What is the nature of a conceptual scheme? Are there alternative conceptual schemes? If so, are some more justifiable or correct than others? The later Wittgenstein already addresses these fundamental philosophical questions under the general rubric of "grammar" and the question of its "arbitrariness"--and does so with great subtlety. This book explores Wittgenstein's views on these questions. Part I interprets his conception of grammar as a generalized version of Kant's transcendental idealist solution to a puzzle about necessity. It also seeks (...) to reconcile Wittgenstein's seemingly inconsistent answers to the question of whether or not grammar is arbitrary by showing that he believed grammar to be arbitrary in one sense and non-arbitrary in another. Part II focuses on an especially central and contested feature of Wittgenstein's account: a thesis of the diversity of grammars. The author discusses this thesis in connection with the nature of formal logic, the limits of language, and the conditions of semantic understanding or access. Strongly argued and cleary written, this book will appeal not only to philosophers but also to students of the human sciences, for whom Wittgenstein's work holds great relevance. (shrink)

The first decade of event-related potential (ERP) research had established that the most consistent correlates of the onset of visual consciousness are the early visual awareness negativity (VAN), a posterior negative component in the N2 time range, and the late positivity (LP), an anterior positive component in the P3 time range. Two earlier extensive reviews ten years ago had concluded that VAN is the earliest and most reliable correlate of visual phenomenal consciousness, whereas LP probably reflects later processes associated with (...) reflective/access consciousness. This article provides an update to those earlier reviews. ERP and MEG studies that have appeared since 2010 and directly compared ERPs between aware and unaware conditions are reviewed, and important new developments in the field are discussed. The result corroborates VAN as the earliest and most consistent signature of visual phenomenal consciousness, and casts further doubt on LP as an ERP correlate of phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

William Whewell’s philosophy of scientific discovery is applied to the problem of understanding the nature of unification and explanation by the composition of causes in Newtonian mechanics. The essay attempts to demonstrate: the sense in which ”approximate’ laws successfully refer to real physical systems rather than to idealizations of them; why good theoretical constructs are not badly underdetermined by observation; and why, in particular, Newtonian forces are not conventional and how empiricist arguments against the existence of component causes, and against (...) the veracity of the fundamental laws, are flawed. (shrink)

Forster demonstrates that Hegel did not in fact ignore epistemology, but on the contrary he fought a tireless and subtle campaign to defeat the threat of skepticism. Forster's work should dispel once and for all the view that Hegel was naive or careless in epistemological matters. Along the way, Forster makes much that has hither to remained obscure in Hegel's texts intelligible for the first time.

What has science actually achieved? A theory of achievement should define what has been achieved, describe the means or methods used in science, and explain how such methods lead to such achievements. Predictive accuracy is one truth-related achievement of science, and there is an explanation of why common scientific practices tend to increase predictive accuracy. Akaike's explanation for the success of AIC is limited to interpolative predictive accuracy. But therein lies the strength of the general framework, for it also provides (...) a clear formulation of many open problems of research. (shrink)

This book considers the cultural legacy of the Keynesian Revolution in economics. It assesses the impact of Keynes and Keynesian thinking upon economics and policy, as well as the response of the Chicago and Austrian schools, and the legacy of all three in shaping economic life. The book is a call to restore economics to its roots in moral and cultural knowledge, reminding us that human beings are more than consumers. The Keynesian Revolution taught us that we should be happy (...) if we are prosperous, but instead we feel hollow and morally anxious – our economy feels empty. Drawing on paradigms from earlier historical periods while affirming modern market systems, this book encourages a return to a view of human beings as persons with the right and responsibility to discover, and do, the things in life that are intrinsically good and enduring. Because in the long run, the legacy of our choices will continue long after “we’re all dead.”. (shrink)

Curve-fitting typically works by trading off goodness-of-fit with simplicity, where simplicity is measured by the number of adjustable parameters. However, such methods cannot be applied in an unrestricted way. I discuss one such correction, and explain why the exception arises. The same kind of probabilistic explanation offers a surprising resolution to a common-sense dilemma.

Intended both for undergraduate students and for general readers, this introduction to the philosophy of science uses case studies, anecdotes and personal comment to portray many heroes and villains from the field of science through the ages.

Having undertaken several attempts in the field of rational theology, Kant argued in the Critique of Pure Reason that all theoretical proofs for God's existence are in principle doomed to failure, and declared moral theology to be the sole goal of reason's efforts in this field.In this essay I try to show that after the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant's moral theology underwent a development and transformation similar to that undergone by his rational theology before the first Critique.Tracing the development (...) of Kant's doctrine of God as a postulate of practical reason from the first Critique to the Opus postumum, I maintain that Kant offered at least four different arguments for why it is necessary for practical reason to postulate God's existence, only to conclude that none of them establishes its conclusion. In the Opus postumum, the classical doctrine of the postulates of pure reason is finally laid to rest. In the end, for Kant, ethics and religion coincide. (shrink)

Van Fraassen has argued that quantum mechanics does not conform to the pattern of common cause explanation used by Salmon as a precise formulation of Smart's 'cosmic coincidence' argument for scientific realism. This paper adds to this list some common examples from classical physics that also do not conform to Salmon's explanatory schema. This is bad news and good news for the realist. The bad news is that Salmon's argument for realism does not work; the good news is that realism (...) need not demand hidden variables in quantum mechanics if they are not used in classical mechanics. Many correlations in physics are explained in terms of property identity (contra Salmon). This leads to a new argument against van Fraassen because the unified version of the theory obtained by identifying theoretical properties is always less empirically adequate. (shrink)

Charles Peirce is often credited for being among the first, perhaps even the first, to develop a scientific metaphysics of indeterminism. After rejecting the received view that Peirce developed his views from Darwin and Maxwell, I argue that Peirce's view results from his synthesis of Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy and George Boole's contributions to formal logic. Specifically, I claim that Kant's conception of the laws of logic as the basis for his architectonic, when combined with Boole's view of probability, yields (...) Peirce's metaphysics of probabilistic laws. Indeterminism provides, therefore, an excellent illustration of how Peirce attempted to use logic to clarify metaphysical problems.Since everyone must have conceptions of things in general, it is most important that they should be carefully constructed. I shall enter into no criticism of the different methods of metaphysical research, but shall merely say that in the opinions of several great thinkers, the only successful mode yet lighted upon is that of adopting our logic as our metaphysics. (W1: 490, 1866)2. (shrink)

This paper is a discussion of points of agreement and conflict between Rorty and Putnam.

A GOOD CASE COULD BE MADE that Herder is the founder not only of the modern philosophy of language but also of the modern philosophy of interpretation and translation and that he has many things to say on these subjects from which we may still learn today. This essay will not attempt to make such a case, but it will be concerned with some aspects of Herder’s position that would be central to it: three fundamental principles in his philosophy of (...) language which also play fundamental roles in his theory of interpretation and translation. The essay’s aim is also threefold: first, to describe the principles in question and their roles in this theory; second, to explain their emergence in a way which helps to make clearer the nature of Herder’s contribution ; and third, to give at least a sense of their philosophical subtlety and defensibility. (shrink)

Classical mechanics is empirically successful because the probabilistic mean values of quantum mechanical observables follow the classical equations of motion to a good approximation (Messiah 1970, 215). We examine this claim for the one-dimensional motion of a particle in a box, and extend the idea by deriving a special case of the ideal gas law in terms of the mean value of a generalized force used to define "pressure." The examples illustrate the importance of probabilistic averaging as a method of (...) abstracting away from the messy details of microphenomena, not only in physics, but in other sciences as well. (shrink)

Recent longitudinal observations show that human menstrual cycles, sleep‐wake cycles and manic‐depressive cycles can become synchronized with lunar cycles, but do so in uniquely complex and heterogeneous ways that are unlikely to have been detected by past studies. Past studies’ negative results have given rise to a scientific consensus that human biology and behavior are unaffected by lunar cycles. The recent observations show that synchrony can be temporary, and can occur with more than one type of lunar cycle, more than (...) one phase of a lunar cycle and more than one resonant frequency of a lunar cycle. Given the variability of human responses to lunar cycles, aggregate analyses used in almost all previous studies would likely have cancelled out individuals’ responses and led to false negative results. In light of these observations, the question of lunar influence should be investigated further, with longitudinal observations and case‐by‐case analyses of individuals’ data. (shrink)

What was the source of this great flowering? Much of the credit for it has tended to go to Jacobi and Mendelssohn, who in 1785 began a famous public dispute concerning the question whether or not Lessing had been a Spinozist, as Jacobi alleged Lessing had admitted to him shortly before his death in 1781. But Jacobi and Mendelssohn were both negatively disposed towards Spinoza. In On the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Mr.

Truth in Wittgenstein′s Later Philosophy. In this paper I attempt to examine Wittgenstein′s understanding of truth in his later period. In doing so, I orient myself primarily on the remarks published as Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty. My primary aim in the destructive part is to show that his later philosophy neither espouses a redundancy and deflationary, nor an epistemic and anti-realist conception of truth. Both strands of interpretation are strongly represented in the debate. An examination of Wittgenstein’s remarks on (...) the correspondence theory of truth will also shed some light on his thoughts about truth. Furthermore, in the preceding constructive part of this paper, I will try to demonstrate that (1) for Wittgenstein there is a strong link between truths that we accept based on our certainties and our use of the term “truth” and (2) that skepticism about truth, which claims that all accepted truths in our Weltbild (“world-view”) could be actually false, fails to give any meaning to its use of “truth”. This culminates in Wittgenstein′s insight, that the question of what truth is can only be answered relative to the Weltbild. Therefore, talking about truths that transcend our Weltbild becomes nonsense. (shrink)

This paper aims to show how Whewell's notions of consilience and unification-explicated in more modern probabilistic terms provide a satisfying treatment of cases of scientific discovery Which require the postulatioin component causes to explain complex events. The results of this analysis support the received view that the increased unification and generality of theories leads to greater testability, and confirmation if the observations are favorable. This solves a puzzle raised by Cartwright in How the Laws of Physics Lie about the nature (...) of explanation by the composition of causes. (shrink)

Although in every inductive inference, an act of invention is requisite, the act soon slips out of notice. Although we bind together facts by superinducing upon them a new Conception, this Conception, once introduced and applied, is looked upon as inseparably connected with the facts, and necessarily implied in them. Having once had the phenomena bound together in their minds in virtue of the Conception men can no longer easily restore them back to the detached and incoherent condition in which (...) they were before they were thus combined. The pearls once strung, they seem to form a chain by their nature. Induction has given them unity which it is so far from costing us an effort to preserve, that it requires an effort to imagine it dissolved — William Whewell, 1858. (Quoted from Butts (ed.), 1989, p. 143). (shrink)

Having functional expected emotions regarding one’s future life as a teacher is important for student teachers to maintain their motivation to choose a career as a teacher. However, humans show several biases when judging their emotional experiences. One famous bias is the so-called peak-end effect which describes the phenomenon that overall affective judgments do not reflect the average of the involved emotional experiences but the most intense and the most recent of the involved emotional experiences. Regarding student teachers’ expected positive (...) emotions, such a bias would be functional since their motivation to become a teacher is enhanced. However, regarding student teachers’ expected negative emotions, such a bias would be dysfunctional since their motivation to become a teacher would be decreased. The aim of the present preregistered study was to examine whether student teachers’ expected future teaching-related emotions show a peak-end effect. Student teachers viewed 14 common events that could part of a typical everyday routine of a teacher and rated their expected emotional pleasure and discomfort for each of the events. Afterward, they were asked to rate their overall expected emotional pleasure and discomfort when looking at their future professional life as a whole. Results showed that expected pleasure was much larger than expected discomfort regarding both overall, peak, and average ratings. No peak-end effect was observed for overall expected discomfort which reflected the average expected discomfort across events. By contrast, overall expected pleasure was biased toward expected peak pleasure experiences. These findings indicate that student teachers judge their expected overall affect in a functional way: realistically when dealing with negative emotions but through rose-colored glasses when dealing with positive emotions. (shrink)

Science, in general, and chemistry in particular advances by methods that are difficult to codify. The availability of theories (models) and instrumentation play an important role but indefinable motivations to study individual phenomena are also involved. The area of chromium photophysics has a rich history that spans 150 years. A case history of the progression from the natural history stage to its present state reveals the way in which several factors that are common to much physical science research interact.

I would like in this article to make some tentative comparative observations about several sorts of reasoning in Western and Chinese philosophy. I try to say something about three important forms of reasoning: logic, skepticism, and practical reason. In each of these cases one can find strands of Chinese philosophy that are strikingly similar to counterparts in Western philosophy. And while in two of the cases in question the strands involved are less common and less fully developed than their Western (...) counterparts, in the third case they are highly sophisticated and in many ways superior to their Western counterparts. (shrink)

Kenneth Wilson won the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1982 for applying renormalization group, which he learnt from quantum field theory (QFT), to problems in statistical physics—the induced magnetization of materials (ferromagnetism) and the evaporation and condensation of fluids (phase transitions). See Wilson (1983). The renormalization group got its name from its early applications in QFT. There, it appeared to be a rather ad hoc method of subtracting away unwanted infinities. The further allegation was that the procedure is so horrendously (...) complicated that one cannot see the forest for the trees. The second allegation is justified in the applications that made it famous. But it is not true of the following example, which appears in Chowdhury and Stauffer (2000, 486-488). (shrink)

Richard Rorty’s attempts to defend liberalism by appeal to pragmatism fail primarily as a result of his conflation of epistemological and political concepts. It is this confusion that leads him to defend unpalatable political views. Once the question of pragmatism is properly distinguished from the question of liberalism, it becomes clear that criticisms of Rorty’s politics have no bearing on his views of philosophy and, similarly, that acceptance of Rorty’s critique of philosophy does not commit pragmatists to his political views.

The purpose of this paper is to explore some central aspects of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics and to suggest how they should be interpreted and assessed. My general strategy will involve pointing up rather than playing down certain inconsistencies and other problems in his position, in part simply because I believe that they are there and that exegesis therefore ought to recognize them, but also in part because reflecting on them seems to me philosophically fruitful. The interpretive and philosophical suggestions which I (...) will be offering are provisional and tentative in spirit. (shrink)