Neste texto, procuro encontrar as origens de um dos mais importantes conceitos de Gilles Deleuze, o conceito de Imagem-tempo. Este conceito remete-nos para os primeiros textos de Deleuze dedicados à filosofia de Espinosa e ao problema do autómato espiritual e relaciona-se directamente com o problema da passividade/actividade do espectador. Ou seja, o conceito crucial na sua filosofia do cinema, a Imagem-tempo, esconde uma importante reflexão sobre a Imagem cinematográfica como arte de massas, os (im)poderes do pensamento e o modo fascista (...) de se pensar. This text seeks to find the origins of one of the most important of Gilles Deleuze's concepts, the concept of Time-image. This concept leads us to his first texts regarding Spinoza's philosophy and the problem of the spiritual automaton, and concerns directly with the problem of passivity/activity of the film goer. That is to say that the crucial concept of his film philosophy, Time-image, hides a fundamental consideration on the cinematic image as a mass art, the (un)powers of thinking and the fascist way of thought. (shrink)

On the historic Cross, it is God Himself Who has actually met the last dark limits of our life, and has brought Himself face to face with that inescapable something (or Someone) which seems to keep us forever strangers (physically, morally, logically and in every other way) to the Absolute and Eternal. And because it is God Himself Who has thus in life and in death personally encountered sin, death, time and corruption, He has overthrown them and raised and transformed (...) the existence that is subject to them, our existence, into the glorious Being of His Everlasting Godhead. He has robbed death of its sting and the grave of its victory, and delivered us from Satan's ancient power. A.N. Prior: Athanasius Contra Mundum. Prior (1934). (shrink)

In libro suo cui titulus Discursus de metaphysica Leibnitius quaestionem movet, quomodo homo in mundum harmonia gaudentem praestabilita agere debeat eiusque bonitatem, quo melius se explicet, adiuvare. Responsio ab eo allata vero discrepantiam quandam prae se fert ad docendum valde utilem. Una ex parte enim Leibnitius docet dari ordinem naturalem a Providentia firme constitutum, altera ex parte tamen suae aetatis doctrinam profitetur, scil. mundum agentibus humanis, ut technologiae cultoribus, infinitas praebere possibilitates. Aliorum Leibnitii textuum perscrutatio necnon eorum cum (...) Aristotele, S. Thoma, I. Kant comparatio revelat, quam acriter Leibnitii in mente veneratio antiquae et a maioribus traditae rationis philosophiam naturalem colendi, quae est scientia pure speculativa, pugnat cum ipsius dedicatione ad modernam notionem naturae dominationis, quod propositum e contra est valde pragmaticum ac transformativum.In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz addresses how human beings ought to intervene in a preharmonized world and contribute to the unfolding of its goodness. His view exhibits an instructive tension between belief in a providentially fixed natural order, on the one hand, and, on the other, a characteristically early modern belief in a world of infinite possibilities for human actors, that is, developers of technology. Other texts in Leibniz, as well as comparison with Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant, helps to reveal the extent to which Leibniz is torn between venerating the ancient tradition of natural philosophy, a purely “contemplative” discipline, and embracing the modern project of mastery of nature, a pragmatic and transformative enterprise. (shrink)

In the mid-1260s in Paris, a dispute raged that concerned the relationship between faith and the Augustinian theological tradition on the one side and secular leaning as represented by the arrival in Latin of Aristotle and various Islamic and Jewish interpreters of Aristotle on the other. Masters of the arts faculty in Paris represented the latter tradition, indicated by the phrase "double truth theory." In 1269, Thomas Aquinas wrote the polemical work On There Being Only One Intellect, Against the Averroists (...) (De unitate intellectus contra averroistas). Thomas is intent on countering two views: first, that intellect is not a faculty of the soul that animates our body, and second, that there is a single intellect existing separately that suffices for all people. Brief as it is, this work puts into play all the significant strands of Thomas's teaching on man - historical doctrinal, philosophical, and theological. It is a valuable source for discussing Thomas's views on the relationship between Aristotle and Christianity and puts to rest the misleading claim that Thomas baptized Aristotle." The introduction places the work historically and sketches the controversy to which it was a contribution. Part 2 includes the Latin Leonine text and McInerny's translation. Part 3 analyzes the basic arguments of Thomas's work and provides a series of interpretive essays meant to make Thomas accessible to today's readers. (shrink)

This note shows that the permutation instructions presented by Zardini (2011) for eliminating cuts on universally quantified formulas in the sequent calculus for the noncontractive theory of truth IKTωare inadequate. To that purpose the note presents a derivation in the sequent calculus for IKTωending with an application of cut on a universally quantified formula which the permutation instructions cannot deal with. The counterexample is of the kind that leaves open the question whether cut can be shown to be eliminable in (...) the sequent calculus for IKTωwith an alternative strategy. (shrink)

Certain instances of contraction are provable in Zardini’s system $\mathbf {IK}^\omega $ which causes triviality once a truth predicate and suitable fixed points are available.

This excellent book is a revision of Kretzmann’s Wilde Lectures in Comparative and Natural Religion delivered at Oxford in 1994. As the subtitle suggests, the book is a study of book 1 of Aquinas’s Summa contra gentiles. Kretzmann envisions the book as the first in a trilogy on SCG, with one volume devoted to each of SCG’s first three books.

RESUMENLa posición de i.Berlin sobre el determinismo fue recibida por muchos como un ataque al alcance de las ciencias humanas. Su argumentación, sin embargo, sugiere nuevas y sugerentes relaciones entre el conocimiento y la libertad, además de una concepción específica de la lectura de la historia. En el presente ensayo, que constituye una primera parte del trabajo, se analiza el argumento de I. Berlin sobre el determinismo, situándolo en las dos discusiones sobre la historia que se desarrollaron tras la II (...) Guerra Mundial. PALABRAS CLAVEDETERMINISMO-BERLINABSTRACTI. Berlin's position on determinism was received by many authors as an attack on the human sciences. His interpretation, however, suggests novel and stimulating relations between knowledge and freedom, together with a specific philosophy of history. This paper, wich constitutes the first part of a whole essay, assesses Berlin's argument on determinism, placing it within the two debates on history held after world war II.KEYWORDSDETERMINISM-BERLIN. (shrink)

Para Eugenio d’Ors, la vida humana no se define por su relación con la muerte, sino como principio creador de formas que se afirma a sí mismo. En cambio, la muerte sí se define como lo radicalmente opuesto a la vida, un principio de negación y destrucción, de fatalidad y resistencia. De este modo se establece entre ambos principios una relación dialéctica, una tensión de antagonistas que hace que la vida sea una permanente lucha contra la muerte. Por ello (...) el planteamiento de d’Ors acerca de la muerte adquiere un fuerte sentido ético y beligerante, afirmando la necesidad de vivir en actitud alerta y combativa. (shrink)

Nazariyat, Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences, issued twice a year in English and Turkish (Nazariyat İslam Felsefe ve Bilim Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi), is a refereed international journal. It publishes original studies, critical editions of classical texts and book reviews on Islamic philosophy, kalām, theoretical aspects of Sufism and the history of sciences. The goal of Nazariyat is to contribute to the discovery, examination and reinterpretation of the theoretical traditions in the history of Islamic thought, by giving (...) special attention to the post-classical period of it. **ISSN: 2148-8088 E-ISBN: 2547-9415**. (shrink)

Vinícius de Moraes, no Soneto de Fidelidade, elabora a fidedigna atuação do eu-lírico sobre a dedicação ao amor. A propulsão da fidelidade está na forma de anular-se para o outro, distanciando-se do raciocínio ao pensá-lo, pois pensar no que ama deslumbra o encanto para além da visão. Argumenta-se sobre as angústias, os relacionamentos e o amor que influenciavam nas tomadas de decisões e na aceitação dos fatos e das desilusões. Inserido na ótica histórica da Segunda Grande Guerra, sob a condição (...) de reler sobre o uso do amor enquanto cura (ou loucura), identifica-se a vivência do poema com a fidelização eufórica, passional, irracional até o ponto de tornar-se banal. Recorre-se, então, à Banalidade, categoria sublinhada por Arendt como a ocorrência que interfere no raciocínio, na capacidade de pensar e na relação humana, por intermédio da ausência de reflexão e adesão irrestrita ao cumprimento da lei, mesmo em acordo com o usufruto do mal. Neste ensaio, encontra-se a aproximação da lírica ao contexto da guerra, o adorno do sentimento ao extremo do amor à pátria, a expressão de Eichmann, de cujo relato se extrai o magnetismo de governança do III Reich que conduziu a massificação de seus súditos a um ideário manipulador no conceito de fidelidade. (shrink)

Arendt Contra Sociology re-assesses the relationship between Hannah Arendt's work and the theoretical foundations of sociology, bringing her insights to bear on key themes within contemporary theoretical sociology. Departing from the view of Arendt as a political theorist who sought to rescue politics from society, and political theory from the social sciences, this book re-examines her distinctions between labour, fabrication and action as a theory of the fundamental ontology of human societies, revisiting her criticism of the tendency of many (...) sociological paradigms to conflate the activity of fabrication with that of action. (shrink)

Spinoza Contra Phenomenology fundamentally recasts the history of postwar French thought, typically presumed to have been driven by a critique of reason indebted to Nietzsche and Heidegger. Although the reception of phenomenology gave rise to many innovative developments in French philosophy, from existentialism to deconstruction, not everyone in France was pleased with this German import. This book recounts how a series of French philosophers used Spinoza to erect a bulwark against the nominally irrationalist tendencies of phenomenology. From its beginnings (...) in the interwar years, this rationalism would prove foundational for Althusser's rethinking of Marxism and Deleuze's ambitious metaphysics. There has been a renewed enthusiasm for Spinozism of late by those who see his work as a kind of neo-vitalism or philosophy of life and affect. Peden counters this trend by tracking a decisive and neglected aspect of Spinoza's philosophy—his rationalism—in a body of thought too often presumed to have rejected reason. In the process, he demonstrates that the virtues of Spinoza's rationalism have yet to be exhausted. (shrink)

Keith Ansell-Pearson's book is an important and very welcome contribution to a neglected area of research: Nietzsche's political thought. Nietzsche is widely regarded as a significant moral philosopher, but his political thinking has often been dismissed as either impossibly individualistic or dangerously totalitarian. Nietzsche contra Rousseau takes a serious look at Nietzsche as political thinker and relates his political ideas to the dominant traditions of modern political thought. In particular, the nature of Nietzsche's dialogue with the philosophy of Jean-Jacques (...) Rousseau is examined, in order to demonstrate Rousseau's crucial role in Nietzsche's understanding of modernity and its discontents. (shrink)

Only propositional logics are at issue here. Such a logic is contra-classical in a superficial sense if it is not a sublogic of classical logic, and in a deeper sense, if there is no way of translating its connectives, the result of which translation gives a sublogic of classical logic. After some motivating examples, we investigate the incidence of contra-classicality (in the deeper sense) in various logical frameworks. In Sections 3 and 4 we will encounter, originally as an (...) example of what (in Section 2) we call a contra-classical modal logic, an unusual logic boasting a connective (" demi-negation" ) whose double application is equivalent to a single application of the negation connective. Pondering the example points the way to a general characterization of contra-classicality (Theorems 3.3 and 4.6). In an Appendix (Section 5), we look at one alternative to classical logic as the target for such translational assimilation, intuitionistic logic, calling logics which resist the assimilation, in this case, contra- intuitionistic. We will show that one such logic is classical logic itself, thereby strengthening a result of Wojcicki's to the effect that the consequence relation of classical logic cannot be faithfully embedded by any connective-by-connective translation into that of intuitionistic logic. (What the "faithfully" means here is that not only is the translation of anything provable in the 'source' logic.. (shrink)

Este trabajo se propone estudiar la dramática del discurso verdadero en los desarrollos foucaultianos de los años 1978 a 1984. La hipótesis que busca señalar es que cada capítulo de esta historia admite actos de producción de verdad para gobernar, y modos en que esa verdad puede ser disputada. En su desarrollo, primero aborda los lineamientos generales de los últimos años del pensamiento de Foucault, y después se detiene en los tres capítulos de la dramática del discurso verdadero: la parrhesía (...) en la antigua Grecia, las contra-conductas sobre el poder pastoral, y la crítica en la Modernidad. En la conclusión se busca ver qué lugar ocupa dentro de esta historia la apuesta de Foucault. (shrink)

Foucault contra Habermas is an incisive examination of, and a comprehensive introduction to, the debate between Foucault and Habermas over the meaning of enlightenment and modernity. It reprises the key issues in the argument between critical theory and genealogy and is organised around three complementary themes: defining the context of the debate; examining the theoretical and conceptual tools used; and discussing the implications for politics and criticism. In a detailed reply to Habermas' Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, this volume explains (...) the difference between Habermas' philosophical practice and Foucault's between the analytics of truth and the politics of truth. Many of the most difficult arguments in the exchange are subject to a detailed critical analysis. This examination also includes discussion of the ethics of dialogue; the practice of criticism; the politics of recognition, and the function of civil society and democracy. (shrink)

El nuevo milenio ha dejado atrás un siglo que ha visto renacer la filosofía del ser de Tomás de Aquino. Algunos de sus más destacados comentaristas, han desafiado la interpretación tradicional de la escuela tomista dominicana. En este artículo, se pretende confrontar una reciente contribución cuyo autor buscar justificar la posición tradicinoal del tomismo acerca de la noción de esse ut existentia. Frente a ella, se presentará otra que ponga de relieve el original estatus del esse ut actus essendi, a (...) la luz de lo que el Aquinate afirma en C.G. I, c. 28, n. 2. (shrink)

RESUMEN:El psicoanálisis lacaniano, sustentado en la ideología del (hetero)patriarcado, afirma que la lógica hamletiana de ser y tener el falo es el juego que estructura la dicotomía de los dos sexos, reservando el segundo término de la dialéctica a la mujer, que permanece al abrigo de la figura del hombre. Por eso, desde las estrategias contra-sexuales del falo lesbiano, Butler y Preciado arremeten contra la dimensión simbólica del discurso hegemónico y recuperan los cuerpos (y deseos) deslegitimados por la (...) moral económica del sistema capitalista, en contra de la lógica hamletiana del falo lacaniano. PALABRAS CLAVE:DIALÉCTICA HAMLETIANA DEL FALO LACANIANO, FALO LESBIANO, PLASTICIDAD DE LO IMAGINARIO, DILDO, ESTRATEGIAS CONTRA-SEXUALES.ABSTRACT:Lacanian psychoanalysis, based on (hetero)patriarchal ideology, claims that the Hamletian logic of being and having the phallus is what structures the dichotomy of the two sexes, reserving the second term of the dialectic to woman, who remains sheltered by the figure of man. Conversely, from the contra-sexual strategies of the lesbian phallus, Butler and Preciado charge against the symbolic dimension of a hegemonic discourse and recover the bodies (and desires), which are delegitimized by capitalist morality, against the Hamletian logic of the Lacanian phallus.KEYWORDS:HAMLETIAN DIALECTIC OF LACANIAN PHALLUS, LESBIAN PHALLUS, PLASTICITY OF THE IMAGINARY, DILDO, CONTRA-SEXUAL STRATEGIES. (shrink)

A partir de la ontología de fuerzas de Nietzsche, en el presente escrito buscaremos convergencias entre dos conceptos clave de dos pensadores fundamentales del siglo XX. Por un lado, el pensamiento en Gilles Deleuze; por otro, la nada en Heidegger. Nuestro objetivo es imbricarlos y enarbolarlos para luchar contra el nihilismo. Por tanto, en primer momento presentaremos la ontología de fuerzas de Nietzsche; después, en torno al sentido de las fuerzas, estudiaremos la voluntad de poder y el nihilismo, reformulando (...) los dos sentidos clásicos nietzscheanos. A continuación, siempre en el marco de la ontología de fuerzas, daremos paso al estudio de la nada en Heidegger y del pensamiento deleuziano. Finalmente, antes de las conclusiones, uniremos pensamiento y nada usando los animales heráldicos de Nietzsche, esto es: la serpiente y el águila, respectivamente. (shrink)

En este artículo argumento en contra del pluralismo lógico modalista de Bueno y Shalkowski. En la primera parte muestro que no está bien motivado, al menos si su motivación surge de las objeciones que le hacen al enfoque de Beall y Restall. Defiendo la posición de Beall y Restall contra estas objeciones apelando a los requisitos de necesidad y normatividad, que no fueron bien comprendidos por Bueno y Shalkowski. En la segunda parte analizo la posición modalista y doy (...) argumentos en su contra. Muestro que los ejemplos ofrecidos por Bueno y Shalkowski no justifican un pluralismo lógico, sino un monismo lógico basado en la lógica clásica en el que algunos contextos inferenciales pueden ser internalizados. Muestro que tales inter-nalizaciones son muy plausibles para los ejemplos que dan los autores: el manejo de bases de datos y el análisis de conceptos epistémicos. In this paper, I argue against the modalist logical pluralism of Bueno and Shalkowski. In the first part, I show that it is not well motivated, at least if its motivation comes from the objections they raise against the approach of Beall and Restall. I defend the position of Beall and Restall against these objections, resorting to the requisites of necessity and normativity, which were misunderstood by Bueno and Shalkowski. In the second part, I analyze the modalist position and provide some arguments against it. I show that the examples offered by Bueno and Shalkowski do not justify a logical pluralism, but rather a logical monism based on classical logic where some inferential contexts can be internalized. I show that these internalizations are very plausible for the two examples the authors provide: database management and the analysis of epistemic concepts. (shrink)

"Seeing then that kings are only the lieutenants of God, established in the Throne of God by the Lord God himself, and the people are the people of God, and that the honor which is done to these lieutenants proceeds from the reverence which is born to those that sent them to this service, it follows of necessity that kings must be obeyed for God's cause, and not against God, and then, when they serve and obey God, and not otherwise.... (...) That sentence of God Almighty must always remain irrevocably true: 'I will not give My glory to any other,' (Is. 42:8), that is, no man shall have such absolute authority, but I will always remain sovereign." In 1572, Roman Catholic soldiers slaughtered thousands of French Huguenots for their Protestant faith. This calamity forced many Protestants to ask whether taking up arms against a king was even lawful. Many Christians thought that even in the case of perseuction, kings had absolute power and lesser magistrates had no right to resist them. Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos is a powerful tract that makes a case for why Christians can sometimes lawfully resist and fight against tyrants and persecutors of the faith. The apostles told the Jews that they needed to obey God rather than man when it came to the Gospel, and to this day many Christians need to be reminded that men only derive their power from God and there are indeed times when resisting the authorities may be lawful and even biblically required. This tract is thoroughly biblical and a great testament to the courage and convictions of our fathers in the faith. (shrink)

Nietzsche criticizes Stoicism for overstating the significance of its ethical ideal of rational self-sufficiency and for undervaluing pain and passion when pursuing an unconditional acceptance of fate. Apparent affinities between Stoicism and Nietzsche’s philosophy, especially his celebration of self-mastery and his pursuit of amor fati, lead some scholars to conclude that Nietzsche cannot advance these criticisms without contradicting himself. In this article, I narrow the target and scope of Nietzsche’s complaints against Stoicism before showing how they follow from his other (...) philosophic commitments. I suggest that the first line of criticism follows from his denial of teleology and his skepticism toward moral values’ descriptive objectivity. I then suggest that the second line of criticism follows from Nietzsche’s account of overcoming as bestowing contributory value upon pain and suffering. Explaining Nietzsche’s criticisms of Stoicism in this way substantially qualifies similarities between his philosophy and that of Stoicism while absolving him of the charge of inconsistency. (shrink)

Leitor atento de Rousseau, embora raramente o citasse em seus textos, Clastres emprega o mesmo vocabulário que ganhou fama sob a pluma do cidadão de Genebra, tomando por vezes distância de suas reflexões: 1) alusão à vontade geral; 2) a encenação do gesto fundador da sociedade civil de cercar um terreno e o discurso possessivo que inaugura a propriedade privada e a acompanha (“isto é meu”); 3) e, por fim e mais importante, a crítica direcionada às duas frentes que compõem (...) a narrativa de Rousseau sobre a origem do Estado: de um lado, a associação entre desejo de prestígio e vontade de poder; de outro, o fundamento econômico do poder político. Se é certo afirmar que a Arqueologia da violência é contra Hobbes ou uma inversão do argumento de Hobbes – pois aí Clastres politiza a guerra –, por sua vez, a Sociedade contra o Estado é em certa medida contra Rousseau ou, ainda, uma inversão do argumento de Rousseau, visto que se coloca contra a narrativa hipotética da história ocidental: não mais da economia e do prestígio para a política, mas da política para a economia, pois aí Clastres politiza a economia. (shrink)

This article explores the issue of jus contra bellum as a particular development within just war thought. At its heart, the jus contra bellum amounts to an attempt to apply the principles of jus in bello (discrimination and proportionality) in order to negate the jus ad bellum. This approach was rather prevalent throughout the Cold War era, as concerns over the prospective use of nuclear weapons facilitated an increasingly sceptical attitude towards the use of force. Whereas the vast (...) majority of just war thinkers have tended to overlook this phenomenon, James Turner Johnson has adeptly recognised the perils of jus contra bellum, and its rather disastrous implications for just war thought. In this respect, Johnson's analysis of this issue constitutes one of his most significant contributions to the tradition. However, as this article will suggest, his assessment of this approach, and consequent efforts to counter it, do not go far enough. As will be noted, the roots of the jus contra bellum can be traced to the prevailing structure of just war thought – a structure which has been consistently championed by virtually every just war thinker. (shrink)

What and how should individuals resist in political situations? While this question, or versions of it, recurs regularly within Western political philosophy, answers to it have often relied on dyads founded upon dogmatically held ideals. In particular, there is a strain of idealist political philosophy, inaugurated by Plato and finding contemporary expression in the work of Alain Badiou, that employs dyads (such as the distinction between truth and doxa or the privilege of thought over sense) that tend to reduce the (...) complexities of practices of resistance to concepts of commitment. Although these dyads have been challenged by, amongst others, poststructuralist theorists, this has often been at the cost of losing their structuralist heritage. This thesis develops an ontology proper to structuralism that engenders non-idealist and non-dogmatic, yet ethical, practices of resistance against commitment orientated accounts of resistance and the return of classical ontological dyads. The thesis begins with an examination of the extent to which a dogmatic use of idealism grounds the work of a prominent contemporary theorist, Alain Badiou. In developing his neo-Maoist metapolitics, Badiou follows both Platonic ontology and the Marxist tradition of dialectics by claiming that political practice can only be carried out in truth by paying fidelity to an event that ruptures the presented order of things. Chapter one opens with an exploration of Badiou's mathematic meta-ontology to draw out its three foundational dyads (truth/doxa; sense/intelligibility; is/is not). It is argued that although Badiou makes important criticisms of the preponderant trends of political philosophy, he is unable to support his own account of politics due to his dogmatic reliance on idealist principles. Chapter two begins by developing two accounts: first, of the relations between Badiou's work and that of his former teacher Louis Althusser and, secondly, the relations between Althusser's thought and that of Gilles Deleuze, in particular his reading of David Hume. Discussion centres around the importance of the role that time plays within the works of all three authors, particularly in regard to the idea of the void. The chapter concludes with the argument that Hume's temporal idea of human nature is the key to a symptomatic reading of Althusser that accounts for the persistence of ideas in the latter's social theory. In chapter three, Deleuze's reading of Hume's idea of relations is developed to take into account Bergson's theory of time. Read in contrast to Quentin Meillassoux's speculative realism, the chapter argues that Deleuze's account of temporal relations informs Althusser's social theory to create the ontological grounds for non-dogmatic and non-idealist practices of resistance. These practices are developed in chapter four with an unlikely turn to John Stuart Mill's idea of genius, the metaphysical property of the individual that signifies the discovery of new truth. The chapter begins with an argument that there is an under-developed account of ethics in Deleuze's work. Distinguishing the idea of genius from both Mill's moral philosophy, as well as from utilitarian thought more generally, the idea of genius is sutured onto Deleuze's ontological account of individuation. Read alongside Althusser's social theory, which accounts for the non-idealist conceptualisation of situations, this suture creates an ethically oriented structuralist ontology. The thesis concludes with the argument that the idea of genius is the ethical imperative that motivates practices of resistance. When individuals are understood as embodied within situations, practices of resistance are conceptualised not against other components of a situation, but contra them, taking them into account in order to amplify, multiply and transform the individual's potential within a situation. (shrink)

‘If I were to toss a coin 1000 times, then it would land heads exactly n times’. Is there a specific value of n that renders this counterfactual true? According to an increasingly influential view, there is. A precursor of the view goes back to the Molinists; more recently it has been inspired by Stalnaker, and versions of it have been advocated by Hawthorne, Bradley, Moss, Schulz, and Stefánsson. More generally, I attribute to these authors what I call Counterfactual Plenitude:For (...) any antecedent A, there is a world wisuch that A ☐→ wiis true.Moreover, some of these authors are also committed to Primitive Counterfacts Realism:There exist primitive modal facts that serve as truth-makers for counterfactual claims.Call the conjunction of these italicized theses counterfactism. I clarify it and suggest some of its virtues, while ultimately rejecting it.Stefánsson’s counterfactism is motivated by and targeted at my “counterfactual skepticism”—I argue that most counterfactuals are false—and counterfactism has various other sources of support. I briefly defend that skepticism, and I seek to undercut those sources of support. I then argue more directly against counterfactism, especially on grounds of its ontological profligacy, and its leading to another kind of skepticism about counterfactuals that I believe is more problematic than my kind. In the process, I discuss how Bradley’s multidimensional semantics bears on counterfactism; I offer some new considerations against some central theses regarding conditionals ; and I reflect more generally on the epistemology of modality and the choice of primitives in our theorizing. (shrink)

My article confronts three of Spinoza’s four arguments against free will in God with Aquinas’s contrary position in the Summa contra Gentiles, Book I. Spinoza’s three arguments come from his Ethics, props. XVII and XXXII. First, since free choice is always exclusive, free choice in God would leave unactualized power in God. Second, if God’s will could be different without entailing divine mutability, then a divine voluntarism would reign. Third, if God has freedom of will but his willing is (...) his essence, the God’s essence could be otherwise. I note that these pitfalls open by assuming that the divine will bears upon creatures directly and immediately. I then show that since for Aquinas, God wills creatures by principally willing himself, none of Spinoza’s criticisms follow. (shrink)

La humanidad ha comenzado a percibirse como una especie que podría enfrentar la extinción, y si ese será o no nuestro futuro es una cuestión que será definida por los conscientes o los dementes. Se argumenta que la principal ilusión del ser humano es seguir creyendo que somos seres inteligentes, cuando en realidad hemos estado atentando contra nuestras propias fuentes de sobrevida. Y se pregunta: ¿No hay en realidad una brecha tajante y profunda entre el ser humano dotado de (...) esta conciencia de especie y el que carece de ella? ¿No parece que se procrean en realidad dos especies dentro de un mismo gremio biológico? Postula el artículo como posibilidad optimista de futuro la conciencia de especie, una política que sea un “pacto por la vida” y una ética planetaria por la supervivencia. (shrink)

FRED SEDDON provides a chapter by chapter examination of Greg Nyquist’s Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature. Nyquist gives a detailed exploration of all of the major branches of Rand’s philosophy as well as Rand’s philosophy of history and her philosophical anthropology.

This article diagnoses and critiques pervasive forms of teleological thought about basic structures of political organization in modern and contemporary political thought: arguments that the sovere...

This article diagnoses and critiques pervasive forms of teleological thought about basic structures of political organization in modern and contemporary political thought: arguments that the sovereign state, the nation-state, or some variant of a cosmopolis both represents the unfolding of history’s moral logic and offers us full moral personhood, agency, and maturity. Despite the received wisdom that modern political thought broke with teleology, I argue that early modern social contract theory was deeply teleological. The emergence of the normatively self-contained sovereign (...) state from the state of nature represented both decisive historical-moral progress from the medieval European non-state polities and the possibility of true moral personhood, thanks to the unity of will and judgment created by a unified authority structure. The article then argues that this overattachment to unity, both as an historical culmination and as a prerequisite to full personhood, was carried over into subsequent nationalist and cosmopolitan thought, where we see over-moralizations of historical processes, excessive claims for the teleological causal force of moral progress, and critiques of the immaturity of those persons who do not live in the recommended political form. The article closes with a sustained critique of both historical and individual-moral teleologies of these sorts. (shrink)

It has often been argued that, notwithstanding his commitment to the authoritarian state, Thomas Hobbes is a champion of the "minimal" version of liberty of conscience: namely, the freedom of citizens to think whatever they like as long as they obey the law. Such an interpretation renders Hobbes's philosophy more palatable to contemporary society. Yet the claim is incorrect. Alongside his notion of "private" conscience, namely, Hobbes develops a conception of conscience as a public phenomenon. In the following, it is (...) argued that this inconsistency serves the purpose of deception: it holds out the possibility of dissent while making it impossible to utilise. Arguably, moreover, this is the proper hermeneutical approach to take to Hobbes's inconsistencies in general. Indeed, said inconsistencies ought to alert contemporary normative theorists to the instability of the "minimal" version of liberty of conscience attributed to Hobbes: Hobbes himself, namely, shows that it is insufficient. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Contra Spinoza? Wim Klever In Book 1 ofthe TreatiseofHumanNature1 Spinoza enjoys thehonour ofbeing the only figure from the history of philosophy and science to be explicitly and extensively discussed by Hume. This honour is, however, a dubious one as the treatment he gets is not so friendly. The passage (T 232-51) is full of insults and denunciations: Spinoza is referred to as "that famous atheist" (T 241), (...) and characterized as "universally infamous" (T 240). His doctrine contains "a true atheism" (T 240). His theory about the thinking substance is an "hideous hypothesis" (T 241); Hume does not want to enter "farther into these gloomy and obscure regions" (T 241), although he spends ten pages on the subject. Richard Popkin2 suggests on account ofthis not too well studied section: "In introducing Spinoza into the discussion of the immateriality ofthe soul, Hume follows what was common practice in his day." This statement, if true, raises the question whether Hume was sincere in writing these 'satanicverses'. Does he, after all, hide the backside of his tongue? This would bring him pretty well in line with two of his English forerunners; with Hobbes about whom Aubrey recorded: "He toldme he [Spinoza]had outthrown him [Hobbes] a bar's length, for he [Hobbes] durst not write so boldly," and with Locke, who possessedinhis privatelibraryall Spinoza's worksbutnonetheless, for one reason or another, refused to assess the theories of "those decried names," saying "I am not so well read in Hobbes or Spinoza as to be able to say what were their opinions in this matter" (namely the pre-existence ofthe soul).4 One commentator, named Gilbert Boss, wrote a two volume dissertation in order to argue for the fundamental opposition between the philosophical systems of both thinkers. In this paper I wish to propose another view and to defend their overall agreement. I will not do so with regard to their thought on religion (as this is already done byPopkin), but I shall more specificallyfocuson the theoretical (mainly epistemological) part oftheir work. Coming to Hume's text the reader of Spinoza's work who is, moreover, convinced by his geometrical demonstration of the propositions, does feel himself quite well at home chez Hume. Hume's is not another world for him. Apart from the question who is the real first modern thinker, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza or Hume, there is much common in their treatises on man and world, not only methodologically. Hume's rejection of "the antient philosophy," in Volume XVI Number 2 89 WIM KLEVER which he criticizes the "fictions... concerning substances, and substantial forms, and accidents, and occult qualities" (T 219), "sympathies, antipathies, and horrors ofa vacuum" (T 224) could have been written by the three other candidates as well. In fact every one of thoseitems maybe tracedoutin Spinoza's work; compare, for instance, JSp 136 ("doctrinam illam puerilem et nugatoriam de formis substantialibus, qualitatibus etc.") or 2 PPC 8s ("Quare omnia ilia figmenta de sympathie et antipathie ut falsa sunt reicienda... Nunquam dicendum erit, quod corpus aliquod movetur, ne detur vacuum; sed tantum ex alterius impulsu"). But let us go to the main theme in Book 1 ofthe Treatise, already present in Part 1, Section 1, "Ofthe Origin ofour Ideas." All our ideas result from impressions, themselves also being ideas or perceptions, though withmoreforce andliveliness. The original perceptions aresaid to be "the causes of our ideas" (T 5). We find the impressions in our mind and their effects, our ideas. Hume does not explain the cognitive status ofthe impressions by reducing them to non-cognitive processes. The "universe of the imagination" (T 68) is a world apart, irreducible to matter; we can't step out ofit, "since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are deriv'd from something antecedently present to the mind" (T 67). Ideas, whatever their character (about external existences or not), can only be explained by other ideas. Hume carefully avoids the category mistake of transcending the border from mental to material things and keeps consequently, at least methodologically, to the absolute caesura between mind and body. The Spinozistic reader must necessarily feel sympathy for this position. The attributes of... (shrink)