Jan Zwicky suggests that Lyric Philosophy may be read as a “letter to a revered parent—with whom I have quarrelled, but by whom I still wish to be understood.” Though the “parent” thinker to whom she refers is Freud, Zwicky’s conversation with Simone Weil in Wisdom & Metaphor addresses Weil as a “foremother” in the act of making “herself clear to herself.” This paper examines Weil’s role in Wisdom & Metaphor and considers Weil as an influence in Zwicky’s poetry, reading (...) “relinquishing” in Zwicky’s poetry and “decreation” in Weil’s philosophy as metaphors that resonate and debate with each other. (shrink)

The anonymous treatise De sex inconvenientibus is a good example of the calculatores’ approach when dealing with motion. It is organized around four main questions relating to the determination of rapidity in four kinds of changes, i.e. in the generation of substantial forms, in alteration, in increase, and in local motion. In some arguments the author points out the paradoxes to which the two ways of determining the rapidity of a motion can lead: rapidity is determined by the effect produced (...) (the degree of quality generated, the space covered, etc.) or it results from the ratio between the moving power and the resistance of the mobile or patient. While this twofold approach to determining rapidity appears in the majority of calculator texts, the two points of view – the analysis according to its effects and the analysis according to its causes – have rarely been confronted. (shrink)

A notable aspect of contemporary fiction is the increasing importance acquired by the detective as a literary figure. From World War II up to today he has transcended a narrow role played in a narrow genre to become the symbol for man's existential quest and puzzlement in the face of mystery. If science fiction is the expression of our hopes and fears concerning the future of our technological society, the detective and a new form of literary detective fiction have lately (...) become the expression of our hopes and fears concerning the present, since mystery is not only, too obviously, in the future but, more subtly, in the present. While science fiction lacks a character typical of the genre who may embody and possibly transcend its purposes, the detective novel thanks to the multifold aspects of its “ordainer”—the detective—has progressively risen to literary prominence through the apparently paradoxical negation of its original functions. (shrink)

Husserl attempted to found logics and language on intuition, and particularly perception. The relationship between logical language and intuition is therefore one of the fundamental themes of his phenomenology. Husserl regarded the two as sharing an isomorphic structure, and this article shows that this structure can be characterized as “mediality.” That is, the “meaning” of language appears by mediation of sound or script, while the “I” as person appears by mediation of the body. I will show furthermore that intuitions themselves (...) appear through the mediation of language, and interpret this idea of mediality in terms of the Japanese language. Guided by Husserl’s notion of Sprachleib, I will also attempt an analysis of the “bodily” function of Chinese script and onomatopeia as aspects of Sprachleib and show how the Sprachleib functions as a “cultural living body” that makes community possible. (shrink)

In Exploring Robotic Minds: Actions, Symbols, and Consciousness as Self-Organizing Dynamic Phenomena, Jun Tani sets out to answer an essential and tantalizing question: How do our minds work? By providing an overview of his "synthetic neurorobotics" project, Tani reveals how symbols and concepts that represent the world can emerge in a neurodynamic structure--iterative interactions between the top-down subjective view, which proactively acts on the world, and the bottom-up recognition of the resultant perceptual reality. He argues that nontrivial problems of consciousness (...) and free will could be addressed through structural understanding of such iterative, conflicting interactions between the top-down and the bottom-up pathways. A wide range of readers will enjoy this wonderful journey of the mind and will follow the author on interdisciplinary discussions that span neuroscience, dynamical systems theories, robotics, and phenomenology. The book also includes many figures, as well as a link to videos of Tani's exciting robotic experiments. (shrink)

This third paper locates the synthetic neurorobotics research reviewed in the second paper in terms of themes introduced in the first paper. It begins with biological non-reductionism as understood by Searle. It emphasizes the role of synthetic neurorobotics studies in accessing the dynamic structure essential to consciousness with a focus on system criticality and self, develops a distinction between simulated and formal consciousness based on this emphasis, reviews Tani and colleagues' work in light of this distinction, and ends by forecasting (...) the increasing importance of synthetic neurorobotics studies for cognitive science and philosophy of mind going forward, finally in regards to most- and myth-consciousness. (shrink)

Direct neurological and especially imaging-driven investigations into the structures essential to naturally occurring cognitive systems in their development and operation have motivated broadening interest in the potential for artificial consciousness modeled on these systems. This first paper in a series of three begins with a brief review of Boltuc’s (2009) “brain-based” thesis on the prospect of artificial consciousness, focusing on his formulation of h-consciousness. We then explore some of the implications of brain research on the structure of consciousness, finding limitations (...) in biological approaches to the study of consciousness. Looking past these limitations, we introduce research in artificial consciousness designed to test for the emergence of consciousness, a phenomenon beyond the purview of the study of existing biological systems. (shrink)

Objectives To explore attitudes and reasoning among Swedish physicians and the general public regarding the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment at a competent patient's request. Design A vignette-based postal questionnaire including 1202 randomly selected individuals in the county of Stockholm and 1200 randomly selected Swedish physicians with various specialities. The vignettes described patients requesting withdrawal of their life-sustaining treatment: (1) a 77-year-old woman on dialysis; (2) a 36-year-old man on dialysis; (3) a 34-year-old ventilator-dependent tetraplegic man. Responders were asked to classify (...) the act of terminating treatment and to prioritise arguments for/against. Results A majority in both groups prioritised arguments in favour of terminating treatment and classified the act as defensible in all vignettes. However, among the general public, 16% classified the act as euthanasia in all vignettes; among physicians this view was most expressed regarding ventilator treatment (26%). Some who classified the act as euthanasia prioritised arguments in favour of terminating treatment: among physicians 18% in vignette 1, 19% in vignette 2 and 34% in vignette 3; among the general public 35% in vignette 1, 20% in vignette 2 and 48% in vignette 3. Conclusion There is a widespread consensus regarding competent patients' right to abstain from life-sustaining treatment. An association between the hastening of death, caused by the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and the concept of euthanasia is proposed. The results also suggest that classifying the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment as ‘euthanasia’ does not necessarily mean that the act is interpreted as ethically unacceptable. (shrink)

Miranda Fricker’s insightful work on epistemic injustice discusses two forms of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the victim lacks the interpretative resources to make sense of her experience, and this lacuna can be traced down to a structural injustice. In this paper, I provide one model of how to fill the conceptual gap in hermeneutical injustice. First, I argue that the victims possess conceptual resources to make sense of their experiences, namely phenomenal concepts. Second, I (...) show how one might work the way up in a two-step process from a subjective, phenomenal concept to a novel, public concept. Finally, I discuss the conditions that have to be met for this process to be successful. The resulting model shows a way how the victims might alleviate hermeneutical injustice by developing novel concepts, given that the dominant group does not care about their predicament. (shrink)

The cognitive phenomenology debate centers on two questions. (1) What is an apt characterization of the phenomenology of conscious thought? And (2), what role does this phenomenology play? I argue that the answers to the former question bear significantly on the answers to the latter question. In particular, I show that conservatism about cognitive phenomenology is not compatible with the view that phenomenology explains the constitution of conscious thought. I proceed as follows: To begin with, I analyze the phenomenology of (...) our sensory experiences and argue for a _weak phenomenal holism_ (WPH) about sensory phenomenology. Next, I explore how WPH can be integrated into the competing accounts of cognitive phenomenology. I argue that, given WPH, conservatism turns out to reduce phenomenal character to a merely concomitant phenomenon that has no explanatory power when it comes to the constitution of conscious thoughts. In contrast, liberalism is explanatorily more powerful in this respect. Finally, I propose a new version of liberalism that explains how phenomenology constitutes conscious thoughts and fits best with WPH. (shrink)

This study attempts to describe the notion of the ‘self’ using dynamical systems language based on the results of our robot learning experiments. A neural network model consisting of multiple modules is proposed, in which the interactive dynamics between the bottom-up perception and the top-down prediction are investigated. Our experiments with a real mobile robot showed that the incremental learning of the robot switches spontaneously between steady and unsteady phases. In the steady phase, the top-down prediction for the bottom-up perception (...) works well when coherence is achieved between the internal and the environmental dynamics. In the unsteady phase, conflicts arise between the bottom-up perception and the top-down prediction; the coherence is lost, and a chaotic attractor is observed in the internal neural dynamics. By investigating possible analogies between this result and the phenomenological literature on the ‘self', we draw the conclusions that the structure of the ‘self’ corresponds to the ‘open dynamic structure’ which is characterized by co-existence of stability in terms of goal-directedness and instability caused by embodiment; the open dynamic structure causes the system's spontaneous transition to the unsteady phase where the ‘self’ becomes aware. (shrink)

The phenomenal concept strategy is considered a powerful response to anti-physicalist arguments. This physicalist strategy aims to provide a satisfactory account of dualist intuitions without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions. In this paper I first argue that physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts fail to explain their cognitive role. Second, I develop an encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts that best explains their particularities. Finally, I argue that the encapsulation account, which features self-representing experiences, implies non-physical referents. Therefore, the account of (...) phenomenal concepts that has strong explanatory power does not explain away dualist intuitions—rather, it reinforces dualism. (shrink)

This paper will deal with the relationship between 'life' (Leben) and the 'life-world' (Lebenswelt) 1 as we find these concepts in the writings of Husserl's last years. The emphasis will be upon elucidating this relation- ship from the transcendental point of view. It is well known that Husserl initially introduced the concept of the life-world into his philosophy in connection with the problem of founding the sciences: accordingly, most studies up to date have dealt with the concept within this context (...) - that is, as part of the program for founding the sciences. However, it is important to remember that the life-world is also, for Husserl, a 'way to the transcendental reduction', and as such, can be ultimately clari- fied only by following this way to its end, and by comprehending it in its relationship to transcendental subjectivity. In his later years, Husserl came to think of the 'way of being' (Seinsweise) of transcendental sub- jectivity as 'world-experiencing-life' (welterfahrendes Leben). Thus it is my view that the problem of the 'life-world' is intimately related to that of 'life', and must necessarily be treated in the context of that rela- tionship. (shrink)

We have been left with a big challenge, to articulate consciousness and also to prove it in an artificial agent against a biological standard. After introducing Boltuc’s h-consciousness in the last paper, we briefly reviewed some salient neurology in order to sketch less of a standard than a series of targets for artificial consciousness, “most-consciousness” and “myth-consciousness.” With these targets on the horizon, we began reviewing the research program pursued by Jun Tani and colleagues in the isolation of the formal (...) dynamics essential to either. In this paper, we describe in detail Tani’s research program, in order to make the clearest case for artificial consciousness in these systems. In the next paper, the third in the series, we will return to Boltuc’s naturalistic non-reductionism in light of the neurorobotics models introduced (alongside some others), and evaluate them more completely. (shrink)

The method of phenomenal contrast aims to shed light on the phenomenal character of perceptual and cognitive experiences. Within the debate about cognitive phenomenology, phenomenal contrast arguments can be divided into two kinds. First, arguments based on actual cases that aim to provide the reader with a first-person experience of phenomenal contrast. Second, arguments that involve hypothetical cases and focus on the conceivability of contrast scenarios. Notably, in the light of these contrast cases, proponents and skeptics of cognitive phenomenology remain (...) steadfast in their views. I provide an explanation of the method’s dialectical ineffectiveness by focusing on first-person performances of phenomenal contrast tasks. In particular, I argue that introspective judgments about phenomenology are regimented by the view initially held. Understanding the underlying mechanisms responsible for the dialectical standoff in the face of phenomenal contrast cases casts light on introspection-based arguments for phenomenology in general. -/- https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/on -the-limits-of-the-method-of-phenomenal-contrast/. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyze the role of phenomenal knowledge in understanding the experiences of the victims of hermeneutical injustice. In particular, I argue that understanding that is enriched by phenomenal knowledge is a powerful tool to mitigate hermeneutical injustice. I proceed as follows: Firstly, I investigate the requirements for a full understanding of the experiences at the center of hermeneutical injustice and I argue that phenomenal knowledge is key to full understanding. Secondly, I distinguish between direct phenomenal knowledge and (...) imaginative phenomenal knowledge. Thirdly, I investigate whether one can gain imaginative phenomenal knowledge of the experiences of members of social groups other than one´s own. I consider reasons for pessimism in this regard and show that they are not conclusive. Then, I provide a model of how outgroup members can acquire imaginative knowledge of the experiences of the victims of hermeneutical injustice. Finally, I connect the varieties of phenomenal knowledge with different grades of understanding an experience and I outline how understanding that involves imaginative phenomenal knowledge helps to overcome various forms of hermeneutical injustice. (shrink)

Memory dynamics need both stable and unstable properties simultaneously. Hence memory dynamics cannot be simulated by chaotic itinerant dynamics alone, with no real world correspondence. Memory dynamics are constrained by both semantics and causalities in the embodied cognition.

This study aimed to propose a novel method for designing a product recommendation virtual agent that can keep users motivated to interact with the agent. In prior papers, many methods of keeping users motivated postulated real-time and multi-modal interactions. The proposed novel method can be used in one-direction interaction. We defined the notion of the “hidden vector,” that is, information that is not mentioned by a PRVA and that the user can suppose spontaneously. We conducted an experiment to verify the (...) hypothesis that PRVAs having a hidden vector are more effective than other PRVAs. As a result, it was shown that PRVAs having a hidden vector were perceived as being more persuasive than other PRVAs and strongly motivated the users to use the PRVAs. From these results, the proposed method was shown to be effective. (shrink)

Consciousness – Bewußtsein – was one of the key concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology. In contrast to this, Heidegger – regarded as Husserl’s most outstanding pupil – placed Dasein at the center of his own phenomenology. This change in key concepts may be seen as an upheaval in the phenomenology that purports to study the “things themselves”: as a shift of focus from the activity of a Bewußtsein that constitutes the Being of objects, to the passivity of a Dasein that receives (...) the donation of Being. But there is another aspect of Dasein that lies in the concept of “Da” (disclosedness), and it implies another possibility for the development of phenomenology that Heidegger did not fully develop. Kitaro Nishida, the Japanese philosopher who introduced phenomenology to Japan during the first half of the 20th century, developed this concept in his own way by analyzing the structure of disclosedness in terms of self-consciousness. (shrink)

In analyzing implicit bias, one key issue is to clarify its metaphysical nature. In this paper, I develop a novel account of implicit bias by highlighting a particular kind of belief-like state that is partly constituted by phenomenal experiences. I call these states ‘qualiefs’ for three reasons: qualiefs draw upon qualitative experiences of what an object seems like to attribute a property to this very object, they share some of the distinctive features of proper beliefs, and they also share some (...) characteristics of what Gendler calls ‘aliefs’. I proceed as follows: First, I develop a general theory of qualiefs. Second, I argue that implicit bias involves generic qualiefs that involve experiences that have been shaped by stereotypes. Elaborating on the particular content of a generic qualief, I explain why we are unaware of the bias even though it involves an experience. Third, I demonstrate that the qualief-model best explains the key features of implicit bias: it accounts for the biases´ implicitness and automaticity. Moreover, it elucidates how implicit bias can be insensitive to logical form and evidence, but at the same time it can serve as propositional input to further mental states. (shrink)

School gardens are part of many schools. Especially in primary schools, but also in secondary schools, they are used as a learning space and experience space for the pupils. Their importance for the development of cognitive and emotional-affective abilities of pupils is empirically well proven. It is also empirically well proven that exposure to nature has an influence on the prosocial behavior of children and adults. However, there is a lack of studies investigating the effect of the stay in the (...) school garden on the social behavior of pupils in secondary class. To investigate whether a school garden is a good environment for social learning, a self-report study and standardized observations with sixth-grade pupils were carried out. Thus, the socially competent behavior of the pupils (communication and cooperation) and their emotions could be analyzed. In order to provide emotional access to the scientific content of biology lessons and to strengthen social learning, each pupil was responsible for their own plant and the group bed over a period of 10 weeks. The design of the lessons followed the principles of basic needs—competence, autonomy, and relatedness—of the Self Determination Theory. The observations were made during a 90-min class, in the school garden as well in the classroom. The 31 girls and 22 boys, aged 11–12 years, changed weekly between the garden and the classroom. Over 150 observations were made in the school garden (82) and in the classroom (68). In summary, pupils showed more socially competent behavior in school garden lessons than in classroom lessons. The school garden lessons, designed according to the basic needs, seem to create favorable incentives for social learning. Due to frequent social interactions, it can be assumed that learning activities in school gardens can promote emotional and social competence. (shrink)

This paper discusses possible correspondences between the dynamical systems characteristics observed in our previously proposed cognitive model and phenomenological accounts of immanent time considered by Edmund Husserl. Our simulation experiments in the anticiparatory learning of a robot showed that encountering sensory-motor flow can be learned as segmented into chunks of reusable primitives with accompanying dynamic shifting between coherences and incoherences in local modules. It is considered that the sense of objective time might appear when the continuous sensory-motor flow input to (...) the robot is reconstructed into compositional memory structures through the articulation processes described. (shrink)