Search results for 'Joel Sobel' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  7
    Moustafa Bensafi, Christina Zelano, Brad Johnson, Joel Mainland, Rehan Khan & Noam Sobel (2004). 19 Olfaction: From Sniff to Percept. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences Iii. MIT Press
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  2.  18
    Joel Sobel (2002). Putting Altruism in Context. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):275-276.
    I argue that Rachlin's notion of self-control is imprecise and not well suited to the discussion of altruism. Rachlin's broader agenda, to improve collective welfare by identifying behavioral mechanisms that increase altruism, neglects the fact that altruism is neither necessary nor sufficient for desirable social outcomes.
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  3. Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg, Rysiek Śliwiński & Jordan Howard Sobel (eds.) (2009). Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz: Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel. Dept. Of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
     
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  4. Jordan Howard Sobel (1994). Taking Chances. Cambridge University Press.
    J. Howard Sobel has long been recognized as an important figure in philosophical discussions of rational decision. He has done much to help formulate the concept of causal decision theory. In this volume of essays Sobel explores the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values, where an action's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. Newcomb's Problem and The Prisoner's Dilemma are discussed, and Allais-type puzzles are viewed from the (...)
     
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  5. Jordan Howard Sobel (1994). Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice. Cambridge University Press.
    J. Howard Sobel has long been recognized as an important figure in philosophical discussions of rational decision. He has done much to help formulate the concept of causal decision theory. In this volume of essays Sobel explores the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values, where an action's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. Newcomb's Problem and The Prisoner's Dilemma are discussed, and Allais-type puzzles are viewed from the (...)
     
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  6.  18
    Jordan Howard Sobel (2008). Walls and Vaults: A Natural Science of Morals (Virtue Ethics According to David Hume). John Wiley & Sons, Inc..
    The work is a charitable study on what the internationally renowned presenter and author, Howard Sobel, views to be largely the truth about moral thought and talk. Discussions and observations from David Humes own writings oftentimes reinforce and elaborate the authors notions and there is an assertive attempt to weave logical thinking into the book. Applications to such mathematical concepts as game theory, decision-making, and conditionals are dispersed throughout so as to enlighten the theory behind the ideas.
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  7.  38
    Alison Gopnik, Clark Glymour, David M. Sobel, Laura Schulz, Tamar Kushnir & David Danks, A Theory of Causal Learning in Children: Causal Maps and Bayes Nets.
    We propose that children employ specialized cognitive systems that allow them to recover an accurate “causal map” of the world: an abstract, coherent, learned representation of the causal relations among events. This kind of knowledge can be perspicuously understood in terms of the formalism of directed graphical causal models, or “Bayes nets”. Children’s causal learning and inference may involve computations similar to those for learning causal Bayes nets and for predicting with them. Experimental results suggest that 2- to 4-year-old children (...)
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  8.  72
    Jordan Howard Sobel (2003). Logic and Theism: Arguments for and Against Beliefs in God. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a wide-ranging book about arguments for and against belief in God.
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  9. David Copp & David Sobel (2004). Morality and Virtue: An Assessment of Some Recent Work in Virtue Ethics. Ethics 114 (3):514-554.
    This essay focuses on three recent books on morality and virtue, Michael Slote's 'Morals from Motives', Rosalind Hursthouse's 'On Virtue Ethics', and Philippa Foot's 'Natural Goodness'. Slote proposes an "agent-based" ethical theory according to which the ethical status of acts is derivative from assessments of virtue. Following Foot's lead, Hursthouse aims to vindicate an ethical naturalism that explains human goodness on the basis of views about human nature. Both Hursthouse and Slote take virtue to be morally basic in a way (...)
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  10. David Sobel & David Copp (2001). Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire. Analysis 61 (1):44-53.
    We argue that beliefs and desires cannot be successfully explicated in terms of direction of fit. It is more difficult than has been realized to do so without presupposing these notions in the explication.
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  11. David Sobel (2002). Varieties of Hedonism. Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (2):240–256.
  12. David Sobel (2009). Subjectivism and Idealization. Ethics 119 (2):336-352.
  13. David Sobel (1994). Full Information Accounts of Well-Being. Ethics 104 (4):784-810.
  14. David Sobel (2007). The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (8):1-17.
    Consequentialism, many philosophers have claimed, asks too much of us to be a plausible ethical theory. Indeed, the theory's severe demandingness is often claimed to be its chief flaw. My thesis is that as we come to better understand this objection, we see that, even if it signals or tracks the existence of a real problem for Consequentialism, it cannot itself be a fundamental problem with the view. The objection cannot itself provide good reason to break with Consequentialism, because it (...)
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  15.  72
    Randolph Blake, Duje Tadin, Kenith V. Sobel, Tony A. Raissian & Sang Chul Chong (2006). Strength of Early Visual Adaptation Depends on Visual Awareness. Pnas Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103 (12):4783-4788.
  16.  65
    David Copp & David Sobel (2002). Desires, Motives, and Reasons: Scanlon's Rationalistic Moral Psychology. Social Theory and Practice 28 (2):243-76.
  17.  81
    David Sobel (2001). Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):218.
    These days, just about every philosophical debate seems to generate a position labeled internalism. The debate I will be joining in this essay concerns reasons for action and their connection, or lack of connection, to motivation. The internalist position in this debate posits a certain essential connection between reasons and motivation, while the externalist position denies such a connection. This debate about internalism overlaps an older debate between Humeans and Kantians about the exclusive reason-giving power of desires. As we will (...)
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  18. David Sobel (2001). Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action. Ethics 111 (3):461-492.
  19. Jordan Howard Sobel (1976). Utilitarianism and Past and Future Mistakes. Noûs 10 (2):195-219.
  20. David Sobel (1999). Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge? Analysis 59 (3):137–147.
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  21.  12
    Jordan Howard Sobel (1987). Self-Doubts and Dutch Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):56 – 81.
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  22. Jordan Howard Sobel (1989). Partition-Theorems for Causal Decision Theories. Philosophy of Science 56 (1):70-93.
    Two partition-theorems are proved for a particular causal decision theory. One is restricted to a certain kind of partition of circumstances, and analyzes the utility of an option in terms of its utilities in conjunction with circumstances in this partition. The other analyzes an option's utility in terms of its utilities conditional on circumstances and is quite unrestricted. While the first form seems more useful for applications, the second form may be of theoretical importance in foundational exercises. Comparisons are made (...)
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  23.  22
    Thomas L. Griffiths, David M. Sobel, Joshua B. Tenenbaum & Alison Gopnik (2011). Bayes and Blickets: Effects of Knowledge on Causal Induction in Children and Adults. Cognitive Science 35 (8):1407-1455.
    People are adept at inferring novel causal relations, even from only a few observations. Prior knowledge about the probability of encountering causal relations of various types and the nature of the mechanisms relating causes and effects plays a crucial role in these inferences. We test a formal account of how this knowledge can be used and acquired, based on analyzing causal induction as Bayesian inference. Five studies explored the predictions of this account with adults and 4-year-olds, using tasks in which (...)
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  24. Jordan Howard Sobel (1988). Infallible Predictors. Philosophical Review 97 (1):3-24.
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  25. David Sobel (2005). Pain for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):437 - 457.
    Can we adequately account for our reasons of mere taste without holding that our desires ground such reasons? Recently, Scanlon and Parfit have argued that we can, pointing to pleasure and pain as the grounds of such reasons. In this paper I take issue with each of their accounts. I conclude that we do not yet have a plausible rival to a desire-based understanding of the grounds of such reasons.
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  26. David Sobel (1998). Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration. Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):249.
    The proposal I offer attempts to remedy the inadequacies of exclusive focus on well-being for moral purposes. The proposal is this: We should allow the agent to decide for herself where she wants to throw the weight that is her due in moral reflection, with the proviso that she understands the way that her weight will be aggregated with others in reaching a moral outcome. I will call this the "autonomy principle." The autonomy principle, I claim, provides the consequentialist's best (...)
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  27. David Sobel (2010). The Limits of the Explanatory Power of Developmentalism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (4):517-527.
    Richard Kraut's neo-Aristotelian account of well-being, Developmentalism, aspires to explain not only which things are good for us but why those things are good for us. The key move in attempting to make good on this second aspiration involves his claim that our ordinary intuitions about what is good for a person can be successfully explained and systematized by the idea that what benefi ts a living thing develops properly that living thing's potentialities, capacities, and faculties. I argue that Kraut's (...)
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  28.  49
    David Sobel (1997). On the Subjectivity of Welfare. Ethics 107 (3):501-508.
  29.  69
    Jordan Howard Sobel (1987). On the Evidence of Testimony for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (147):166-186.
    A BAYESIAN ARTICULATION OF HUME’S VIEWS IS OFFERED BASED ON A FORM OF THE BAYES-LAPLACE THEOREM THAT IS SUPERFICIALLY LIKE A FORMULA OF CONDORCET’S. INFINITESIMAL PROBABILITIES ARE EMPLOYED FOR MIRACLES AGAINST WHICH THERE ARE ’PROOFS’ THAT ARE NOT OPPOSED BY ’PROOFS’. OBJECTIONS MADE BY RICHARD PRICE ARE DEALT WITH, AND RECENT EXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED BY AMOS TVERSKY AND DANIEL KAHNEMAN ARE CONSIDERED IN WHICH PERSONS TEND TO DISCOUNT PRIOR IMPROBABILITIES WHEN ASSESSING REPORTS OF WITNESSES.
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  30. David Sobel (2007). Subjectivism and Blame. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 149-170.
    My favorite thing about this paper is that I think I usefully explicate and then mess with Bernard Williams's attempt to explain how his internalism is compatible with our ordinary practices of blame. There are a surprising number of things wrong with Williams's position. Of course that leaves my own favored subjectivism in a pickle, but still...
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  31.  28
    Jordan Howard Sobel (1986). Notes on Decision Theory: Old Wine in New Bottles. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):407 – 437.
  32. David Sobel (2011). Parfit's Case Against Subjectivism. In Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 6. OUP Oxford
    I argue that Parfit's On What Matters does not make a compelling case against subjective accounts of reasons for action.
     
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  33.  72
    David Sobel (1999). Pleasure as a Mental State. Utilitas 11 (2):230.
    Shelly Kagan and Leonard Katz have offered versions of hedonism that aspire to occupy a middle position between the view that pleasure is a unitary sensation and the view that pleasure is, as Sidgwick put it, desirable consciousness. Thus they hope to offer a hedonistic account of well-being that does not mistakenly suppose that pleasure is a special kind of tingle, yet to offer a sharp alternative to desire-based accounts. I argue that they have not identified a coherent middle position.
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  34.  13
    Jordan Howard Sobel (1985). Circumstances and Dominance in a Causal Decision Theory. Synthese 63 (2):167 - 202.
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  35.  20
    Richard Sobel (2007). The HIPAA Paradox: The Privacy Rule That's Not. Hastings Center Report 37 (4):40-50.
    : HIPAA is often described as a privacy rule. It is not. In fact, HIPAA is a disclosure regulation, and it has effectively dismantled the longstanding moral and legal tradition of patient confidentiality. By permitting broad and easy dissemination of patients’ medical information, with no audit trails for most disclosures, it has undermined both medical ethics and the effectiveness of medical care.
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  36. David Sobel (2009). Review of Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4).
    I assess Schroeder's book Slaves of the Passions and isolate some grounds for concerns about the overall position.
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  37.  9
    Jordan Howard Sobel (1990). Maximization, Stability of Decision, and Actions in Accordance with Reason. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):60-77.
    Rational actions reflect beliefs and preferences in certain orderly ways. The problem of theory is to explain which beliefs and preferences are relevant to the rationality of particular actions, and exactly how they are relevant. One distinction of interest here is between an agent's beliefs and preferences just before an action's time, and his beliefs and preferences at its time. Theorists do not agree about the times of beliefs and desires that are relevant to the rationality of action. Another distinction (...)
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  38.  8
    Jordan Howard Sobel (1983). Expected Utilities and Rational Actions and Choices. Theoria 49 (3):159-183.
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  39.  35
    J. Howard Sobel (1970). Utilitarianisms: Simple and General. Inquiry 13 (1-4):394 – 449.
    If we overlook no consequences when we assess the act, and no relevant features when we generalize, can it matter whether we ask 'What would happen if everyone did the same?' instead of 'What would happen if this act were performed?'? David Lyons has argued that it cannot. Two examples are here articulated to show that it can. The first turns on the way consequences are identified and assessed and in particular on the treatment accorded 'threshold consequences'. The second example (...)
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  40. David Sobel & Steven Wall (2009). Introduction. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press
  41.  49
    Jordan Howard Sobel, On the Storeyed Revenge of Strengthened Liars, and the Contrary Finality of No-Proposition Resolutions.
    “To this day, partiality approaches to the paradox have been dogged by the so-called ‘Strengthened Liar’. .... The Strengthened Liar observes that if we follow a partiality theorist and declare the Liar sentence* neither true nor false (or failing to express a proposition,. or suffering from some sort of grave semantic defect), then the paradox is only pushed back. For we can go on to conclude that whatever this status may be, it implies that the Liar sentence is not true. (...)
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  42. David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.) (2009). Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
    What are our reasons for acting? Morality purports to give us these reasons, and so do norms of prudence and the laws of society. The theory of practical reason assesses the authority of these potentially competing claims, and for this reason philosophers with a wide range of interests have converged on the topic of reasons for action. This volume contains eleven essays on practical reason by leading and emerging philosophers. Topics include the differences between practical and theoretical rationality, practical conditionals (...)
     
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  43.  21
    David Sobel (2003). Reply to Robertson. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):185-191.
    Philosophical Papers Vol.32(2) 2003: 185-191.
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  44.  41
    Jordan Howard Sobel (2001). Blackburn's Problem: On its Not Insignificant Residue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.
    Moral properties would supervene upon non-moral properties and be conceptually autonomous. That, according to Simon Blackburn, would make them if not impossible at least mysterious, and evidence for them best explained by theorists who say they are not real. In fact moral properties would not challenge in ways Blackburn has contended. There is, however, something new that can be gathered from his arguments. What would the supervenience of moral properties and their conceptual autonomy from at least total non-moral properties entail (...)
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  45.  21
    Jordan Howard Sobel (1988). Defenses and Conservative Revisions of Evidential Decision Theories: Metatickles and Ratificationism. Synthese 75 (1):107 - 131.
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  46.  36
    Jordan Howard Sobel (1996). Pascalian Wagers. Synthese 108 (1):11 - 61.
    A person who does not have good intellectual reasons for believing in God can, depending on his probabilities and values for consequences of believing, have good practical reasons. Pascalian wagers founded on a variety of possible probability/value profiles are examined from a Bayesian perspective central to which is the idea that states and options are pragmatically reasonable only if they maximize subjective expected value. Attention is paid to problems posed by representations of values by Cantorian infinities. An appendix attends to (...)
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  47.  4
    Jordan Howard Sobel (1988). Maximizing, Optimizing, and Prospering. Dialogue 27 (02):233-.
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  48.  13
    Jordan Howard Sobel (1997). Cyclical Preferences and World Bayesianism. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):42-73.
    An example shows that 'pairwise preferences' (certain hypothetical choices) can cycle even when rational. General considerations entail that preferences tout court (certain relations of actual valuations) cannot cycle. A world-bayesian theory is explained that accommodates these two kinds of preference, and a theory for rational actions that would have them maximize and be objects of ratifiable choices. It is observed that choices can be unratifiable either because of troublesome credences or because of troublesome preferences. An appendix comments on a third (...)
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  49.  7
    Jordan Howard Sobel (1985). Utilitarianism and Cooperation. Dialogue 24 (01):137-.
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  50. Jordan Howard Sobel (1998). Puzzles for the Will. University of Toronto Press.
     
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