In this paper, we show that it is not a conceptual truth about laws of nature that they are immutable (though we are happy to leave it as an open empirical question whether they do actually change once in a while). In order to do so, we survey three popular accounts of lawhood—(Armstrong-style) necessitarianism, (Bird-style) dispositionalism and (Lewis-style) ‘best system analysis’—and expose the extent, as well as the philosophical cost, of the amendments that should be enforced in order to (...) leave room for the possibility of changing laws. (shrink)

‘The shamanic context of cave art is attested by a number of features’, Michael Winkelman writes (p.6); and, scarcely pausing for breath, he proceeds to reel off as if they were matters of established fact a list of co njectures about the authorship and meaning of ice-age cave paintings. We are t o conclude, without question apparently, that ‘cave art images represent shamanic activities and altered states of consciousness, and the subterranean rock art sites were used for shamanic vision questing’ (...) (p. 7). Well, may be. The shaman hypothesis is certainly an intriguing one; and David Lewis-Williams, in particular, has made a plausible case for it. Yet my own first reaction is: not so fast. For one thing, I myself, in the pages of this Journal a few years ago, presented evidence which – to begin with, anyway – suggests that any such interpretation has to be complet ely mistaken. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 183 Moore goes on to provide an analysis, all of which goes to support the contentions (1) that, except in philosophy, there is no puzzle ("In the first place: Are you puzzled?...I am in a way, in spite of all the Critical Phil. I've done. But I'm not sure my puzzlement is all of the sort B. means: it seems such a queer question to ask: Why (...) should you ask it?"); (2) if there is a problem it exists within a philosophical theory, as in Russell's Analysis o] Matter, and that what "Critical Phil. really can do is to explain why R. is wrong when he says this"; and (3) "If you don't find that question interesting, I think you'd better not do Crit. Phil." (p. 170). Curious stuff for Part I Moral Science Tripes takers; one wonders how many of them decided they weren't that interested in the question as to whether the theories of Broad or Ru~ell were true or false, or just plain silly. Perhaps this suffices to show that the characteristic mood of Moore's public writings is to be found in the lectures as well. Somehow or other, students were exposed to this cold bath of scepticism as to the significance of the whole endeavor, and yet went on to caxry out, in his own sytle, those rather more dogmatic exercises in analysis for which he is famous. This curious combination of dogmatic claim and lingering doubt suffuses Moore's work, of course. Perhaps it is seen best here in his ready acceptance of a method in which problems will be resolved by showing what is entailed by what we say, yet admitting that in most cases how you decide that p entails q is not terribly clear. All in all this is a valuable extension of a portrait of a major figure in twentieth century philosophy; and Mr. Lewy is to be congratulated for his skillful editing, conveying the arguments while preserving the quality of Moore's mind. At the same time there is something a bit depressing about it all, something a little too arrogant about the insistence that the stuff he is doing has no significance apart from what other moral science lecturers are saying to other crowds of undergraduates and writing for other lecturers in moral science. A. R. LoucH Ctar~faont Graduate School ~ant et le Kantisme. By Jean Lacroix. (Paris: Presses Universitairesde France, 1966.Pp. 127. -~ "Que Sais-je?", 1213.) Lacroix' Kant et ~e Kantisme is a concise, well argued defense of two theses: 1) The main import of Kant's work is metaphysical. 2) Kant's Critical programme derived its impetus from the desire to insure human freedom, morality, and religion against the fatalism or scepticism to which Kant felt Leibniz' and Wolff's dogmatic metaphysics or Hume's naturalism condemned them. The approach is not altogether new, particularly in Europe, but it has been largely overlooked in the United States and Britain. There are exceptions, such as Lewis White Beck, but generally English speaking philosophers have contended that Kant's motives were mainly epistemological. Lacroix argues that the three Critiques are parts of a single philosophical conception of man's place in the universe. Although his book is short, directed at the general (French) reader, and therefore necessarily concerned with the broad flow of Kant's thought, he does an admirable job of marshalling evidence from all the main works in the Kantian corpus, including the Opus Postumum. In the last, according to Lacroix, "... Kant a voulu ]ui-m~me synthdtiser les diverses Critiques et donner une rue d'ensemble de sa pens~e" (p. 9). The reader will, however, feel frustrated with Lacroix' documentation, for all the citations are to French translations, making them difficult to follow up. Inasmuch as Lacroix has a penchant for citing particularly pregnant passages and has written a book worthy of consideration by serious students of Kant, correlate citations to the Akademie Ausgabe are warranted. The weight of Lacroix' thesis that Kant's intentions were primarily metaphysical rests on his contention that "... le noum~ne a aussi un rble positif" (p... (shrink)

In this paper I consider Saul Kripke’s famous Humphrey objection to David Lewis’s views on de re modality and argue that responses to this objection currently on the market fail to mitigate its force in any significant way.

Shows that many of our understandings about scientific thought can be corrected once we realise just how unnatural science is. Quoting scientists from Aristotle to Einstein, the book argues that scientific ideas are, with rare exceptions, counter-intuitive and contrary to common sense.

This paper explores Kant’s account of propositional content and its implications for the relationship between his notions of knowledge (Wissen) and cognition (Erkenntnis). While previous commentators commonly read Kant as holding a Fregean theory of propositional content, in this paper I argue that Kant’s theory of propositional content aligns more closely with Peter Hanks’ recent account. According to my reading, Kant holds that individual acts of judging are both ontologically and explanatorily prior to propositions or Kantian judgments (Urteil). Furthermore, on (...) my reading, acts of judging for Kant are acts of assertively predicating a property of an object rather than merely acts of neutral predication. This reading challenges the lately popular view that Kant’s notions of knowledge and cognition are not only distinct but also disjunct. I instead suggest that we should regard Kantian knowledge that requires cognitions as its grounds as a species of Kantian cognitions. (shrink)

I argue that supervenience is an inadequate device for representing relations between different levels of phenomena. I then provide six criteria that emergent phenomena seem to satisfy. Using examples drawn from macroscopic physics, I suggest that such emergent features may well be quite common in the physical realm.

Aristotle Aristotle is a towering figure in ancient Greek philosophy, who made important contributions to logic, metaphysics, mathematics, physics, biology, botany, ethics, politics, agriculture, medicine, dance and theater. He was a student of Plato who in turn studied under Socrates. He was more empirically-minded than Plato or Socrates and is famous for … Continue reading Aristotle →.

A different way of thinking about how the sciences are organized is suggested by the use of cross-disciplinary computational methods as the organizing unit of science, here called computational templates. The structure of computational models is articulated using the concepts of construction assumptions and correction sets. The existence of these features indicates that certain conventionalist views are incorrect, in particular it suggests that computational models come with an interpretation that cannot be removed as well as a prior justification. A form (...) of selective realism is described which denies that one can simply read the ontological commitments from the theory itself. (shrink)

This paper develops an inventory and conceptual map of espoused organizational values. We suggest that espoused values are fundamentally different to other value forms as they are collective value statements that need to coexist as a basis for organizational activity and performance. The inventory is built from an analysis of 3112 value items espoused by 554 organizations in the UK and USA in both profit and not-for-profit sectors. We distil these value items into 85 espoused value labels, and these are (...) assessed in terms of their similarity and difference through judgements made by 53 experienced individuals. The resulting conceptual map facilitates the evaluation of values which are espoused at the organizational level, as opposed to aggregations of personal values, an important distinction that is often ignored in the literature. This analysis identifies a number of distinct areas of emphasis occupied by espoused values. In particular, the richness of value labels that relates to broader ethical issues may be aimed at external stakeholder management, but also may have an increasing influence on organizational behaviour as they are embedded into organizational practices. By advancing our understanding of espoused values, through an analysis of those being used in practice, we provide a means by which future research into organizational values and ethical issues can progress. (shrink)

How is consciousness possible? What biological purpose does it serve? And why do we value it so highly? In Soul Dust, the psychologist Nicholas Humphrey, a leading figure in consciousness research, proposes a startling new theory. Consciousness, he argues, is nothing less than a magical-mystery show that we stage for ourselves inside our own heads. This self-made show lights up the world for us and makes us feel special and transcendent. Thus consciousness paves the way for spirituality, and allows (...) us, as human beings, to reap the rewards, and anxieties, of living in what Humphrey calls the "soul niche." Tightly argued, intellectually gripping, and a joy to read, Soul Dust provides answers to the deepest questions. It shows how the problem of consciousness merges with questions that obsess us all--how life should be lived and the fear of death. Resting firmly on neuroscience and evolutionary theory, and drawing a wealth of insights from philosophy and literature..."--Jacket. (shrink)

We summarise and respond to the main points made by the commentators on our target article, which concern: whether structural similarity can play a causal role in normal object identification and in neuropsychological deficits for living things, the nature of our structural knowledge of the world, the relations between sensory and functional knowledge of objects, and the nature of our functional knowledge about living things, whether we need to posit a “core” semantic system, arguments that can be marshalled from evidence (...) on functional imaging, the causal mechanisms by which category differences can emerge in object representations, and the nature of our knowledge about categories other than living and nonliving things. We also highlight points raised in our article that seem to be accepted. (shrink)

The traditional definition per genus et differentiam is argued to be cognitively grounded in perception and in order to avoid needless argument, definitions are stipulated to assert boundaries. An analysis of the notion of perspective shows that a boundary is a composite of two distinctions: similarity that includes and difference that excludes. The concept is applied to the type-token distinction and percepts are shown to be the result of a comparison between a token as representing some phenomenon and a type (...) as representing the kind of object the phenomenon might be. The Principle of Connection is proposed as the mental architecture that gives rise to percepts. The value of a percept is shown to be one of Identical, Similar, Different or Contrary and its perceptual aspects represent the cognitive schema of Essence, Quality, Quantity and Relation. The two notions of similarity and difference are claimed to constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for definitions. Accordingly, the qualitative elements of a definition signify the genus as representing the similarity of the defined entity in terms of others of its kind and the quantitative elements signify the differentia as representing the difference it has from everything else. Paying proper attention to both qualitative and quantitative aspects will enable formulation of definitions that are ‘good’. (shrink)

This collects some of the remarks made at the 2016 Pacific APA Memorial session for Patrick Suppes and Jaakko Hintikka. The full list of speakers on behalf of these two philosophers: Dagfinn Follesdal; Dana Scott; Nancy Cartwright; Paul Humphreys; Juliet Floyd; Gabriel Sandu; John Symons.

Reprint of the ed. published by Viking Press, New York.

This volume is devoted to Lewis's work in metaphysics and epistemology. Topics covered include properties, ontology, possibility, truthmaking, probability, the mind-body problem, vision, belief, and knowledge. The purpose of this collection, and the volumes that precede and follow it, is to disseminate more widely the work of an eminent and influential contemporary philosopher. The volume will serve as a useful work of reference for teachers and students of philosophy.

Critical history is a philosophy of history that highlights the peculiarity and originality of the epistemology and methodology of Bernard Lonergan in the study of history. It is a method of reading the movement of history, through the Lonerganian creative criticism as well as a critical instrument that can help one rise above diverse forms of oversight and bias while working for progress in a human community. It tries to expound on how one can build personal capacities that work for (...) the advantage of the common good. Its precepts can help one achieve self-transcendence and authenticity which are essential in the making of a creative society. It can inspire and create symbols that link one's experience, imagination, rationality, responsibility and affectivity to authentic lived history. It can arouse an intellectual conversion that brings moral revival and can offer insights that help community planners in proposing proper solutions by identifying the actual drivers of progress, decline and re-covery in a society. Critical history creates an intellectual cultivation of mind and character achieved by insight which helps to build an authentic human person and progressive community. Its critical elements can lead to higher viewpoints that rise above prejudices, and these higher viewpoints can move one to integration to higher values. The result will be an authentic subjectivity and emergence of republic of virtues guided by objectivity and sound ethics. (shrink)

Prof. Kitto studies the parts played by Man and God in Sophoclean drama. He argues that they are essentially complementary, and that if one fails to appreciate the significance of Sophocles' religious teaching, one will fail to understand his literary and dramatic artistry.

Research ethics committees ‘(RECs) members’ perceptions of their role in regard to the science of research proposals are discussed. Our study, which involved the interviewing of 20 participants from amongst the UK’s independent (Phase I) ethics committees, revealed that the members consider that it is the role of the REC to examine and approve the scientific adequacy of the research – and this notwithstanding the fact that a more competent body will already have done this and even when that other (...) body has the legal responsibility for this function. The problematic nature of this situation, tantamount to double jeopardy, is considered: it can delay research and so add to costs whilst offering no countervailing benefits, or the double jeopardy may be just the cost society imposes, through its RECs, on researchers as the price for research on human subjects. (shrink)

The what next question for moral error theorists asks: if moral discourse is systematically error-ridden, then how, if at all, should moral error theorists continue to employ moral discourse? Recent years have seen growing numbers of moral error theorists come to endorse a wider normative error theory according to which all normative judgements are untrue. But despite this shift, the what next question for normative error theorists has received far less attention. This paper presents a novel solution to this question: (...) revolutionary normative subjectivism. Along the way, two primary contributions are advanced. First, a non-normative methodology for answering the normative error theoretic what next question is developed. Second, revolutionary normative subjectivism is presented and defended in accordance with the proposed methodology. (shrink)

Consciousness is, perhaps, the aspect of our mental lives that is the most perplexing for both psychologists and philosophers. Daniel Dennett has described it as 'both the most obvious and the most mysterious feature of our minds' and attempts at definition often seem to move in circles. Thomas Nagel famously remarked that 'without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless.'. These observations might suggest that consciousness - indefinable and mysterious - falls outside the (...) scope of rational enquiry, defying both scientific and philosophical investigation. In reality, however, the topic has been a focus of psychological investigation since William James and is increasingly vital in philosophical research. This book illustrates the various, interdisciplinary approaches to the problem, providing both pointers to a solution and a summary of the key positions. (shrink)

In the first Critique, Kant famously holds a novel practical notion of Belief (Glauben) as assent justified not by evidence but by practical considerations. This paper examines the early development of Kant’s practical notion of Belief prior to the first Critique. It aims to make clear what prompted Kant to develop this notion in the first place, and how this notion came to assume its crucial role in Kant’s critical system. This development, I argue, has two main steps. The first (...) is his introduction of a practical notion of Belief in mid-to-late 1760s. I argue that he did so because he regards this notion as a useful tool to get ordinary people to justifiably commit to the existence of God and an after-life. The second step is Kant’s abandonment of the objective validity of his logical proof of God around 1772. This step elevated Belief from a merely useful means to the only justified way to commit to the existence of God and an after-life. This second step, I argue, is closely connected to Kant’s pivot to the view that the objective validity of concepts requires sensibly given objects, and it is motivated by Kant’s concern with subject-cancelling real repugnance. (shrink)

The first volume of this series presents fifteen selected papers dealing with a variety of topics in ontology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.

_Raritan: A Quarterly Review_ , IX, 68-98, Summer 1989. Reprinted (with footnotes), _Occasional Paper #8_ , Center on Violence and Human Survival, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, The City University of New York, 1991; Daniel Kolak and R. Martin, eds., _Self & Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues_ , Macmillan, 1991.

In his article “Deep Ecology and the Irrelevance of Morality,” Eric H. Reitan contends that, contrary to the disavowals of Fox and Naess, the “ecosophy T” concept of “Self-realization” constitutes a precondition of morality according to a “robust” Kantian moral framework. I suggest that there is a significant problem involved in rendering Self-realization compatible with a Kantian moral framework. This problem of ontological priority demonstrates that Naess and Fox are in fact correct in their assertion that Self-realization is a nonmoral (...) phenomenon. (shrink)

In this essay I seek to re?examine the ?what is ideology?? question in the light of recent developments in ideology theory. We see that contemporary ideology theory tends to employ either a ?restrictive? or an ?inclusive? conception of ideology. Most theorists operating in the field of ideology study see these two approaches as both rival and exclusive. Furthermore the relationship between the analyst of ideology and the ideological field is at issue in both cases. I argue that the concept/conception distinction (...) allows us to discern that these two approaches do not merely employ rival conceptions of the same concept. There are two concepts of ideology at work here, which perform such radically different roles that their coexistence can be seen as unproblematic, reflecting the presence of both normative and interpretative work in social science. (shrink)

This paper examines the recent ?deliberative turn? in environmental political thought with particular regard to demands concerning the employment of public reason in democratic deliberation. Working from John Rawls? account of the three essential elements of deliberative democracy, the paper assesses the scope for bringing environmental claims within the remit of public reason, and revisits the ?unfairness to novel reasons? objection against public reason, as articulated by Jeremy Waldron and then criticised by Lawrence Solum. I argue for a contextual view (...) of political justification. The unfairness objection is found to hold in an attenuated form, and disbarring non?public reasons from decisiveness in political justification, even on a wide view of public political culture, imposes an arbitrary unfairness on those, such as environmental activists, seeking to challenge widely shared, but possibly misguided, beliefs. (shrink)