The human relationship to trees is arguably as complex as human experience itself. We cohabitate intimately with them as they regulate the systems that sustain us. We use them instrumentally to tra...

T. J. Kasperbauer presents an analysis of the ethics of de-extinction that is fairly distinctive in its focus on the welfare of individual animals. But while he is right to express concerns about individual animal well-being, individualism may not be the most important lens through which to view this issue. If one examines more closely what is at issue in de-extinction technologies in relation to species, additional problems appear that cast doubt both on the legitimacy of de-extinction projects, and on (...) the limited defense of them that Kasperbauer offers. (shrink)

“De-extinction” projects propose to re-create or “resurrect” extinct species. Perhaps the most common justification offered for these projects is that humans have an obligation to make restitution to species we have eradicated. There are three versions of this argument for de-extinction—one individualistic, one concerned with species, and one that emphasizes ecological restoration—and all three fail to provide a compelling case for species revival. A general critique of de-extinction can be sketched that highlights how it can both facilitate inattentiveness to biological (...) and ecological boundaries and foster a managerial mentality toward the natural world. (shrink)

"Applies Emmanuel Levinas's thought in approaching environmental philosophy from both humanistic and nonanthropocentric points of view, arguing that themes at the heart of his work--the significance of the ethical, responsibility, alterity, the vulnerability of the body, bearing witness, and politics--are important for thinking about many of our most pressing contemporary environmental questions" --Provided by publisher.

: This essay examines the content and significance of the notion of "identification" as it appears in the works of theorists of deep ecology. It starts with the most frequently expressed conception of identification—termed "identification-as-belonging"—and distinguishes several different variants of it. After reviewing two criticisms of deep ecology that appear to target this notion, it is argued that there is a second, less frequently noticed type of identification that appears primarily in the work of Arne Naess—"identification-as-kinship." Following this analysis, it (...) is suggested that identification-as-kinship may be less vulnerable to the criticisms that are aimed at identification-as-belonging. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 7.1 (2002) 24-38 [Access article in PDF] Arne Naess, Val Plumwood, and Deep Ecological SubjectivityA Contribution to the "Deep Ecology-ecofeminism Debate" Christian Diehm Karen Warren's recent essay, "Ecofeminist Philosophy and Deep Ecology," begins by noting that the philosophical positions found under the heading "deep ecology" are anything but monolithic. This point, which has been overlooked by deep ecologists as often as by others, (...) is crucial for those who are interested in the "deep ecology-ecofeminism debate," for just as one must specify which of the ecofeminisms are in question, so too one must be clear about which of the deep ecologies is being debated, if one is to make one's way through the complex relationships between them. In the course of her article, Warren recounts with approval Val Plumwood's "Nature, Self and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism," an essay which locates, discusses, and critiques three versions of the "self" that various deep ecologists offer. In light of Plumwood's comments, Warren argues that the work of Arne Naess differs significantly from other deep ecologists such that "Naess' deep ecology position is or could be compatible with ecofeminism" (Warren 1999, 255). [End Page 24]In this essay, I propose to continue the analysis offered by Warren by examining how Naess might respond individually to the objections Plumwood voices. This will be done by looking closely at Naess's articulation of what he refers to as the "ultimate premises" of his view, premises that are not necessarily aspects of deep ecology per se, but of his own ecophilosophy, "Ecosophy 'T'." 1 I will argue that even though Naess may not be subject to Plumwood's most immediate criticisms, her work exposes the problematic tendency of his philosophy of identification to stress sameness in relations with others. I will conclude by suggesting a critical revision of the notion of identification that would allow one to retain key features of Naess's view—most notably his gestaltist understanding of the "self" or "subject" and his emphasis on "Self-realization" as an ultimate norm—while responding to the problems that Plumwood's work exposes. The Self as Transpersonal One of the three senses of self specified by Plumwood is the "transpersonal" self. Her discussion of the transpersonal self focuses on the work of Warwick Fox who, in his Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, describes three "varieties of identification": personal, ontological, and cosmological. 2 Fox favors the latter two because they are less local than personal identification, and this is due to the fact that they are not rooted in the immediate reality in which one moves, but rather within broader, more encompassing views, and thus are said to be "impartial" (Fox 1995, 256). As such, it is claimed that these trans-personal forms of identification escape the problem that accompanies personal identification, which is that, qua personal, it is necessarily biased in favor of those with whom one has personal contact, and thus seems to "have far more to do with the cause of possessiveness, greed, exploitation, war, and ecological destruction than with the solution to these seemingly intractable problems" (262). But this is not meant to imply an outright rejection of personal identification, and Fox cites as proof of this Naess's approval of the "felt nearness" of others as a principle for resolving conflicts. Fox's point is to show that trans-personal identification "proceeds from a sense of the cosmos... and works inward to each particular individual's sense of commonality with other entities" (258), but that within this framework personal identification remains important as "an inescapable aspect of living and... plays a fundamental role in human development" (266-7).Plumwood's critique of this view is that the privileging of the transpersonal [End Page 25] over the personal repeats a patriarchal gesture of the exclusion of a "corrupting and self-interested" particularity in favor of an impersonal and abstract universality (Plumwood 1991, 15). And, ultimately, such a position "cannot allow for the deep and highly... (shrink)

While much of Arne Naess’s ecosophy underscores the importance of understanding one’s ecological Self, his analyses of gestaltism are significant in that they center less on questions of the self than on questions of nature and what is other-than-human. Rather than the realization of a more expansive Self, gestalt ontology calls for a “gestalt shift” in our thinking about nature, one that allows for its intrinsic value to emerge clearly. Taking such a gestalt shift as a central task enables Naess (...) to avoid some common criticisms of his view. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 7.1 (2002) 24-38 [Access article in PDF] Arne Naess, Val Plumwood, and Deep Ecological SubjectivityA Contribution to the "Deep Ecology-ecofeminism Debate" Christian Diehm Karen Warren's recent essay, "Ecofeminist Philosophy and Deep Ecology," begins by noting that the philosophical positions found under the heading "deep ecology" are anything but monolithic. This point, which has been overlooked by deep ecologists as often as by others, (...) is crucial for those who are interested in the "deep ecology-ecofeminism debate," for just as one must specify which of the ecofeminisms are in question, so too one must be clear about which of the deep ecologies is being debated, if one is to make one's way through the complex relationships between them. In the course of her article, Warren recounts with approval Val Plumwood's "Nature, Self and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism," an essay which locates, discusses, and critiques three versions of the "self" that various deep ecologists offer. In light of Plumwood's comments, Warren argues that the work of Arne Naess differs significantly from other deep ecologists such that "Naess' deep ecology position is or could be compatible with ecofeminism" (Warren 1999, 255). [End Page 24]In this essay, I propose to continue the analysis offered by Warren by examining how Naess might respond individually to the objections Plumwood voices. This will be done by looking closely at Naess's articulation of what he refers to as the "ultimate premises" of his view, premises that are not necessarily aspects of deep ecology per se, but of his own ecophilosophy, "Ecosophy 'T'." 1 I will argue that even though Naess may not be subject to Plumwood's most immediate criticisms, her work exposes the problematic tendency of his philosophy of identification to stress sameness in relations with others. I will conclude by suggesting a critical revision of the notion of identification that would allow one to retain key features of Naess's view—most notably his gestaltist understanding of the "self" or "subject" and his emphasis on "Self-realization" as an ultimate norm—while responding to the problems that Plumwood's work exposes. The Self as Transpersonal One of the three senses of self specified by Plumwood is the "transpersonal" self. Her discussion of the transpersonal self focuses on the work of Warwick Fox who, in his Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, describes three "varieties of identification": personal, ontological, and cosmological. 2 Fox favors the latter two because they are less local than personal identification, and this is due to the fact that they are not rooted in the immediate reality in which one moves, but rather within broader, more encompassing views, and thus are said to be "impartial" (Fox 1995, 256). As such, it is claimed that these trans-personal forms of identification escape the problem that accompanies personal identification, which is that, qua personal, it is necessarily biased in favor of those with whom one has personal contact, and thus seems to "have far more to do with the cause of possessiveness, greed, exploitation, war, and ecological destruction than with the solution to these seemingly intractable problems" (262). But this is not meant to imply an outright rejection of personal identification, and Fox cites as proof of this Naess's approval of the "felt nearness" of others as a principle for resolving conflicts. Fox's point is to show that trans-personal identification "proceeds from a sense of the cosmos... and works inward to each particular individual's sense of commonality with other entities" (258), but that within this framework personal identification remains important as "an inescapable aspect of living and... plays a fundamental role in human development" (266-7).Plumwood's critique of this view is that the privileging of the transpersonal [End Page 25] over the personal repeats a patriarchal gesture of the exclusion of a "corrupting and self-interested" particularity in favor of an impersonal and abstract universality (Plumwood 1991, 15). And, ultimately, such a position "cannot allow for the deep and highly... (shrink)

Translation of Christian Diehm’s Natural Disasters.

The following interview was conducted by Christian Diehm in the home of Arne Naess near Oslo, Norway, in December of 2001. At eighty-nine years of age, Naess was preparing for the English-language release of his latest book, Life’s Philosophy. We are pleased to provide a transcript of a large part of the conversations that spanned two afternoon dialogues.

Abstract:This essay argues for the continuing import and relevance of deep ecological philosophy by reading it together with explorations of connection to nature in the social sciences. It begins by clarifying deep ecological concepts of "identification" with nature. It then argues that these conceptualizations align with notions of human-nature connectedness employed by social scientists, and that empirical research largely corroborates deep ecologists' claims about the practical significance of a sense of connection to the natural world. Finally, it reviews literature discussing (...) whether time outdoors, zoo visitation, and scientific study promote a sense of connection to nature, thus providing additional insight into the claims of deep ecologists, and offering practical guidance for conservationists and connectedness advocates. (shrink)

Although Stephen R. Kellert critiques both nonanthropocentric and narrowly anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics, and proposes instead a broadly anthropocentric position that relies on a distinctive version of the biophilia hypothesis, his portrayal of his position as anthropocentric exposes his work to some common criticisms of human-centered views. However, the version of the biophilia hypothesis that Kellert advocates actually supports a nonanthropocentric environmental ethic, and his example of a shift in public attitudes toward marine mammals can be used to demonstrate (...) how his position would benefit from affirming the noninstrumentalist attitudes that are implicit within it. (shrink)

Although Stephen R. Kellert critiques both nonanthropocentric and narrowly anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics, and proposes instead a broadly anthropocentric position that relies on a distinctive version of the biophilia hypothesis, his portrayal of his position as anthropocentric exposes his work to some common criticisms of human-centered views. However, the version of the biophilia hypothesis that Kellert advocates actually supports a nonanthropocentric environmental ethic, and his example of a shift in public attitudes toward marine mammals can be used to demonstrate (...) how his position would benefit from affirming the noninstrumentalist attitudes that are implicit within it. (shrink)

This book explores human-nature connectedness through deep ecological philosophy and conservation social science. Emphasizing ecologically-inclusive identities, it argues that connection to nature is more important than many environmental advocates realize and that deep ecology contributes much to the increasingly pressing conversations about it.

This essay explores connections between Charles Darwin’s thinking and the writings of theorists in the deep ecology movement. It begins by placing Darwin’s thought in the context of Western attempts to reject teleological descriptions of nature. It then shows that while some authors cite Darwin’s naturalistic view of human origins as a positive contribution to deep ecological thought, the fact that his work also helped eliminate teleological explanations of natural phenomena is problematic for non-anthropocentric environmental ethics. Because of this, the (...) argument is made that the significance of Darwin’s work for deep ecology theorists is not simply that it views humans as a part of nature, but that it asserts a basic continuity between humans and other living things. The essay concludes by suggesting that an outlook grounded in a Darwinian sense of continuity does not necessarily issue in a strictly bio-centric understanding of nature’s value. (shrink)

This essay is written as a companion to the interview “Here I Stand,” and it examines the place of phenomenology in the environmental thought of deep ecologist Arne Naess. Tracing a line through Naess’s somewhat sporadic references to phenomenology, and his comments in the interview, the article argues that Naess’s interest in phenomenology is tied to his attempts to develop an ontology, and tries to show how this project situates Naess in relation to several phenomenologists. The essay concludes with some (...) reflections on Naess’s general criticism of phenomenology, and claims that despite his reservations, he may still be quite close to the spirit of phenomenological thinking. (shrink)

This essay questions the place of other-than-human animals in Levinas’s thought. After detailing how animals and animality figure in Levinas’s work, it is claimed that his ethical exclusion of animals is due to a conception of animals as wholly accountable for in terms of species-being, wholly within “naturalhistory.” It is then suggested that Levinas’s position is ill-founded, and at odds with his claims about the importance of suffering and the vulnerable body in the encounter with the other. The essay concludes (...) by arguing that speaking of other-than-human animal “faces” is not necessarily an unduly anthropocentricextension of thinking-of-the-other. (shrink)

This essay examines the relationship between Marti Kheel’s ecofeminism, particularly as articulated in her recent book Nature Ethics, and holistic eco-philosophy. It begins by arguing that while Kheel’s view shares some common ground with holistic thinkers, her position is best understood as one that re-conceives the meaning of holism. Next, her comments on species preservation are discussed both to show her individualism, and to highlight a weakness in her approach to issues involving at-risk species. It is then suggested that one (...) could develop a more holistic answer to questions about species that is consonant with Kheel’s overall philosophical approach. (shrink)

This essay is written as a companion to the interview “Here I Stand,” and it examines the place of phenomenology in the environmental thought of deep ecologist Arne Naess. Tracing a line through Naess’s somewhat sporadic references to phenomenology, and his comments in the interview, the article argues that Naess’s interest in phenomenology is tied to his attempts to develop an ontology, and tries to show how this project situates Naess in relation to several phenomenologists. The essay concludes with some (...) reflections on Naess’s general criticism of phenomenology, and claims that despite his reservations, he may still be quite close to the spirit of phenomenological thinking. (shrink)

It has been claimed that Val Plumwood’s work is vulnerable to the same charge of “assimi­lationism” that she has leveled against moral extensionist viewpoints. It is argued that while one might regard Plumwood’s position as suspect because of its emphasis on human-nature continuity, associating claims of continuity with assimilationism could lead one to seek a mode of relating to nature as absolutely other, a move which is claimed to be problematic for several reasons. Because the extensionist error is not simply (...) that of acknowledging human-nature continuity, Plumwood’s position is not extensionist in any objectionable sense. This issue is connected up with the ongoing debate about “perspectival anthropocentrism” in environmental ethics; however, allowing for human epistemic locatedness does not force the conclusion that all environmental ethics is ultimately assimilationist. (shrink)

It has been claimed that Val Plumwood’s work is vulnerable to the same charge of “assimi­lationism” that she has leveled against moral extensionist viewpoints. It is argued that while one might regard Plumwood’s position as suspect because of its emphasis on human-nature continuity, associating claims of continuity with assimilationism could lead one to seek a mode of relating to nature as absolutely other, a move which is claimed to be problematic for several reasons. Because the extensionist error is not simply (...) that of acknowledging human-nature continuity, Plumwood’s position is not extensionist in any objectionable sense. This issue is connected up with the ongoing debate about “perspectival anthropocentrism” in environmental ethics; however, allowing for human epistemic locatedness does not force the conclusion that all environmental ethics is ultimately assimilationist. (shrink)

This essay examines how becoming familiar with trees in their specificity might impact how we position ourselves in the ongoing debate among environmental philosophers regarding anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics. It begins with an analysis of what the process of learning to identify trees entails, and a discussion of how this often involves the development of non-instrumentalist evaluative attitudes towards them, an axiological orientation at odds with the instrumental reductivism characteristic of anthropocentric views. It is then argued that (...) a basic concern we might have with anthropocentrism is that it does not admit what are perhaps the most significant values that emerge in relationship with other-than-human entities. (shrink)

Christian Diehm has argued against using a genetically modified American chestnut variety in forest restoration. He is concerned that a GM variety sets a bad precedent and is disrespectful toward nature. He is also concerned that not enough has been done to consult with Native American tribes. We give evidence that consultation with tribes, environmental organizations, and the public is valuable and necessary – and that there is support for the GM chestnut. Genetic modification that saves a species (...) from functional extinction shows respect to that species and its ecological relationships. Hopeful, wise, coordinated action is needed to save ecosystems. (shrink)

Kants Musikästhetik wird weithin unterschätzt. Dabei bietet sie die entscheidenden Ansätze zur Befreiung der Musik aus den Fängen der Nachahmungsästhetik, wie sie vor allem E.T.A.Hoffman kongenial umgesetzt hat.

Les disciplines historiques, littéraires et philosophiques font un emploi abondant des catégories historiographiques. Parmi celles-ci, les termes en ismes sont très fréquents pour référer à une doctrine, un courant artistique, une idéologie ou des événements spécifiques. On fait cependant remarquer que ces désignations posent de nombreux problèmes d’interprétation. En particulier, que l’origine exacte d’une catégorie est souvent méconnue et que sa signification est plus équivoque qu’on ne le croit habituellement. La formation d’un terme en isme s’explique souvent dans un contexte (...) polémique et sert à condamner ou critiquer plutôt qu’à comprendre une pensée, un mouvement ou des faits historiques. Les catégories d’athéisme, de classicisme ou de féminisme en sont de bons exemples. Le présent volume vise à contribuer à l’étude critique des catégories historiographiques et des notions en isme en s’attardant à l’époque moderne (XVI e XVIII e siècles). Il s’agit d’un moment clef de l’histoire européenne pendant laquelle nombre de ces notions apparaissent ou pour laquelle l’historiographie en a fait un emploi abondant. Les chapitres en examinent la valeur théorique par rapport à une origine ou des usages, et déterminent de quelles manières elles contribuent à l’interprétation de l’histoire, de la littérature ou de la philosophie, de la Renaissance jusqu’à la Révolution française. (shrink)

Der „Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur strukturellen Weiterentwicklung der Pflegeversicherung“ vom 17. 10. 2007 sieht Regelungen zur Einbeziehung von stationären Pflegeeinrichtungen in die ambulante ärztliche GKV-Versorgung vor. Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert und bewertet den Ansatz zur „heimärztlichen Versorgung“ unter rechtlichen Aspekten vor dem Hintergrund der Problematik der Psychopharmakaversorgung von Heimbewohnern und schon bestehender Möglichkeiten der Verzahnung der ambulanten ärztlichen und der stationären pflegerischen Versorgung. Das geplante Modell verfolgt das begrüßenswerte Ziel, die gelegentlich als unzureichend beschriebene ambulante ärztliche Betreuung von Pflegebedürftigen in (...) Pflegeheimen zu verbessern, Schnittstellenprobleme abzubauen und gleichzeitig der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung unnötige Transport- und Krankenhauskosten zu ersparen. Es ist jedoch nur ein rudimentäres Heimarztmodell, da es gerade keine flächendeckende Versorgung der Heimbewohner mit Heimärzten erreichen will. Auch fehlen Anreize für eine Optimierung der ärztlichen und der pflegerischen Zusammenarbeit. Insofern können die Probleme, die sich im Rahmen der Psychopharmakaversorgung von stationär zu pflegenden Heimbewohnern abzeichnen, nur punktuell durch diese Reform verbessert werden. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer „Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur strukturellen Weiterentwicklung der Pflegeversicherung“ vom 17. 10. 2007 sieht Regelungen zur Einbeziehung von stationären Pflegeeinrichtungen in die ambulante ärztliche GKV-Versorgung vor. Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert und bewertet den Ansatz zur „heimärztlichen Versorgung“ unter rechtlichen Aspekten vor dem Hintergrund der Problematik der Psychopharmakaversorgung von Heimbewohnern und schon bestehender Möglichkeiten der Verzahnung der ambulanten ärztlichen und der stationären pflegerischen Versorgung. Das geplante Modell verfolgt das begrüßenswerte Ziel, die gelegentlich als unzureichend beschriebene ambulante ärztliche Betreuung von Pflegebedürftigen in (...) Pflegeheimen zu verbessern, Schnittstellenprobleme abzubauen und gleichzeitig der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung unnötige Transport- und Krankenhauskosten zu ersparen. Es ist jedoch nur ein rudimentäres Heimarztmodell, da es gerade keine flächendeckende Versorgung der Heimbewohner mit Heimärzten erreichen will. Auch fehlen Anreize für eine Optimierung der ärztlichen und der pflegerischen Zusammenarbeit. Insofern können die Probleme, die sich im Rahmen der Psychopharmakaversorgung von stationär zu pflegenden Heimbewohnern abzeichnen, nur punktuell durch diese Reform verbessert werden. (shrink)

What kind of animals are human beings? And how do our visions of the human shape our theories of social action and institutions? In Moral, Believing Animals>, Christian Smith advances a creative theory of human persons and culture that offers innovative, challenging answers to these and other fundamental questions in sociological, cultural, and religious theory. Smith suggests that human beings have a peculiar set of capacities and proclivities that distinguishes them significantly from other animals on this planet. Despite the (...) vast differences in humanity between cultures and across history, no matter how differently people narrate their lives and histories, there remains an underlying structure of human personhood that helps to order human culture, history, and narration. Drawing on important recent insights in moral philosophy, epistemology, and narrative studies, Smith argues that humans are animals who have an inescapable moral and spiritual dimension. They cannot avoid a fundamental moral orientation in life and this, says Smith, has profound consequences for how sociology must study human beings. (shrink)

Suppose you perform two actions. The first imposes a risk of harm that, on its own, would be excessive; but the second reduces the risk of harm by a corresponding amount. By pairing the two actions together to form a set of actions that is risk-neutral, can you thereby make your overall course of conduct permissible? This question is theoretically interesting, because the answer is apparently: sometimes Yes, sometimes No. It is also practically important, because it bears on the moral (...) status of practices such as offsetting personal greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In this article we propose a criterion for distinguishing between cases where pairing risk-increasing and risk-reducing actions makes each action permissible, and those where it does not: the Principle of Aggregate Risk-Imposition. We work towards this by considering a range of examples that illustrate various illegitimate ways of pairing risk-increasing actions with risk-reducing ones, and asking what goes wrong in each case. We then use this criterion to evaluate GHG offsetting. Is offsetting a legitimate way of removing the risk-imposition associated with GHG emissions, or not? Controversially, we argue that this turns out to depend on the form that the offsetting takes. (shrink)

Contrary to a widespread belief, this book establishes that ontological and epistemological reductionism stand or fall together.

Some moral theorists argue that innocent beneficiaries of wrongdoing may have special remedial duties to address the hardships suffered by the victims of the wrongdoing. These arguments generally aim to simply motivate the idea that being a beneficiary can provide an independent ground for charging agents with remedial duties to the victims of wrongdoing. Consequently, they have neglected contexts in which it is implausible to charge beneficiaries with remedial duties to the victims of wrongdoing, thereby failing to explore the limits (...) of the benefiting relation in detail. Our aim in this article is to identify a criterion to distinguish contexts in which innocent beneficiaries plausibly bear remedial duties to the victims of wrongdoing from those in which they do not. We argue that innocent beneficiaries incur special duties to the victims of wrongdoing if and only if receiving and retaining the benefits sustains wrongful harm. We develop this criterion by identifying and explicating two general modes of sustaining wrongful harm. We also show that our criterion offers a general explanation for why some innocent beneficiaries incur a special duty to the victims of wrongdoing while others do not. By sustaining wrongful harm, beneficiaries-with-duties contribute to wrongful harm, and we ordinarily have relatively stringent moral requirements against contributing to wrongful harm. On our account, innocently benefiting from wrongdoing _per se_ does not generate duties to the victims of wrongdoing. Rather, beneficiaries acquire such duties because their receipt and retention of the benefits of wrongdoing contribute to the persistence of the wrongful harm suffered by the victim. We conclude by showing that our proposed criterion also illuminates why there can be reasonable disagreement about whether beneficiaries have a duty to victims in some social contexts. (shrink)

Christian Georg Martin offers an argumentative reconstruction of the whole work, reading it as a critical ontology, namely as the attempt to abstract from all presuppositions and to immanently unfold conceptual determinations characterizing ...

This book examines the epistemic function of perception and the relation between language and conceptual thought, and provides new ways of conceptualizing the Buddhist defense of the reflexivity thesis of consciousness: namely, that each cognitive event is to be understood as involving a pre-reflective implicit awareness of its own occurrence.

Some moral theorists argue that being an innocent beneficiary of significant harms inflicted by others may be sufficient to ground special duties to address the hardships suffered by the victims, at least when it is impossible to extract compensation from those who perpetrated the harm. This idea has been applied to climate change in the form of the beneficiary-pays principle. Other philosophers, however, are quite sceptical about beneficiary pays. Our aim in this article is to examine their critiques. We conclude (...) that, while they have made important points, the principle remains worthy of further development and exploration. Our purpose in engaging with these critiques is constructive — we aim to formulate beneficiary pays in ways that would give it a plausible role in allocating the cost of addressing human-induced climate change, while acknowledging that some understandings of the principle would make it unsuitable for this purpose. (shrink)

Abstract:Organizational justice is a behavioral science concept that refers to the perception of fairness of the past treatment of the employees within an organization held by the employees of that organization. These subjective perceptions of fairness have been empirically shown to be related to 1) attitudinal changes in job satisfaction, organizational commitment and managerial trust beliefs; 2) behavioral changes in task performance activities and ancillary extra-task efforts to assist group members and improve group methods; 3) numerical changes in the quantity, (...) quality and efficiency of divisional outputs; and—though this is far more tentative—4) eventual changes in the competitive advantage and financial performance of the full organization. The authors propose that these constructs can be applied to all stakeholders, rather than just to the current employees of the firm, and that objective determinations of fairness by the managers can be related to subjective perceptions of fairness by the stakeholders that will result in the sequential series of attitudinal, behavioral and numerical changes that will lead to performance improvements. In short, the authors propose a normative stakeholder theory of the firm, based upon ethical principles, that will have testable descriptive hypotheses derived from the behavioral constructs. (shrink)

The first impacts of climate change have become evident and are expected to increase dramatically over the next decades. Thus, it becomes more and more pressing to decide who has to compensate those people who suffer from negative impacts of climate change but have neither contributed to the problem nor possess the resources to cope with the consequences. Since the frequently invoked Polluter Pays Principle cannot account for all climate-related harm, I will take a closer look at the much more (...) controversial Beneficiary Pays Principle. It is argued that, appropriately qualified, the Beneficiary Pays Principle can help to identify additional duty-bearers. Based on these results, I briefly comment on three different policy options to generate funds for compensation. (shrink)

Some moral theorists argue that being an innocent beneficiary of significant harms inflicted by others may be sufficient to ground special duties to address the hardships suffered by the victims, at least when it is impossible to extract compensation from those who perpetrated the harm. This idea has been applied to climate change in the form of the beneficiary-pays principle. Other philosophers, however, are quite sceptical about beneficiary pays. Our aim in this article is to examine their critiques. We conclude (...) that, while they have made important points, the principle remains worthy of further development and exploration. Our purpose in engaging with these critiques is constructive — we aim to formulate beneficiary pays in ways that would give it a plausible role in allocating the cost of addressing human-induced climate change, while acknowledging that some understandings of the principle would make it unsuitable for this purpose. (shrink)

Rev. version of the author's Habilitationsschrift, Martin-Luther-Universitèat.