We argue for teleology as a description of the way in which we ordinarily understand others’ intentional actions. Teleology starts from the close resemblance between the reasoning involved in understanding others’ actions and one’s own practical reasoning involved in deciding what to do. We carve out teleology’s distinctive features more sharply by comparing it to its three main competitors: theory theory, simulation theory, and rationality theory. The plausibility of teleology as our way of understanding others is underlined by developmental data (...) in its favour. (shrink)

Written by a select international group of leading privacy scholars, Social Dimensions of Privacy endorses and develops an innovative approach to privacy. By debating topical privacy cases in their specific research areas, the contributors explore the new privacy-sensitive areas: legal scholars and political theorists discuss the European and American approaches to privacy regulation; sociologists explore new forms of surveillance and privacy on social network sites; and philosophers revisit feminist critiques of privacy, discuss markets in personal data, issues of privacy in (...) health care and democratic politics. The broad interdisciplinary character of the volume will be of interest to readers from a variety of scientific disciplines who are concerned with privacy and data protection issues. (shrink)

Privacy and surveillance scholars increasingly worry that data collectors can use the information they gather about our behaviors, preferences, interests, incomes, and so on to manipulate us. Yet what it means, exactly, to manipulate someone, and how we might systematically distinguish cases of manipulation from other forms of influence—such as persuasion and coercion—has not been thoroughly enough explored in light of the unprecedented capacities that information technologies and digital media enable. In this paper, we develop a definition of manipulation that (...) addresses these enhanced capacities, investigate how information technologies facilitate manipulative practices, and describe the harms—to individuals and to social institutions—that flow from such practices. -/- We use the term “online manipulation” to highlight the particular class of manipulative practices enabled by a broad range of information technologies. We argue that at its core, manipulation is hidden influence—the covert subversion of another person’s decision-making power. We argue that information technology, for a number of reasons, makes engaging in manipulative practices significantly easier, and it makes the effects of such practices potentially more deeply debilitating. And we argue that by subverting another person’s decision-making power, manipulation undermines his or her autonomy. Given that respect for individual autonomy is a bedrock principle of liberal democracy, the threat of online manipulation is a cause for grave concern. (shrink)

Since 2016, when the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal began to emerge, public concern has grown around the threat of “online manipulation”. While these worries are familiar to privacy researchers, this paper aims to make them more salient to policymakers — first, by defining “online manipulation”, thus enabling identification of manipulative practices; and second, by drawing attention to the specific harms online manipulation threatens. We argue that online manipulation is the use of information technology to covertly influence another person’s decision-making, by targeting (...) and exploiting their decision-making vulnerabilities. Engaging in such practices can harm individuals by diminishing their economic interests, but its deeper, more insidious harm is its challenge to individual autonomy. We explore this autonomy harm, emphasising its implications for both individuals and society, and we briefly outline some strategies for combating online manipulation and strengthening autonomy in an increasingly digital world. (shrink)

This new book by Beate Rossler is a work of real quality and originality on an extremely topical issue: the issue of privacy and the relations between the private and the public. Rossler investigates the reasons why we value privacy and why we ought to value it. In the context of modern, liberal societies, Rossler develops a theory of the private which links privacy and autonomy in a constitutive way: privacy is a necessary condition to lead an autonomous life. (...) The book develops a theory of freedom and autonomy which sees the ability to pose the "practical question" of how one wants to live, of what a person strives to be, at the centre of the modern idea of autonomy. The question of privacy is emerging as an increasingly important topic in social and political theory and is central to many current debates in law, the media and politics. The Value of Privacy will be widely recognised to be a classic contribution to the subject. (shrink)

This new book by Beate Rossler is a work of real quality and originality on an extremely topical issue: the issue of privacy and the relations between the private and the public. Rossler investigates the reasons why we value privacy and why we ought to value it. In the context of modern, liberal societies, Rossler develops a theory of the private which links privacy and autonomy in a constitutive way: privacy is a necessary condition to lead an autonomous life. (...) The book develops a theory of freedom and autonomy which sees the ability to pose the "practical question" of how one wants to live, of what a person strives to be, at the centre of the modern idea of autonomy. The question of privacy is emerging as an increasingly important topic in social and political theory and is central to many current debates in law, the media and politics. The Value of Privacy will be widely recognised to be a classic contribution to the subject. (shrink)

This article joins in and extends the contemporary debate on the right to privacy. We bring together two strands of the contemporary discourse on privacy. While we endorse the prevailing claim that norms of informational privacy protect the autonomy of individual subjects, we supplement it with an argument demonstrating that privacy is an integral element of the dynamics of all social relationships. This latter claim is developed in terms of the social role theory and substantiated by an analysis of the (...) role of privacy in intimate relationships, in professional relationships and in social interactions between strangers in public. We conclude by arguing that it is not always reasonable to assume a conflict between individual privacy on the one hand and society on the other. Legislators and participants in public debate also have to take into account the consequences of limiting privacy on social interaction and the integration of the society. (shrink)

Talking about privacy in the public prima facie seems to be a contradiction: why should privacy have to play a role within the public sphere? What could possibly be private in the public? However, quite a number of theories of privacy conceptualize privacy as a protective shield which we carry with us wherever we are: respect for privacy in public then means, for instance, not listening in on private conversations between friends on the street or in a cafe. The most (...) important form of privacy in public, however, which has gained a lot of attention during the last decade or so, is privacy as anonymity: the form of privacy in the public sphere, online as well as offline, which means invisibility, nontraceability, not being identifiable as an individual person. Theories of privacy differ as to the possibility as well as to the desirabilty of anonymity in public contexts, online as well as offline. In my paper, I investigate the complicated relations between privacy, anonymity, and the public sphere. I will, firstly, clarify the conceptual relation between privacy and anonymity, drawing on theories which define privacy in terms of conditions enabling individual freedom and autonomy. I will also review some normatively relevant differences between the online and the offline world. In the second part, I will discuss possible normative conflicts between a moral or legal right to privacy and anonymity, and considerations of security, accountability, or moral responsibility. One of the important questions will concern the ethical consequences of the technical possibilities of identification and de-anonymization in the online world. (shrink)

In this article I argue that it does not make sense – either empirically or normatively – to speak of ‘authentic’ cultures. All we need when talking about cultures is a relatively weak concept that still carries enough normative weight to function as the meaningful background of a person’s identity, autonomy and good life. Discussing the authentic culture, I refer to the debates around the German Leitkultur as well as the Dutch populist movement as examples. However, I am interested not (...) only in the concept of the authenticity of a culture but also in the concept of the authenticity of persons: if an ‘authentic culture’ is not feasible, does this have repercussions on the concept of the autonomy and authenticity of persons? In suggesting that this might be the case, I argue that persons can be autonomous without always being fully authentic. (shrink)

Cross-sector development partnerships are project-based collaborative arrangements between business, government, and civil society organizations in support of international development goals such as sustainability, health education, and economic development. Focusing on public private partnerships in development cooperation, we examine different constellations of bridging agents and their effects in the formation of single CSDP projects and longer-term alliances. We conceptualize bridging agency as a collective process involving both internal partner representatives and external intermediaries in initiating and/or supporting roles. We find that the (...) involvement of external intermediaries eases the formation of single projects and longer-term alliances. However, when projects are initiated by external intermediaries they tend to be repetitive and narrow in scope, whereas projects initiated by internal partner representatives often explore novel agendas and embody a greater potential for social innovation. Yet, the longer-term pursuit of these agendas beyond single projects may require external intermediaries in supporting roles. Findings help better understand micro-processes and collective practices of brokerage and alliance formation in transnational governance contexts and beyond. (shrink)

The disagreement between defenders and opponents of extended cognition is often framed in terms of constitution. The underlying principle of this discussion is what I will call the co-location principle: cognition is located where its constituents are located. The crucial question is under which conditions something is to be counted as a constituent of cognition. I will formulate three criteria of adequacy that an account of constitution must satisfy to be applicable to the dispute on extended cognition. I will evaluate (...) different accounts of constitution as to whether they satisfy the criteria of adequacy. Three different accounts of constitution can be identified in the literature on extended cognition, which I will call property-based constitution, diachronic constitution, and mechanistic constitution. I will show that none of the accounts satisfies all three criteria. Thus, the search for the mark of constitution does not seem to be a promising strategy for defending extended cognition. I will briefly sketch a new strategy of how to deal with this situation. (shrink)

Constitutive mechanistic explanations are said to refer to mechanisms that constitute the phenomenon-to-be-explained. The most prominent approach of how to understand this constitution relation is Carl Craver’s mutual manipulability approach to constitutive relevance. Recently, the mutual manipulability approach has come under attack (Leuridan 2012; Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Romero 2015; Harinen 2014; Casini and Baumgartner 2016). Roughly, it is argued that this approach is inconsistent because it is spelled out in terms of interventionism (which is an approach to causation), whereas (...) constitutive relevance is said to be a non-causal relation. In this paper, I will discuss a strategy of how to resolve this inconsistency, so-called fat-handedness approaches (Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Casini and Baumgartner 2016; Romero 2015). I will argue that these approaches are problematic. I will present a novel suggestion of how to consistently define constitutive relevance in terms of interventionism. My approach is based on a causal interpretation of mutual manipulability, where manipulability is interpreted as a causal relation between the mechanism’s components and temporal parts of the phenomenon. (shrink)

his monograph examines the metaphysical commitments of the new mechanistic philosophy, a way of thinking that has returned to center stage. It challenges a variant of reductionism with regard to higher-level phenomena, which has crystallized as a default position among these so-called New Mechanists. Furthermore, it opposes those philosophers who reject the possibility of interlevel causation. Contemporary philosophers believe that the explanation of scientific phenomena requires the discovery of relevant mechanisms. As a result, new mechanists are, in the main, concerned (...) solely with epistemological questions. But, the author argues, their most central claims rely on metaphysical assumptions. Thus, they must also take into account metaphysics, a system of thought concerned with explaining the fundamental nature of being and the world around it. This branch of philosophy does indeed matter to the empirical sciences. The chapters investigate the nature of mechanisms, their components, and the ways in which they can bring about different phenomena. In addition, the author develops a novel account of causation in terms of activities. The analysis provides the basis for many further research projects on mechanisms and their relations to, for example, the mind-body problem, realization, multiple realization, natural kinds, causation, laws of nature, counterfactuals, and scientific levels. (shrink)

The processing, representation, and perception of bodily signals (interoception) plays an important role for human behavior. Theories of embodied cognition hold that higher cognitive processes operate on perceptual symbols and that concept use involves reactivations of the sensory-motor states that occur during experience with the world. Similarly, activation of interoceptive representations and meta-representations of bodily signals supporting interoceptive awareness are profoundly associated with emotional experience and cognitive functions. This article gives an overview over present findings and models on interoception and (...) mechanisms of embodiment and highlights its relevance for disorders that are suggested to represent a translation deficit of bodily states into subjective feelings and self-awareness. (shrink)

Recent findings in different areas of psychology and cognitive science have brought the unconscious mind back to center stage. However, the unconscious mind worry remains: What renders unconscious phenomena mental? I suggest a new strategy for answering this question, which rests on the idea that categorizing unconscious phenomena as “mental” should be scientifically useful relative to the explanatory research goals. I argue that this is the case if by categorizing an unconscious phenomenon as “mental” one picks out explanatorily relevant similarities (...) to a corresponding paradigmatically mental conscious phenomenon. Explanatory relevance is spelled out in terms of mechanistic norms. (shrink)

The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency--the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources while others (...) focus on recent developments; some rely on the tools of analytic philosophy while others cite the latest empirical research on human action. All agree, however, on the centrality of the CTA in the philosophy of action. The contributors first consider metaphysical issues, then reasons-explanations of action, and, finally, new directions for thinking about the CTA. They discuss such topics as the tenability of some alternatives to the CTA; basic causal deviance; the etiology of action; teleologism and anticausalism; and the compatibility of the CTA with theories of embodied cognition. Two contributors engage in an exchange of views on intentional omissions that stretches over four essays, directly responding to each other in their follow-up essays. As the action-oriented perspective becomes more influential in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, this volume offers a long-needed debate over foundational issues. Contributors: Fred Adams, Jesus H. Aguilar, John Bishop, Andrei A. Buckareff, Randolph Clarke, Jennifer Hornsby, Alicia Juarrero, Alfred R. Mele, Michael S. Moore, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Josef Perner, Johannes Roessler, David-Hillel Ruben, Carolina Sartorio, Michael Smith, Rowland Stout. (shrink)

Many authors have turned their attention to the notion of constitution to determine whether the hypothesis of extended cognition (EC) is true. One common strategy is to make sense of constitution in terms of the new mechanists’ mutual manipulability account (MM). In this paper I will show that MM is insufficient. The Challenge of Trivial Extendedness arises due to the fact that mechanisms for cognitive behaviors are extended in a way that should not count as verifying EC. This challenge can (...) be met by adding a necessary condition: cognitive constituents satisfy MM and they are what I call behavior unspecific. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDas Verhältnis zwischen Ethikkonsultation und der bspw. in psychiatrischen Arbeitsfeldern und im Palliativbereich etablierten psychologischen Supervision ist bisher wenig untersucht. Dieser Vergleich und die Abgrenzung von Ethikkonsultation stellen eine Forschungslücke dar. Anhand von zwei Fallvignetten aus der Praxis von EK und PS werden unter Kontrastierung mit dem jeweils anderen Ansatz Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten im methodischen und praktischen Vorgehen sowie Kriterien der Unterscheidung analysiert. Als Ergebnis wird eine systematische Gegenüberstellung präsentiert, die folgende Merkmale umfasst: 1. Ziele jedes Ansatzes, 2. Einberufung, 3. (...) Gegenstand, 4. Fokus, 5. Methode/Prozess, 6. Rolle des Beraters, 7. Ergebnisse, 8. Dokumentation, 9. Bearbeiten von Emotionen, 10. Bearbeiten ethischer Fragestellungen. Trotz Überschneidungen der beiden Arbeitsformen erscheinen EK und PS nicht wechselseitig austauschbar; eine Vermischung wird nicht empfohlen. Als Fazit werden Hinweise zur Indikationsstellung von EK oder PS gegeben; dabei spielen auch die Motivation der Teilnehmenden und die zeitnahe Verfügbarkeit der Beratungsangebote eine Rolle. (shrink)

English summary: Beate Bengard deals with the ecumenical hermeneutics of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. His theory is of interest for ecumenical theology particularly in the area of ecumenical reception. The specificity of ecumenical reception is that it requires the acceptation of otherness - of the alterity - of the ecumenical partner. Obviously, this process goes far beyond the ratification of ecumenical documents. In order to clarify the process of reception, a hermeneutical model is needed which explains the interrelation (...) of the interpersonal recognition of otherness, the reception of texts, as well as of changing collective identities. A complex model of the reception process is deduced from the theory of Paul Ricoeur and Ricoeur's model is compared with three concrete ecumenical processes in France. This shows there is a high degree of accordance between these ecumenical examples and Ricoeur's hermeneutical process. The conclusion points to ways in which this contributes to building an ecumenical culture inspired by Ricoeur's philosophy. German description: Beate Bengard stellt erstmals der Beitrag des franzosischen Philosophen Paul Ricoeur zum okumenischen Dialog detailliert vor. Die Studie, die im Rahmen eines deutsch-franzosischen Promotionsprojekts entstanden ist, beruht auf teilweise bisher unveroffentlichten Zeugnissen. Fur die okumenische Theologie ist Ricoeurs Beitrag primar fur die Frage der 'okumenischen Rezeption' interessant. Die Besonderheit der okumenischen Rezeption gegenuber anderen Rezeptionsprozessen besteht darin, dass sie die Annahme des Anderen, d.h. die Rezeption der Alteritat des okumenischen Partners verlangt. Was das im Einzelnen bedeutet, kann nicht durch eine Rezeptionsforschung geklart werden, die sich nur auf die Ratifikation von okumenischen Dokumenten konzentriert. Zu seiner Klarung braucht es vielmehr ein hermeneutisches Modell, das den Zusammenhang von interpersonaler Anerkennung, Textrezeption und dem Wandel kollektiver Identitaten erklart. Eine solche komplexere Rezeptionstheorie rekonstruiert Bengard aus der Fulle von Ricoeurs philosophischem Werk und uberpruft dieses anschliessend auf ihre Plausibilitat hin. Dazu untersucht Bengard drei sehr unterschiedliche okumenische Rezeptionssituationen aus Frankreich: die Rezeption der Leuenberger Konkordie in den evangelischen Kirchen, die unabhangig fur den katholisch-evangelischen Dialog arbeitende Groupe des Dombes und die Communaute de Taize. Abschliessend gibt sie Anregungen fur eine Okumenekultur, die Inspiration aus dem Werk von Paul Ricoeur bezieht. (shrink)

One assumption of the new mechanistic approach is that there are two kinds of mechanistic explanations: etiological and constitutive ones. While the former explain phenomena in terms of their preceding causes, the latter are supposed to refer to mechanisms that constitute phenomena. Based on arguments by Kaiser and Krickel (Br J Philos Sci 68(3):745–779, 2017) and Krickel (The mechanical world, vol. 13, Springer International Publishing, 2018), I will show that this view is too narrow. Indeed, three different types of explanation (...) are usually subsumed under the label “constitutive explanation”. However, one of those types of explanation is not a version of constitutive explanation. Rather it is a variant of etiological explanation. As a result, I will show that there are four types of mechanistic explanation, two variants of etiological explanation—which I will call output mechanistic explanations and input-output mechanistic explanations—and two variants of constitutive explanation—which I will call filler mechanistic explanations and dimensioned mechanistic explanations. Keeping these apart is crucial as they come with different ontological implications. An evaluation of the mechanistic approach regarding its stance on reduction, levels, and interlevel causation crucially depends on which notion of mechanistic explanation one has in mind. (shrink)

According to the new mechanistic approach, an acting entity is at a lower mechanistic level than another acting entity if and only if the former is a component in the mechanism for the latter. Craver and Bechtel :547–563, 2007. doi:10.1007/s10539-006-9028-8) argue that a consequence of this view is that there cannot be causal interactions between acting entities at different mechanistic levels. Their main reason seems to be what I will call the Metaphysical Argument: things at different levels of a mechanism (...) are related as part and whole; wholes and their parts cannot be related as cause and effect; hence, interlevel causation in mechanisms is impossible. I will analyze this argument in more detail and show under which conditions it is valid. This analysis will reveal that interlevel causation in mechanisms is indeed possible, if we take seriously the idea that the relata of the mechanistic level relation are acting entities and accept a slightly modified notion of a mechanistic level that is highly plausible in the light of the first clarification. (shrink)

There is a striking correspondence -which reveals, at the same time, its important differences- between Edith Stein and Simone Weil, not only in their life circumstances but also in their intellectual preoccupation with the subject of the human being, liberty, and their relationship with the Absolute.

In this short commentary, I will first show why Kiverstein & Kirchhoff's (this volume) analysis of the CC-fallacy is inadequate in an important way and show why their strategy for avoiding the CC-fallacy based on diachronic constitution is problematic. Second, I will reply to their criticism of the mechanistic account of constitution.

The paper focuses on processes of normalization through which dis/ability is simultaneously produced in specific collectives, networks, and socio-technological systems that enable the construction of such demarcations. Our point of departure is the cochlear implant, a neuroprosthetic device intended to replace and/or augment the function of the damaged inner ear. Unlike hearing aids, which amplify sounds, the CI does the work of damaged hair cells in the inner ear by providing sound signals to the brain. We examine the processes of (...) the CI’s genesis as well as its specific uses by and interrelations to the different and divergent actors that the CI assembles. We argue that the technological device and the implicated normalization process mobilize complex effects in varying socio-technical arrangements. The CI is conceived as a “boundary object” [89] or a “quasi-object” [49, 83], i.e., a metastabilized medium of translation that coordinates social, cultural, and technological action. Although intended to transform non-hearing or hard of hearing people into competent and “normal” hearing subjects, the CI system reproduces the asymmetrical structures of the disability discourse [14] through its function of “developing and maintaining coherence between intersecting social worlds” [89, 393]. Additionally, it initiates controversial discourses that have resulted in new forms of biosocial collectivities ranging from cochlear implantees with normal human hearing to human configurations who have passed through human enhancement. Our approach is thus situated at the intersection of disability and media studies and tackles the particular conditions technological media configurations impose upon the production of dis/ability. (shrink)

In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sciences and consciousness.

Metaphor theory has shifted from asking whether metaphor is 'conceptual' or 'linguistic' to debating whether it is 'embodied' or 'discursive'. Although recent work in the social and cognitive sciences has yielded clear opportunities to resolve that dispute, the divide between discourse- and cognition-oriented approaches has remained. To unite the field, this book brings together leading metaphor researchers from a number of disciplines. It collects major arguments and presents a wide variety of empirical evidence, placing special emphasis on the embodiment and (...) socio-cultural embeddedness of cognition, as well as the multi-modal and social-interactive nature of communication. It shows that metaphor theory can only profit from an approach that takes multiple perspectives into consideration and tries to account for findings yielded by multiple methodologies. By doing so, it works towards a dynamic, multi-dimensional, socio-cognitive model of metaphor that goes beyond what research traditions have separately achieved. (shrink)

Many philosophers as well as psychologists hold that implicit biases are due to unconscious attitudes. The justification for this unconscious-claim seems to be an inference to the best explanation of the mismatch between explicit and implicit attitudes, which is characteristic for implicit biases. The unconscious-claim has recently come under attack based on its inconsistency with empirical data. Instead, Gawronski et al. (2006) analyze implicit biases based on the so-called Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model, according to which implicit attitudes are phenomenally conscious (...) and accessible. The mismatch between the explicit and the implicit attitude is explained by the Cognitive Inconsistency Approach (CIA) (as I will call it): implicit attitudes are conscious but rejected as basis for explicit judgments because the latter lead to cognitive inconsistency with respect to other beliefs held by the subject. In this paper, I will argue that the CIA is problematic since it cannot account for the fact that implicit attitudes underlying implicit biases typically are unconscious. I will argue that a better explanation of the attitude-mismatch can be given in terms of a Neo-Freudian account of repression. I will develop such an account, and I will show how it can accommodate the merits of the APE model while avoiding the problems of the CIA. (shrink)

BackgroundCurrently, we are facing a demographic shift to an older population and its consequences worldwide: in the years to come, several older people will need nursing home care. The work culture is important for care quality in NHs. Some Norwegian municipalities have implemented the Joy of Life Nursing Home strategy, representing a resource-oriented health-promoting approach. Knowledge about how implementation of the JoLNH approach impacts the work culture is scarce.AimssWe hypothesized that the JoLNH strategy impacts positively on the work culture: when (...) comparing measurements at two time points and when comparing two municipalities, among which one has implemented the JoLNH and the other has not.MethodWith a 1-year interval, healthcare personnel in 43 NHs located in two large Norwegian municipalities responded to a survey in two waves. In total, 558 healthcare personnel participated at T1 and 515 at T2. Work culture was assessed by the Systematizing Person–Group Relations Instrument.FindingsThe municipality implementing the JOLNH strategy experienced significant increases in SPGR dimensions, representing positive orientations towards a better work culture, whereas those working in the non-JoLNH municipality reported an increase in SPGR dimensions, signifying a worsened work culture.DiscussionThe data indicate that the implemented JoLNH strategy has endorsed positive effects in the work culture. The JoLNH strategy emphasizes on the quality of patient care, which is what healthcare personnel, in general, are much concerned about. Furthermore, attention to task orientation and independent work seem to encourage a better work culture in NHs.ConclusionThis study suggests that the JoLNH strategy impacts positively on the work culture in Norwegian NHs. (shrink)

Immer mehr Menschen verbringen ihren Lebensabend in Einrichtungen der Altenpflege. Zusätzlich zur Sorge um physische, psychische und soziale Belange gilt es, deren spirituelle Bedürfnisse zu berücksichtigen. Ziel dieser Arbeit war es, die spirituellen Bedürfnisse von alten Menschen in Langzeitpflegeeinrichtungen zu erfassen. Gleichzeitig wurde untersucht, welche spirituellen Bedürfnisse Pflegende bei den ihnen anvertrauten Bewohner/-innen wahrnehmen. Dabei wurden Übereinstimmungen bzw. Unterschiede identifiziert. Daten aus 28 Einzelinterviews mit Bewohnerinnen und Bewohnern und 9 Fokusgruppeninterviews mit Mitarbeitenden wurden mittels Qualitativer Inhaltsanalyse ausgewertet und unter die (...) Kernkategorien „Sinn“, „Verbundenheit“, „Transzendenz“ kategorisiert. Die Kategorien beider Befragtengruppen wurden einem Vergleich unterzogen. Trotz zahlreicher Übereinstimmungen in den Aussagen beider Gruppen bleiben Defizite in der Wahrnehmung von Pflegenden. Aus den Ergebnissen der Arbeit werden Schlussfolgerungen für die Einbeziehung der spirituellen Dimension der alten Menschen in die pflegerische Arbeit im Seniorenheim gezogen und Empfehlungen ausgesprochen. (shrink)

Complex-transitive argument structures have received a large amount of attention from syntacticians of both formalist and cognitive-functional orientations. To account for expressions with causative resultative meanings, construction grammar has postulated a family of argument-structure constructions whose core is constituted by the Caused-Motion Construction and the Resultative Construction, exhibiting a locative complement and a predicative complement in the form of an AjP, respectively. Argument structures with NP complements, however, have been largely neglected. The present study investigates these patterns in the International (...) Corpus of English (ICE-GB) by means “collostruction analysis”. It shows that the formal distinction between AjP and NP complements corresponds to a constructional distinction hitherto unrevealed, viz. that between the Resultative Construction and another argument-structure construction, here called the “Denominative Construction”. Apart from improving existing descriptions of the network of complex-transitive argument-structure constructions, this study demonstrates that collostruction analysis can be employed in an exploratory way to discover constructions. (shrink)

The present debate on constitutional rights aims to protect the individual against the intrusive power of the state. Analysing the precarious relationship between art and money, the authors argue that constitutional rights need to be extended into the regimes of private governance. This requires four fundamental changes. (1) Constitutional rights can no longer be limited to the protection of individual actors. Instead, they need to be extended to guarantees of freedom of discourses. (2) The new experience of the twentieth century (...) is that totalizing tendencies have their origin not only in politics, but also in other fields of action, especially in technology, science, and the economy. Thus, a discursive concept of constitutional rights should be directed against any social system with totalizing tendencies. (3) Instead of concentrating on centres of economic and social power, constitutional rights in the private sphere should focus on the specific communicative medium of the expansionist social system involved. (4) This excludes the direct analogy of a ‘right’ as a quasispatial exclusion zone. More significant guarantees of discursive autonomy could be found in a ‘proceduralization’ of constitutional rights. (shrink)

This paper introduces the special issue 'The point of view of shared agency', a collection of papers that develops, and critically assesses, a striking development in recent philosophy of mind, epistemology, and developmental psychology, that is, the fundamental reappraisal of the time-honoured distinction between a ‘first-person' and a ‘third-person perspective' on our mental lives. In recent years, the nature of the ‘second-person standpoint' has become a major focus of work across a range of disciplines. More recently, the idea of ‘first-person (...) plural knowledge', has received some attention, for example in considering knowledge of what ‘we are doing’ when we are doing things together. This collection explores collective agency, self-knowledge, and knowledge of other minds, from this plural and relational point of view. (shrink)

By analysing the cumulated usage of the Greek loan word daedalus in De rerum natura it can be shown that the mythological artist Daedalus functions as a poetological model for the didactic narrator. The narrator presents himself as a poet-Daedalus. As with Daedalus’ statues who were said to see and walk around like human beings, De rerum natura adds to the poetic mimesis a formal one such as to stand as a model for the nature it describes. Likewise, as Daedalus’ (...) most characteristic feature in classical literature is his astuteness the muse of poetry in De rerum natura is called callida. The craftsman’s work finally is reflected in the ordering of elements, i.e. in word order. The Epicurean position is furthermore elucidated by comparison with the Platonic view on Daedalus. (shrink)