Dans Cartésianisme et augustinisme au XVIIe siècle, Gouhier ne range pas Fénelon aux côtés des cartésiens « inconditionnels » et ne le considère pas comme l'auteur d'un système philosophique mais lui accorde un simple éclectisme de concepts et de notions. Ce sont ces deux assertions que nous souhaiterions examiner en montrant que Fénelon est non seulement un interprète pertinent et orthodoxe de la métaphysique des Méditations mais que, dans son entreprise herméneutique, il offre l'exemple d'une philosophie originale et achevée, accomplissant (...) ce que Descartes a laissé inachevé, à savoir un traité des attributs divins. Continuateur du projet cartésien de développer une « science parfaite » des perfections divines (AT IX, 56), Fénelon propose une apologétique cartésienne correspondant à cette « philosophie chrétienne » que Descartes lui-même entendait élaborer et à laquelle il conférait utilité et certitude (Épître aux Méditations, AT IX, 6) In Cartésianisme et augustinisme au XVIIe siècle, Gouhier does not rate Fénelon among « unconditional Cartesians » neither does he judge him as the author of a philosophical sys-tem but he does grant him mère conceptual eclecticism. We would like to challenge those two assertions in showing that Fénelon is not only a relevant and orthodox interpréter ofthe meta-physics of the Méditations but also that, in his undertaking hermeneutics, he offers example of an original and accomplished philosophy, achieving what Descartes had left uncompleted, i.e. a treatise of divine attributes. Successor of Descartes' project of a « perfect science » of divine perfections (AT IX, 56), Fénelon suggests a Cartesian apologia, which squares with this « Christian philosophy », that Descartes himself wanted to found as useful and certain (Épître, AT IX, 6). (shrink)

Against the “universal consent of the people” and “the crowd of philosophers”, Pascal proves the existence of the void, thus re-establishing the truth where only the force and falsity of opinions had prevailed. Nature “has no repugnance for the void”, it “makes no effort to avoid it” but “admits it without difficulty or resistance”. Pascal defines the void as neither matter nor nothingness. Can this definition be found in Philosophy, in the Anthropology of the Pensées? We would like to show (...) the importance of the notion of the capacity of empty nature, which is decisive when it comes to describing the condition of man, troubled by a desire for truth and happiness that he cannot satisfy. Nature is thus, for him, what is “most contrary” to him, depriving him of what is rightfully his. The void has a cardinal function in Physics, but also in Philosophy. (shrink)

La philosophie cartésienne se décline en un refrain tranquille : « je pense, donc je suis », la méthode, le doute, le triomphe de la raison, Dieu lui-même soumis à la logique de l’entendement et toutes les passions domestiquées. Ce refrain semble même être devenu celui de la nation française toute entière : y a-t-il un autre philosophe auquel il soit fait aussi couramment référence? Mais ce « cartésianisme » que la tradition a retenu n’est justement pas cartésien. A rebours (...) de nos a priori sur Descartes, Laurence Devillairs souligne le caractère inclassable de sa philosophie : Descartes revendique le droit de la raison à s’exercer librement mais il se définit aussi comme « philosophe chrétien » ; il déclare l’homme capable de connaître l’essence même de Dieu mais en affirme l’irréductible incompréhensibilité ; il rétablit les droits de l’âme contre toute confusion avec le corporel mais fait de l’homme l’union intime d’un corps et d’un esprit. Ainsi se fait jour le portrait d’un maître à penser sans réel disciple, critique de la philosophie de l’École, désireux de voir le cartésianisme enseigné au titre de philosophie officielle, premier philosophe de la modernité et meilleur théologien de son siècle. Descartes n’a d’autre école que la sienne. (shrink)

The wisdom of famous philosophers distilled into practical takeaways for modern readers For centuries, philosophers have considered the "big questions" of human life, mulling over everything from ethics to the definition of reality. Their ideas and insights are powerful and innovative, but often inaccessible and far too academic for most readers. In The Philosophy Cure: Lessons on Living from the Great Philosophers, scholar and expert on Cartesian philosophy, Laurence Devillairs has stripped away the convoluted language, translating the core (...) ideas and wisdom of some of the most prominent philosophers into simple concepts for modern readers. She skillfully reveals that far from being impractical or distantly academic, philosophy is, at its heart, a deeply useful discipline ultimately concerned with what it means to live a good and fulfilling life. Perfect for readers who are intrigued with philosophy, but who are uninterested in reading dense academic texts, The Philosophy Cure reveals the true wisdom of the best-known philosophers-from Socrates to Kant and Descartes. (shrink)

Comment connaître Dieu? Est-il légitime de faire de son essence l’objet de la méthode, d’appliquer à sa nature et à ses attributs les modes de connaissance définis par cette méthode, à savoir l’induction, la déduction voire l’intuition? Comment défendre la possibilité d’une intellection claire et distincte de l’essence de Dieu, telle que la représente son idée, et faire droit à l’incompréhensibilité attachée à son infinité? Le paradoxe de la métaphysique cartésienne consiste à la fois à revendiquer la possibilité de connaître (...) Dieu à partir de son essence, selon la « vraie définition » qu’en donne son idée innée, et à poser l’incompréhensiblité de cette essence, irréductible à ce que la raison peut en déterminer. C’est sur ce paradoxe que s’élaborent une « science parfaite » de Dieu et un traité de ses attributs, que Descartes déclare avoir tous « expressément prouvés ».Le Dieu de la métaphysique n’est toutefois pas seulement objet de science; il suscite aussi la plus « violent des passions » : sa connaissance et la preuve de tous ses attributs n’ont en effet d’autre utilité que de nous conduire à son amour, lequel procure des « satisfactions » et « des contentements qui valent incomparablement davantage que nos petites joies passagères ». (shrink)

Ce dossier est consacré à la correspondance de Fénelon, dont l’édition, achevée en 2007, a considérablement enrichi la connaissance de la vie et de l’œuvre de l’archevêque de Cambrai, en éclairant d’un jour nouveau ses multiples visages. Miroir et mémoire de l’œuvre publiée, quand elle ne constitue pas elle-même une part essentielle de l’œuvre, la correspondance en augmente la compréhension par la découverte de ses étapes d’élaboration, des obstacles qu’elle a rencontrés ou des circonstances qui l’ont favorisée. Elle dévoile aussi (...) ce que l’œuvre ne montre pas : les projets avortés et les renoncements, enfin, et surtout, l’ample milieu qui, autour de Fénelon lui permet de tisser le réseau où s’insère cette exceptionnelle vie faite d’engagements radicaux, de combats, de gloire mais aussi de déceptions, de disgrâces, et de soumission. (shrink)

Dans l’Epître aux Méditations, Descartes affirme que toute l’utilité de sa philosophie réside dans la « solidité » des preuves de l’existence de Dieu qu’elle propose. C’est par un effort de détachement de l’esprit des sens et par un retour sur soi, sur des raisons tout « intérieures », que ces démonstrations s’élaborent et acquièrent évidence et certitude. Cette méthode n’est-elle pas la reprise, en philosophie moderne, de l’itinéraire augustinien de l’âme vers Dieu?

Descartes choisit de donner à sa première publication métaphysique, la forme et le titre de « méditations ». Cette dénomination est un sujet d'études traditionnel du commentaire cartésien qui l'associe généralement à un exercice religieux, issu de la spiritualité jésuite. Nous souhaiterions renouveler cette interprétation et montrer que la forme méditative de la métaphysique n'est ni une rhétorique ni une pratique religieuse mais qu'elle représente une méthode proprement philosophique. De plus, ce n'est pas aux exercices d'Ignace de Loyola que semble (...) se référer la méditation cartésienne mais bien plutôt à la pensée d'Augustin.Descartes chose to give to his first metaphysical publication, the form and the title of meditations. This denomination is a traditional topic of Cartesian commentary, which generally relates it to a religious exercise, derived from Jesuitical spirituality. We wish for changing this interpretation by asserting that the meditative form of Metaphysics is not a question of rhetoric neither of religious practice but it represents a purely philosophical method. Moreover, it is not to Ignace de Loyola's exercises that Cartesian meditation seems to refer but rather to Augustine's thought. (shrink)

Quel sens la philosophie a-t-elle donné à la définition biblique de l’homme comme image de Dieu ? Au cours du XVIIe siècle, que l’on qualifie d’augustinien, la reprise de ce thème scripturaire se fait-elle en fidélité à l’évêque d’Hippone ? Le point de départ de notre analyse sera Descartes et le texte injustement négligé de la Troisième Méditation, tout entier consacré à cette notion de l’homme comme image de Dieu. Nous passerons ensuite à l’étude de Pascal, pour constater que, paradoxalement, (...) c’est l’auteur que l’on qualifie le plus indiscutablement d’augustinien qui donne le moins d’ampleur à cette notion. A travers ces exemples, et en y ajoutant le contre point que représente, par rapport à Pascal, la philosophie de Fénelon, c’est ce que signifie être augustinien à l’Âge classique que nous souhaiterions pouvoir éclaircir.What specific meaning can Philosophy gives to the biblical assertion of human being as an image of God ? During the XVIIth century, which is recognized as an Augustinian one, is the interpretation of this topic made in reference to Augustine ? We will begin our analysis with Descartes and the text of the Third Meditation, unjustly disregarded by scholars, but all dedicated to this notion of human being as imago Dei. We will follow our study with Pascal, and we will have to notice that, paradoxically, he is the author who is considered indisputably as Augustinian but in the same time the one who gives the less extent to this notion of imago Dei. Through these examples, and with the additional consideration of Fénelon’s philosophy, we intend to precise what being an Augustinian means during the early modern Ages. (shrink)

Le Dieu de la Première Méditation de Descartes reste une figure énigmatique de la Divinité ; le développement de la métaphysique cartésienne opposera à cette vetus opinio d’un Dieu tout-puissant et bon l’idée innée du « vrai Dieu ». Les commentateurs ont cherché à préciser l’origine d’une telle opinion : nous tenterons à notre tour de lever l’anonymat de ce Dieu en montrant que la Première Méditation s’élabore à partir d’une lecture des premières confessions d’Augustin, à savoir le De beata (...) vita. Cette source augustinienne est d’ailleurs confirmée par Régis qui rattache spontanément les attributs du Dieu de la vetus opinio à la théologie d’Augustin. (shrink)

1 Knowledge and Justification This book is an investigation of one central problem which arises in the attempt to give a philosophical account of empirical ...

In this incisive new book one of Britain's most eminent philosophers explores the often overlooked tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. He seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied, at its best, in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily believe or what they voluntarily accept? And (...) should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, the author sheds new light on issues of crucial importance in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. (shrink)

Laurence Goldstein gives a straightforward and lively account of some of the central themes of Wittgenstein's writings on meaning, mind, and mathematics.

La recherche des causes apparaît à la fois comme un impérieux besoin de l'esprit humain et, sous la plume de nombreux acteurs du développement historique des connaissances, comme un obstacle. L'examen comparé des tendances majeures du raisonnement commun et des théories scientifiques actuellement enseignées fait apparaître des écarts importants quant à leur statut du point de vue de la causalité. " Donc ", " alors ", " ensuite " : ce trio de vocables résume la question que posent la part (...) de l'implication logique et celle des relations temporelles entre cause et effet. La causalité au sens où les physiciens l'entendent se distingue ainsi du lien qu'une relation pose entre grandeurs prises au même instant. Le débat rejoint ainsi la notion de fonction - et son nécessaire développement vers les fonctions de plusieurs variables - ainsi que celle des associations probabilistes entre grandeurs. Cet ouvrage invite à un examen croisé de la manière dont ce thème est abordé dans différentes disciplines (mathématiques, sciences physiques, biologie, histoire-géographie), sous le double regard de la didactique et de l'épistémologie. (shrink)

A comprehensive defence of the rationalist view that insight independent of experience is a genuine basis for knowledge.

Johnathan Cohen's book provides a lucid and penetrating treatment of the fundamental issues of contemporary analytical philosophy. This field now spans a greater variety of topics and divergence of opinion than fifty years ago, and Cohen's book addresses the presuppositions implicit to it and the patterns of reasoning on which it relies.

The book was planned and written as a single, sustained argument. But earlier versions of a few parts of it have appeared separately. The object of this book is both to establish the existence of the paradoxes, and also to describe a non-Pascalian concept of probability in terms of which one can analyse the structure of forensic proof without giving rise to such typical signs of theoretical misfit. Neither the complementational principle for negation nor the multiplicative principle for conjunction applies (...) to the central core of any forensic proof in the Anglo-American legal system. There are four parts included in this book. Accordingly, these parts have been written in such a way that they may be read in different orders by different kinds of reader. (shrink)

In “Internalism and Externalism,” Laurence BonJour suggests that the contemporary epistemological debate over internalism and externalism concerns the formulation of the justification or warrant condition in an account of knowledge. The internalist requires that for a belief to meet this condition, all of the necessary elements must be cognitively accessible to the believer, whereas the externalist claims that at least some such elements do not need to be accessible to the believer. BonJour gives an overview of this dispute. He (...) suggests that the opposition between the two views is less straightforward than has usually been thought. He proposes, in addition, that each of them has valuable roles to play in major epistemological issues, even though the internalist approach is more fundamental in an important way. (shrink)

One of the many problems that would have t o be solved by a satisfactory theory of empirical knowledge, perhaps the most central is a general structural problem which I shall call the epistemic regress problem: the problem of how to avoid an in- finite and presumably vicious regress of justification in ones account of the justifica- tion of empirical beliefs. Foundationalist theories of empirical knowledge, as we shall see further below, attempt t o avoid the regress by locating a (...) class of empirical beliefs whose justification does not depend on that of other empirical beliefs. Extemalist theories, the topic of the present paper, represent one species of foundationalism. (shrink)

Two new philosophical problems surrounding the gradation of certainty began to emerge in the 17th century and are still very much alive today. One is concerned with the evaluation of inductive reasoning, whether in science, jurisprudence, or elsewhere; the other with the interpretation of the mathematical calculus of change. This book, aimed at non-specialists, investigates both problems and the extent to which they are connected. Cohen demonstrates the diversity of logical structures that are available for judgements of probability, and explores (...) the rationale for their appropriateness in different contexts of application. Thus his study deals with the complexity of the underlying philosophical issues without simply cataloging alternative conceptions or espousing a particular "favorite" theory. (shrink)

This book offers a unique synthesis of past and current work on the structure, meaning, and use of negation and negative expressions, a topic that has engaged thinkers from Aristotle and the Buddha to Freud and Chomsky. Horn's masterful study melds a review of scholarship in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics with original research, providing a full picture of negation in natural language and thought; this new edition adds a comprehensive preface and bibliography, surveying research since the book's original publication.

Technology used in online marketing has advanced to a state where collection, enhancement and aggregation of information are instantaneous. This proliferation of customer information focused technology brings with it a host of issues surrounding customer privacy. This article makes two key contributions to the debate concerning digital privacy. First, we use theories of justice to help understand the way consumers conceive of, and react to, privacy concerns. Specifically, it is argued that an important component of consumers' privacy concerns relates to (...) fairness judgments, which in turn comprise of the two primary components of distributive and procedural justice. Second, we make a number of prescriptions, aimed at both firms and regulators, based on the notion that consumers respond to perceived privacy violations in much the same way they would respond to an unfair exchange. (shrink)

Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one's belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification. The issues debated by Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa concern mostly the nature and conditions of such epistemic justification, and its place in our understanding of human knowledge. Presents central issues pertaining to internalism vs. externalism and foundationalism vs. virtue epistemology in the form of a philosophical debate. Introduces students to fundamental questions within epistemology (...) while engaging in contemporary debates. Written by two of today’s foremost epistemologists. Includes an extensive bibliography. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Past and Future of Utopian StudiesLaurence Davis (bio)This critical forum on “The Past and Future of Utopian Studies” originated as a roundtable discussion at the conference, “Opening Utopia: New Directions in Utopian Studies,” held at the University of Brighton in July 2022. The title of the conference reflected a determination on the part of the program coordination team—Patricia McManus (University of Brighton), Laurence Davis (University College Cork), (...) Siân Adiseshiah (Loughborough University), Antonis Balasopoulos (University of Cyprus), Tom Moylan (University of Limerick), Michael G. Kelly (University of Limerick), Emrah Atasoy (Cappadocia University), and Ross Sparkes (University of Brighton)—to make the conference an inclusive and potentially radically transformative event, one that would challenge entrenched orthodoxies in the field of utopian studies and help scholars and activists chart new directions in utopian scholarship and practice.This transformative ethos was reflected in the collaboratively produced conference call for papers, which stipulated that the event was dedicated to an exploration of radical utopian thinking and revolutionary praxis. The conference, we emphasized, was intended to create a welcoming and broadly [End Page 478] inclusive space where participants could explore the role of utopian thinking, imagination, and practice in addressing some of the fundamental challenges of our times. Towards this end we appended to the call a section, entitled “USS and Utopia Beyond the University,” in which we noted that our aim was to design a program that would center work intended to blur or break the well-policed and expensive borders between the university and the communities within which universities sit. We proposed, and indeed later fulfilled the promise, to work with local activists in Brighton to establish some in-person and remote-access events that would highlight and explore radical hope as it is present in the politics of migrant solidarity, co-housing initiatives, and anarchist and queer groups and spaces. We also explicitly invited contributions from those working outside the formal limits of academia or who were inside academic spaces pushing out. The enthusiastic response to the call for papers exceeded all expectations, and the resulting conference program was exceptionally varied and promising and indeed suggestive of many possible new directions in utopian studies. What follows in this special section of Utopian Studies is a product of one very lively five-person conference panel that I co-organized with Antonis Balasopoulos (University of Cyprus).The chief impetus for the transformation from conference panel to special journal section was an email invitation from the then-editor of Utopian Studies, who had attended the session and who subsequently invited us to revise and elaborate the talks for publication in the journal. Interestingly, the journal editor suggested that the contributions might provide answers to two questions: first, “where do you see the value of utopian studies in our dark times?” and second, “how can utopia and utopianism inspire activism and political changes?”In response, and speaking in my capacity as the panel chair and prospective editor of the special section, I noted that while it would be fascinating to see the contributors address questions of the value of utopian studies in our dark times, and specifically how utopia and utopianism might inspire activism and political change, such a remit would not get to the heart of what was distinctive about either our panel or the Brighton conference as a whole. The Brighton conference was dedicated specifically to an exploration of radical utopian thinking and revolutionary practice. And its title, “Opening Utopia: New Directions in Utopian Studies” suggested that utopia can be a catalyst for transformative change only if the study of utopia(s) is itself open, or “opened,” to radical influences. In our panel we explored both the past and some possible futures of utopian studies and considered “new [End Page 479] directions” that might facilitate more radical utopian thinking and revolutionary practice. While all of the contributors celebrated utopia’s transformative potential, they also criticized aspects of the field of utopian studies that arguably have limited that transformative potential, including its “blind spots” in relation to the “organizational imaginary” (Balasopoulos), its own privileged “whiteness” and colonial prerogatives (Edwards), its Anglo-American focus and tendency to overlook significant social movements outside... (shrink)

Introduction -- Part I: The classical problems of epistemology -- Descartes's epistemology -- The concept of knowledge -- The problem of induction -- A priori justification and knowledge -- Immediate experience -- Knowledge of the external world -- Some further epistemological issues : other minds, testimony, and memory -- Part II: Contemporary responses to the cartesian epistemological program -- Introduction to part II -- Foundationalism and coherentism -- Internalism and externalism -- Quine and naturalized epistemology -- Knowledge and skepticism.

In this paper I present a novel account of achievement and I argue that, all other things being equal, the presence of this particular type of achievement in a person’s life makes that life more meaningful. In arguing for this conclusion, I explore the connections between m-achievements and a person’s self-conception and especially the idea that m-achievements provide a reason for the revision of one’s self-conception.