The article aims to assess Hobbes’ methodological legacy. After a brief review of different interpretations of Hobbes relevant to the subject, I center the discussion on the reading advanced by Norberto Bobbio and the notion of three “different forms and levels of rationality”: First, Hobbes’ dichotomy-based reasoning that radically contended the Aristotelian tradition, as well as biblical hermeneutics used by medieval theologians. Second, individualism as a method for collective decision making, one that led to socalled “game theory” and moral individualism (...) (quite significant in contemporary political philosophy). Finally, the rationality of political power that imposes on Sovereignty binding rules for gaining and maintaining power.After the discussion of the three different forms and levels of rationality, the article concludes that Thomas Hobbes, instead of being primarilyre- ferred to as an advocate of autocratic regimes, should be considered, at the very beginning of the long history of rule of law, as one of the key authors of modern constitutionalism and democracy.Resumen:Después de un rápido recorrido sobre las múltiples interpretaciones del pensamiento hobbesiano, el ensayo retoma y desarrolla la lectura que de Hobbes propuso Norberto Bobbio. Con base en esta lectura, se busca evaluar el legado metodológico de Hobbes, el cual se despliega a través de distintos niveles de racionalidad: en primer lugar, el razonamiento basado en dicotomías, el cual desafió de manera contundente la tradición aristotélica, la labor de los historiadores antiguos y la hermenéutica bíblica de los teólogos medievales. En segundo lugar, el individualismo como método para tomar decisiones colectivas, lo que abrió la puerta a la así llamada “teoría de juegos” y al individualismo moral tan notable en la filosofía política contemporánea. Y finalmente, la racionalidad del poder político, que lógicamente impone sobre la soberanía ciertas reglas vinculantes para obtener y mantener el poder.En conjunto, con el análisis de las distintas formas y niveles de racionalidad se pretende respaldar la idea de que Hobbes —antes de ser identificado como un defensor de regímenes autocráticos— puede ser considerado como un autor clave para la democracia y el constitucionalismo moderno, colocado en el justo inicio de la larga historia del Estado de derecho. (shrink)

This article engages the anthropological assumptions underlying the apprehensions and promises associated with language in artificial intelligence (AI). First, we present the contours of two rivalling paradigms for assessing artificial language generation: a holistic-enactivist theory of language and an informational theory of language. We then introduce two language generation models – one presently in use and one more speculative: Firstly, the transformer architecture as used in current large language models, such as the GPT-series, and secondly, a model for 'autonomous machine (...) intelligence' recently proposed by Yann LeCun, which involves not only language but a sensory-motor interaction with the world. We then assess the language capacity of these models from the perspectives of the two rivalling language paradigms. Taking a holistic-enactivist stance, we then argue that there is currently no reason to assume a human-comparable language capacity in LLMs and, further, that LeCun's proposed model does not represent a significant step toward artificially generating human language because it still lacks essential features that underlie the linguistic capacity of humans. Finally, we suggest that proponents of these rivalling interpretations of LLMs should enter into a constructive dialogue and that this dialogue should continuously involve further empirical, conceptual, and theoretical research. (shrink)

What is the relation of logic to thinking? My dissertation offers a new argument for the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking in the following sense: representational activity counts as thinking only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules. In short, thinking has to be minimally logical. An account of thinking has to allow for our freedom to question or revise our commitments – even seemingly obvious conceptual connections – without loss of understanding. This freedom, I argue, requires that (...) thinkers have general abilities to respond to support and tension among their thoughts. And these abilities are constituted by following logical rules. So thinkers have to follow logical rules. But there isn’t just one correct logic for thinking. I show that my view is consistent with logical pluralism: there are a range of correct logics, any one of which a thinker might follow. A logic for thinking does, however, have to contain certain minimal principles: Modus Ponens and Non-Contradiction, and perhaps others. We follow logical rules by exercising logical capacities, which display a distinctive first-person/third-person asymmetry: a subject can find the instances of a rule compelling without seeing them as instances of a rule. As a result, there are two limits on illogical thinking. First, thinkers have to tend to find instances of logical rules compelling. Second, thinkers can’t think in obviously illogical ways. So thinking has to be logical – but not perfectly so. When we try to think, but fail, we produce nonsense. But our failures to think are often subjectively indistinguishable from thinking. To explain how this occurs, I offer an account of nonsense. To be under the illusion that some nonsense makes sense is to enter a pretence that the nonsense is meaningful. Our use of nonsense within the pretence relies on the role of logical form in understanding. Finally, while the normativity of logic doesn’t fall directly out of logical constitutivism, it’s possible to build an attractive account of logical normativity which has logical constitutivism as an integral part. I argue that thinking is necessary for human flourishing, and that this is the source of logical normativity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.3 (2000) 381-395 [Access article in PDF] Minds, Forms, and Spirits: The Nature of Cartesian Disenchantment Han van Ruler What is Descartes's contribution to Enlightenment? Undoubtedly, Cartesian philosophy added to the conflict between philosophical and theological views which divided intellectual life in the Dutch Republic towards the end of its "Golden Age." 1 Although not everyone was as explicit as Lodewijk Meyer, who (...) said that his theological doubts were inspired by Descartes's philosophical method, Cartesianism along with Copernicanism, Socinianism, and Cocceianism played an important part in the growing skepticism towards the authority of Scripture. 2 Apart from Descartes's general method, however, specific Cartesian ideas encouraged a new view towards nature and towards God's role in governing it. In physics and physiology the new philosophy replaced the image of mind working on matter with the image of a self sufficient mechanism. This new causal metaphor led to a typically Cartesian form of "disenchantment." In this article I argue that on account of their approval of a Cartesian theory of causality, even authors with sincere religious motives came close to accepting radical and nearly Spinozistic ideas. I start with disenchantment in a very literal sense: Balthasar Bekker's denial of the activities of devils, angels, and other spirits. A comparison of Bekker's arguments with those of another Cartesian, Arnold Geulincx will, I hope, bring out the nature and importance of what I shall present as [End Page 381] Descartes's "mechanical reduction" in physics. Finally, I argue that the Cartesian separation of mind and body gave rise to a form of disenchantment that reached far beyond contemporary debates. Devils, Ghosts, and God's Omnipotence Balthasar Bekker's classic book The World Bewitched (1691-93) does not so much deal with the practice of sorcery as with its theory. Bekker offers a wide range of theological and philosophical arguments in order to combat the idea that ghosts, devils, and angels influence natural or historical events. In particular Bekker draws some important conclusions from the philosophy of Descartes. Yet it is immediately clear to the reader that the motives for his critique are religious rather than philosophical. 3 The World Bewitched is not written as a scientific assault on superstition. Bekker, at the time serving as a Calvinist minister in Amsterdam, presents his work as a new and perhaps final phase in the perfection of Christianity. For two centuries it had been a goal of the Protestant Reformation to accentuate God's majesty and to establish the idea of His absolute power over creation. Bekker's World again expresses this idea. His denial that ghosts and devils are active in the world is a logical consequence of the belief that there is no room for demigods in nature. Bekker thus adds a final touch to the project of the Reformation. The World Bewitched will testify to the fact "that I return as much of the honor of His Power and Wisdom to the Almighty, as they took from Him who gave it to the Devil. I ban [the Devil] from the World and I bind him in Hell." 4 Removing devils and spirits from nature, Bekker aims to distinguish superstition from true faith. The battle against superstitious beliefs had formed a characteristic element of Protestant tactics. Dutch Calvinists, for instance, took offense at the continuing practices of blessings and incantations. 5 Bekker wanted to go even further. The Protestantization of Christian dogma could only be completed by making everything in nature's course depend on God's unique power and providence. 6 "Science" in our sense of the word was a subsidiary matter. 7 Still, Bekker saw the new scientific theories of his day as useful allies. In particular it was the new philosophy of Descartes that attracted him. Following Descartes, Bekker reasons "that I think, that I will, [End Page 382] [and] that I understand something," without any part of my body being involved in this type of consciousness. Mind and body in fact have nothing in common: My... (shrink)

This essay has two aims. The first is to offer an explanation concerning the problem of form in Umberto Eco’s philosophical research, showing that he deals with it while admitting that form can be a temporary element connected to a system of relationships which may be subject to variability. Namely, his reflection is open to the issue of structure. The second aim is to identify some principles that, according to this theoretical approach, may be considered a basis for (...) a positive philosophy of the arts whose adoption might also lead to the understanding of their most recent evolutions. Focusing above all on the work Eco carried out in the years preceding the elaboration of his semiotic theory, I will pursue the following two objectives. After introducing some aspects of Eco’s philosophical methodology, I will focus on the theme of form, considering it in meta-operative terms in light of Luigi Pareyson’s ‘theory of formativity’ and in relation to the issue of structure. In the final part of the essay, I will then show how this theoretical approach provides significant resources for a positive philosophy that can successfully address the evolution of the arts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.3 (2000) 381-395 [Access article in PDF] Minds, Forms, and Spirits: The Nature of Cartesian Disenchantment Han van Ruler What is Descartes's contribution to Enlightenment? Undoubtedly, Cartesian philosophy added to the conflict between philosophical and theological views which divided intellectual life in the Dutch Republic towards the end of its "Golden Age." 1 Although not everyone was as explicit as Lodewijk Meyer, who (...) said that his theological doubts were inspired by Descartes's philosophical method, Cartesianism along with Copernicanism, Socinianism, and Cocceianism played an important part in the growing skepticism towards the authority of Scripture. 2 Apart from Descartes's general method, however, specific Cartesian ideas encouraged a new view towards nature and towards God's role in governing it. In physics and physiology the new philosophy replaced the image of mind working on matter with the image of a self sufficient mechanism. This new causal metaphor led to a typically Cartesian form of "disenchantment." In this article I argue that on account of their approval of a Cartesian theory of causality, even authors with sincere religious motives came close to accepting radical and nearly Spinozistic ideas. I start with disenchantment in a very literal sense: Balthasar Bekker's denial of the activities of devils, angels, and other spirits. A comparison of Bekker's arguments with those of another Cartesian, Arnold Geulincx will, I hope, bring out the nature and importance of what I shall present as [End Page 381] Descartes's "mechanical reduction" in physics. Finally, I argue that the Cartesian separation of mind and body gave rise to a form of disenchantment that reached far beyond contemporary debates. Devils, Ghosts, and God's Omnipotence Balthasar Bekker's classic book The World Bewitched (1691-93) does not so much deal with the practice of sorcery as with its theory. Bekker offers a wide range of theological and philosophical arguments in order to combat the idea that ghosts, devils, and angels influence natural or historical events. In particular Bekker draws some important conclusions from the philosophy of Descartes. Yet it is immediately clear to the reader that the motives for his critique are religious rather than philosophical. 3 The World Bewitched is not written as a scientific assault on superstition. Bekker, at the time serving as a Calvinist minister in Amsterdam, presents his work as a new and perhaps final phase in the perfection of Christianity. For two centuries it had been a goal of the Protestant Reformation to accentuate God's majesty and to establish the idea of His absolute power over creation. Bekker's World again expresses this idea. His denial that ghosts and devils are active in the world is a logical consequence of the belief that there is no room for demigods in nature. Bekker thus adds a final touch to the project of the Reformation. The World Bewitched will testify to the fact "that I return as much of the honor of His Power and Wisdom to the Almighty, as they took from Him who gave it to the Devil. I ban [the Devil] from the World and I bind him in Hell." 4 Removing devils and spirits from nature, Bekker aims to distinguish superstition from true faith. The battle against superstitious beliefs had formed a characteristic element of Protestant tactics. Dutch Calvinists, for instance, took offense at the continuing practices of blessings and incantations. 5 Bekker wanted to go even further. The Protestantization of Christian dogma could only be completed by making everything in nature's course depend on God's unique power and providence. 6 "Science" in our sense of the word was a subsidiary matter. 7 Still, Bekker saw the new scientific theories of his day as useful allies. In particular it was the new philosophy of Descartes that attracted him. Following Descartes, Bekker reasons "that I think, that I will, [End Page 382] [and] that I understand something," without any part of my body being involved in this type of consciousness. Mind and body in fact have nothing in common: My... (shrink)

The prevalence and characteristics of research misconduct have mainly been studied in highly developed countries. In moderately or poorly developed countries such as Croatia, data on research misconduct are scarce. The primary aim of this study was to determine the rates at which scientists report committing or observing the most serious forms of research misconduct, such as falsification, fabrication, plagiarism, and violation of authorship rules in the Croatian scientific community. Additionally, we sought to determine the degree of development and the (...) extent of implementation of the system for defining and regulating research misconduct in a typical scientific community in Croatia. An anonymous questionnaire was distributed among 1232 Croatian scientists at the University of Rijeka in 2012/2013 and 237 returned the survey. Based on the respondents who admitted having committed research misconduct, 9 admitted to plagiarism, 22 to data falsification, 9 to data fabrication, and 60 respondents admitted to violation of authorship rules. Based on the respondents who admitted having observed research misconduct of fellow scientists, 72 observed plagiarism, 69 observed data falsification, 46 observed data fabrication, and 132 respondents admitted having observed violation of authorship rules. The results of our study indicate that the efficacy of the system for managing research misconduct in Croatia is poor. At the University of Rijeka there is no document dedicated exclusively to research integrity, describing the values that should be fostered by a scientist and clarifying the forms of research misconduct and what constitutes a questionable research practice. Scientists do not trust ethical bodies and the system for defining and regulating research misconduct; therefore the observed cases of research misconduct are rarely reported. Finally, Croatian scientists are not formally educated about responsible conduct of research at any level of their formal education. All mentioned indicate possible reasons for higher rates of research misconduct among Croatian scientists in comparison with scientists in highly developed countries. (shrink)

A large number of scholars have argued that a) Islamic architecture is hidden, in the sense that its interior is not articulated on the basis of its exterior; b) the form of Islamic buildings neither expresses nor embodies its function; and c) Islamic architecture is not tectonic or structural, but iconic in character. In this paper, we use Ernst Grube’s analysis of these three claims and focus our attention on the design of the congregational mosques. This paper presents informed (...) arguments against these claims. We begin the discussion with a clarification of the meaning of ‘form follows function’. A clear understanding of the relationship between these two concepts is indispensable for evaluating the claims that Grube makes in his analyses. Then we argue that the form of the congregational mosque embodies its function in a significant manner. Finally, the paper explains in some detail how the function of a mosque is the basis on which its formal structure is designed. The proposition that we defend in this paper is that Islamic architecture exists and expresses the spirit of Islamic culture. (shrink)

Polanyi’s vision of the cosmic process as undergirded by a logic of emergence common to both the mental life of human beings and the processes of non-human nature can be vindicated if one is prepared to make certain adjustments in the notion of morphogenetic fields with an active center or organizing principle. Given the author’s field-oriented interpretation of Whiteheadian societies, it should be possible to think of entelechies or final causes in developmental rather than strictly Aristotelian terms. That is, the (...) “common element of form” or organizing principle of a Whiteheadian society depends for its own existence on the spontaneous activity of previous sets of actual occasions and yet serves as the ongoing principle of formal and final causality for the present set of actual occasions and still others to follow it. In Aristotelian language, matter and form thus dialectically condition one another and neither is ontologically superior to the other. (shrink)

This paper investigates Wittgenstein's "notorious" criticism of Russell's theory of judgment. Instead of advancing a further new interpretation of it, though, I analyze and discuss some of the most promising readings of the Russell/Wittgenstein dispute put forward in the secondary literature; I aim to show that, despite their alleged reciprocal opposition, they cohere with each other because they are, at bottom, different ways of highlighting the same question. I then connect Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell to the account of the nature (...) of the proposition presented in the Tractatus, arguing that the latter can be seen as a natural development of the former. Finally, I make a quick connection between Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell and the conception of the world as the totality of facts, as presented in the Tractatus. (shrink)

This intensely interesting study of Aristotelian form and universal locates itself squarely in the framework expressed in Scholastic terminology as ante rem, in re and post rem. It aims to show that "the Aristotelian theory of universals is not therefore in re but post rem". Further, it emphasizes "the denial that forms are to be identified with universals, and of course the equivalent claim that forms are particular," thereby maintaining "an in re theory of forms". It acknowledges that the (...) expression "particular form" does not occur in Aristotle, but establishes the above conclusions by "direct evidence" from texts and by "indirect evidence" from passages that have more general meaning, or that are "consistent with" particular forms, or where the expression "implies that the form exists as a particular form". Finally it investigates Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Neoplatonic commentators for support. As it proceeds it makes several important "excursus" on the Aristotelian topics of thought, matter, accidental forms, and abstraction and related issues. (shrink)

The defining characteristics anticipated for any prospective psychophysically neutral language are explored in this essay through the analysis and comparison of two previous approaches. The idea of a psychophysically neutral language was first articulated byWolfgang Pauli in the context of the dual-aspect theory of mind and matter that he developed with C.G. Jung. The first approach discussed is George Spencer Brown's Laws of Form. An overview is given, followed by a review of the critical responses and extensions of the (...) work, particularly Francisco Varela's attempt to use it to formalize biological autopoiesis and Louis Kaufman's development of Brownian algebra. The mathematical basis of Spencer Brown's calculus and its philosophical assumptions and implications are then investigated. The second approach discussed is Marie-Louise von Franz's Number and Time, an investigation of number archetypes through which she continued the inquiry begun by Jung and Pauli. The central tenets of her work are summarized and critically evaluated, and a comparison with Spencer Brown's work is carried out. Finally, implications are drawn for any future attempt to formulate a psychophysically neutral language. (shrink)

That Wittgenstein in the Tractatus likens logic to geometry has been noticed; however, the extent and force of the analogy he develops between logical form and a broadly Kantian account of geometry has not been sufficiently appreciated. In this paper, I trace Wittgenstein's analogy in detail by looking closely at the relevant texts. I then suggest that we regard the fact that Wittgenstein develops his account of logical form by analogy with a Kantian account of geometry as evidence (...) for the bold thesis that Wittgenstein belongs within a Kantian epistemological tradition. Finally, I supply two small pieces of the interpretive puzzle needed to support the larger thesis: first, evidence that Wittgenstein's concern with logical form involves a crucial epistemological component; second, a sketch of how Wittgenstein's account of logical and mathematical knowledge can be viewed as continuing a Kantian tradition. (shrink)

The literature on methodological individualism is characterized by a widely held view that if the doctrine were stated with sufficient care it would be seen to be trivially true. Professor Bhargava questions this view. He begins by carefully disentangling the various formulations of the doctrine, identifies its most plausible version, and finally locates the principal assumption underlying it, namely that beliefs are attitudes individuated entirely in terms of what lies within the individual mind. Bhargava argues that once this individualist assumption (...) is challenged it is possible to rehabilitate a non-individualist methodology which permits a contextual study of beliefs and actions, and even a study of social context relatively independent of the beliefs and actions of individuals. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews Kenneth Dorter. Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues: The "'Parmenides," "Theaetetus," "Sophist," and "Statesman." Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994. Pp. x + 256. Cloth, $45.00. Dorter's title suggests an engagement with Eieaticism, and, certainly in three of" the dialogues, Parmenides was much on Plato's mind. In a book otherwise sensitive to implications of dramatic setting for the argument, little is said (...) of Eleaticism. If the "Eleatic" in the title was selected instead of "critical" for purposes of neutrality (x), "form" and "good" are more revealing of Dorter's approach. The introduction gives a rendering of revisionist and unitarian arguments about the late dialogues, pondering the effects of interpretive style, while Dotter attempts to retain some element of interpretive neutrality without disguising his own preference for finding a reaffirmation, not a critical rejection of the forms. About the forms Dorter would extract two fundamental claims, conspicuous throughout his commentary: forms are "universals, instances of 'sameness' in reality" and "values, articulations of the goodness of reality" (l 5)Keeping these two points in view, Dorter sees all four dialogues united by the method of hypothesis as outlined in the Phaedo, supplemented in the latter two by the more rigorous method of division. Dorter follows the analytic interpretive tradition in taking the Parmenides to raise serious criticisms against the theory of forms; all criticisms have, however, rejoinders anticipated in the middle dialogues. It seems Socrates, being but a boy at the time, is too young to formulate responses to the attack, if not too young to fully and accurately articulate the theory under attack. The generation of contradiction upon contradiction out of the hypotheses about the one illustrates negatively that the unity of form, in particular the form of the good, is indispensible. Forms are recovered in a hypothetical exposition carried on throughout the subsequent three dialogues, each representing a hypothesis that responds one step more adequately than the previous dialogue in the series, each dialogue itself comprising a progression of hypotheses. The Theaetetus argues by reductio for the forms. While the theory of universal flux allows that all things are produced by mixture, a process of"parentage" (75ff.), knowledge is missing one parent, the forms, which are not admitted in the dialogue. Nevertheless, each failed account of knowledge comes closer to the truth, the most promising account being the definition of knowledge as true opinion with an account, where the account is an analysis into parts. This fails in Dorter's view because, in assuming the whole to be nothing other than the parts, it does not say how parts can be intelligible apart from a prior whole. A reader might find it as hard to say how this is a hypotheti- [679] 680 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER 1995 cal advance over the criticisms of the Parmenidesas to say how the Theaetetusshould be called an "Eleatic" dialogue. The Sophist then reintroduces form, but in its epistemological aspect alone. Extensive use is made of the method of division, presented in the commentary as a rigorous method for precise definition, yet the Sophistfails to distinguish sophistry from philosophy. Two reasons are given. The final division locates sophistry under the productive, rather than the acquisitive arts. (The commentary indicates no surprise at sophistry being categorized as an art at all.) Moreover, the method of division makes no use of value, the real distinguishing feature of the two types of art, although Dorter argues that allusion is made to value through references to the Republic'stheory of soul. The Statesman fills in the missing feature by introducing measurement against the standard of the mean as opposed to relative measurement, finally reintegrating both features that Dorter considers salient aspects of Platonic forms: universality (sameness) from the Sophistand now value (the mean) in the Statesman. The commentary finds that the use of division in the Statesman, where it is not strictly dichotomous, evidences a "decline from the rigor and precision of the divisions in the Sophist"(l 8 l), despite the rejection of division by strict halving in the Phaedrusand in Aristotle. Lack of rigor is not, however, a reproach in Dorter's... (shrink)

Conflict can profoundly affect individuals and their groups. Oftentimes, conflict involves a clash between one side seeking change and increased gains through victory and the other side defending the status quo and protecting against loss and defeat. However, theory and empirical research largely neglected these conflicts between attackers and defenders, and the strategic, social, and psychological consequences of attack and defense remain poorly understood. To fill this void, we model (1) the clashing of attack and defense as games of strategy (...) and reveal that (2) attack benefits from mismatching its target's level of defense, whereas defense benefits from matching the attacker's competitiveness. This suggests that (3) attack recruits neuroendocrine pathways underlying behavioral activation and overconfidence, whereas defense invokes neural networks for behavioral inhibition, vigilant scanning, and hostile attributions; and that (4) people invest less in attack than defense, and attack often fails. Finally, we propose that (5) in intergroup conflict, out-group attack needs institutional arrangements that motivate and coordinate collective action, whereas in-group defense benefits from endogenously emerging in-group identification. We discuss how games of attack and defense may have shaped human capacities for prosociality and aggression, and how third parties can regulate such conflicts and reduce their waste. (shrink)

Finality suggests an unchangeable conclusion. It also raises the idea of a goal towards which a reality is directed. This is the sense in which one finds the final cause in Aristotle and other philosophers. Nearly everyone feels helpless before finality. This is because it evokes the spectrum of finitude as it appears to occur in the dead. No one in the prime of life and at the peak of health, wealth, pleasure and hopeful optimism actively desires death. (...) Yet like a shadow, the awareness of a possible sudden end stalks at everyone. It is not the most comfortable feeling. This raises a situation where both the idea and the reality of death must be confronted in order to make sense of life. Has it meaning? Is it destined or free floating? How and when will life end or does it even have an absolute termination at all? Is death life’s last unassailable barrier or just a simple demarcation from other forms of conscious existence in some way? Though often never put into words, failure to engage these questions raises conundrum. Attempts to answer them form and inform cultures, nourish customs, create traditions, inspire inventions, and generally stimulate the human spirit. They keep religions alive, engage thinkers, inspire fidelity to cultural roots and symbols and fire up the spirit of research. It is the position of this paper that confronting human finality is at the service of valorizing human life further. It is like an unseen engine that keeps the vehicle alive. Thus, life approaches death while death serves life. It (death) forbids anyone at the level of the intellect, experience and knowledge from making any absolute positive claims regarding the termination of life. Confronting death psychologically, physically and spiritually requires specific perspectives since each man must face it inevitably in his person and each culture and religion must make sense of it in its own way. That is what this study examines. (shrink)

If the block universe view is correct, the future and the past have similar status and one would expect physical theories to involve final as well as initial boundary conditions. A plausible consistency condition between the initial and final boundary conditions in non-relativistic quantum mechanics leads to the idea that the properties of macroscopic quantum systems, relevantly measuring instruments, are uniquely determined by the boundary conditions. An important element in reaching that conclusion is that preparations and measurements belong in a (...) special class because they involve many subsystems, at least some of which do not form superpositions of their physical properties before the boundary conditions are imposed. It is suggested that the primary role of the formalism of standard quantum mechanics is to provide the consistency condition on the boundary conditions rather than the properties of quantum systems. Expressions are proposed for assigning a set of (unmeasured) physical properties to a quantum system at all times. The physical properties avoid the logical inconsistencies implied by the no-go theorems because they are assigned differently from standard quantum mechanics. Since measurement outcomes are determined by the boundary conditions, they help determine, rather than are determined by, the physical properties of quantum systems. (shrink)

In this paper on Oswaldo Chateaubriand’s book Logical Forms I, I am mostly concerned with the critical task of indicating some shortcomings and stressing my disagreements with the distinguished scholar. The most important shortcoming of the book is Chateaubriand’s unfamiliarity with Husserl’s views on logic and semantics, some of which anticipate views propounded by the former – e.g., the distinction between logical law and logical necessity-, whereas others are more subtle than Chateaubriand’s views – e.g., Husserl’s views on the referent (...) of statements. One of the most important contributions of Chateaubriand’s book is his analysis and rejection of all forms of the so-called “slingshot argument”. On the other hand, I disagree with Chateaubriand’s rendering of some of Frege’s views, though some of these are very common among Fregean scholars. Finally, I assess Chateaubriand’s criticism of Kripke’s views as well as those of Tarski. I tend to agree with his criticism of Kripke, but disagree with his assessment of Tarskian semantics. (shrink)

The main thesis of this excellent little book is that "contrary to widespread misapprehensions, two formally different kinds of utilitarianism, simple and general, and along with the latter one kind of rule-utilitarianism, are extensionally equivalent; that is, analogous principles of the various kinds necessarily yield equivalent judgments in all cases; or, in other words, it makes no difference in theory whether the simple or generalization test is applied to acts or—within limits—whether an appeal is made to rules grounded in utility." (...) The "misapprehension" is dispelled in the particularly valuable third chapter, "Extensional Equivalence," by means of an a priori causal analysis of action situations and an exacting consideration of action descriptions. Furthermore, Lyons argues that other rule-utilitarian theories not extensionally equivalent to the simple utilitarianism of tradition differ from it in the wrong ways. As a result of these two findings the author holds that "any appeal to generalization or to rules consequently fails to escape the force of traditional arguments against utilitarianism." Utilitarian readers who accept Lyons' argument and particularly his interspersed but incisive criticisms of the works of Broad, Harrison, Singer, Harrod, Brandt, and Rawls, are likely to feel that it is best to go back to Mill! But in his final chapter Lyons' analysis of promising and fairness throws doubt on the adequacy of any purely utilitarian moral theory. However this may be, to read Lyons' book is to follow a precise and rigorous intellect, free of current dogmas about value statements, while it threads its way through a maze of conceptual complexities toward substantive philosophic conclusions.—R. B. C. (shrink)

Mimicry is often cited as a compelling demonstration of the power of natural selection. By adopting signs of a protected model, mimics usually gain a reproductive advantage by minimising the likelihood of being preyed upon. Yet while natural selection plays a role in the evolution of mimicry, it can be doubted whether it fully explains it. Mimicry is mediated by the emergence of formally analogous patterns between unrelated organisms and by the fact that these patterns are meaningfully perceived as similar. (...) The perception of similarity is always perceiver-dependent. Similarities between for instance colours are psychophysical phenomena, and their existence is conditioned by an intimate interdependence between perceivers and perceptible reality. In this sense, mimicry is by its very nature dualistic. The analogy in form needed to establish a mimicry does not emerge out of the blue. It depends on the ecological context and the morphogenetic potential of a species. In our proposal, we take into account both the developmental generators of formally analogous structures and the perceptual and cognitive processes that lead to the emergence of mimicry. We show that some of the rather controversial and nowadays largely neglected ideas found in non-Anglo-Saxon literature on mimicry deserve closer attention. We suggest that the diversity of mimicry types is due to differences in variational properties of form-generating and perceptual systems among diverse groups of organisms. We also anticipate that processes studied within social psychology and emotion research probably take place, at least in a simplified form, also in non-human animals. Finally, we argue that these meaning-attributive processes underlie the functionality of mimicry. (shrink)

The goal of this study is to investigate whether different types of structures and lexical tones of Chinese characters cause different processing fluency. In Experiment 1, participants’ explicit affective assessments of Chinese characters with different structures, frequencies, and lexical tones were analyzed. Results indicated that participants showed explicit preferences and dispreferences to different structures and lexical tones. In Experiment 2, participants’ implicit responses to different structures and lexical tones were investigated using a metaphor experimental paradigm. Results were consistent with the (...) major findings of Experiment 1. In Experiments 3 and 4, participants’ recognition of words of different structures and lexical tones were analyzed. Results revealed that participants had a better memory for Surround structure characters when stimuli were visually presented and for Tone 3 when stimuli were auditorily presented. Finally, the significance and implications of this study are discussed. (shrink)

Kant's "Critique of Aesthetic Judgement," which is the first part of his larger Critique of Judgement, is enjoying a renewed interest. This renewed interest, however, has brought with it a renewed controversy over just how Kant's aesthetic theory should be understood. Of the many interpretative questions at issue, perhaps the most fundamental is what it is about an object, on Kant's accounting, that makes it beautiful. Traditionally, Kant has been understood as holding a formalist theory of beauty. That is to (...) say, beauty--or better, our appreciation of beauty--is a matter of the way an object is structured or organized. While there can be no doubt that Kant stresses the importance of form in the early sections of the "Critique," the later portions of the text advance what seems to be a quite different, perhaps even antithetical, paradigm of beauty. In these sections, Kant maintains that for an object to be beautiful it must have some content--specifically, the object must express some "idea." What makes an interpretation difficult is that Kant seems to stand on both sides of a wide gulf in modern aesthetic theory. Within a single work on aesthetics, Kant claims first that beauty depends upon form and, later, that it depends upon content. And, yet, it is typically thought that these positions are mutually exclusive. ;My dissertation is directed specifically to the question of what Kant considers as the features of an object responsible for beauty. Stated broadly, I argue that Kant's consistent position is that for an object to be considered as beautiful we must base our judgment upon how the object is organized , but with an eye to how well this organization is able to express an idea . More precisely, I claim that for Kant both form and expression of ideas are necessary conditions for beauty. To support my thesis I shall follow Kant's own procedure for identifying what makes an object beautiful. In the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgement," Kant considers the issue of beauty from the standpoint of an analysis and justification of the judgment that something is beautiful. That is to say, Kant first determines what is meant by such a judgment and then considers what features an object must possess if we are to claim legitimately that something is beautiful. After closely studying Kant's analysis and justification, I argue that an object can be judged as beautiful only if it is organized in such a way as to express an idea. ;In the first two chapters of my dissertation, I describe Kant's project in the Critique of Judgement generally and the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgement" more particularly. I devote Chapter III to a close study of the argument of the first half of the text in order to determine the extent to which Kant presents a coherent justification of judgments of beauty. I subsequently argue, in Chapter IV, that the early sections do not complete Kant's justification of judgments of beauty. Further, I argue for what must yet be shown for Kant to make his case. In the final two chapters, V and VI, I describe Kant's theory of expression, argue that it completes Kant's central argument, and, in the end, I support my interpretation that both form and expression of ideas constitute the requirements for beauty in Kant's theory. (shrink)

Aristotelian naturalism (AN) holds that the norms governing the human will are special instances of a broader type of normativity that is also found in other living things: natural goodness and natural defect. Both critics and defenders of AN have tended to focus on the thorny issues that are specific to human beings. But some philosophers claim that AN faces other difficulties, arguing that its broader conception of natural normativity is incompatible with current biological science. This paper has three aims. (...) First, we consider a distinctive and nuanced critique of AN’s general understanding of natural normativity put forward by Tim Lewens. Second, after giving a defense of AN, we explore and evaluate Lewens’ proposed alternative view—Kantian projectivism about life forms. We present a problem for Kantian projectivism and suggest reasons for thinking that AN is, after all, the superior position. Finally, we clarify and explain how AN’s claims about life forms and our knowledge of them, relate to empirical observation and to contemporary biological science. (shrink)

Pragmatism is a humanist philosophy that tells an antifoundationalist and antirepresentationalist story of progress and emancipation. While most theoretical approaches since the 1960s have radically rejected the humanist legacy, in pragmatism a particular understanding of humanism has persisted. This persistence of humanism is of the utmost importance, since one can only grasp the unique contemporary significance of pragmatism when one appreciates how pragmatism, humanism, anti-authoritarianism, and postmetaphysics are interlinked, and how this link has gained in importance after the exhaustion of (...) antihumanist theories. This essay combines the endeavor to elucidate the idea of a pragmatist humanism with a discussion of the relationship between pragmatism and aesthetic form. The essay is divided into three parts. While the first part explains why pragmatism is a humanist philosophy, the second part discusses why most pragmatists have been unwilling to consider the significance of form. It develops the central idea that Dewey’s naturalist aesthetics does not offer a convincing conception of form. The final part advances the argument that a pragmatist humanism that refuses to historicize the concept of form and is reluctant to regard the act of form-giving as a kind of poetic agency weakens its own position. (shrink)

Live commerce is a phenomenally innovative form of social commerce in China. In this paper, the authors aim to explore the authenticity of live commerce. By employing a qualitative approach using in-depth interviews and grounded theory, 21 initial categories are classified into six core categories. Among them, authenticity-associated concepts are classified into explicit concepts and implicit concepts. Explicit concepts of authenticity are associated with objectively authentic cues, while implicit concepts of authenticity are associated with subjectively authentic experiences. Moreover, the (...) study explores the relationship between explicit concepts of authenticity and product commitment, as well as the relationship between implicit concepts of authenticity and affective commitment. Both of these paths are found to influence consumers' shopping-related behaviors. Although consumers can more easily perceive explicitly authentic cues than implicitly authentic experiences, this study suggests that the latter may be more effective in inducing shopping behaviors. In addition, the effect of streamer attractiveness on opinion leader building is addressed, while authenticity is found to be an alternative approach to attract consumers both for attractive and nonattractive streamers. Finally, the study addresses theoretical implications and practical implications as well as suggestions for future research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Can Creatures Cause Forms?Aquinas on Cosmology and EvolutionLucas PrietoThus formulated, the question may seem odd. It is enough to look at nature to see that many of the relations that are established between substances are causal relations that results in the production of a form. So, for example, the fire from a match in contact with a piece of paper produces fire, in such a way that the (...) agent causes a new form because it communicates its own actuality. In this sense, at the natural level, we can even say that all production involves the causation of a form. The question becomes meaningful, however, when we distinguish between being the cause of this form inasmuch as it actualizes a matter and being the cause of the form as such—that is, between causing a particular order in a matter and being the cause of the reason for this order.1 Continuing with the example: the fire of the match is specifically the same as the fire found in the paper, so that the former cannot be the cause per se of the fire of the latter—that is, the fire of the match is not that which gives reason for the formality of the fire—because in that case it would be the cause of its own formality. The argument leads us to postulate another agent that is the cause of fire as such.So, we can now ask: can creatures be ultimately responsible (at the created level) for this particular ontological configuration? That is, can creatures cause a natural form as such? Aquinas answers yes, and his answer is of particular importance in explaining the causal order among creatures [End Page 441] and the possibility of true specific novelty in the universe. In this article I will advance how Aquinas justifies ontological novelty by resorting to intra-mundane causes and then show how this causal model allows us to understand the transformism of species (evolution) in a Thomistic framework. To do so, we will formulate our argument in three steps: (1) first we will analyze the notion of form that Aquinas handles in order to understand also how it can be caused in an individual, (2) then we will study the various ways in which the causation of a form can occur, and (3) finally, we will apply these conclusions to the problem of evolution.Form and IndividualFor Aquinas, form is a fundamental ontological principle of the corporeal entity because it structures matter according to a determined order of perfection. By the form we can distinguish between different entities because a formal perfection supposes a certain term or limit of the act that implies the deprivation of the perfection of another form. A dog indicates a certain degree of perfection, but by the fact of being a dog it lacks the perfection of being a cat. Now, in the physical world, we find an innumerable diversity of entities that differ from each other not only in their form or essence, but also as individuals, which shows that, ultimately, the fundamental distinction is not between being a cat and being a dog, but between being this cat and being this dog, or more clearly, between this dog and that dog. Aquinas holds that this diversity and inequality, both specific and numerical, is something positively willed and caused by God as first agent.2 But does this mean that the diverse structuring of matter is produced by a special divine action? That is, is the formal difference the effect of a creative act of God?In the Summa theologiae, Thomas directly addresses this problem by asking whether creation is mixed in the works of nature and of the arts, which is equivalent, in the last analysis, to the question of the origin of novelty in the physical world.3 Indeed, when an entity is generated, a substance appears that is not absolutely contained in the preceding causes. The agent certainly communicates his actuality by resembling the effect to himself, but in the effect, there is always something else that escapes the essential principles. Therefore, how can this novelty of the effect be founded? Before answering this question... (shrink)

The pandemic implied an acceleration of the impending devastation of various forms of public pedagogical life attached to the campus, changing the ecology of study and affecting the sense-ability and response-ability of the university as an ‘association for/to study’ (‘universitas studii’). This contribution sketches two developments that play a role in this weakening of pedagogical life: the establishment and expansion of a hyper-modern learning factory and the creation of the figure of the independent learner. It is suggested that the rejuvenation (...) and regeneration of pedagogical life can be supported by a critical pedagogy that cultivates the art of distinction in order to describe and indicate the distinctions that matter to various forms of pedagogical life and what they make happen. This is then exemplified through a brief discussion of the lecture and the seminar engendering ‘spoken science’. Finally, it is indicated how a rejuvenation and regeneration implicates students and scholars. (shrink)

(Ak 10:74).[1] During the so-called ‘silent decade’ of the 1770s, when Kant was working on the Critique of Pure Reason, he promised repeatedly not only that he would soon finish that work but also that he would soon publish a “metaphysics of morals” (Ak 10:97, 132, 144).[2] Yet it was not until four years after the first Critique that Kant finally wrote a work on ethics, and even then he merely laid the ground for a metaphysics of morals by identifying (...) and establishing the supreme principle on which a system of duties would be based (G 4:392). Three years later, in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant once again dealt entirely with foundational questions in moral philosophy. Kantian ethics is primarily known, especially among English-speaking philosophers, through these two ethical works of the 1780s, neither of which contains anything like a ‘metaphysics of morals’. (shrink)

This paper discusses the different teaching-learning styles and how they can be applied to university education. It is a common misconception that there are only three learning styles: visual, auditory, and kinesthetic. There are nine different learning styles that can be applied to university teaching-learning. With a literature review, these nine different learning styles and how they can be used in the classroom setting will be explored. In addition, teaching techniques and strategies in a university education will be explored. The (...) importance of these techniques and how they can be improved will also be discussed, considering three different methods: active learning, collaborative learning, and self-directed learning, taking into account the integration of technology in its design. Finally, a dissertation will be made on the new forms of teaching for the training of professionals for industry 4.0 and the new labor demands. (shrink)

Peirce was greatly influenced by Aristotle, particularly on the topic of final cause. Commentators are therefore right to draw on Aristotle in the interpretation of Peirce's teleology. But these commentators sometimes fail to distinguish clearly between formal cause and final cause in Aristotle's philosophy. Unless form and end are clearly distinguished, no sense can be made of Peirce's important claim that 'desires create classes.' Understood in the context of his teleology, this claim may be considered Peirce's answer to nominalists (...) and sceptics on the possibility and status of scientific knowledge. On the basis of an improved view of Peirce's teleology, the objection that inorganic physical events do not admit of teleological explanation can be answered. I argue that the non-teleological alternative leaves the laws of nature and the actions of inorganic matter unexplained. (shrink)

As we know, the whole system of Hegel 's thought is based totally on the self-development process of the Geist. In other words, according to dialectical scheme of neoplatonism which Proclus systematized as a triad, μονή-πρόοδος-ἐπιστροφή, Hegel says that the Geist remains in himself, comes out from himself, and then returns to himself. With this process of self-development of the Geist, Hegel tries to explain the realities in general such as nature, history, art, religion, and philosophy. This process of the (...) development of the Geist makes a circle mode with the triadic way of an sich - für sich - an und für sich, but itself as the final destination of the Geist after finishing the whole process, is not a mere itself at the beginning, but the completed itself filled with the self-consciousness and freedom in full bloom. The last moment when the Geist returns to itself, Hegel says it is ‘Ruhe in Gott’. This is the final moment which the Geist as reality of the world and the history arrives and also the conclusion of his philosophy. Then, what happens to this final stage of the return of the Geist to itself, and what does it mean? Most of all, Hegel saw that, as the goal of world history is the achievement of self-consciousness of the Geist on its freedom and the realization of the freedom, this goal was achieved in the self-return of the Geist. And he has seen that the finite and the infinite, which showed constant opposition in the history of Western thought, are united here. According to Hegel, the infinite and finite in the bad concept that came out of the intellect(Verstand) are confronted with each other, and existence and non-existence are substantially separated. However, in the true concept of the infinite derived from reason(Vernunft), is formed the unified moment, in which the confrontations of both parties has been resolved and everything had been included in itself. The transcendence that he advocates is not a transmundane transcendence that is separated absolutely from the finite sensory world in existence and then unreachable absolutely, but a ‘right transcendence’ in which the finite and the infinite are really inseparable and remain as moments of the process of the Geist. In his view, the former which Platonism represents in Western philosophy, is an 'empty transcendence,' but the transcendence that he speaks is a 'full transcendence' that encompasses all moments of the finite in itself. The return of the absolute idea to itself means not only the sublation (Aufhebung) of the finite but also the the sublation of the reality, of the other, of the outwardness, of the abandonment of history, and secures the opposites to those such as ideality, self-identity, inwardness, and trans-historicity. Hegel's Geist as returning to itself has self-consciousness recognizing that it negates and rules the world and the history at the same time. In other words, it is honored and then the glorifying of God has been achieved in the consciousness of itself as the Absolute that it has been the only subject and the sole ruler of world history. According to Hegel, this glorifying of God is the most valuable object of the Geist and history. The Geist that has completed the process of self-development in the return to the itself enjoys the serenity, which is not a 'vacant serenity' but a ‘full serenity’ integrating the finite and the infinite into its inner simplicity. Hegel regarded the transition from the other to being self-internal as a transition from necessity to freedom, and in this serenity the Geist enjoys the freedom that it has in its own nature, as possible as it can. That is to say, in this serenity, the Geist becomes absolutely free and became itself, negating and sublating all other-being(Anderssein). In his view, the "Serenity in God," where the Geist becomes itself and its absolute freedom is obtained, is the ultimate goal of the Geist, and the omega point of the history. (shrink)

The purpose of the dissertation is to present a philosophical reading of Balthasar's teaching on the polarity of expression and form in beauty. ;Chapter I, "Expression," presents the concept of expression in the context of the aesthetic doctrine of Wahrheit. It confronts Balthasar's teaching about expression with an alternate view. On the basis of the clarification achieved in this confrontation, the chapter turns to some major texts from Herrlichkeit in which Balthasar unfolds the structure of expression. ;Chapter II, " (...) class='Hi'>Form," presents Balthasar's concept of form and develops it by a presentation of some historical sources. The results of the presentation are then summarized in an exposition of some of the main metaphors used by Balthasar to describe form. ;Chapter III, "Beauty," turns to Balthasar's thesis that beauty implies the polarity of expression and form. It gives an exposition of the central metaphor of light and compares Balthasar's teaching with that of Dionysius the Areopagite, St. Thomas, and St. Bonaventure. The chapter ends with an introduction to two major developments which converge in the doctrine of participation. ;Chapter IV, "The Expression of Free Interiority in Man," presents Balthasar's analysis of the aesthetic structure of man. The two main questions discussed are how free interiority can be preserved in expression, and whether free interiority necessarily gives rise to a conventional medium of expression. ;Chapter V, "The Expression of God in Creatures," turns to the summit of Balthasar's philosophical aesthetics. It present his teaching on the apprehension of an absolute horizon of free love that lies in the awakening of the human spirit. This teaching is unfolded in a presentation of Balthasar's interpretation of the Thomistic doctrine of participation in existence . The chapter ends by pointing to the center of Balthasar's philosophical aesthetics, developing especially his thesis that the center of the light which appears in beauty remains inchoative and open to a final revelation of God's glory. ;The "Theological Epilogue" of the dissertation presents Balthasar's teaching on the appearing of trinitarian love in the expressive form of Jesus. It describes, thus, the apex of the whole of his aesthetics. (shrink)

This chapter shall mainly focus on strategies of resistance against the alleged neutral perspective adopted by the liberal tradition of social and political theory vis-à-vis the plurality of personal expectations about happiness and well-being. I shall first support that material and symbolic hindrances that individuals and groups find as they pursue happiness, as well as stave off pain and suffering, belong to a set of troubles that politics ought to face and attempt to forestall in the entangled context of global (...) neoliberal society. Second, I aim at tackling how the current provision of global standards of forms of life, spread as a homogeneous norm by large companies and media, brings about large spaces of precariousness, lack of recognition and social death, which are often misinterpreted in public as a subjective uneasiness, when not directly viewed as a personal disability. Finally, I shall explore whether the classical liberal disclaimer before economic and social misfortune of citizens has been seized by neoliberalism as an excellent opportunity to make of liveability an unexpected source of business and profitability, drawing as a conclusion that it engages a deep disrepair of our affective life and health. (shrink)

György Lukács first published the original Hungarian language version of Soul and Form in 1910. It included eight of the ten essays later to be published in subsequent German, Italian, and English editions. This current centennial edition adds to the mix one additional Lukács essay, "On Poverty of Spirit", written at roughly the same time as the others and bearing a vital relationship to them. Finally, in this edition we have added to the Lukács material an important introductory essay (...) by Judith Butler, as well as a concluding essay, by Katie Terezakis, which draws out connections between the Lukácsian concept of form and its elaboration and critique in Lukács’s own work and in works of critical theory and philosophy up to the present. (shrink)

The work defines three aspects of Souriau’s animal aesthetics by stressing their relevance in the context of early and contemporary ethology: in (1), the concept «biological nature» which is interpreted by Souriau as a realm of appearances and as intrinsically aesthetic; in (2), the concept of animal sensibility, which makes it possible to reframe animals’ artistic behaviours and the sense by which such phenomena establish a meaningful relationship with the environment; in (3), the concept of form, in the description (...) of natural appearances, is presented as it enters into the process of institution that, accordingly to Souriau’s interpretation of biological nature, encompasses non-human animals and humans. All three definitions will allow us a), to present Souriau’s critique of anthropomorphism and his proposal of an «healthy» zoomorphism; b) to reformulate animals’ sensibility in a non-reductionistic fashion; and finally, c) to address the issue with the supposedly sole communicative function of animal artistic behaviors. (shrink)

Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal (...) value. The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes. (shrink)

I argue that scientific and poetic modes of objectivity are perspectival duals: 'views' from and onto basic natural forces, respectively. I ground this analysis in a general account of objectivity, not in terms of either 'universal' or 'inter-subjective' validity, but as receptivity to basic features of reality. Contra traditionalists, bare truth, factual knowledge, and universally valid representation are not inherently valuable. But modern critics who focus primarily on the self-expressive aspect of science are also wrong to claim that our knowledge (...) is or should be ultimately mediated by ourselves. In objective science, we represent nature as a field of phenomena determined by and within explanatorily-basic physical structures that encode the causal impact of elemental physical forces. These causally-basic forces hence ground the possibility of objective scientific theory, even though (I argue) they are systematically excluded from its representational contents. I show how my notions of force and field emerge partly through my effort to naturalize concepts of 'God' and 'Laws' in 17th-century natural philosophy. In science, we use the structure of basic forces' impact to see corresponding objects. We do not see these forces themselves—and this relates to the 'transcendence' of 'God'. I supplement this historical analysis by critiquing standard accounts of objectivity, and by synthesizing elements from neo-Kantian epistemology and current 'structural' realism into a view that I call 'dynamic structuralism'. Finally, I argue that physics systematically relies on passive characterizations of phenomena like inertia and impressed force. Dynamic alternatives that are just as empirically adequate are possible, but they are non-scientific. Poetic objectivity involves a direct presentation of nature as an order of interacting forces. I elaborate first by developing a novel theory of the relation between beauty and sublimity, mediated by a basic category of 'sensory force' (e.g. a 'singing' tone in a beautiful melody). I then describe the interaction between sensory and affective dimensions of aesthetic experience, in relation to an original historical analysis of passion and 'disinterestedness' in Kant, Schiller and Nietzsche. I synthesize these lines of analysis into a critique of the role of 'expression' in art. I also resist 'spectator'-centric aesthetics, in this connection, by developing an account of artistic objectivity in dialogue with Ruskin's critique of the 'pathetic fallacy'. I contrast artistic objectivity with Romantic ideals of self-expression, while elaborating its positive relation to certain currents within Victorian and Modernist aesthetics, including Imagists' stress on 'exteriority'. My project creatively extends Nietzsche's view that philosophical and scientific theories are 'perspectival' expressions of theorists' drives. It is a virtue of Nietzsche's account that he takes the outlet of strong human drives in creative acts of theorizing to be just one among many higher modes of 'will to power' in nature—many of which are totally impersonal. But Nietzsche is still too focused on self-expression or willing one's own power. Objective science involves external forces' 'expression' in and through us, not just 'expressing' our own powers. And Nietzsche's vitalistic 'will to power' must be replaced by a basic ontology that better accommodates inorganic phenomena, like the 'lawful' order of celestial motions. Thus I aim to de-anthropomorphize and 'de-organicize' post-Kantian notions of willful striving and organic development, while preserving for force the primary ontological and evaluative status that theorists from Schiller and Goethe to Schelling and Schlegel to Emerson and Nietzsche attributed to will or to life. (shrink)

The publication of The Use of Bodies, the final volume in Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer series, makes it possible to take stock of Agamben’s project as a whole. Having started with a powerful critique of the biopolitical sovereignty as the essence of modern politics, Agamben concludes his project with an affirmative vision of inoperative politics of form-of-life, in which life is not negated or sacrificed to the privileged form it must attain, but rather remains inseparable from the (...) class='Hi'>form that does nothing but express it. The article begins by reconstituting the non-relational logic that Agamben develops in order to render inoperative the existing apparatuses of ontology, ethics and politics. We then address the dimension of lifestyle as a new key domain of Agamben’s work, in which biopolitics may be recast in an affirmative key of form-of-life. While Agamben is better known for sceptical and scornful statements about contemporary liberal democracies, we shall argue that his affirmative biopolitics, characterized by destituent power, resonates with Claude Lefort’s understanding of democracy as structured around the ontological void and epistemic indeterminacy. In the conclusion we question the viability of this biopolitical democracy, focusing on Agamben’s example of the Nocturnal Council in Plato’s Laws. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is an analysis of the transformation of the concept “transcendentalism” in history of modern philosophy. I first reconstruct the Kantian idea of transcendental philosophy. After that I analyze the notion of transcendentalism, its definition and functions in the theories of Cohen and Cassirer and demonstrate that Neo-Kantian understanding of transcendentalism distinguishes itself from the Kantian and receives some features which allow for a transition from theory of knowledge to theory of culture and prepare the so (...) called “cultural turn”. Finally, I briefly consider the main directions of modern transcendentalism and their main features. (shrink)

Society has historically not taken a benign view of genetic disease. The laws permitting sterilization of the mentally re tarded~ and those proscribing consanguineous marriages are but two examples. Indeed as far back as the 5th-10th centuries, B.C.E., consanguineous unions were outlawed (Leviticus XVIII, 6). Case law has traditionally tended toward the conservative. It is reactive rather than directive, exerting its influence only after an individual or group has sustained injury and brought suit. In contrast, state legislatures have not been (...) inhibited in enacting statutes. Many of their products can be characterized as hasty, unnecessary, ill-conceived, and based on the heart rather than the head. Moreover the lack of expert consultation sought has also been remarkable. One state legislature, for example, has advocated immunization for sickle cell anemia! Many others have enacted laws for the screening of inborn errors of metabolism, e.g., phenylketon uria, but have poorly defined the lines of responsibility to secure compliance. A spate of specific disease-related bills has emerged in the u.S. Congress, each seeking recognition and appropriations. Sickle cell anemia, hemophilia, Cooley's anemia and Tay-Sachs disease have been among the front-runners for support. Finally, in 1975, Congress has begun to examine an omnibus bill concerning all forms of genetic disease. The bill, termed the National Genetic Diseases Act is, however, still far from being enacted. (shrink)

This article argues for a viable genealogical approach within critical theory that could settle the questions regarding normative viability of such critique. Then, the implications of the normative inheritance implied lead to the pairing of Jaeggi’s conceptualization and critique of forms of life with Rosa’s dual diagnosis of (late) modernity through the structural lenses of genealogy as tridimensional endeavor posed by Saar. In the end, the final argument is that a genealogical critique in these terms could be the next step (...) towards the revitalization of decolonial studies and a path for direct political action. (shrink)

I discuss Andrea Iacona’s idea that logical form mirrors truth conditions, and that logical form, and thus truth conditions, are in turn represented by means of adequate formalization. I criticize this idea, noting that the notion of adequate formalization is highly indefinite, while the pre-theoretic idea of logical form is often much more definite. I also criticize Iacona’s claim that certain distinct sentences, with the same truth conditions and differing only by co-referential names, must be formalized by (...) the same formula (in the same context). I criticize this claim, noting that it imposes implausible demands on adequate formalization. Finally, I offer some brief remarks on the connection between Iacona’s ideas and the distinction between logical and non-logical constants. (shrink)

The concept of legal gap is tackled from a number of logical perspectives and semantic methods. After presenting our own goal (Section 1), a first introduction into legal logic refers to Bobbio’s works and his formalization of legal statements (Sections 2 and 3). Then Woleński’s contribution to the area is taken into account through his reference to the distinction between two juridical systems (viz. Common Law vs Civil Law) and the notion of conditional norms (Section 4). The notion of reason (...) is also highlighted in the case of Raz’s legal logic, thereby leading to a future connection with von Wright’s logic of truth and an analogy made with an anti-realist reading of truth-values and norms (Section 5). Our personal contribution is introduced through a reflection on how logic should deal with the logical form of norms (Section 6), before entering a number of crucial definitions and distinctions for the concepts of norm, legal statement, and promulgation (Section 7). The final point is a proposed semantics for legal statements, which is both many-valued and gap-friendly (Section 8). A distinction between a number of requirements for permission and forbiddance leads to a set of non-classical juridical systems in which non-permission and forbiddance are not equivalent with each other any more; this does justice to Woleński’s former distinction between Common Law and Civil Law, also leading ultimately to a non-classical square of legal oppositions in which several legal operators may collapse into other ones (Section 9). (shrink)

Daniel Sennert , a prominent physician and a prolific and influential writer, was both an atomist and an Aristotelian. He was influenced by a distinctive and now little known Aristotelian approach to matter and form, and this promoted his development over time of a hierarchical account of atoms, with elementary atoms and grades of molecules. The first section provides a study of Sennert's Aristotelian foundation. The final two sections consider, in turn, Sennert's development over time of an atomistic theory, (...) and the nature and significance for him of substantial forms. (shrink)

This book, the first systematic exploration of the third person in English, German, and French, takes a fresh look at person reference within the realm of political discourse. By focusing on the newly refined speech role of the target, attention is given to the continuity between second and third grammatical persons as a system. The role played by third-person forms in creating and maintaining interpersonal relationships in discourse has been surprisingly overlooked. Until now, third-person forms have overwhelmingly been considered as (...) referring to the absent, i.e. to someone outside the communication situation, other than the speaker or the hearer: the "nonperson". By broadening the scope and finally integrating the third person, we come to understand The Politics of Person Reference fully, and to see the strategic, argumentative, and dialogical nature of the act of referring to other discourse participants, understood as the act of creating new referents. (shrink)

Many assume that Plato's Form of the Good is a final cause. This might be true if one assumes an Aristotelian definition of final cause; however, I argue that if one adopts Plato's conception of final causation as evidenced in the Phaedo and Timaeus, the claim that the Form of the Good is a final cause for Plato is untenable.

The Common Rule originally issued in 1991 and last amended in 2005 is scheduled to be replaced on January 19, 2018 by a revised Common Rule. The goal of the revisions is to modernize and improve applicability of the rule to a research landscape that has dramatically changed since 1991. Translating these changes into action will require comprehensive understanding of the final rule and detailed implementation planning by Human Research Protection Programs. This paper presents select changes that require substantial attention; (...) including for example: expansion of the exempt category, changes to continuing review requirements, changes to the informed consent form and the use of single IRBs for domestic multi-site research. In addition, myriad policies, procedures and workflows will have to be developed, drastically rewritten, or just mildly tweaked. (shrink)

This paper identifies and offers commentary upon a previously un-remarked consonance between Nietzsche and Weil when it comes to the idea of a universal love of the world. The discussion focuses on five features of the Nietzschean account of affirmation, which are as follows: that the possibility of affirmation has the form of a fundamental question at the heart of human life, which has an all-or-nothing character ; that genuine affirmation is rare, difficult or traumatic in an existentially revealing (...) way, primarily because affirmation means facing up to the lack of finality in the world, and in particular the problem of meaningless suffering, which means that affirmation is tied up with a fundamental revaluation. The first half of the paper outlines the parallels between Nietzschean affirmation and Weilian ‘consent to necessity’ in relation to the first three of these, which are also the most general. The second half of the paper explores the fourth and fifth, so as to suggest a way of reading the underlying similarity between these two projects: both are attempts to rediscover the possibility of an all-embracing affirmation of reality in the absence of any existential teleology, and when eschatology has been presumed to be impossible. In other words, both Nietzsche and Weil are compelled to find a way of achieving a transfigured perspective on ‘the whole’ in the absence of any transformation of ‘the whole’. (shrink)