In §93 of The Principles of Mathematics, Bertrand Russell observes that “the variable is a very complicated logical entity, by no means easy to analyze correctly”. This assessment is borne out by the fact that even now we have no fully satisfactory understanding of the role of variables in a compositional semantics for first-order logic. In standard Tarskian semantics, variables are treated as meaning-bearing entities; moreover, they serve as the basic building blocks of all meanings, which are constructed out of (...) variable assignments. But this has disquieting consequences, including Fine’s antinomy of the variable and an undue dependence of meanings on language. Here I develop an alternative, Fregean version of predicate logic that uses the traditional quantifier–variable apparatus for the expression of generality, possesses a fully compositional, non-representational semantics, and is not subject to the antinomy of the variable. The advantages of Fregean over Tarskian predicate logic are due to the former’s treating variables not as meaningful lexical items, but as mere marks of punctuation, similar to parentheses. I submit that this is indeed how the variables of predicate logic should be construed. (shrink)

In my Contemporary Critiques of Religion and in my Scepticism , I argue that non-anthropomorphic conceptions of God do not make sense. By this I mean that we do not have sound grounds for believing that the central truth-claims of Christianity are genuine truth-claims and that we do not have a religiously viable concept of God. I argue that this is so principally because of three interrelated features about God-talk. While purporting to be factual assertions, central bits of God-talk, e.g. (...) ‘God exists’ and ‘God loves man-kind’, are not even in principle verifiable in such a way that we can say what experienceable states of affairs would count for these putative assertions and against their denials, such that we could say what it would be like to have evidence which would make either their assertion or their denial more or less probably true. Personal predicates, e.g. ‘loves’, ‘creates’, are at least seemingly essential in the use of God-talk, yet they suffer from such an attenuation of meaning in their employment in religious linguistic environments that it at least appears to be the case that we have in such environments unwittingly emptied these predicates of all intelligible meaning so that we do not understand what we are asserting or denying when we utter ‘God loves mankind’ or ‘God created the heavens and the earth’ and the like. When we make well-formed assertions, it appears at least to be the case that a necessary condition for such wellformedness is that we should be able successfully to identify the subject of that putative statement so that we can understand what it is that we are talking about and thus understand that a genuine statement has actually been made. But, where God is conceived non-anthropomorphically, we have no even tolerably clear idea about how God, an infinite individual, occupying no particular place or existing at no particular time, and being utterly transcendent to the world, can be identified. Indeed we have no coherent idea of what it would be like to identify him and this means we have no coherent idea of what it would be like for God even to be a person or an it. He cannot be picked out and identified in the way persons and things can. (shrink)

In this brief reply to the essays by Edwin Etieyibo, Thad Metz, and Elisa Galgut, I argue that African morality is neither biocentric nor ecocentric in the sense of accepting that “there is no significant moral difference between animal and human slaughter and rituals,” and that African modal relationalism is problematic in both its empirical assumptions and its normative counsel. I concede that anthropocentrism, whether this involves the view that only human beings merit moral treatment or the view that any (...) human is necessarily superior to or more significant morally than any other animal, is not essential to African morality. There exist several resources in African philosophical thinking for deriving a nonanthropocentric and nonspeciesist ethical orientation. The task, however, is a formidable one that requires imagination as well as intellectual consistency and honesty. (shrink)

Paired associative stimulation at the spinal cord has been shown to increase muscle force and dexterity by strengthening the corticomuscular connection, through spike timing dependent plasticity. Typically, transcranial magnetic stimulation and transcutaneous peripheral nerve electrical stimulation are often used in spinal PAS. PNS targets superficial nerve branches, by which the number of applicable muscles is limited. Alternatively, a muscle can be activated by positioning the stimulation electrode on the “motor point”, which is the most sensitive location of a muscle to (...) electrical stimulation. Although this can increase the number of applicable muscles for spinal PAS, nobody has tested whether MPS can be used for the spinal PAS to date. Here we investigated the feasibility of using MPS instead of PNS for spinal PAS. Ten healthy male individuals received spinal PAS on two separate days with different stimulation timings expected to induce facilitation of corticospinal excitability or no effect on the soleus. The motor evoked potentials response curve in the soleus was measured prior to the spinal PAS, immediately after and at 10, 20, 30 min post-intervention as a measure of corticospinal excitability. The post-intervention MEP response curve areas were larger in the REAL condition than the CONTROL conditions. Further, the post-intervention MEP response curve areas were significantly larger than pre-intervention in the REAL condition but not in the CONTROL condition. We conclude that MPS can facilitate corticospinal excitability through spinal PAS. (shrink)

皮膚は自己と環境との境界である。家は公と私を隔て、国境は国を隔てる。これら境界は本当は一体何を隔て、われわれに何を強いているのか。境界を越えるという経験はいかなる意味をもちうるのか。境界を越えて、われ われはいかに他者と出会い、世界とつながることができるのか―。幾層もの境界を徹底的に問い直し、内/外を無効化する流動的でダイナミックな存在のあり方を提示する。身体・自己・世界の関係を考察してきた著者が、 流体の存在論なる新境地に挑む。.

In Section 10 of Grundgesetze, Volume I, Frege advances a mathematical argument (known as the permutation argument), by means of which he intends to show that an arbitrary value-range may be identified with the True, and any other one with the False, without contradicting any stipulations previously introduced (we shall call this claim the identifiability thesis, following Schroeder-Heister (1987)). As far as we are aware, there is no consensus in the literature as to (i) the proper interpretation of the permutation (...) argument and the identifiability thesis, (ii) the validity of the permutation argument, and (iii) the truth of the identifiability thesis. In this paper, we undertake a detailed technical study of the two main lines of interpretation, and gather some evidence for favoring one interpretation over the other. (shrink)

We see a systematic set of cut-free axiomatisations for all the basic normal modal logics formed by some combination the axioms d, t, b, 4, 5. They employ a form of deep inference but otherwise stay very close to Gentzen’s sequent calculus, in particular they enjoy a subformula property in the literal sense. No semantic notions are used inside the proof systems, in particular there is no use of labels. All their rules are invertible and the rules cut, weakening and (...) contraction are admissible. All systems admit a straightforward terminating proof search procedure as well as a syntactic cut elimination procedure. (shrink)

Wittgenstein did not write on the philosophy of religion. But certain strands of his later thought readily lend themselves to what I call Wittgensteinian Fideism. There is no text that I can turn to for an extended statement of this position, but certain remarks made by Winch, Hughes, Malcolm, Geach, Cavell, Cameron and Coburn can either serve as partial statements of this position, or can be easily used in service of such a statement. Some of their contentions will serve as (...) targets for my argumentation, for as much as I admire Wittgenstein, it seems to me that the fideistic conclusions drawn by these philosophers from his thought are often absurd. This leads me back to an inspection of their arguments and the premisses in these arguments. (shrink)

African ethics is primarily concerned with community and harmonious communal relationships. The claim is frequently made on behalf of African moral beliefs and customs that, in stark contrast with Western moral attitudes and practices, there is no comparable objectification and exploitation of other-than-human animals and nature. This article investigates whether this claim is correct by examining the status of animals in religious and philosophical thought, as well as traditional cultural practices, in Africa. I argue that moral perceptions and attitudes on (...) the African continent remain resolutely anthropocentric. Although values like ubuntu or ukama have been expanded to include nonhuman nature, animals are characteristically not seen to have any rights, and human duties to them are almost exclusively “indirect.” I conclude by asking whether those who, following their own liberation, continue to exploit and oppress other creatures—simply because they can—are not thereby contributing to their own dehumanization. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I argue that people have a right to self‐determination when they are plainly predominant in a certain territory and do not violate the civil liberties of minorities. But there is no self‐determination without the preservation of self‐identity and the cultural preservation that goes with its secure existence. So to preserve autonomy and self‐determination people must preserve their cultural identity and this cannot be securely sustained in modern conditions without a nation‐state concerned to nourish that identity. Such considerations support a (...) right to secession when certain conditions are met. The conditions are that the people in question have a cultural identity, live in a distinct territory which they have inhabited for a long time, form an extensive majority, and respect the civil liberties of the minorities living in that territory (as well as elsewhere). Where they are such a group they have a right to secede from a larger state to which they are historically attached. These conditions, I argue, are met in Quebec. (shrink)

It is not quite as easy to see that there is in fact no formula of this modal language having the same truth conditions (in terms of S5 Kripke semantics) as (1). This was rst conjectured by Allen Hazen2 and later proved by Harold Hodes3. We present a simple direct proof of this result and discuss some consequences for the logical analysis of ordinary modal discourse.

Wittgenstein did not write on the philosophy of religion. But certain strands of his later thought readily lend themselves to what I call Wittgensteinian Fideism. There is no text that I can turn to for an extended statement of this position, but certain remarks made by Winch, Hughes, Malcolm, Geach, Cavell, Cameron and Coburn can either serve as partial statements of this position, or can be easily used in service of such a statement. Some of their contentions will serve as (...) targets for my argumentation, for as much as I admire Wittgenstein, it seems to me that the fideistic conclusions drawn by these philosophers from his thought are often absurd. This leads me back to an inspection of their arguments and the premisses in these arguments. (shrink)

Identity, we're told, is the binary relation that every object bears to itself, and to itself only. But how can a relation be binary if it never relates two objects? This puzzled Russell and led Wittgenstein to declare that identity is not a relation between objects. The now standard view is that Wittgenstein's position is untenable, and that worries regarding the relational status of identity are the result of confusion. I argue that the rejection of identity as a binary relation (...) is perfectly tenable. To this end, I outline and defend a logical framework that is not committed to an objectual identity relation but is nevertheless expressively equivalent to first-order logic with identity. After it has thus been shown that there is no indispensability argument for objectual identity, I argue that we have good reasons for doubting the existence of such a relation, and rebut a number of attempts at discrediting these reasons. (shrink)

It is a received view of the post-Fregean predicate logic that a universal statement has no existential import and thus does not entail its particular (existential) counterpart. This paper takes issue with the view by discussing the trespasser case, which has widely been employed for supporting the view. The trespasser case in fact involves a shift of context. Properly understood, the case provides no support for the received view but rather suggests that we rethink the ‘quantity view’ of the existential (...) import of quantifiers. (shrink)

African ethics is primarily concerned with community and harmonious communal relationships. The claim is frequently made on behalf of African moral beliefs and customs that African society does not objectify and exploit nature and natural existents, unlike Western moral attitudes and practices. This book investigates whether this claim is correct by examining religious and philosophical thought, as well as traditional cultural practices in Africa. Through exploration of what kind of status is reserved for other-than-human animals in African ethics, Horsthemke argues (...) that moral perceptions and attitudes on the African continent remain resolutely anthropocentric, or human-centred. Although values like ubuntu (humanness) and ukama (relationality) have been expanded to include nonhuman nature, animals have no rights, and human duties to them are almost exclusively 'indirect'. Animals and African Ethics concludes by asking whether those who, following their own liberation, continue to exploit and oppress other creatures, are not thereby contributing to their own dehumanization. (shrink)

We first look at an existing infinitary sequent system for common knowledge for which there is no known syntactic cut-elimination procedure and also no known non-trivial bound on the proof-depth. We then present another infinitary sequent system based on nested sequents that are essentially trees and with inference rules that apply deeply inside these trees. Thus we call this system “deep” while we call the former system “shallow”. In contrast to the shallow system, the deep system allows one to give (...) a straightforward syntactic cut-elimination procedure. Since both systems can be embedded into each other, this also yields a syntactic cut-elimination procedure for the shallow system. For both systems we thus obtain an upper bound of φ20 on the depth of proofs, where φ is the Veblen function. (shrink)

Many contemporary metaphysicians believe that the existence of a contingent object such as Socrates metaphysically explains the existence of the corresponding set {Socrates}. This paper argues that this belief is mistaken. The argument proposed takes the form of a dilemma. The expression “{Socrates}” is a shorthand either for the expression “the set that contains all and only those objects that are identical to Socrates” or for the expression “the set that contains Socrates and nothing else”. However, Socrates' existence does not (...) explain the existence of the set that contains all and only those objects that are identical to Socrates, because there is such a set no matter whether or not Socrates exists. And although Socrates' existence does explain that of the set that contains Socrates and nothing else, this explanation is a conceptual rather than a metaphysical one. Both these claims rely on a deflationary account of the use of set theoretic vocabulary that is explained, though not properly justified, in the paper. (shrink)

(2011). Diotima's Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to Lessing. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 353-355.

Human rights are often taken for granted, but "What is the basis of human rights?" This is no easy answer, De Xiao Weiqi, in his 2004 book of this difficult the problem. He considered the following four main theories: First, the external theory: the root cause of human rights outside the law, such as human rights divine theory; Second, the intrinsic theory: the root cause of human rights within the law - law positivism ; three, rationalist approaches: human rights is (...) based on rational intuition ; Fourth, experience-based approaches: human rights from human experience, especially experience the experience of injustice. He made ​​the first three theories are severely criticized, and to promote a fourth to experience-based approaches. This paper points out that although the experience of Germany and Xiao Weiqi theory have many advantages, but it is evidence of human rights legislation are vague and inconsistent standards of the Department, and its invention on human rights can not provide more solid foundation. In fact, these issues are perceived more or less de Xiao Weiqi, he repeatedly pointed out that the need for external to the human rights legal standards, I think the divine rights theory is to provide a basis for human rights may be one of the world. De Xiao Weiqi theory of divine criticism of human rights have a good reminder, but I think it still can not rule out the Christ-centered Christian contemporary human rights theory. Human rights are often taken for granted but in fact the origin or foundation of human rights is not an easy question. Alan Dershowitz tries to tackle this thorny issue in his 2004 book: Rights from Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights. He mainly considers four theories: 1) externalism, eg, the divine source of human rights theory; 2) Internalism, eg, legal positivism; 3) Rationalism, eg, the claim that human rights are founded upon rational intuitions; 4) Experiential approach, ie, human rights are derived from our historical experience of serious wrongs or injustice. He severely criticizes the first three theories, and defends the fourth. In this article, I will point out that despite quite a few merits of Dershowitz's theory; his criteria for the validation of human rights are vague or even inconsistent. His general stance of constructivism towards moral and human rights claims, moreover, are unable to provide solid foundations for human rights. In fact Dershowitz is to some extent aware of these problems, and he feels that human rights do need an objective external source, if only it is possible. I think the theistic worldview is indeed able to provide this objective external source. Dershowitz has raised a lot of good questions for the divine source theory but I argue that in the end they cannot exclude the possibility of a contemporary Christocentric theory of human rights. (shrink)

Until recently, most humanities scholars in North America and Europe lived in a world where China was notable for its absence. In the great debates of the 1990s and early 2000s on postmodernism, the end of history, the legacy of Marxism, and the future of liberalism, no Chinese contributions were heard, nor were they in the more recent debates on the relationship between Islam and the West, the post-secular age, genetic engineering, the digital age, or Speculative Realism. Only most recently, (...) with the changed geopolitical situation, are Chinese thinkers starting to receive more attention. In this context, Eric S. Nelson’s book Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century... (shrink)

The probability puzzle known as "Sleeping Beauty" raises interesting and difficult ques tions about the nature of evidence. It appears that the puzzle itself has already been solved, for there is a near consensus in the relevant philosophical literature that 1/3 is the correct answer.' Be that as it may, no new argument for that result is offered here. Instead, an at tempt is made to clarify the nature of certain problems that an answer of 1/3 raises for theories of (...) evidential reasoning. Various approaches to solving the most important of these problems are then considered and rejected. (shrink)

Luca Barlassina and Fabio del Prete argue that the past has changed by appealing to a sentence whose truth value changes after the time to which it refers. We consider various interpretations of the sentence at issue and show that there is no interpretation under which their argument goes through. We suggest a possible source of the confusion and consider what implications the discussion may have for the analysis of tense.

Auditory scene analysis is an elementary aspect of music perception, yet only little research has scrutinized auditory scene analysis under realistic musical conditions with diverse samples of listeners. This study probed the ability of younger normal-hearing listeners and older hearing-aid users in tracking individual musical voices or lines in JS Bach's The Art of the Fugue. Five-second excerpts with homogeneous or heterogenous instrumentation of 2–4 musical voices were presented from spatially separated loudspeakers and preceded by a short cue for signaling (...) the target voice. Listeners tracked the cued voice and detected whether an amplitude modulation was imposed on the cued voice or a distractor voice. Results indicated superior performance of young normal-hearing listeners compared to older hearing-aid users. Performance was generally better in conditions with fewer voices. For young normal-hearing listeners, there was interaction between the number of voices and the instrumentation: performance degraded less drastically with an increase in the number of voices for timbrally heterogeneous mixtures compared to homogeneous mixtures. Older hearing-aid users generally showed smaller effects of the number of voices and instrumentation, but no interaction between the two factors. Moreover, tracking performance of older hearing aid users did not differ when these participants did or did not wear hearing aids. These results shed light on the role of timbral differentiation in musical scene analysis and suggest reduced musical scene analysis abilities of older hearing-impaired listeners in a realistic musical scenario. (shrink)

Identifying the theme of self and death as central to the “Qiwulun” — or Discussion on Making All Things Equal3 — is at odds with a majority of interpreters: they tend to see issues such as the possibility of knowledge and the nature of language or epistemic perspectives as lying at the core of the concerns for Zhuangzi. Chad Hansen, for instance, ascribes a thoroughgoing version of skepticism and relativism to Zhuangzi, a position stating that nothing can be known and (...) no school of thought enjoys a privileged status over others (Hansen 1983, 1992). Some philosophers are reluctant to ascribe such a radical form of skepticism to Zhuangzi. For example, Paul Kjellberg holds that Zhuangzi offers relevant considerations .. (shrink)

There is probably no conceptualization of rights more famous than Ronald Dworkin’s claim that they are “trumps.” This seems to stand in stark contrast to the dominant, proportionality-based strand of rights discourse, according to which rights, instead of trumping competing interests, ultimately have to be balanced against them. The goal of this article is to reconcile Dworkin’s work and proportionality and thereby make a contribution to our understanding of both. It offers a critical reconstruction of Dworkin’s theory of rights which (...) does away with the misleading label of rights as “trumps” and shows that, far from being in conflict with proportionality, properly understood Dworkin’s work supports and supplements that doctrine and provides a much-needed account of its moral foundation as being about human dignity, freedom, and equality. (shrink)

I argue that it is possible to acquire evidence that has no probability, not even zero, prior to its acquisition. If I am right then, contrary to certain Bayesian models of confirmation, conditionalization is not the only possible basis upon which a rational agent will alter her credence in some hypothesis in response to new evidence. My conclusion follows from certain analyses of the Sleeping Beauty problem. Because those analyses are controversial, however, I alter the Sleeping Beauty scenario to generate (...) an obvious example of evidence that has no prior probability. (shrink)

The rule-following paradox of Kripke's Wittgenstein posits that there is no fact of the matter about an individual that can determine whether he means one thing or another by a term, such as "+". The paradox thus renders the existence of meaning illusory. The objective of this thesis is to examine the paradox and try to offer a version of a dispositional account that can counteract Kripke's skeptics. ;Gaining insights from previous dispositionalist accounts of meaning and rule-following, including those of (...) Dretske, Fodor, Millikan, Martin & Heil, Shogenji, and Yallowitz, my project is to put all those insights together to formulate a functional view of human dispositions to rule-following which will resolve the error, finitude, and first-person epistemic problems that Kripke raises against the dispositionalist approach. Specifically, I argue that rule-following or meaning consists in one's possessing a disposition, realistically construed. A rule-following disposition is real in the sense that it is responsible for, and hence not to be equated with, its manifestations under various conditions. A person acquires a real disposition to rule-following through a learning history which is constrained by biologically innate human endowments of learning and cognition. The error problem then becomes the problem of how to identify the disposition without vacuity or circularity. My claim is that identifying a rule-following disposition is a task of scientific hypothesizing, which is epistemically and methodologically sound. The finitude problem is in my view a form of Humean inductive skepticism. My response to it is to adopt a reliabilist theory of justification and its treatment of the induction problem. A distinctive contribution of mine is to offer a functionalist account of dispositions and introspection in the resolution of the first-person epistemic problem. My aim is to do full justice to the phenomenology and epistemology of meaning and rule-following from the first-person point of view. ;My conclusion is that a satisfactory dispositional account such as the one I offer not only vindicates the reality of rule-following and meaning but also increases our understanding of the nature of meaning and human rule-following phenomenon. (shrink)

The method of appealing to considered judgments in Wide Reflective Equilibrium has been thought to have unwelcome relativistic or ethnocentric implications. This belief, which is widely held, is, I shall argue, mistaken. Wide Reflective equilibrium has no such untoward implications. I shall first specify what I am talking about in speaking of relativism, then generally characterize WRE, then deploy some central arguments for it and finally try to show that it has no relativistic implications.

In 1941 Konrad Lorenz published a paper with the title “Kant’s Doctrine of the A Priori in the light of Contemporary Biology”. This essay stands as the foundation of the Austro-German School of Evolutionary Epistemology. As indicated by the title of the paper, the Lorenzians attempt to interpret Kantian transcendentalism along biological lines.Lorenz was, however, by no means the first who attempted to biologise Kant. Philosophers and scientists such as Ernst Mach, Henri Poincare, Ludwig Boltzmann and Jean Piaget had made (...) similar points previously. Nevertheless, it remains Lorenz’s achievement to have formulated his thesis explicitly and provided ample empirical evidence in favour of it.Lorenz’s seminal paper remained largely unknown, and even his book on evolutionary epistemology published in 1973 raised little interest among philosophers, particularly in the English-speaking world. Meanwhile several other biologists and philosophers have joined Lorenz in his endeavour to elucidate epistemological issues through biological research. (shrink)

As part of the roundtable “International Institutions and Peaceful Change,” this essay focuses on the “Kindleberger trap,” a term coined by Joseph Nye Jr. referring to the situation in which no country takes the lead to maintain international institutions in the international system. President Trump's destructive policies toward many international institutions seem to push the current international order to the brink of the Kindleberger trap. Ironically, China has pledged, at least rhetorically, to support and even save these existing international institutions. (...) Based on an institutional-balancing perspective, we suggest that the worry about the Kindleberger trap is unwarranted because the international institutional order will not easily collapse after the decline of U.S. hegemony. Institutional competition among great powers and institutional changes within the institutional order have become two remedies to maintain international institutions and to avoid the Kindleberger trap during the international order transition. What states, including the United States and China, should do is to reembrace and reinvigorate the role of multilateralism in world politics so that the dynamics of institutional balancing and consequential institutional changes in the context of U.S.-China competition do not deprive international society of the public goods and normative values of international institutions. The future international order should not be led by a single country, but by dynamic and balanced international institutions. (shrink)

In "*Must* ...stay ...strong!" (von Fintel & Gillies 2010) we set out to slay a dragon, or rather what we called The Mantra: that epistemic *must* has a modal force weaker than expected from standard modal logic, that it doesn't entail its prejacent, and that the best explanation for the evidential feel of *must* is a pragmatic explanation. We argued that all three sub-mantras are wrong and offered an explanation according to which *must* is strong, entailing, and the felt indirectness (...) is the product of an evidential presupposition carried by epistemic modals. Mantras being what they are, it is no surprise that each of the sub-mantras have been given new defenses. Here we offer them new problems and update our picture, concluding that *must* is (still) strong. (shrink)

What is time? Is time real, or a mere illusion? We seem to feel the passage of time in our consciousness but are doomed to encounter great difficulty when trying to get a deeper grip on the nature of time. As Augustine famously remarked, "if no one asks me about what time is, I know what it is, but if I wish to explain it to him who asks, I do not know". The present essay does not aim so much (...) at giving a complete answer to this intricate and difficult question as to focus on Zhuangzi to excavate the idea of time inherent in his philosophical writings. A second aim is to show how it relates to some of the contemporary concerns about time. More specifically, our concern is not about... (shrink)

It is sometimes thought that belief in God is rationally required of human beings, for without such a religious belief moral beliefs are without any appropriate ground or rationale. Some have argued that in a Godless world we have no grounds for being persons of good will or for doing what is morally required of us. Indeed, nothing in such a world is morally required of us. If there is no God the concept of moral requiredness becomes a Holmesless Watson. (...) A variety of grounds for such a conception of the relation of religion to morality are explored and shown to be unsatisfactory. To make sense of life or to make sense of morality, belief in God is not necessary. Indeed, only if we do have some autonomous appreciation of morality can we even understand the concept of God embedded in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition. (shrink)

Kurt Baier, in a series of important articles, defends the position that there is a necessary connection between rationality and morality. The immoralist, Baier would have it, no matter how well informed, clever, prudent, self-controlled, psychologically perceptive, or philosophically sophisticated, must, in acting immorally, exhibit some failure of rationality. Immoralists need not be irrational but they cannot be up to par rationally. Morality is in accordance with reason, immorality contrary to it. A personal policy of immoralism is contrary to reason.

The very enterprise of philosophy itself became problematical under Wittgenstein's probing. Rorty, extending Wittgenstein's conception and aligning certain prominent features of Wittgenstein's work with pragmatism, argues that philosophy is only problematic when taken as a disciplinary matrix. Where it is viewed as a non-disciplinary attempt to see how things hang together, it is unproblematic. But Wittgenstein himself in effect argues that philosophy in both senses is problematic even when the synthetic side is taken in a metaphysically innocuous way. This conception (...) is explicated and its underlying rationale is both sympathetically probed and critically inspected. It is l\irther shown that no such seeing how things hang together is articulated in his philosophy of culture and that his cultural commentary finds no grounding in Wittgenstein's powerfully articulated metaphilosophy. The former along with many of Wittgenstein's passionately held attitudes toward life, could be rejected and the latter accepted. (shrink)

The interpretation of if -clauses in the scope of ordinary quantifiers has provoked semanticists into extraordinary measures, such as abandoning compositionality or claiming that if has no meaning. We argue that if -clauses have a normal conditional meaning, even in the scope of ordinary quantifiers, and that the trick is to have the right semantics for conditionals.

It is well documented that training the rules employed in figural matrices tests enhances test performance. Previous studies only compare experimental conditions in which all or no rules were trained and therefore ignore the particular influence of knowledge about the easy and difficult rules. With the current study, we wanted to provide some first insights into this topic. Respondents were assigned to four groups that received training for no rules, only the easy rules, only the difficult rules, or for all (...) rules. The results show that a training only for the difficult rules was more effective than the other trainings. This applies also to performance in the easy rules that were actually not part of the training. A possible explanation for this finding is a facilitation of the solution process that is primarily driven by knowledge about the difficult rules. In conclusion, our results demonstrate that taking differences between the rules into account may provide a deeper understanding of the effects of trainings for figural matrices tests. (shrink)

In 1996, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal of United States ruled that a Washington law banning physician-assisted suicide was unconstitutional. In the same year, the 2nd Circuit found a similar law in New York unconstitutional. One year later, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed both rulings, saying that there was no constitutional right to assisted suicide. However, the Court also made plain that they did not reject such a right in principle and that “citizens are free to press for permissive (...) reforms… through legislation or referendums” (Dworkin 1997: 6). (The unanimity of the vote was therefore, as Dworkin notes (1997:1), deceptive.) Oregon chose to do so and legalized physician-assisted suicide in 1997. Oregon’s “Death with Dignity Act” is one of the latest expressions of a medical and legal consensus that has gradually emerged in U.S. and some European countries over the past two decades, that is, the consensus that recognizes the right of terminally ill and competent patients to receive assistance with suicide. (shrink)

In contrast to standard possible worlds semantics, possible worlds in a two-dimensional semantic framework play two kinds of roles, rather than just one. This allows the framework to assign two kinds of intensions to expressions, rather than just one. Its fruitful use in explicating modal operators and the meanings of referential expressions like indexicals has led to two-dimensional accounts that seek to revive the Fregean conception of meaning, or more specifically the descriptivist view of reference, which has fallen into disrepute (...) due to intense criticisms, most famously, by Saul Kripk’s seminal work Naming and Necessity (1972). This entry provides a critical overview of the two most prominent of such accounts, proposed by Frank Jackson and David Chalmers. Unfortunately, there is not space to describe either account in detail, so I rely largely on brief descriptions and plenty of references to primary and secondary sources. More importantly, I rely on focusing on how the accounts explain the phenomenon of necessary a posteriori identity that Kripke’s well-known examples (such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’) have brought to light. Focusing on and structuring our discussions around this phenomenon is by no means just an expository convenience. These cases are of central importance in themselves. They epitomize a large part of the contribution of Naming and Necessity to the theory of reference. This is why section 2 outlines Kripke’s critique of the Fregean theory of referential expressions and section 3 explains rigid designation and identity statements. Section 4 discusses rigidification and the notion of a world considered as actual, leading to the introduction of two-dimensional functions in Section 5. I discuss, finally, Frank Jackson’s and David Chalmers’ two-dimensionalism in Sections 6 and 7. Section 8 makes a few critical remarks on Jackson’s handling of the semantic argument. I conclude (Section 8) by discussing the important distinction between semantics and metasemantics. (shrink)

ARGUMENT ABOUT whether in any significant sense we can derive an ought from an is has been persistent and intractable. Fifteen to twenty years ago it was orthodoxy in analytical philosophical circles to claim that for all their other differences Hume and Moore were right in agreeing that in no significant sense can we derive an ought from an is. At present there is no orthodoxy or even anything like a dominant view and, given our current understanding of how language (...) works and our understanding of moral and ideological discourse, we could not possibly reasonably remain content with old orthodoxies or take the question to be as straightforward as it was often thought to be. (shrink)

What role does audience uptake play in determining whether a speaker refuses or consents to sex? Proponents of constitution theories of uptake argue that which speech act someone performs is largely determined by their addressee’s uptake. However, this appears to entail a troubling result: a speaker might be made to perform a speech act of sexual consent against her will. In response, we develop a social constitution theory of uptake. We argue that addressee uptake can constitute a speaker’s utterance of (...) ‘no’ as a speech act of consent under some conditions, but that this does not prevent us from judging that an addressee committed rape. Second, we claim that addressee uptake is not the only form of uptake that matters—the uptake of other members of the discursive community matters too, and can override the addressee’s uptake, constituting the speaker’s utterance as the speech act it was intended to be. (shrink)