generation of experimental results. Given this dependency of experiments on computer simulations, that of simulations on models, and that of the models on free parameters, how do researchers establish trust in their experimental results? Using high-energy physics (HEP) as a case study, I will identify three different types of robustness that I call conceptual, methodological, and parametric robustness, and show how they can sanction this trust. However, as I will also show, (...) simulation models in HEP themselves fail to exhibit a type of robustness I call inverse parametric robustness. This combination of robustness and failures thereof is best understood by distinguishing different epistemic capacities of simulations and different senses of trust: Trusting simulations in their capacity to facilitate credible experimental results can mean accepting them as means for generating belief in these results, while this need not imply believing the models themselves in their capacity to represent an underlying reality. (shrink)

In this paper, we pursue three general aims: (I) We will define a notion of fundamental opacity and ask whether it can be found in High Energy Physics (HEP), given the involvement of machine learning (ML) and computer simulations (CS) therein. (II) We identify two kinds of non-fundamental, contingent opacity associated with CS and ML in HEP respectively, and ask whether, and if so how, they may be overcome. (III) We address the question of whether any kind of opacity, contingent (...) or fundamental, is unique to ML or CS, or whether they stand in continuity to kinds of opacity associated with other scientific research. (shrink)

Sripada has recently advanced a new account for asymmetries that have been uncovered in folk judgments of intentionality: the ?Deep Self model,? according to which an action is more likely to be judged as intentional if it matches the agent's central and stable attitudes and values (i.e., the agent's Deep Self). In this paper, we present new experiments that challenge this model in two ways: first, we show that the Deep Self model makes predictions that are falsified, then we present (...) cases that it cannot account for. Finally, we discuss how the Deep Self model could be modified to accommodate these new data. (shrink)

Does phenomenal consciousness overflow access consciousness? Some researchers have claimed that it does, relying on interpretations of various psychological experiments such as Sperling's or Landman's, and crucially using alleged subjective reports from participants to argue in favor of these interpretations. However, systematic empirical investigations of participants' subjective reports are scarce. To fill this gap, we reproduced Sperling's and Landman's experiments, and carefully collected reports made by subjects about their own experiences, using questionnaires and interviews. We found that participants' subjective reports (...) do not support the overflow thesis, but rather suggest alternative interpretations of the experiments. (shrink)

Appendix 1 was incomplete in the initial online publication. The original article has been corrected.

In this chapter, I present a comprehensive review of the literature on experimental philosophy of aesthetics.

This book explores the prospects of rivaling ontological and epistemic interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM). It concludes with a suggestion for how to interpret QM from an epistemological point of view and with a Kantian touch. It thus refines, extends, and combines existing approaches in a similar direction. -/- The author first looks at current, hotly debated ontological interpretations. These include hidden variables-approaches, Bohmian mechanics, collapse interpretations, and the many worlds interpretation. He demonstrates why none of these ontological interpretations can (...) claim to be the clear winner amongst its rivals. Next, coverage explores the possibility of interpreting QM in terms of knowledge but without the assumption of hidden variables. It examines QBism as well as Healey’s pragmatist view. The author finds both interpretations or programs wanting in certain respects. As a result, he then goes on to advance a genuine proposal as to how to interpret QM from the perspective of an internal realism in the sense of Putnam and Kant. -/- The book also includes two philosophical interludes. One details the notions of probability and realism. The other highlights the connections between the notions of locality, causality, and reality in the context of violations of Bell-type inequalities. (shrink)

According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. Gilbert Harman challenged the view that there is any straightforward connection between logical consequence and norms of reasoning. Authors including John MacFarlane and Hartry Field have sought to rehabilitate the traditional view. I argue that the debate is marred by a failure to distinguish three types of normative assessment, and hence three ways to understand the question of the normativity of logic. Logical principles might be thought to provide the reasoning agent with (...) first-personal directives; they might be thought to serve as third-personal evaluative standards; or they might underwrite our third-personal appraisals of others whereby we attribute praise and blame. I characterize the three normative functions in general terms and show how a failure to appreciate this threefold distinction has led disputants to talk past one another. I further show how the distinction encourages fruitful engagement with and, ultimately, resolution of the question. (shrink)