"Case notes." Ethos: Official Publication of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory, (199), pp. 34–35.

Leveraging perspectives from social cognitive theory, the attention-based view, and social networks literatures, we tested the relationship between unethical choice and network unethicality, which we define as respondents’ perceptions of their peer advisors’ unethical choices. Although social cognitive theory predicts that perceptions of peer advisor unethical choice are positively associated with unethical choice, we theorize that the nature of this relationship depends on the personality of the actor and the situation. Results from a lagged study suggest that individual and (...) situational variables may act as key buffers to the adverse impact of unethical social influence on ethical choice. Strengths, limitations, and directions for future research are discussed. (shrink)

Duns Scotus has a remarkably unique and comprehensive theory concerning the nature of justice. Alas, commentators on his work have yet to full flesh out the details. Here, we begin the process of doing so, focusing primarily on his metaethical views on justice, i.e., what justice is or amounts to. While Scotus’s most detailed account of justice can be found in his Ordinatio, we find further specifics emerging in a number of other contexts and works. (...) We argue that Scotus offers a unique contribution in the history of philosophy: justice in God is a formality, in humans a virtue, and when attributed to actions, a relation. Even though formalities, virtues, and relations are ontologically distinct items, each can satisfy Scotus’s preferred Anselmian definition of justice—rectitude of will preserved for its own sake—since each characterizes a will aimed at rendering to goodness what is its due. (shrink)

Democracy has been a flawed hegemony since the fall of communism. Its flexibility, its commitment to equality of representation, and its recognition of the legitimacy of opposition politics are all positive features for political institutions. But democracy has many deficiencies: it is all too easily held hostage by powerful interests; it often fails to advance social justice; and it does not cope well with a number of features of the political landscape, such as political identities, boundary disputes, and environmental (...) crises. Although democracy is valuable it fits uneasily with other political values and is in many respects less than equal to the demands it confronts. In this volume prominent political theorists and social scientists present original discussions of such central issues. Democracy's Values deals with the nature and value of democracy, particularly the tensions between it and such goods as justice, equality, efficiency, and freedom. (shrink)

The enterprise of state punishment requires the use of limited resources for which there are other competitors, such as national defense, market regulation, and social welfare. How resource-demanding retributive justice will turn out to be depends on how retributivists answer a series of questions concerning the theory’s structure. After elaborating these questions and the varieties of retributive justice that answers to them might generate, I consider the resource demands of retributive justice in the context of competing theories (...) of distributive justice. Various tensions and outright conflicts between the pursuit of retributive and distributive justice are then explored. (shrink)

Even though the first book of the Republic ends with the claim that the definition of justice has not been determined, a careful analysis of the details of Socrates’ arguments with Polemarchus and Thrasymachus yields a definition of justice. Polemarchus should have defended the understanding of justice as helping friends and harming enemies by saying that, because one can use one’s knowledge either to help or to harm, a just person will choose to use his knowledge of (...) an art either to help his friends or to harm his enemies. Socrates’ art of wage-earning is not really an art at all, but merely amounts to having an ulterior motive for doing what one does. Socrates’ true position will be seen to be that just people use their knowledge for the sake of helping people—not for the sake of acquiring some supposed benefit for themselves in the future. (shrink)

This dissertation opens, or perhaps re-opens, a dialogue between the work of Emmanuel Levinas and that of Gabriel Marcel. These two thinkers, each in his own way a philosopher of "the other," both provide us with descriptions of the intersubjective relationship. However, the remarkable similarity of these descriptions is matched by a frustrating incompatibility. The remarkable similarity manifests itself in the emphasis both philosophies place on the unique and in some sense inviolable position of the other person with respect to (...) the self and, further, in advocating the service of the other by the self. The incompatibility is the result of two entirely different, seemingly contradictory, accounts of the nature of the other person: Levinas insists the other person is absolutely other, while Marcel maintains this otherness in only relative. ;Following a short introduction, chapters two and three provide a foundation for the later chapters by offering a summary of the work of Levinas and Marcel respectively. Chapters four and five look critically at Marcel and Levinas in turn, identifying problems or ambiguities in their thought, and investigate the extent to which the points of opposition between them are insurmountable obstacles to a reconciliation. These chapters examine both the concrete and pragmatic implications of each thinker's philosophy and the transcendental positions that condition these implications. Chapter six, based on the preceding four chapters, attempts to ascertain why what appear to be responses to similar callings have resulted in dissimilar philosophies. The obstacle that ultimately prevents the harmonization of these two philosophies is a different understanding of "otherness," which is itself in no small part the result of different understandings of how one relates to God. Finally, the concluding chapter offers some brief thoughts on how this dialogue might proceed from here, given the similar inspiration, the parallel exposition and, yet, the fundamental incompatibility of these two thinkers. (shrink)

One of the most emphasized issues in our Holy Book Holy Qur'an is the hereafter. The idea of an afterlife attracts men’s interest and wonder thus all descriptions related to the afterlife are for the satisfy men’s concerns regarding life after death. The Holy Quran includes many verses related to the afterlife. As the Quran is a guideline for both this world and afterlife, it covers many issues, advices, and highlights related to the afterworld.The Great Judgment issue is one of (...) the most recognizable lectures and the verses related to this judgment of man emphasizes that human being will gain their salvation or punishment as a result of their good or bad actions. Those verses also inform us that there will be existed pure and perfect scales of justice so that the case of judgments will be done perfectly and equally. However, there have been notable disagreements for the characters and functions of these scales and for that how human being’s good or bad actions will be evaluated or sophisticated.This article aims to sophisticate the afterlife's scales of justice in its all manners in the light of verses related to the judgement day. For doing so, in this study, those verses have been revealed and their terminological and philological manners have been discussed. Moreover, some of the information from the Quran and the ideas and perspectives of influential glossators of both early and contemporary Islamic world have also been mentioned. It has not been neglected to evaluate and recover all this information for reaching a conclusion. We hope that our work will contribute to the understanding of the Qur'an much. (shrink)

In this paper I reconsider the relation between property and unjust enrichment and respond to a recent argument that actions in unjust enrichment cannot be actions in corrective justice. I suggest that any analysis that regards actions in unjust enrichment as embodying principles of corrective justice requires supplementation by considerations that are, at bottom, proprietary in nature. I argue that there is no incompatibility in viewing actions in unjust enrichment as actions whose grounds are broadly proprietary in (...) nature; that understanding unjust enrichment in this manner does not threaten its theoretical coherence; and that understanding unjust enrichment in this manner allows us to view actions in unjust enrichment as actions in corrective justice. (shrink)

Some of the earliest Western ideas about the virtues of character gave justice a prominent position, but if moral philosophy has made any progress at all in the past two centuries, we might think it worthwhile to reconsider what that virtue involves. Kant seems (even to most non-Kantians) to have crystallized something important to our relations with others in formulating a proscription against treating others merely as means. And twentieth-century moral and political theory put the justice of social (...) institutions in the spotlight in an unprecedented way. Here I explore the significance of these developments for what it is to be a just person (the nature of “individual justice”) as it was originally understood, within the eudaimonist virtue-ethical theories of the ancient Greeks. By any standard, ancient thinking about individual justice seems to have been incomplete in important ways; perhaps, in virtue of these advances in moral theory, we are in position to enrich our thinking about it. (shrink)

Since the war there has been a revival of interest in the idea of justice and its relation to law. The main contributions have come from the side of jurisprudence among which may be mentioned Sir Carleton Kemp Allen, Aspects of Justice ; Potter, The Quest of Justice ; Friedmann, Legal Theory ; Stone, Province and Function of Law ; Paton, Textbook of Jurisprudence ; Goodhart, English Law and the Moral Law ; H. L. Hart, The Concept (...) of Law ; E. Dowrick, Justice According to English Common Lawyers ; there have also appeared English translations of important continental contributions, such as the translation by Campbell of Del Vecchio's Justice ; by C. D. Broad of Axel Hägerströms's Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals and the work by Alf Ross On Law and Justice. (shrink)

This article isolates ten prepositions, which constitute the undercurrent paradigm of contemporary discourse of health disease and medicine. Discussion of the interrelationship between those prepositions leads to a systematic refutation of this paradigm. An alternative set is being forwarded. The key notions of the existing paradigm are that health is the natural condition of humankind and that disease is a deviance from that nature. Natural things are harmonious and healthy while human made artifacts are coercive interference with natural balance. (...) It is suggested that the current paradigm is influenced by the world of finances and by instrumental reason. The alternative model suggests that human nature cannot be delineated. Humans fashion their own selves and nature by artificial means, medicine among them. The article discusses the implications of the paradigm adapted in various scholarly and popular debates such as the use of sex hormones for contraception, the care of the elderly, holistic medicine and distributive justice in health care. Medicine is not an isolated or a privileged realm. There is no unique entitlement to health care. It is always part of a broader agenda of social values and institutions. A open view of human societies, values and practices as they are situated within concrete material conditions is the platform required for an integrative and creative discourse of health care. (shrink)

Featuring a new, explanatory Foreword by Justice Cardozo's premier biographer, this renowned and much-used analysis of the process of judicial decision-making includes embedded page numbers from the original 1921 edition for continuity of citations and syllabi.

Although the importance of measuring and reporting the social and environmental impact of organisational action is increasingly well recognised by both organisations and society at large, existing approaches to impact measurement are still far from being universally accepted. In this context, the stakeholder dynamics within the nascent field of impact investing demonstrate the complexity of resolving potentially differing perspectives on key impact measurement issues such as materiality. This paper argues, from an organisational perspective, that such arenas of contestation can be (...) conceptualised in terms of social justice. Specifically, we draw upon Sen’s notions of ‘arrangement and realisation’ to explore the dynamics of contestation across a range of stakeholders concerning materiality judgements to suggest that such ‘arrangements’ may lead to suboptimal impact outcomes as ‘realisations.’ Our analysis of the nature of materiality contestations in impact measurement reveals the conflicts, tensions and paradoxes evident in this field of action. Empirically, we examine data drawn from 19 cases and 33 interviews. The analysis suggests three arenas of contestation around the materiality of impact measurement: the power dynamics between economically powerful investors and objectified investees; the conflicts between materiality norms and standards; and the interactions between all stakeholders with differing motivations towards radical or incremental materiality. Building upon this analysis, we then discuss how arenas of contested materiality may be mediated by drawing upon Sen’s notions of transcending the individual interests of the invested parties for the greater good via processes of contextualisation and case-specificity. (shrink)

A collection of the author's new and reprinted papers in general jurisprudence. Chapters: -/- Introduction: A Philosophy of Legal Philosophy -/- Law, As Such 1. The Concept of Law Revisited 2. Law as a Means 3. Custom and Convention at the Foundations of Law 4. Realism and the Sources of Law 5. Feminism in Jurisprudence -/- Law and Morality 6. The Germ of Justice 7. The Inseparability of Law and Morals 8. The Morality in Law 9. The Role of (...) a Judge 10. Should Law Improve Morality? -/- The Demands of Law 11. Hume on Allegiance 12. Associative Obligations and the State 13. The Forces of Law 14. The Duty to Govern. (shrink)

David Hume famously states, in his A Treatise of Human Nature, “that ’tis only from the selfishness and confin’d generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin”.1 This is Hume’s summary of the conditions under which the very idea of rules of justice makes practical sense, and he effectively repeats it in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.2 To put it briefly at the outset, (...) Hume’s point is simply this: if there was either a superabundance or drastic scarcity of resources, or if everyone were either completely and unfailingly virtuous or completely and unfailingly wicked, we would not need rules. (shrink)

The critical environmental justice (CEJ) framework contends that inequalities are sustained through intersecting social categories, multi-scalarity, the perceived expendability of marginalized populations, and state-vested power. While this approach offers new pathways for environmental justice research, it overlooks the role of firms, suggesting a departure from long-standing political-economic theories, such as the treadmill of production (ToP), which elevate the importance of producers. In focusing on firms, we ask: how do firms operationalize diverse social forces to produce environmental injustice? What (...) organizational logics sustain these inequalities? To understand the firm-level dynamics shaping treadmill acceleration and environmental injustice, we utilize two concepts—social embeddedness and managerial authority—from economic sociology research on firms. The former refers to the social and non-economic factors that guide economic decision-making, whereas the latter refers to the power that reinforces worksite hierarchies. This theoretical paper argues that social embeddedness and managerial authority interact within firms to produce an organizational logic that sustains environmental injustice and ecological disorganization. We draw from historical and contemporary evidence on sugarcane plantations in Latin America and the Caribbean, with cases ranging from the colonial period to the present day. By bringing economic sociological concepts to bear on the CEJ and ToP frameworks, we advance debates on how firm-level dynamics shape environmental inequalities. (shrink)

Through an extensive examination of the conceptions of social justice that may be ascribed validly to Karl Marx's political thougtht, Elliot R. Pruzan analyzes the apparent conflict between Marx as value-neutral social scientist and as revolutionary. He suggests a resolution to this conflict through a carefully constructed presentation of Marx's theory of human nature and the ethical presuppositions of that theory. In so doing, Pruzan identifies those elements of Marx's political thought that warrant our continued serious consideration of (...) it as a genuine theory of politics, especially when compared with other more traditionally conceived forms of political thought. (shrink)

WHENCE COMES the idea of justice? The question may seem strange. Yet Hume devoted one entire section of A Treatise of Human Nature to "The origin of justice and property" and returned to the problem in Section III of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, and John Stuart Mill developed a rival theory in the last chapter of Utilitarianism.

In this article, I analyze the circumstances of justice, that is, the background conditions that are necessary and sufficient for justice to exist between individual parties in society. Contemporary political philosophers almost unanimously accept an account of these circumstances attributed to David Hume. I argue that the conditions of this standard account are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for justice. In particular, I contend that both a Hobbesian state of nature and a prisoner’s dilemma are cases (...) in which the conditions of the standard account obtain and yet no justice exists between parties. I propose an alternative set of generic circumstances of justice motivated by examples from game theory. Parties are in these generic circumstances with respect to each other when: (1) they are engaged in a conflictual coordination game with multiple strict Nash equilibrium points where, at any of these equilibria, some parties do not receive their greatest payoffs, and (2) they have common knowledge that each party is rational and follows her end of a strict equilibrium where no party receives her greatest payoff. These two conditions reflect the idea that justice requires all parties to make some sacrifices so that others can have more of the goods they need and want. I argue that these generic circumstances are necessary and sufficient conditions for parties to follow generic norms of justice, that is, mutually beneficial practices that require some sacrifices. Key Words: common knowledge • conflictual coordination • correlated equilibrium • moderate selfishness • moderate variable scarcity • rough equality. (shrink)

Do motivational limitations due to human nature constrain the demands of justice? Among those who say no, David Estlund offers perhaps the most compelling argument. Taking Estlund’s analysis of “ability” as a starting point, I show that motivational deficiencies can constrain the demands of justice under at least one common circumstance — that the motivationally-deficient agent makes a good faith effort to overcome her deficiency. In fact, my argument implies something stronger; namely, that the demands of (...) class='Hi'>justice are constrained by what people are sufficiently likely to be motivated to do. Thus, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, it is the business of ideal theory — not just nonideal theory — to work with the motivational capacities people are likely enough to have. (See also Estlund's reply in the same issue of EJPT and my rejoinder on Philpapers.). (shrink)

Many theorists claim that justice is a question-begging concept that has no inherent substantive content. They point to disagreements among justice theorists themselves about basic aspects of the justice theory, such as the nature of corrective justice and the distinction between it and distributive justice, as even further reason to dismiss the concept of justice or to fill it with their preferred theoretical content. Yet most persons perceive that the concept of justice (...) is not an empty shell. Since ancient times it has been thought to encompass not merely a formal equality (treating like cases alike), but also a substantive equality grounded in the equal dignity of each human being which requires giving each person his or her "due" - what is his or hers as a matter of right - a requirement that is usually understood to be in direct conflict with the basic principles of aggregate social welfare theories such as utilitarianism or its modern variant, economic efficiency. The elaboration of this substantive equality and its implications for morality, justice, and law form the core of the natural-law or natural-right theories of law. In this article I build upon a summary and critique of John Finnis's natural law theory (1) to delineate the basic assumptions and principles of the natural law theory regarding the foundations of and relationships among morality, justice, and law; (2) to demonstrate the agreement of major natural law theorists, from Aristotle through Aquinas and Kant to Finnis, on these basic assumptions and principles; (3) to distinguish these basic assumptions and principles from those of the competing theories of utilitarianism and economic efficiency; and (4) to clarify the nature of and distinctions between the two basic divisions of substantive justice: distributive justice and interactive justice. I use the term "interactive justice" instead of the usual term, "corrective justice," since the former term is much more informative and precise in conveying the distinct nature and domain of this type of justice, whereas the latter term almost always misleads people into one or both of two related misconceptions: (1) that "corrective" justice is concerned solely with the correction of wrongful injuries and has nothing to say about the nature of the underlying wrongs or the prevention of their occurrence, and (2) that it is merely a remedial corollary of distributive justice which corrects deviations from the distributively just distribution. Distributive justice and interactive justice separately address the two fundamental problems of human existence, and they employ quite different criteria of equality to resolve those problems. Together, they seek to assure the attainment of the common good (the full realization, to the extent practicable, of each person's humanity) by providing each person with her fair share of the social stock of instrumental goods (positive freedom via distributive justice) and by securing her person and her existing stock of instrumental goods from interactions with others that are inconsistent with her status as a rational being with equal, absolute moral worth (negative freedom via interactive justice). (shrink)

This article examines Hesiod’s Chaos and Anaximander’s apeiron individually and in relation to each other through the frame of René Descartes’ notion of natural geometry and through bounds and limits in Euclid and Immanuel Kant. Thanks to this frame, it shows that, in his poetic vision, Hesiod saw in Chaos the act of bounding such that different things can appear while, in his speculative vision, Anaximander saw in the apeiron the self-limiting limit of bounded things, which is to say, time (...) as distinct from the temporality of bounded things resulting from Chaos. Thus, together, Chaos and the apeiron present the spatiotemporal order of the world. Finally, delving further into Anaximander’s fragment shows that the justice ruling over all includes the apeiron as the time foundational to temporality, meaning justice is without foundation and therefore anarchic. (shrink)

It has long been the habit of philosophers, and is still a common failing of ordinary playgoers, to see tragedy through the coloured spectacles of an acquired philosophical or religious outlook, and to commend or condemn rather from the standpoint of partiality for a certain view about life in general than from that of one assessing the intrinsic merits of a work of art. Because we all, whether laymen or specialists, theorize about the nature and destiny of that mysterious (...) universe which, for a brief span, our minds illumine, and because the working hypothesis so engendered is inevitably tinged by our personal idiosyncrasies of temperament and taste, there have been—and, building on such a foundation, there must be—almost as many different theoretical explanations of the tragic as theoreticians speculating on this high theme. Besides introducing that personal equation which has always been anathema to science, the distorted vision for which philosophical preconceptions are responsible brings with it minor illusions that are scarcely less injurious; the reading into a play or a novel of notions that had never entered the poet's brain, or the interpolation of history with incidents that never really occurred, the discarding of much that is genuinely tragic because it happens not to fit into the mould shaped by our own ideas, and the acceptance of much that is not merely untragic, but actually inartistic—pacifist, or communist, or feminist, or religious propaganda—because it happens to display the native hue of our own convictions. (shrink)

. The nature of crime: A synthesis, following the three perspectives offered in the grammar of criminal law. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 91-98.

In this article, part of a symposium devoted to Hennie Lötter’s Poverty, Ethics and Justice, my aims are threefold. First, I present a careful reading of Lötter’s original and compelling central conception of the nature of poverty as the inability to ‘obtain adequate economic resources….to maintain physical health and engage in social activities distinctive of human beings in their respective societies’. After motivating this view, particularly in comparison to other salient accounts of poverty, I, second, raise some objections (...) to it, regarding relativistic implications that it has. Third, I propose another, more universalist conception of the nature of poverty, which is inspired by some of Lötter’s other remarks and which is all the stronger. According to this view, people are more poor, the less they can obtain adequate economic resources to pursue a wide array of finally valuable activities and states characteristic of human beings. I conclude by briefly pointing out how this view merits critical comparison with related views, such as Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach. (shrink)

The idea that a just political system must ignore or nullify socially caused initial advantages in competing for positions and other social benefits is as old as political philosophy itself. Plato called for social mobility among his classes so that all could gravitate toward the classes for which their temperaments naturally suited them. The idea that the system must take positive steps to correct for these differences among individuals is likewise as old as the concept of public education, the supposed (...) great equalizer. But the claim that society must correct also for natural differences among individuals – differences in intelligence, talents, beauty, and physical prowess – is far more recent, having been articulated most forcefully by Rawls. The reasoning underlying this further step toward a more radical notion of equal opportunity appeals to the fact that natural differences are equally arbitrary from a moral point of view as a basis for differential rewards as are socially caused differences. A person no more deserves to be born smart than rich. Why then should the former but not the latter be allowed to influence future benefits and rewards? A negative answer, however, creates a tension within a liberal theory of justice between the demand to nullify natural differences, or to use them to the benefit of those least well endowed, and the demand to respect distinct individuals that supposedly grounds such a theory. (shrink)

The work of Paulo Freire, while remaining important to many educators, has been challenged by some postmodernist arguments. In particular, the pursuit of justice becomes difficult, or at least more complicated, when the concept of difference is taken seriously. This paper reconsiders the Freirean commitment to justice in the light of ideas from Young and Pavlich and Ratner, Critical theory, poststructuralism and the social context, Palmerston North: Dunmore Press). How might the work of Paulo Freire accommodate these ideas (...) and what demands do they place on his philosophy? In addressing this question, I focus on three key themes in contemporary debates over pedagogy and justice: the notion that the individual is produced; the significance of difference; and the idea that justice is context dependent and multiple. I argue that given Freire’s emphasis in later publications on the produced and unfinished self and his recognition of the multilayered nature of oppression, Freirean theory continues to have much to offer to these debates. (shrink)

The “motive of justice” is ambiguous between three quite different categories of motivation. These are: the motive to perform a particular just act; the motive to set up institutions of justice, most particularly the conventions or “artifices” which regulate and establish property; and a motivational disposition, or essential part of a complex of motivational dispositions, that is characteristic of a person with the virtue of justice. The question now arises: Can justice as a basic virtue be (...) understood as having at its core a natural motive which is expressed in its various differentiated forms? More particularly, could Hume find such a motive? This chapter argues that compassion can be seen as just that natural motive. It considers two problems for the understanding of compassion as the natural motive for justice in sense, in relation to Hume's theory of the passions. (shrink)

The idea that a just political system must ignore or nullify socially caused initial advantages in competing for positions and other social benefits is as old as political philosophy itself. Plato called for social mobility among his classes so that all could gravitate toward the classes for which their temperaments naturally suited them. The idea that the system must take positive steps to correct for these differences among individuals is likewise as old as the concept of public education, the supposed (...) great equalizer. But the claim that society must correct also for natural differences among individuals – differences in intelligence, talents, beauty, and physical prowess – is far more recent, having been articulated most forcefully by Rawls. The reasoning underlying this further step toward a more radical notion of equal opportunity appeals to the fact that natural differences are equally arbitrary from a moral point of view as a basis for differential rewards as are socially caused differences. A person no more deserves to be born smart than rich. Why then should the former but not the latter be allowed to influence future benefits and rewards? A negative answer, however, creates a tension within a liberal theory of justice between the demand to nullify natural differences, or to use them to the benefit of those least well endowed, and the demand to respect distinct individuals that supposedly grounds such a theory. (shrink)

This article sets out and comments on the arguments of Binmore 's Natural Justice, and specifically on the empirical hypotheses that underpin his social contract view of the foundations of justice. It argues that Binmore 's dependence on the hypothesis that individuals have purely self-regarding preferences forces him to claim that mutual monitoring of free-riding behavior was sufficiently reliable to enforce cooperation in hunter-gatherer societies, and that this makes it hard to explain why intuitions about justice could (...) have evolved, since in such a society intuitions about justice would have had no adaptive advantage. I argue that it is empirically plausible that human beings display systematic other-regarding preferences. These could be incorporated into Binmore 's general framework in a way that would enrich it and make it more useful for solving practical problems about justice. Key Words: natural justice • fairness • norms • evolution • self-regarding preferences • Rawls • social contract. (shrink)

Justice, according to Thomas Aquinas, is a personal virtue. Modern theorists, by contrast, generally treat justice as a virtue of social institutions. Jean Porter rightly argues that both perspectives are necessary. But how should we conceive the relationship between the virtue of justice and the justice of institutions? I address this question by drawing from Aquinas’s account of the role of the convention of money in mediating relations of just exchange. Developing Aquinas’s account, I defend two (...) conclusions and raise one problem. The conclusions are: Aquinas does presuppose the need for just institutions in just relations; Aquinas highlights the importance of an underappreciated consideration: the way institutions mediate just or unjust relationships. The problem, which naturally arises from bringing together the virtue of justice and the justice of institutions, is whether and how individuals can act justly in a context of structural injustice. (shrink)

Principles of distributive justice bind macro-level institutional agents, like the state. But what does justice require in non-ideal circumstances, where institutional agents are unjust or do not e...

This article suggests that the inconsistency between collective and personal conceptions of justice in the "republic" is an intentional platonic statement, reflecting the dialogue's distinction between opinion and knowledge. The five parts of the analysis consider the demands put forward by glaucon and adeimantus at the outset of book 2; the function of the city in speech; the two applications of justice in book 4; the relationship between philosophy and the consideration of the concept of justice; and (...) the dimensions which a concern for justice has for the distinction between opinion and knowledge. (shrink)

Jurisprudence has up until recently largely neglected international law as a subject of philosophizing. The Nature of International Law tries to offset against this deficiency by providing a comprehensive explanatory account of international law. It does so within an analytical tradition, albeit within the one which departs from the nowadays dominant method of the metaphysically-driven conceptual analysis. Instead, it adopts the prototype theory of concepts, which is directed towards determining typical features constitutive of the nature of international law. (...) The book's central finding is that those features are: normativity, institutionalization, coercive guaranteeing, and justice-aptness. Since typical features are context sensitive, their specificities at the international level are further elucidated. The book, finally, challenges the often raised claim that fragmentation is international law's unique feature by demonstrating that international institutional actors, particularly adjudicative ones, largely perceive themselves as officials of a unified legal order. (shrink)

This article tries to explain why it was impossible for Rawls to develop a normative theory of justice for international relations; something that has been demanded by some rawlsian thinkers (Beitz, Pogge, etc.). There were two obstacles for such an enterprise. On one hand, the link established by the philosophical tradition between justice, as a political virtue, and the political unity (polis, national-state, etc.). On the other hand, Rawls’ meta-philosophical decisions, which make his a ‘post-metaphysical’ and ‘strictly political’ (...) theory of justice. (shrink)

In Natural Justice Binmore offers a game-theoretic map to the landscape of human morality. Following a long tradition of such accounts, Binmore’s argument concerns the forces of biological and cultural evolution that have shaped our judgments about the appropriate distribution of resources. In this sense, Binmore focuses on the morality of outcomes. This is a valuable perspective to which we add a friendly amendment from our own research: moral judgments appear to depend on process just as much as outcome. (...) What matters is not just that the butler is dead, but who killed him, how, and for what reason. Thus, a complete understanding of natural justice’ will entail an account not only of evolutionary pressures, but also of the psychological mechanisms upon which they act. (shrink)

Robert Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation is among the notable contributions made to mainstream jurisprudence in the last three decades. Remaining true to its rational discursive mission, it engages with both analytical positivism and natural law theories. A recent collection of essays edited by George Pavlakos explores Alexy’s theory from a number of philosophical standpoints, revealing its theoretical potential and flaws. By doing so, this volume helps us to gain a better understanding of the implications of Alexy’s theory of legal (...) argumentation, but also to identify new areas of research within the discourse theory of law. Although this collection is concerned with a critical examination of various aspects of Alexy’s work, it nonetheless draws attention to the dual characteristics of positive law, that is, the problematic separation of facts from values, law from morality, legal certainty from justice, which continue to preoccupy legal theory. In what follows I shall attempt to examine the debate between Alexy and the contributors to Pavlakos’s volume in order to gain a deeper understanding of the role of dichotomies in legal theory. Part 1 starts by explaining the theoretical background against which I have read the debate on Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation. I have explored the role of dichotomies in socio-legal research elsewhere. However, in the following pages, I shall use Alan Norrie’s critical examination of antinomies to throw light on some of the shortcomings of Alexy’s theory and also to discuss the concerns of mainstream jurisprudence. In that sense, this essay presents both Norrie’s and Alexy’s works, using the former to critically assess the latter. In Part 2, I briefly sketch the layout of Pavlakos’s collection to provide an overview of the type of questions that are discussed by the various contributors. Parts 3 and 4 bring into focus two issues that loom large in the collection. The first issue is Alexy’s central thesis on law’s claim to correctness, while the second concerns the duality of law exemplified by the attempts of mainstream jurisprudence to cope with the tension between the positivist notion of law and the idea of justice. In Part 5, I conclude the essay by reflecting on some of the implications of Alexy’s thesis. (shrink)

In the article, I examine Hélène Cixous's play La Ville parjure ou le Réveil des Erinyes as a political contribution to the debate over memory and justice. The focus is on the question of how the telling of a story of atrocities may be therapeutic to both the victim and to society. I stress Cixous's alternative way of addressing justice: through forgiveness instead of criminal prosecution or other forms of retribution or reconciliation. Referring to Jacques Derrida's work, the (...) main argument revolves around the question of whether forgiveness for unspeakable crimes should be unconditional or conditional. Instead of seeing Cixous's play as an unequivocal stance on restorative justice in general, and on conditional forgiveness in particular, I stress that the main protagonist, the Mother, is not willing to forgive the crime itself because of its unforgivable nature. (shrink)