This paper is a reflection on the potential of teaching methodologies that focus on the phenomenon of dissonance or cognitive conflict. In a multicultural and increasingly polarized society, the capacity to question one’s own beliefs and behaviors is certainly one of the skills that the educational system should promote, and the development of this competence is closely related to the effective control of the experience of dissonance originated by new information. Starting from a brief reconstruction of the pedagogical and psychological (...) literature on the subject, I will try to analyze the complexity of the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance by proposing an explanation of the contradictory results of empirical research, identifying as the main problematic nodes the emotional regulation of conflict and the role of the teacher as a facilitator of the process of conceptual change. (shrink)

Even though it has been a privileged form of philosophical inquiry since its origins, dialogue seems to have a marginal role in the teaching of philosophy in Italian schools. The attempt to overcome this paradox through methodologies from the Anglo-Saxon tradition, such as debate, does not seem to respond to the intrinsic needs of the discipline to promote a problematizing attitude towards reality because it is based on a formalization of the debate that emphasizes the competition but neglects self-confrontation and (...) the real questioning of one’s pre-knowledge. Through an analysis of the related literature, this paper proposes a recovery of the Socratic model of dialogue, as a tool to induce cognitive dissonance, a necessary condition for the development of critical thinking. (shrink)

Are we really free? Can we be? To find out, the author guides us in a philosophical dialogue between different scientific disciplines, from psychology to biology, passing through neuroscience, through countless curiosities and curious anecdotes, from racist plants to pig trials. The result is a popular essay that intrigues, but also a concrete example of how philosophical practice can really improve everyday life.

Socratic dialogue is nowadays often invoked as a model in education, and several educational approaches explicitly claim to be inspired by it (Naccari, 2003; Shah, 2008; Delić & Bećirović, 2016). However, contemporary versions depart profoundly from its original form as expressed in the Platonic dialogues, reinterpreting the role of the teacher in the dialogical exchange and referring to different epistemological criteria (cf. Shields, 1953; Reich, 1998; Dinkins, & Cangelosi, 2019; Marshall, 2019). The aim of this paper is to highlight, on (...) the one hand, how such a distortion of the classical model results in the renunciation of the heuristic and transformative functions of Socratic dialogue, and on the other hand, to propose an alternative model of dialogic teaching that restores these functions while maintaining its practicability in contemporary school contexts. Specifically, the role of epistemological relativism and the facilitator in constructivist education are identified as the critical issues in the construction of effective dialogical confrontation in the post-truth era. (shrink)

This research project analyzes a strategy for teaching philosophy in secondary school inspired by Socratic dialogue, which aims at the creation and effective management of cognitive dissonance as a tool for promoting critical thinking, called Socratic Challenge (SC). The research originates from workshops held in the years 2016/2019 in a technical and vocational institute in the province of Varese, in which I participated as the creator and conductor, involving the voluntary participation of about 150 students. The research questions are: What (...) are the characteristics of the Socratic Challenge? Can it constitute a teaching methodology to be proposed? Under what conditions? Within what project framework? The empirical research is qualitative, naturalistic, and exploratory (Lumbelli, 1984), specifically a self-study (Hamilton & Pinnegar 2009), divided into two phases. In the first phase, data regarding motivation and perceptions of training impact were collected through in-depth interviews of students (16) and analyzed using the criteria of reflective thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke 2019). In the second phase, the workshops were repeated remotely in technical and vocational institutes in Milan and the province, involving 113 students who were surveyed with a qualitative questionnaire. The workshops were recorded and the discussion interactions were analyzed according to a qualitative inductive approach that refers to Constructivist Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 2006). Results show how this dialogical instructional strategy in philosophy teaching can be considered an effective alternative to the historical-philosophical approach predominant in the Italian tradition (Illetterati 2007). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Gender Ideology and the “Artistic” Fabrication of Human Sex: Nature as Norm or the Remaking of the Human?Michele M. SchumacherUntil quite recently,” the famous English novelist C. S. Lewis remarked in 1959, “it was taken for granted that the business of the artist was to delight and instruct his public”: that is to say, to address simultaneously their passions and their intellects. “There were, of course, different publics.... (...) And an artist might lead his public on to appreciate finer things than they had wanted at first; but he could do this only by being; from the first, if not merely entertaining, yet entertaining, and if not completely intelligible, yet very largely intelligible.” This constraint—let us call it intelligent (or purposeful) design, in keeping with a basic analogy that we will draw upon in these pages—had however been lost, Lewis observed. Hence, even “in the highest aesthetic circles one now hears nothing about the artist’s duty to us. It is all about our duty to him. He owes us nothing; we owe him ‘recognition,’ even though he has never paid the slightest attention to our tastes, interests, or habits.”1 In short, the artist of modernity need not pay the slightest attention to an intention, not even his own. Modern art need not be an expression of intelligence or [End Page 363] understanding; it is expression as such (tout court): personal and autonomous.2Lewis’s remarks do not point merely to the increasingly relativist tendencies of art in the Western world, to the lack of objective criteria or norms governing the artistic disciplines. They also point to the growing disregard among artists for the sociocultural expectations of their publicum. Mediating between the two is, without a doubt, the basis upon which both artistic and social norms were traditionally founded: nature, which served as a classic analogy for both art (understood in the broad sense, so as to include not only the fine arts, but also technology and practical sciences) and ethics in virtue of nature’s intrinsic inclination towards its defining end and perfection.With regard to the first of these analogies (that of art and nature), Mark Schiefsky explains that although art does bring about “results that nature itself cannot,” it does so in the classic understanding “by acting in a natural way—the way nature would act if it could generate the products of art.”3 As for the difference between the two, nature is moved to its specifying end by way of intrinsic inclinations that are implicit to it, whereas a work of art is moved to its end extrinsically, and thus with more or less violence.4 A sculptor, for example, who introduces a form into a piece of marble, does so by chiseling [End Page 364] and hammering away at the fine stone.5 “Art is,” Aristotle explains, “the principle and form of the thing that comes to be [let us say, a sculpture]; but it is located elsewhere [in, for example, the artist’s mind or in a sketch that he has made] than in that thing, whereas the movement of nature is located in the thing itself that comes to be [a tree, for example, or a baby], and is derived from another natural organism [a tree or human parents] which possessed the form in actuality.”6This classic distinction between art and nature parallels the distinction between art and ethics. Ethics “does not affect human action in the same way as do art and technique,” Servais Pinckaers explains. Unlike art and technique, which are concerned with “the external work produced by human action”—this painting or that machine, for example—ethics is concerned with an immanent principle, qualifying the actor as such: the stable dispositions (or habitus: virtues or vices) at the origin of “the active willing that is the principle source of the action.”7 This immanent principle at the source of ethical action is—to complete our analogy—creative in only a limited sense. The human person is indeed free to choose, but he or she is not free to decide “what is good or evil” as such, nor what is “good or bad for... (shrink)

A autora retoma a sua trajetória, o que aprendeu ao longo de mais de trinta anos, interessando-se pelas formas como seus contemporâneos leem (ou não leem). Com as reflexões de Michel de Certeau como referência teórica, ela lembra como se colocou ao lado dos leitores, esforçando-se para prestar atenção às suas formas de apropriação e representação de um livro, um texto escrito ou uma biblioteca. Narra como aprofundou a análise da importância da literatura desde a infância, construindo um espaço para (...) se descobrir e simbolizar sua experiência. Em seguida, ela conta como se interessou por experiências literárias compartilhadas que reuniam pessoas que tinham vivido muito distantes da cultura escrita: lugares de "educação informal", oficinas em que a leitura de obras literárias e a arte desempenhavam um papel fundamental, concebidos para vítimas de catástrofes, populações deslocadas, jovens desvinculados de grupos guerrilheiros ou paramilitares, dependentes químicos nas ruas, crianças vítimas de violência doméstica, mulheres com bebês em situação de extrema pobreza... Essas experiências são conduzidas por educadores que tentam fazer algo fora do contexto acadêmico tradicional, ou bibliotecários, promotores de leitura, às vezes psicólogos, artistas, narradores, etc. A autora analisa sua arte de fazer, considerando crianças, adolescentes (e também adultos) em sua dimensão sensível, psíquica, física e não apenas cognitiva. Por fim, ela relembra como refletiu sobre a transmissão cultural, debilitada em muitas famílias: quando a luta pela sobrevivência ou o trabalho ocupa o tempo cotidiano, as crianças perdem uma etapa importante para integrar os diferentes registros da língua. Essa etapa é aquela em que, desde muito cedo, alguém é iniciado no uso das palavras tão vital quanto "inútil", gratuito, muito próximo da vida, das sensações, das emoções, do prazer compartilhado; muito longe do controle e da qualificação. Tudo o que ela estudou a convenceu da importância da literatura, oral e escrita, que atende a uma necessidade antropológica. (shrink)

:In this article, we begin by identifying three main neuroethical approaches: neurobioethics, empirical neuroethics, and conceptual neuroethics. Our focus is on conceptual approaches that generally emphasize the need to develop and use a methodological modus operandi for effectively linking scientific and philosophical interpretations. We explain and assess the value of conceptual neuroethics approaches and explain and defend one such approach that we propose as being particularly fruitful for addressing the various issues raised by neuroscience: fundamental neuroethics.

2020 update of the entry "Properties".

It is often claimed that democratic voters have epistemic responsibilities. However, it is not often specified why voters have such epistemic responsibilities. In this paper, I contend that voters have epistemic responsibilities because voting is best understood as an act that bears assertoric force. More precisely, voters perform what I call an act of political advocacy whereby, like an asserter who states or affirms that something is the case, they state or affirm that a certain course of political action is (...) the one that should be followed or enacted. Consequently, the performance of acts of political advocacy such as voting should be understood as bounded by epistemic norms mirroring those binding the act of assertion and yield epistemic responsibilities mirroring the ones required to satisfy these norms. (shrink)

As part of recent epistemic challenges to democracy, some have endorsed the implementation of epistemic constraints on voting, institutional mechanisms that bar incompetent voters from participating in public decision-making procedures. This proposal is often considered incompatible with a commitment to political equality. In this paper, I aim to dispute the strength of this latter claim by offering a theoretical justification for epistemic constraints on voting that does not rest on antiegalitarian commitments. Call this the civic accountability justification for epistemic constraints (...) on voting. On this view, voters stand to one another in a normative relation of reciprocal accountability that requires them to uphold an epistemically responsible conduct. Modest epistemic constraints on voting are justifiable because they secure that participation in voting is conforming to this normative requirement. Thanks to its distinctive features, the civic accountability justification can overcome two problems that egalitarians commonly associate with the idea of epistemic constraints on voting: the disrespect problem and the hierarchy problem. (shrink)

I shall defend in this paper the thesis that, if there are irreducible powers such as the power to produce a certain object (generative powers), then there are objects that do not exist and they are part of the fundamental level of the universe. Thus, generative powers come together with Meinongianism. After having clarified my argument, I shall examine and criticize Armstrong (1997)’s attempt to reduce powers to other sorts of entities. Finally, I shall deal with five accounts of generative (...) powers that are somehow alternative to Meinongianism and with some (more general) miscellaneous concerns about the truth of this doctrine. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss an often-neglected topic in the literature on the ethics of voting. Our aim is to provide an account of what states are obligated to do, so that voters may fulfil their role as public decision-makers in an epistemically competent manner. We argue that the state ought to provide voters with what we call a substantive opportunity for competence. This entails that the state ought to actively foster the epistemic capabilities that are necessary to achieve competent (...) participation in political decision-making practices. (shrink)

The recently published Guidelines on Disorders of Consciousness by the European Academy of Neurology and by the American Academy of Neurology in collaboration with the American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine and the National Institute on Disability, Independent Living, and Rehabilitation Research stand as the most ambitious international attempts to provide clear and standardized recommendations to clinicians working with patients with DoCs. They offer an updated, timely, and wide-ranging list of recommendations for the diagnosis, prognosis, and clinical care of affected patients. (...) However, while commendable, the guidelines pose a number of questions including some related to the practical implementation of their recommendations. The paper introduces the Distributed Responsibility Model as a tool for maximizing the impact of recommendations in clinical practice. (shrink)

In the literature, there have been several methods and definitions for working out whether two theories are “equivalent” or not. In this article, we do something subtler. We provide a means to measure distances between formal theories. We introduce two natural notions for such distances. The first one is that of axiomatic distance, but we argue that it might be of limited interest. The more interesting and widely applicable notion is that of conceptual distance which measures the minimum number of (...) concepts that distinguish two theories. For instance, we use conceptual distance to show that relativistic and classical kinematics are distinguished by one concept only. (shrink)

In this paper I take up the question of the nature of the doxastic attitudes we entertain while inquiring into some matter. Relying on a distinction between two stages of open inquiry, I urge to acknowledge the existence of a distinctive attitude of cognitive inclination towards a proposition qua answer to the question one is inquiring into. I call this attitude “hypothesis”. Hypothesis, I argue, is a sui generis doxastic attitude which differs, both functionally and normatively, from suspended judgement, full (...) belief, credences, and acceptance. In closing, I point to the epistemological significance of hypothesis. More specifically, I contend that holding an attitude of hypothesis enables us to respond rationally to peer disagreement, and I suggest that such an attitude offers a suitable articulation of the view, originally put forward by Philip Kitcher, that cognitive diversity in inquiry has epistemic benefits. (shrink)

Michèle Le Dœuff discusses the revival of feminism in France, including the phenomenon of state-sponsored feminism, such as government support for “parity”: equal numbers of women and men in government. Le Dœuff analyzes the strategically patchy application of this revival and remains wary about it. Turning to the work of seventeenth-century philosopher Gabrielle Suchon, Le Dœuff considers her concepts of freedom, servitude, and active citizenship, which may well, she argues, have influenced Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Le Dœuff favorably juxtaposes the active citizenship (...) defended by Suchon with the kind of citizenship implicitly supported by recent French government feminism. (shrink)

Institutional operability refers to the normative conditions governing the exercise of power of office that makes an institution work. Because institutional action occurs by the interrelated actions of the officeholders, a focus on institutional operability requires the analysis and assessment of the officeholders’ conduct in their institutional capacity. This article distinguishes two perspectives on operability: ‘outward’ and ‘inward.’ The outward view emphasizes predefined instructions for efficient execution, focusing on rule-following to achieve institutional purposes. The inward perspective highlights role-playing and reflective (...) engagement among officeholders to uphold an institution’s raison d’être. The inward perspective brings to the fore the relational aspect of institutional life and officeholders’ interrelated responsibility for guiding institutional action. (shrink)

We analyse the implications of classical liberal and libertarian approaches for distributive justice in the context of social welfare orderings. We study an axiom capturing a liberal non-interfering view of society, the Weak Harm Principle, whose roots can be traced back to John Stuart Mill. We show that liberal views of individual autonomy and freedom can provide consistent foundations for welfare judgements. In particular, a liberal non-interfering approach can help to adjudicate some fundamental distributive issues relative to intergenerational justice. However, (...) a strong relation is established between liberal views of individual autonomy and non-interference, and egalitarian principles in the Rawlsian tradition. (shrink)

In recent years, scepticism about democracy’s ability to deliver good political decisions has resurfaced. In response, some political philosophers have argued that we should replace democracy with epistocracy. In this political system, the exercise of political decision-making powers – including the exercise of the right to vote – is made formally conditional on a sufficient degree of political competence. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the normative justifiability of epistocracy. Whereas most political philosophers firmly reject epistocracy and support (...) democracy, I will instead defend an uncommon middle-ground view. More precisely, I will defend what I call the civic argument for epistemic constraints on voting. According to this argument, voters have a civic duty (an obligation grounded in the normativity of joint agency) to uphold the demands associated with their role in political decision making practices and owe each other compliance with this duty. Given the distinctively epistemic dimension that characterizes their role, the civic duty of voters is to act in an epistemically responsible way by exercising a cluster of epistemic capacities. I then contend that some limited constraints on participation in voting can be normatively justified as a way to ensure, as much as possible, that voters act in an epistemically responsible way. This view provides a novel contribution to the debate, one that can resist some standard egalitarian objections to epistocracy and yet avoid some of the most radical conclusions of standard accounts of epistocracy. (shrink)

This paper focuses on two legal languages such as the legal English developed by the European Union institutions and the legal Chinese of Mainland China, to study whether the mental representations and the embodied simulation created by the conceptual metaphors for the same Western concept, right, differ in any significant ways. By analysing the data contained in two large corpora, this study has found that, despite the common origin of the concept right in the two legal languages, they conceptualise it (...) in a significantly different fashion. Finally, the findings of this study are read through the theoretical framework proposed for this special issue—hybridity and the Third Space. While it is somewhat straightforward to conceive of Euro English as a hybrid language, owing to the multilingual and supranational setting where it is used, this study has found that the Chinese legal language, too, is a hybrid language exhibiting linguistic features that intersect different belief systems. (shrink)

This paper extends the analysis of liberal principles in social choice recently proposed by Mariotti and Veneziani (2009a) to infinitely-lived societies. First, some novel characterisations of inegalitarian leximax social welfare relations are derived based on the Individual Benefit Principle (IBP), which incorporates a liberal, non-interfering view of society. This is surprising because the IBP does not explicitly incorporate any preference for inequality, nor does it assign priority to well-off members of society. Second, some impossibility results are derived that highlight a (...) general tension between standard fairness and efficiency axioms in social choice, and a liberal Principle of Non-Interference that generalises IBP. (shrink)

In English, deictic verbs of motion, such ascomecan encode the perspective of the speaker, or another individual, such as the addressee or a narrative protagonist, at a salient reference time and location, in the form of an indexical presupposition. By contrast, Spanish has been claimed to have stricter requirements on licensing conditions forvenir(“to come”), only allowing speaker perspective. An open question is how a bilingual learner acquiring both English and Spanish reconciles these diverging language-specific restrictions. We face this question head (...) on by investigating narrative productions of young Spanish-English bilingual heritage speakers of Spanish, in comparison to English monolingual and Spanish dominant adults and children. We find that the young heritage speakers producevenirin linguistic contexts where most Spanish adult speakersdo not, but where English monolingual speakersdo, and also resemble those of young monolingual Spanish speakers of at least one other Spanish dialect, leading us to generate two mutually-exclusive hypotheses: (a) the encoding of speaker perspective in the young heritage children is cross-linguistically influenced by the more flexible and dominant language (English), resulting in a wider range of productions by these malleable young speakers than the Spanish grammar actually allows, or (b) the young Spanish speakers are exhibiting productions that are in fact licensed in the grammar, but which are pruned away in the adult productions, being supplanted by other forms as the lexicon is enriched. Given independent evidence of the heritage speakers' robust Spanish linguistic competence, we turn to systematically-collected acceptability judgments of three dialectal varieties of monolingual adult Spanish speakers of the distribution of perspective-taking verbs, to assess their competence and adjudicate between (a) and (b). We find that adultsaccept venirin contexts in which they do notproduceit, leading us to argue that (a)venirisnotobligatorily speaker-oriented in Spanish, as has been claimed, (b) adults may not producevenirin these contexts because they instead select more specific motion verbs, and (c) for heritage bilingual children, the more dominant language (English) may support the grammatically licensed but lexically-constrained productions in Spanish. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What is Racism? Why is Racism Morally Wrong? What Constitutes Racism and When is it Morally Wrong? Must We Believe in the “Permanence of Racism?”.

The article discusses the resort to whistleblowing as a form of resistance to institutional wrongdoing that comes from within an institution. The resort to whistleblowing can take either an individual or an institutional form. As an individual act of resistance, whistleblowing has often been presented as a last resort against institutional wrongdoing whose justification draws on normative arguments for civil disobedience. The institutional form we present in this article shows a nontrivial sense in which a “normalized resort” to whistleblowing can (...) be morally justified as an ordinary practice to resist institutional wrongdoing. Whistleblowing is thus a component of an institutional ethics of office that calls on officeholders’ responsibility to engage in practices of self-scrutiny and self-correction of institutional dysfunctions. The integration of the justification of the resort to whistleblowing within this framework emphasizes the importance of entrusting the oversight of institutional action primarily to institutional members. (shrink)

This essay analyzes Ceva and Ferretti’s theory on the moral wrongness of political corruption. It highlights the significance of the concept of “mandate” in regulating the exercise of official power by public officials. In the second part of the essay, the paper discusses cases in which the violation of the terms of mandate may not be enough to conclude that political corruption is always morally problematic.

Un Canguilhem philosophe à part entière revient aujourd'hui sur le devant de la scène grâce, d'une part, à l'édition des Œuvres complètes reprenant l'ensemble des textes publiés par l'auteur de son vivant et, de l'autre, à la constitution du Fonds Canguilhem qui a mis à disposition pour consultation l'ensemble de ses écrits inédits. Considérée dans son ensemble, l'œuvre de cet étrange philosophe apparaît comme une extraordinaire méditation sur le problème de la création et de l'erreur à l'ère des sciences de (...) la vie ; une méditation au cours de laquelle on voit la tradition philosophique elle-même, notamment celle de l'idéalisme, s'ouvrir aux problèmes posés par la biologie et s'engager dans la voie d'une « pensée du vivant ». Commencée au contact de l'esthétique d'Alain comme une méditation sur l'erreur en tant qu'acte créateur, la réflexion de Canguilhem s'ouvre, de façon à la fois cohérente et inattendue, sur la révolution darwinienne et retrouve dans l'initiative même du vivant la puissance créatrice du sujet et de l'erreur. (shrink)

According to orthodoxy, our best physical theories strongly support Eternalism over Presentism. Our goal is to argue against this consensus, by arguing that a certain overlooked aspect of our best physical theories strongly supports Presentism over Eternalism.

The pluralist sheds the more traditional ideas of truth and ontology. This is dangerous, because it threatens instability of the theory. To lend stability to his philosophy, the pluralist trades truth and ontology for rigour and other ‘fixtures’. Fixtures are the steady goal posts. They are the parts of a theory that stay fixed across a pair of theories, and allow us to make translations and comparisons. They can ultimately be moved, but we tend to keep them fixed temporarily. Apart (...) from considering rigour of proof as a fixture, I discuss fixed models, invariant notions and fixed information about objects across theories. There are other fixtures, but it is enough to start with these. (shrink)

Albert the Great’s Aristotelian paraphrases (De animalibus, Parva Naturalia) are famous for their extensive use of medical doctrines. Their use is not unprecedented in other Albertinian works, though. This article tries to show how Albert’s early theological works (De homine, Commentarium super libros Sententiarum) provide crucial evidence to understand the rationale behind Albert’s integration of medico-philosophical doctrines into his mature works of natural philosophy. In the first place, the early works assert that medicine – at least, its theoretical part – (...) treats a natural body subject to a natural process (healing), a view that leads Albert in his mature works to consider (this part of) medicine as a part of natural philosophy. Secondarily, the article moves on to show how Albert’s selective attitude towards medical doctrines and his position on the Galenic-Aristotelian quarrels about generation and origin of veins date back to his De homine and are strongly – although not entirely – dependent on Avicennian zoology and medicine. Unlike Avicenna, Albert would reshape in his mature works notions of Galenic and Avicennian medicine (spirit, radical, moisture) and zoology (formative power) into an original paradigm of ‘universal physiology’, meant to investigate the world of plants and minerals not only according to their parts and functions but also according to their species. (shrink)

In this study, we explore the role of Chief Executive Officers’ incentives, split between monetary and non-monetary, in relation to corporate social responsibility. We base our analysis on a sample of 597 US firms over the period 2005–2009. We find that both monetary and non-monetary incentives have an effect on CSR decisions. Specifically, monetary incentives designed to align the CEO’s and shareholders’ interests have a negative effect on CSR and non-monetary incentives have a positive effect on CSR. The study has (...) important implications for the design of executive remuneration plans, as we show that there are many levers that can affect the CEO’s decisions with regard to CSR. Our evidence also confirms the prominent role of the CEO in relation to CSR decisions, while also recognizing the complexity of factors affecting CSR. Finally, we propose a research design that takes into account endogeneity issues arising when examining compensation variables. (shrink)