Search results for 'Joel Sobel' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Joel Sobel (2002). Putting Altruism in Context. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):275-276.score: 240.0
    I argue that Rachlin's notion of self-control is imprecise and not well suited to the discussion of altruism. Rachlin's broader agenda, to improve collective welfare by identifying behavioral mechanisms that increase altruism, neglects the fact that altruism is neither necessary nor sufficient for desirable social outcomes.
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  2. Moustafa Bensafi, Christina Zelano, Brad Johnson, Joel Mainland, Rehan Khan & Noam Sobel (2004). 19 Olfaction: From Sniff to Percept. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences Iii. Mit Press.score: 240.0
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  3. Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg, Rysiek Śliwiński & Jordan Howard Sobel (eds.) (2009). Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz: Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel. Dept. Of Philosophy, Uppsala University.score: 120.0
     
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  4. Jordan Howard Sobel (2008). Walls and Vaults: A Natural Science of Morals (Virtue Ethics According to David Hume). John Wiley & Sons, Inc..score: 60.0
    The work is a charitable study on what the internationally renowned presenter and author, Howard Sobel, views to be largely the truth about moral thought and talk. Discussions and observations from David Humes own writings oftentimes reinforce and elaborate the authors notions and there is an assertive attempt to weave logical thinking into the book. Applications to such mathematical concepts as game theory, decision-making, and conditionals are dispersed throughout so as to enlighten the theory behind the ideas.
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  5. David Copp & David Sobel (2004). Morality and Virtue: An Assessment of Some Recent Work in Virtue Ethics. Ethics 114 (3):514-554.score: 30.0
    This essay focuses on three recent books on morality and virtue, Michael Slote's 'Morals from Motives', Rosalind Hursthouse's 'On Virtue Ethics', and Philippa Foot's 'Natural Goodness'. Slote proposes an "agent-based" ethical theory according to which the ethical status of acts is derivative from assessments of virtue. Following Foot's lead, Hursthouse aims to vindicate an ethical naturalism that explains human goodness on the basis of views about human nature. Both Hursthouse and Slote take virtue to be morally basic in a way (...)
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  6. David Sobel (2007). The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (8):1-17.score: 30.0
    Consequentialism, many philosophers have claimed, asks too much of us to be a plausible ethical theory. Indeed, the theory's severe demandingness is often claimed to be its chief flaw. My thesis is that as we come to better understand this objection, we see that, even if it signals or tracks the existence of a real problem for Consequentialism, it cannot itself be a fundamental problem with the view. The objection cannot itself provide good reason to break with Consequentialism, because it (...)
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  7. Kate Manne & David Sobel (2014). Disagreeing About How to Disagree. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):823-34.score: 30.0
    David Enoch, in Taking Morality Seriously, argues for a broad normative asymmetry between how we should behave when disagreeing about facts and how we should behave when disagreeing due to differing preferences. Enoch claims that moral disputes have the earmarks of a factual dispute rather than a preference dispute and that this makes more plausible a realist understanding of morality. We try to clarify what such claims would have to look like to be compelling and we resist his main conclusions.
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  8. Janice Dowell, J. L. & David Sobel (forthcoming). Advice for Non-Analytical Naturalists. In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Reading Parfit. Routledge.score: 30.0
    We argue that Parfit's "Triviality Objection" against some naturalistic views of normativity is not compelling. We think that once one accepts, as one should, that identity statements can be informative in virtue of their pragmatics and not only in virtue of their semantics, Parfit's case against naturalism can be overcome.
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  9. David Sobel (2009). Subjectivism and Idealization. Ethics 119 (2):336-352.score: 30.0
  10. David Sobel (2002). Varieties of Hedonism. Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (2):240–256.score: 30.0
  11. David Sobel (2009). Review of Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4).score: 30.0
    I assess Schroeder's book Slaves of the Passions and isolate some grounds for concerns about the overall position.
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  12. David Sobel (2011). Parfit's Case Against Subjectivism. In Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 6. Oup Oxford.score: 30.0
    I argue that Parfit's On What Matters does not make a compelling case against subjective accounts of reasons for action.
     
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  13. David Sobel & David Copp (2001). Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire. Analysis 61 (1):44-53.score: 30.0
    We argue that beliefs and desires cannot be successfully explicated in terms of direction of fit. It is more difficult than has been realized to do so without presupposing these notions in the explication.
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  14. David Sobel (2011). The Limits of the Explanatory Power of Developmentalism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (4):517-527.score: 30.0
    Richard Kraut's neo-Aristotelian account of well-being, Developmentalism, aspires to explain not only which things are good for us but why those things are good for us. The key move in attempting to make good on this second aspiration involves his claim that our ordinary intuitions about what is good for a person can be successfully explained and systematized by the idea that what benefi ts a living thing develops properly that living thing's potentialities, capacities, and faculties. I argue that Kraut's (...)
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  15. David Sobel (2001). Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action. Ethics 111 (3):461-492.score: 30.0
  16. David Sobel (1994). Full Information Accounts of Well-Being. Ethics 104 (4):784-810.score: 30.0
  17. David Sobel (forthcoming). Self-Ownership and the Conflation Problem. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.score: 30.0
    Libertarian self-ownership views in the tradition of Locke, Nozick, and the left-libertarians have supposed that we enjoy very powerful deontological protections against infringing upon our property. Such a conception makes sense when we are focused on property that is very important to its owner, such as a person’s kidney. However, this stringency of our property rights is harder to credit when we consider more trivial infringements such as very mildly toxic pollution or trivial risks such having planes fly overhead. Maintaining (...)
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  18. Jordan Howard Sobel (2009). Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens for Conditional Probabilities, and Updating on Uncertain Evidence. Theory and Decision 66 (2):103 - 148.score: 30.0
    There are narrowest bounds for P(h) when P(e) = y and P(h/e) = x, which bounds collapse to x as y goes to 1. A theorem for these bounds -- bounds for probable modus ponens -- entails a principle for updating on possibly uncertain evidence subject to these bounds that is a generalization of the principle for updating by conditioning on certain evidence. This way of updating on possibly uncertain evidence is appropriate when updating by ’probability kinematics’ or ’Jeffrey-conditioning’ is, (...)
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  19. Jordan Howard Sobel (1987). On the Evidence of Testimony for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (147):166-186.score: 30.0
    A BAYESIAN ARTICULATION OF HUME’S VIEWS IS OFFERED BASED ON A FORM OF THE BAYES-LAPLACE THEOREM THAT IS SUPERFICIALLY LIKE A FORMULA OF CONDORCET’S. INFINITESIMAL PROBABILITIES ARE EMPLOYED FOR MIRACLES AGAINST WHICH THERE ARE ’PROOFS’ THAT ARE NOT OPPOSED BY ’PROOFS’. OBJECTIONS MADE BY RICHARD PRICE ARE DEALT WITH, AND RECENT EXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED BY AMOS TVERSKY AND DANIEL KAHNEMAN ARE CONSIDERED IN WHICH PERSONS TEND TO DISCOUNT PRIOR IMPROBABILITIES WHEN ASSESSING REPORTS OF WITNESSES.
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  20. David Sobel (2005). Pain for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):437 - 457.score: 30.0
    Can we adequately account for our reasons of mere taste without holding that our desires ground such reasons? Recently, Scanlon and Parfit have argued that we can, pointing to pleasure and pain as the grounds of such reasons. In this paper I take issue with each of their accounts. I conclude that we do not yet have a plausible rival to a desire-based understanding of the grounds of such reasons.
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  21. Jordan Howard Sobel (2004). Logic and Theism: Arguments for and Against Beliefs in God. Cambridge University Press.score: 30.0
    This is a wide-ranging book about arguments for and against belief in God.
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  22. David Copp & David Sobel (2000). What We Owe to Each Other, T. M. Scanlon, the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998, IX + 420 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):333-378.score: 30.0
  23. David Sobel (2007). Practical Reasons and Mistakes of Practical Rationality. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):299-321.score: 30.0
  24. Jordan Howard Sobel, To My Critics (Taliaferro, Swinburne, and Koons).score: 30.0
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  25. Jordan Howard Sobel, On the Storeyed Revenge of Strengthened Liars, and the Contrary Finality of No-Proposition Resolutions.score: 30.0
    “To this day, partiality approaches to the paradox have been dogged by the so-called ‘Strengthened Liar’. .... The Strengthened Liar observes that if we follow a partiality theorist and declare the Liar sentence* neither true nor false (or failing to express a proposition,. or suffering from some sort of grave semantic defect), then the paradox is only pushed back. For we can go on to conclude that whatever this status may be, it implies that the Liar sentence is not true. (...)
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  26. David Sobel (2001). Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (02):218-.score: 30.0
    These days, just about every philosophical debate seems to generate a position labeled internalism. The debate I will be joining in this essay concerns reasons for action and their connection, or lack of connection, to motivation. The internalist position in this debate posits a certain essential connection between reasons and motivation, while the externalist position denies such a connection. This debate about internalism overlaps an older debate between Humeans and Kantians about the exclusive reason-giving power of desires. As we will (...)
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  27. David Sobel (1997). On the Subjectivity of Welfare. Ethics 107 (3):501-508.score: 30.0
  28. David Sobel (2007). Subjectivism and Blame. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 149-170.score: 30.0
    My favorite thing about this paper is that I think I usefully explicate and then mess with Bernard Williams's attempt to explain how his internalism is compatible with our ordinary practices of blame. There are a surprising number of things wrong with Williams's position. Of course that leaves my own favored subjectivism in a pickle, but still...
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  29. Jordan Howard Sobel (1991). Some Versions of Newcomb's Problem Are Prisoners' Dilemmas. Synthese 86 (2):197 - 208.score: 30.0
    I have maintained that some but not all prisoners' dilemmas are side-by-side Necomb problems. The present paper argues that, similarly, some but not all versions of Newcomb's Problem are prisoners' dilemmas in which Taking Two and Predicting Two make an equilibrium that is dispreferred by both the box-chooser and predictor to the outcome in which only one box is taken and this is predicted. I comment on what kinds of prisoner's dilemmas Newcomb's Problem can be, and on opportunities that results (...)
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  30. David Sobel (1999). Pleasure as a Mental State. Utilitas 11 (02):230-.score: 30.0
    Shelly Kagan and Leonard Katz have offered versions of hedonism that aspire to occupy a middle position between the view that pleasure is a unitary sensation and the view that pleasure is, as Sidgwick put it, desirable consciousness. Thus they hope to offer a hedonistic account of well-being that does not mistakenly suppose that pleasure is a special kind of tingle, yet to offer a sharp alternative to desire-based accounts. I argue that they have not identified a coherent middle position.
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  31. David Copp & David Sobel (2002). Desires, Motives, and Reasons: Scanlon's Rationalistic Moral Psychology. Social Theory and Practice 28 (2):243-76.score: 30.0
  32. Jordan Howard Sobel (1966). Dummett on Fatalism. Philosophical Review 75 (1):78-90.score: 30.0
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  33. David Sobel (2012). Backing Away From Libertarian Self-Ownership. Ethics 123 (1):32-60.score: 30.0
    Libertarian self-ownership views have traditionally maintained that we enjoy very powerful deontological protections against any infringement upon our property. This stringency yields very counter-intuitive results when we consider trivial infringements such as very mildly toxic pollution or trivial risks such having planes fly overhead. Maintaining that other people's rights against all infringements are very powerful threatens to undermine our liberty, as Nozick saw. In this paper I consider the most sophisticated attempts to rectify this problem within a libertarian self-ownership framework. (...)
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  34. Jordan Howard Sobel, Not Much of a Liar Paradox: An Exercise.score: 30.0
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  35. Jordan Howard Sobel (2003). Review: Hume, Holism, and Miracles. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (448):728-733.score: 30.0
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  36. Jordan Howard Sobel (1992). Lies, Lies, and More Lies: A Plea for Propositions. Philosophical Studies 67 (1):51 - 69.score: 30.0
    To resolve putative liar paradoxes it is sufficient to attend to the distinction between liar-sentences and the propositions they would express, and to exercise the option of turning would-be deductions of paradox (of contradictions) into reductions of the existence of those propositions. Defending the coherence of particular resolutions along these lines, leads to recognition of the non-extensionality of some liar-sentences. In particular, it turns out that exchanges of terms for identicals in the open-sentence '- does not expression a true proposition' (...)
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  37. David Sobel (1999). Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge? Analysis 59 (3):137–147.score: 30.0
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  38. David Sobel (1998). Sumner on Welfare. Dialogue 37 (03):571-.score: 30.0
    In this paper I criticize the way Sumner marks the subjective/objective divide and the way he argues for subjective views of well-being.
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  39. Jordan Howard Sobel, Collapsing Arguments for Facts and Propositions.score: 30.0
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  40. David Sobel (1999). Michael J. Zimmerman, The Concept of Moral Obligation:The Concept of Moral Obligation. Ethics 109 (2):468-470.score: 30.0
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  41. Jordan Howard Sobel (1968). Rule-Utilitarianism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):146 – 165.score: 30.0
  42. David Sobel (1998). Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration. Economics and Philosophy 14 (02):249-.score: 30.0
    The proposal I offer attempts to remedy the inadequacies of exclusive focus on well-being for moral purposes. The proposal is this: We should allow the (informed) agent to decide for herself where she wants to throw the weight that is her due in moral reflection, with the proviso that she understands the way that her weight will be aggregated with others in reaching a moral outcome. I will call this the "autonomy principle." The autonomy principle, I claim, provides the consequentialist's (...)
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  43. Alison Gopnik, Clark Glymour, David M. Sobel, Laura Schulz, Tamar Kushnir & David Danks, A Theory of Causal Learning in Children: Causal Maps and Bayes Nets.score: 30.0
    We propose that children employ specialized cognitive systems that allow them to recover an accurate “causal map” of the world: an abstract, coherent, learned representation of the causal relations among events. This kind of knowledge can be perspicuously understood in terms of the formalism of directed graphical causal models, or “Bayes nets”. Children’s causal learning and inference may involve computations similar to those for learning causal Bayes nets and for predicting with them. Experimental results suggest that 2- to 4-year-old children (...)
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  44. Jordan Howard Sobel, Born Again!score: 30.0
    Hartshorne derives that, “There is a perfect being, or perfection exists,” from the premises that, “perfection is not impossible,” and that, “perfection could not exist contingently.” (Hartshorne 1962, pp. 50-1.).
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  45. Jordan Howard Sobel, On the Storeyed Revenge of Liars.score: 30.0
    The Liar sentence is here the sentence ‘The Liar sentence is not true.’. “Consider a Liar sentence: ...let us take a sentence l which says l is not true. W e can, informally, reason as..
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  46. Jordan Howard Sobel (2009). Lotteries and Miracles. In Unknown Unknown (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 2. Oxford Univ Pr. 275-316.score: 30.0
    (forthcoming in Oxford Readings in the Philosophy of Religion).
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  47. Jordan Howard Sobel, Walls and Vaults.score: 30.0
    II. Virtue and Vice 1. David Hume – virtue theorist. 2. W hat kinds of things are virtues and vices according to Hume? 3. Hume’s first question in order of explanation: W hat is it for something to be a virtue? 4. The nature or definition of virtue – Hume’s hypothesis, in brief. 5. Detailing Hume’s account. 6. The nature of virtue according to this hypothesis. 7. Illusory qualities. 8. “A controversy started of late” (Hume) and “The M oral Problem” (...)
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  48. Jordan Howard Sobel (1993). Backward-Induction Arguments: A Paradox Regained. Philosophy of Science 60 (1):114-133.score: 30.0
    According to a familiar argument, iterated prisoner's dilemmas of known finite lengths resolve for ideally rational and well-informed players: They would defect in the last round, anticipate this in the next to last round and so defect in it, and so on. But would they anticipate defections even if they had been cooperating? Not necessarily, say recent critics. These critics "lose" the backward-induction paradox by imposing indicative interpretations on rationality and information conditions. To regain it I propose subjunctive interpretations. To (...)
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  49. Alison Gopnik, Clark Glymour, David M. Sobel & Laura E. Schultz, Causal Learning in Children: Causal Maps and Bayes Nets.score: 30.0
    We outline a cognitive and computational account of causal learning in children. We propose that children employ specialized cognitive systems that allow them to recover an accurate “causal map” of the world: an abstract, coherent representation of the causal relations among events. This kind of knowledge can be perspicuously represented by the formalism of directed graphical causal models, or “Bayes nets”. Human causal learning and inference may involve computations similar to those for learnig causal Bayes nets and for predicting with (...)
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