El objetivo de este trabajo es, en primera instancia, defender que el términomal o maldad es rescatable en el contexto moral con ciertas acotaciones.Aun cuando se desligue de las connotaciones metafísicas quelo originaron y que lo acompañan, en tanto que sirve para describir unconjunto específico de acciones que no pueden ser capturadas adecuadamentecon otros términos. Para todo esto, se considerará primeramentela posible vigencia del término, luego las distintas características que sehan propuesto como necesarias y suficientes para clasificar una accióncomo “malvada” (...) -dentro de las cuales se encuentra la motivación moral,en la que se hará hincapié- buscando las posibilidades que existen paraque los motivos de una acción sean malvados. (shrink)

En este texto se analiza la posibilidad de integrar los resultados deinvestigaciones empíricas a las principales discusiones teóricas entorno a la motivación moral, un territorio especialmente escabrosode la metaética, específicamente, de la psicología moral. Para esto sepresentan, grosso modo, los dos principales debates en torno a la motivaciónmoral, los argumentos e intuiciones de las que parten las distintasposturas respecto al origen y la naturaleza de la motivación moral.

ObjectiveIntimate partner violence has been related to emotional dependence and addictive disorders. This study aims to provide a global approach to analyse the relationship between these variables and to determine the factors underlying permanence in violent relationships.MethodsIt is a non-experimental, cross-sectional correlational design study. Participants had to have at least one dating relationship for at least 1 month to complete the questionnaire, which included the following instruments: emotional dependence scale, scale of violence in dating relationships and impulse control disorders scale.ResultsThe (...) sample consisted of 1.533 adolescents, 53.9% were male and 46.1% female, between 14 and 18 years. Emotional dependence correlated significantly with received violence. Compulsive spending is strongly associated with emotional dependence, whereas sex addiction is associated with received violence to a greater extent. Received violence mediates on emotional dependence and addictions.ConclusionIPV is a risk factor for the perpetuation of addictive behaviours. It is advisable to promote affective education for developing resilience and adequate coping. (shrink)

ObjectiveThe literature has shown the relevance of certain psychological variables in adjustment to cancer. However, there is a great variability, and these features could be modified through the disease process. The aim of this study is to provide an integrated and global perspective of the importance of variables such as coping, resilience, emotional control, social support, affect, and others in cancer patients through a longitudinal study, with the objective of exploring their associations and underlying interactions.MethodsThe sample was composed of 71 (...) people diagnosed with cancer who were attending psychological support at the Spanish Association Against Cancer. We assessed the following variables in two periods of 6 months: perceived stress, emotional control, resilience, coping strategies, personality, social support, affect, emotional distress, quality of life and visual-analogic scales.ResultsResults showed predictive effects of perceived stress on physical health perception. Mental health perception was influenced by almost all the psychological variables. Consciousness at baseline, change in Extraversion and Resilience had significant effects on perceived mental health.ConclusionThis study provides a global health model that integrates and explores associations between psychological variables related to cancer disease. This information could be useful for guiding personalized psychotherapeutic interventions, with the aim of increasing adjustment to disease. (shrink)

In its treatment of the role of emotion in ethics the argument of the book outlines a new way of packing motivational force into moral meaning that allows for a ...

Macroergonomic compatibility refers to the extent to which macroergonomic factors and elements interact positively with humans. It is one of the most complex constructs to measure in work systems and in ergonomics. The goal of this paper is to determine the levels of MC in a manufacturing system. As methods, we use the macroergonomic compatibility index and the Macroergonomic Compatibility Questionnaire. The MCQ was administered in its three versions to collect data about the macroergonomic practices implemented in the manufacturing company. (...) Regarding results, all the macroergonomic factors and most of the macroergonomic elements showed a low level of MC; that is, MCI < 0.7. Only macroergonomic elements Education, Knowledge, and Skills reached a medium level; namely, MCI = 0.709. The factor with the highest level of MC was the Person factor. Similarly, the whole manufacturing system showed a low level of MC. In conclusion, the studied manufacturing company requires urgent macroergonomic interventions. Also, we found that the MCI can effectively measure the level of MC of MFEs and can guide the implementation of macroergonomic practices and explain the MC construct. (shrink)

In this chapter, I defend a pluralistic approach to intertheoretic reduction, in which reduction is not understood in terms of a single philosophical “generalized model”, but rather as a family of models that can help achieve certain epistemic and ontological goals. I will argue then that the reductive model (or combination of models) that best suits to a particular case study depends on the specific goals that motivate the reduction in the intended case study.

Empirically minded philosophers have raised questions about judgments and theories based on moral intuitions such as Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium. But they work from the notion of intuitions assumed in empirical work, according to which intuitions are immediate assessments, as in psychologist Jonathan Haidt’s definition. Haidt himself regards such intuitions as an appropriate basis for moral judgment, arguing that normal agents do not reason prior to forming a judgment and afterwards just “confabulate” reasons in its defense. I argue, first, (...) that the notion of “considered intuitive judgment” that Rawls spells out when he first presents his method is pre-theoretical, but not at all pre-reflective, in the way Haidt’s definition supposes; it may rest on various forms of reasoning short of systematic derivation from theoretical principles. I go on to take issue with Haidt’s dismissal of ex post facto moral reasoning, arguing that it can play both a causal role in an individual’s later intuitions or judgments and a legitimate normative role, as required by moral competence in judging non-taboo cases. I suggest that the move from intuition to judgment and thence to ex post facto reasoning makes sense as a justificatory version of Peircean abduction, or what is now mainly called “inference to the best explanation.”. (shrink)

This book explains how P4C can facilitate young people's exploration of key ethical concerns of our time, such as sustainability, justice and intercultural and ...

_Employment and Employee Rights_ addresses the issue of rights in the workplace. Although much of the literature in this field focuses on employee rights, this volume considers the issue from the perspective of both employees and employers. Considers the rights of both employees and employers. Discusses the moral and legal landscape and traditional assumptions about right in employment. Investigates arguments for guaranteeing rights, particularly for employees, which are derived from relational, developmental, and economic bases. Explores new dimensions of employment including (...) a model that incorporates growing workplace diversity, builds upon our understanding of the legal landscape, and expands upon our justifications for recognizing and protecting rights. (shrink)

In GIVING WELL: THE ETHICS OF PHILANTHROPY, an accomplished trio of editors bring together an international group of distinguished philosophers, social scientists, lawyers and practitioners to identify and address the most urgent moral questions arising today in the practice of philanthropy.

In this dissertation, I argue that Heidegger offers a philosophy of science by explicating that philosophy of science. The following chapter presents Heidegger's early analysis of modern science, from 1916 to the mid-1930s. During these years Heidegger maintains two theses: that the essence of science is the mathematical projection of nature; and that metaphysics is the science of being. As the latter thesis becomes more problematic, Heidegger turns from metaphysics as a science, to the sciences. ;The pivot for this turn (...) is the experiment. Chapter 3 is an analysis of three specific issues surrounding the experiment. I raise the question of whether a single experimental result is enough to overturn a theory, the problem of the theory-loadedness of observation, and the question of representation. ;These issues serve to explicate Heidegger's claim that the essence of science is research, and to show that Heidegger's philosophy of science shares issues with contemporary analytic philosophy of science. Further, I take Heidegger's claim that the essence of science is the ground from out of which the essence of the modern epoch can be shown, as proof that his consideration of science is not secondary in his thinking but rather is the basis from which his critique of the modern epoch is made. ;Chapter 4 is an account of Heidegger's view of the role of science in the university. Heidegger's vision is that the German university can serve to guide historical destiny. His complete disillusionment with that vision comes with his realization that, whereas he calls for a renewal of science for the sake of the sciences in their service of the people, the Nazi call for a renewal of the sciences is toward their own political ends. What little I have to say about Heidegger's involvement with the Nazis is found in this chapter. ;Chapter 5 considers Heidegger's view of ancient science. It lays out Aristotle's distinction between physis and techne under Heidegger's reading. In Chapter 6, I argue that the ancient distinction between physis and techne is not sustained in the modern epoch under Heidegger's account. ;I close with a brief account of Heidegger on quantum theory. (shrink)

Ideal for a two-to-three week introduction to the Presocratics and Sophists, this volume offers a selection of the extant remains of early Greek philosophical thought on cosmology, metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, together with unobtrusive, minimally interpretive editorial material: an introduction, brief headnotes, maps, and a concordance.

Providing balanced coverage of abortion, sexual harassment, censorship and pornography, and other timely and controversial subjects, this pathbreaking anthology is the first to offer a comprehensive introduction to feminist legal philosophy. An important resource for courses in women's studies, philosophy, law, sociology, and political science, it provides many stimulating insights into essential topics in jurisprudence, such as the nature and justification of law, judicial reasoning and the process of adjudication, the connection between law and equality, and freedom and justice.

Is there anything irrational, or self-undermining, about having "inconsistent" attitudes of caring or valuing? In this paper, I argue that, contra suggestions of Harry Frankfurt and Charles Taylor, the answer is "No." Here I focus on "valuations," which are endorsed desires or attitudes. The proper characterization of what I call "valuational inconsistency" I claim, involves not logical form (valuing A and not-A), but rather the co-possibility of what is valued; valuations are inconsistent when there is no possible world in which (...) what is valued can co-exist. Essentially conflicting valuations, I show, are no worse for an agent than contingently conflicting ones, which are common and no threat to rationality or well-being. Partly based on reflections about a conflicted mother, who values staying at home and also having a career, I argue that valuational inconsistency does not render a person unable to act, does not make a person's actions ineffective because of vacillation, does not undermine a person's autonomy, and need not make a person dissatisfied with himself. I defend my characterization of inconsistency as an apt one; I offer some reasons to value inconsistency itself; and I draw out some implications for coherence thinking in moral philosophy. (shrink)

With the demise of Marxism and socialism, the United States is becoming a model not merely for free enterprise, but also for employment practices worldwide. I believe that free enterprise is the least worst economic system, given the alternatives, a position I shall assume, but not defend, here. However, I shall argue, a successful free enterprise political economy does not entail mimicking US employment practices. I find even today in 1998, as I shall outline in more detail, these practices, when (...) consistently carried out, by and large erode trust in the workplace, they are, on balance unfair to workers and managers, and, if Jeffrey Pfeffer is correct, they do not maximize long-term corporate earnings or growth. Getting clear on US employment practices and their weaknesses may help to shape other models for employment that neither contravene free enterprise nor are degrading to workers. (shrink)

My comments focus on Proops’s treatment of the Paralogisms. I agree with many aspects of his discussion, including his views about the project of Rational Psychology and his analyses of how, exactly, the arguments of the Paralogisms are defective in form, but I disagree with his interpretation of the First Paralogism. I argue that the source of confusion that Kant diagnoses is not the grammatical distribution of ‘I’ as singular, but the fact that the I-representation is both empty and necessary (...) for cognition. (shrink)

How does Kant understand the representation of an empirical self? For Kant, the sources of the representation must be both a priori and a posteriori. Several scholars claim that the a priori part of the ‘self’ representation is supplied by the category of ‘substance,’ either a regular substance (Andrew Chignell), a minimal substance (Karl Ameriks) or a substance analog (Katharina Kraus). However, Kant opens the Paralogisms chapter by announcing that there is a thirteenth ‘transcendental’ concept or category: “We now come (...) to a concept that was not entered in the above general list of transcendental concepts, and that must yet be classed with them … This is the concept – or, if one prefers, the judgment – I think.” (A341/B399). I argue that it is the ‘I think’ that provides the a priori framework for the representation of the empirical self. (shrink)

Among the paradoxical aspects of Hobbes's scepticism attention has recently turned to Hobbes's fool of Leviathan , chapter xv, where Hobbes makes a claim about justice that paraphrases Psalm 52:1: "The fool hath said in his heart there is no God." It is a charge of which Hobbes himself could be suspected, but in fact we see that it is on this startling claim that his legal positivism rests. Moreover it is embedded in a theory of natural law that Hobbes (...) inherited from the late scholastics and that he shares in common with Grotius as a practical solution to the problem of scepticism. Indeed, the fool is not even honoured with the designation "sceptic." He is simply dumb, stultus , one of the mindless mob, or those led astray by priests. Hobbes's treatment of the fool as stultus is Epicurean, as we see in the Historia Ecclesiastica , where he gives the topos special attention, and Epicureanism helps us solve the puzzle of the fool. (shrink)

The first issue of Business Ethics Quarterly was launched in 1991. At that time there were few general principles that could serve as guidelines for global business. However, since 1991 a plethora of such principles have been developed to serve as guidelines and evaluative mechanisms for global corporate responsibilities. But operationalizing these principles in practice has been a challenge for most transnational corporations and even for smaller, more local enterprises. This is because, in some cases, the principles ask too much (...) of companies. In other cases, the principles are ambiguous. And in still other cases,the principles, written by and large from a Western, rights-based perspective, cannot be operationalized in some cultural or religious settings. In this paper I will outline a series of dilemmas multinational enterprises face in the global market place, even when they sincerely sign on to one or another set of principles. These problems are not insurmountable, but in the imperfect world of commerce, require that our expectations of corporate responsibilities be satisficing rather than absolutist. (shrink)

Two very different insights motivate characterizing the brain as a computer. One depends on mathematical theory that defines computability in a highly abstract sense. Here the foundational idea is that of a Turing machine. Not an actual machine, the Turing machine is really a conceptual way of making the point that any well-defined function could be executed, step by step, according to simple 'if-you-are-in-state-P-and-have-input-Q-then-do-R' rules, given enough time (maybe infinite time) [see COMPUTATION]. Insofar as the brain is a device whose (...) input and output can be characterized in terms of some mathematical function -- however complicated -- then in that very abstract sense, it can be mimicked by a Turning machine. Given what is known so far brains do seem to depend on cause-effect operations, and hence brains appear to be, in some formal sense, equivalent to a Turing machine [see CHURCH-TURING THESIS]. On its own, however, this reveals nothing at all of how the mind-brain actually works. The second insight depends on looking at the brain as a biological device that processes information from the environment to build complex representations that enable the brain to make predictions and select advantageous behaviors. Where necessary to avoid ambiguity, we will refer to the first notion of computation as algorithmic computation, and the second as information processing computation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Humans have been thinking with fire since ancient times. In elemental philosophy, fire is considered as one of the most important elemental technologies. Fire has allowed the building of our world by reshaping matter, by making the earth less inhospitable, providing warm shelters and chasing and attracting animals. In the current elemental turn in media theory, the material dimensions of fire as medium have gained importance. Fire, however, also has important epistemological, psychological, and symbolic meaning, captured by Gaston Bachelard (...) in a series of entangled “fire complexes.” This article focuses on these immaterial and subjective aspects of fire exemplified in a range of “matterphors” and combustive imagery of contemporary cinema to address its pyrotechnical dimensions and redefine media as affective fiery messages, interfaces, and environments. (shrink)

The text aims to examine the concept of Fortune in Machiavelli. The analysis will be carried out from the poems Di Fortuna and Dell´Occasione, the letter to Giovan Battista Soderini, the Canto VII of Hell, by Dante, and passages that make references to the concept of Fortune in The Prince. The poem Di Fortuna will be divided into eight parts in order to exam and present the Fortune’s concept.

*[Intertheoretic Reduction]: ___ When a new and very powerful theory turns out to entail a set of propositions and principles that mirror perfectly the propositions of some older theory or conceptual framework, we can conclude that the old terms and the new terms refer to the very same thing, or express the very same properties. (e.g. heat = high average molecular kinetic energy) The old theory is then said to be "reducible" to the new theory.

Until recently, business issues in healthcare organizations were relatively insulated from clinical issues, for several reasons. The hospital at earlier stages of its development operated on a combination of charitable and equitable premises, allowing for providing care to be separated from financial support. Physicians, who were primarily responsible for clinical care, constituted an independent power nexus within the hospital and were governed by their own professional codes of ethics. In exchange for a great deal of control over their conditions of (...) practice, they took almost complete responsibility for patient care. Thus clinical and professional ethics could to some extent be compartmentalized from the business issues—a much easier feat when, as in much of the last few decades, virtually all care was reimbursed from some source or other. In addition, many HCOs were not categorized or treated as businesses, although of course they were presumed to be governed by the same expectation for good management as any other organization. (shrink)

Suppose I am now making plans for next summer’s vacation. I can spend a week in Rome or on the Riviera, but not both. Either choice would be excellent, but after weighing various pros and cons, I decide that for my purposes Rome would be better. If I am rational, then, I must choose Rome. It is an assumption of standard decision theory that rationality requires maximizing: trying to get the maximum amount of whatever form of value we are after (...) (usually construed as “utility”). An alternative has been proposed, under the heading of “satisficing” – being satisfied with what suffices, as it were, or settling for an option that is “good enough” – but this may seem rational only when there are costs to determining which option is best that diminish the value of choosing it, to the point where the choice of a less good option really amounts to maximizing. Where there is no serious cost, even in time and effort, to getting hold of something better – a vacation in Rome rather than the Riviera – how could it be rational to turn it down? If we pay attention to the temporal standpoint from which a choice is made, though, satisficing makes good sense. It accords with our common appeal to thresholds: adequate levels of satisfaction or value, such that getting above them is not necessary, though it might be nice. Once we have reached a threshold, it is rational – meaning rationally permissible – to stop. Pushing further toward the best may also be permissible but is not rationally required, where we already have a good enough option in hand. So if offered a chance to move to Rome while already settled happily on the Riviera, I would not be irrational to turn the offer down, even if I grant that accepting it would make my vacation even better. (shrink)

The Parmenides has long been thought of as one of Plato's more mysterious dialogues. The first part is an attack on the Theory of Forms while the second is an apparently bewildering discussion of the One and the Others. It is the contention of this project that in the Parmenides Plato points out and begins to solve a serious difficulty generated by assumptions about being and the Forms made in the middle period theory. ;The dissertation has three major divisions. In (...) the first, several aspects of the middle period Theory of Forms are examined. It is first shown that his acceptance of the Parmenidean analysis of being, combined with Heraclitean views on change and Socratic assumptions about definitions, leads Plato to separate Forms from particulars. There follow a discussion of a particular interpretation of self-predication with an analysis of its role in the Theory of Forms and an examination of the relation of participation. The first section closes with a discussion of certain problems in the first part of the Parmenides. ;The second part of the thesis discusses the arguments of the First Hypothesis, showing that the middle period claim that a Form, the F-itself, must be only f and can neither be nor become its opposite is so strong as to undermine the theory, since it prevents the application of any predicate to a Form. ;The third section examines the arguments of the Second Hypothesis and shows that in that hypothesis Plato begins to solve the problem posed by the First by introducing participation at the level of the Forms, allowing two types of predication to be applied to Forms. The thesis closes with a discussion of the nature of this new relation of Form-participation and the implications of this new relation for the Theory of Forms. (shrink)

This study investigates the effects of making academic space for service learning that emphasizes the importance of active participation in society. We describe several projects of professional practice performed by students at our university with the objective of satisfying the needs of NGOs. The practice will allow for a meeting between academic learning of CSR and the needs of the community, articulated through voluntary practice. The final goal is to guide students through the process of facing the needs of their (...) social context. Through an analysis of these aspects, we will demonstrate how the university can contribute to the formation of future professionals with solid social responsibility awareness. (shrink)

_A study edition of Peirce's manuscripts for lectures on pragmatism given in spring 1903 at Harvard University, with notes, preface, and an original introduction by the editor introducing Peirce and interpreting Peirce's thinking for a more general readership._.

This paper argues that debating the relative possibility and desirability of past reconstruction and present interpretation cannot furnish an adequate response to questions about the character and value of history. It is also necessary to debate whether or not to acknowledge, and therefore engage with, the social and political consequences of historical enquiry, which includes taking responsibility for a relationship with its audience.