Ce texte a déjà paru dans La Lettre de l'OCIM, n° 150, novembre-décembre 2013, p. 15-24. Nous remercions Daniel Jacobi et Serge Lochot, Rédacteur en chef La Lettre de l'OCIM, de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. L'exposition temporaire résistera-t-elle à la montée en force de l'événementiel? Cette interrogation nourrit ici une réflexion menée à partir d'une analyse des différentes offres – expositions temporaires, événements – proposées au public par les musées depuis une trentaine d'années, - Sciences de l'information (...) et de la communication. (shrink)

... Let me start my investigation by taking a brief look at the way in which self-awareness is expressed linguistically, as in the sentences "I am tired" or ...

Quentin Landenne | : Le problème du système comme mode de construction de la pensée philosophique a trouvé dans la période de l’Idéalisme allemand l’un de ses points culminants dans l’histoire de la philosophie. Loin de se limiter à une question extrinsèque portant sur le choix d’une forme d’exposition qui resterait relativement indifférente au contenu de la doctrine elle-même, l’adoption ou le rejet de tel ou tel type de systématicité implique des décisions conceptuelles importantes touchant à des problèmes philosophiques qui (...) sont au coeur des discussions de l’époque. C’est notamment la question de la complétude du système et de son rapport à une éventuelle extériorité qui sont mis en jeu dans ces discussions. Parmi les acteurs de cette controverse, Jacobi, Fichte et Hegel se sont ainsi affrontés, directement ou indirectement, sur la question spécifique du rapport entre système et vie, d’une part, entre système et absolu, d’autre part. Alors que Jacobi reproche à Fichte d’absorber la vie dans son système mortifiant et nihiliste et que Hegel dénonce au contraire dans la Doctrine de la science l’incomplétude d’un système incapable de combler l’écart entre savoir et vie, pour Fichte, l’unité différenciée de la vie et du système, posés comme points de vue de la réflexivité philosophique, rend possible un système qui, quoique accompli en lui-même, n’abolit pas son extériorité constitutive et son ouverture à la vie. | : The problem of the system as a way of constructing the philosophical thought has found one of his historical climax in the period of German Idealism. Far from being reduced to an external concern about the choice of a form of exposition which would remain indifferent to the very content of the doctrine, the adoption or the rejection of one or another systematic type involves important conceptual decisions concerning philosophical problems that are hardly discussed at that time. Namely, the questions of the completeness of the system and of his relation to a possible exteriority are at stake in these discussions. Among the key figures of this controversy, Jacobi, Fichte and Hegel were engaged in a direct or indirect confrontation about the specific question of the relationship between system and life, on the one hand, between system and absolute, on the other hand. While Jacobi accuses Fichte of absorbing the life in his mortifying and nihilistic system and as Hegel criticized, on the contrary, the incompleteness of the Science of Knowledge, which would be unable to fill the gap between science and life, for Fichte, the differentiated unity of life and system, both considered as points of view of the philosophical reflexivity, makes it possible to accomplish a system that does not eliminate a constitutive open relationship to life. (shrink)

Avec l'ecrit sur le Droit naturel, Foi et Savoir constitue la voie d'entree, strategiquement fondamentale, dans le systeme hegelien, comme Theorie et Doctrine du Logos. En sa conclusion Hegel ayant expose la coeur de la philosophie de la reflexion dont les hautes figures sont Kant, Jacobi et Fichte, celebre le Vendredi Saint de l'esprit qui abolit le Dieu perdu de Pascal (Br. 441). Ainsi est annoncee la derniere page de La Phenomenologie de l'esprit ou dans le Golgotha de l'Esprit absolu, (...) comme Savoir absolu, depassant le savoir en devenir (Werdend Wissen) se dit la fin de l'histoire dont emerge le sens depuis le Calice auquel reve Schiller (La Phenomenologie de l'esprit, page derniere). (shrink)

If one comes to Phénoménologie de la perception after having read Sein und Zeit (or Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs) one will be in for a surprise. Both works contain a number of both implicit and explicit references to Husserl, but the presentation they give is so utterly different, that one might occasionally wonder whether they are referring to the same author. Thus nobody can overlook that Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Husserl differs significantly from Heidegger’s. It is far more charitable. In (...) fact, when evaluating the merits of respectively Husserl and Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty often goes very much against the standard view. This is not only the case in his notorious remark on the very first page of Phénoménologie de la Perception where he declares that the whole of Sein und Zeit is nothing but an explication of Husserl’s notion of Lifeworld, but also - to give just one further example - in one of his Sorbonne-lectures, where Merleau-Ponty writes that Husserl took the issue of historicity far more seriously than Heidegger. (shrink)

In this entry, I tackle the phenomenon known as "faultless disagreement", considered by many authors to pose a challenge to the main views on the semantics of subjective expressions. I first present the phenomenon and the challenge, then review the main answers given by contextualist, absolutist and relativist approaches to the expressions in question. I end with signaling two issues that might shape future discussions about the role played by faultless disagreement in semantics.

The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology presents twenty-eight essays by some of the leading figures in the field, and gives an authoritative overview of the type of work and range of topics found and discussed in contemporary phenomenology. It is the definitive guide to what is currently going on in phenomenology, and offers a rich source of insight and stimulation for philosophers, students of philosophy, and for people working in other disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, who are (...) interested in the state of phenomenology today. The essays explore a diverse range of topics, including intentionality, embodiment, perception, naturalism, temporality, self-consciousness, language, knowledge, ethics, politics, art and religion, and will make it clear that phenomenology, far from being a tradition of the past, is alive and in a position to make valuable contributions to contemporary thought. (shrink)

Many times, what we say proves to be wrong. It might turn out that what we took to be a comforting remark was, in fact, making things worse. Or that a joke was inappropriate. Or that yelling out loud was rude. More importantly for this paper, there are plenty of cases in which what we said turns out to be false: we spoke without paying attention, we were misinformed or tricked, or we made a reasoning mistake. -/- A particular instance (...) of this latter phenomenon is when someone changes their perspective and doesn't find their previous assertions true anymore. For example, imagine that you used to like licorice as a child, and that you went around saying things like "Licorice is tasty." But, growing up, you find licorice too strong and quite boring; your tastes have changed. While the taste of licorice itself has not changed, you are not going around anymore uttering "Licorice is tasty." In fact, in certain cases, you might even think that what you said in your childhood was wrong - at least in light of your present preferences. -/- Sometimes we "take back" the assertions we made when we realize they are no longer true. Such speech acts of taking back can be performed in various ways: more formally, as effected in a court of law or when an official speaks to the press, or more informally in our day-by-day interactions. These acts of taking back are known as retraction. Retraction is usually achieved by employing certain linguistic markers ('I was wrong', 'I was mistaken', 'I retract', "Scratch that' etc.) that signal that the retractor takes their previous speech act to be faulty in a certain way. -/- This phenomenon has formed the basis for a popular argument used by relativists about a variety of natural language expressions (predicates of taste, epistemic modals, moral and aesthetic claims etc.) in support of their view. Recently, several considerations (mostly from contextualists about the same expressions), both from the armchair and based on empirical studies, have been offered to undercut the support retraction was thought to provide for relativism. In this paper, I consider and re-evaluate that support in light of both types of considerations, showing that neither of them decisively undermines it. However, to survive the contextualist counterattack, the relativist needs to pay a price: that is, she will be forced to make some concessions or rethink certain claims. I show what I think those concessions should be and what needs to be rethought (and how). The upshot is that, while the support retraction offers relativism is not as strong as initially believed, appeal to retraction remains a legitimate move in the debate. In section 1, I introduce the views in the debate and clarify the phenomenon of retraction and its dialectical role. Armchair data are investigated in section 2, proper experimental studies in section 3, while section 4 summarizes and concludes. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology contains thirty-seven new essays by leading scholars in the field. The essays all highlight historical influences, connections, and developments and provide an in-depth coverage of the development of phenomenology; one that allows for a better comprehension and assessment of the continuity as well as diversity of the phenomenological tradition. The handbook is divided into three distinct parts. The first part contains chapters that address the way phenomenology has been influenced by earlier periods (...) or figures in the history of philosophy. The second part contains chapters targeting prominent phenomenologists: How was their work affected by earlier figures, how did their own views change over time, and what kind of influence did they exert on subsequent thinkers? The contributions in the third part trace various core topics such as subjectivity, intersubjectivity, embodiment, spatiality, and imagination in the work of different phenomenologists, in order to explore how the notions were transformed, enriched, and expanded up through the century. The handbook will be a source of insight for philosophers, students of philosophy, and for people working in other disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, who are interested in the phenomenological tradition. It is an authoritative guide to how phenomenology started, how it developed, and where it is heading. (shrink)

Augustin-Louis Cauchy publie une majorité de ses recherches arithmétiques entre 1829 et 1840. Celles-ci ne sont pourtant qu’évoquées dans certaines histoires de la théorie des nombres centrées sur les lois de réciprocité ou sur la théorie des nombres algébriques. Elles y sont décrites comme contenant quelques résultats similaires à ceux de Gauss, Jacobi ou Dirichlet mais de manière incomplète et désordonnée. L’objectif de cet article est de présenter une analyse des textes arithmétiques de Cauchy publiés entre 1829 et 1840 pour (...) montrer qu’ils contiennent au contraire un ensemble cohérent de résultats en lien avec les formes quadratiques \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$4p^{\mu }=x^2+ny^2$$\end{document}, où \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$p$$\end{document} est un nombre premier et \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$n$$\end{document} un diviseur de \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$p-1$$\end{document}. Nous discuterons également la forme particulière de ce corpus et la stratégie utilisée pour retrouver les lignes directrices du travail de Cauchy. Augustin-Louis Cauchy published most of his arithmetical research between 1829 and 1840. These are however only mentioned in some number theory history centered on reciprocity laws or on theory of algebraic numbers. They are described as containing some results similar to those of Gauss, Jacobi and Dirichlet but in a incomplete and disorganized way. The objective of this paper is to present an analysis of Cauchy’s arithmetical texts published between 1829 and 1840 to show that they contain a rather consistent set of results related to quadratic forms \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$4p^{\mu } = x ^2 + ny ^2 $$\end{document}, where \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$p$$\end{document} is a prime and \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$n$$\end{document} a divisor of \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$ p-1 $$\end{document}. We will also discuss the particular form of this body of texts and the strategy we used to find the guidelines of the work of Cauchy. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a range of existent and possible ameliorative semantic theories of gender terms: invariantism, according to which gender terms are not context-sensitive, contextualism, according to which the meaning of gender terms is established in the context of use, and relativism, according to which the meaning of gender terms is established in the context of assessment. I show that none of these views is adequate with respect to the plight of trans people to use their term of (...) choice to self-identify and be referred to accordingly. I then consider an invariantist view based on self-identification and explore some of its challenges. (shrink)

When people speak, their words never fully encode what they mean, and the context is always compatible with a variety of interpretations. How can comprehension ever be achieved? Wilson and Sperber argue that comprehension is an inference process guided by precise expectations of relevance. What are the relations between the linguistically encoded meanings studied in semantics and the thoughts that humans are capable of entertaining and conveying? How should we analyse literal meaning, approximations, metaphors and ironies? Is the ability to (...) understand speakers' meanings rooted in a more general human ability to understand other minds? How do these abilities interact in evolution and in cognitive development? MEANING AND RELEVANCE sets out to answer these and other questions, enriching and updating relevance theory and exploring its implications for linguistics, philosophy, cognitive science and literary studies. (shrink)

Ecologically-motivated authoritarianism flourished initially during the 1970s but largely disappeared after the decline of socialism in the late-1980s. Today, 'eco- authoritarianism ' is beginning to reassert itself, this time modelled not after the Soviet Union but modern-day China. The new eco-authoritarians denounce central planning but still suggest that governments should be granted powers that free them from subordination to citizens' rights or democratic procedures. I argue that current eco-authoritarian views do not present us with an attractive alternative to market liberal (...) democracy even if we take a highly pessimistic view of our shared prospects under the latter sort of regime. (shrink)

The contemporary debate on collective intentionality in analytic philosophy has lasted several decades, but questions concerning the nature of ‘we’ and the relation between the individual and the community are obviously far older. We can find a particularly rich discussion in early phenomenology. Indeed, while starting out with an interest in the individual mind, phenomenologists began their exploration of dyadic forms of interpersonal relations shortly before the start of World War I and were already deeply engaged in extensive analyses of (...) collective forms of intentionality a few years later. A distinctive feature of the phenomenological contribution was its exploration of the relation between the first- and second-person singular and the first-person plural perspectives. How are I, you, and we intertwined? The aim of this paper is to present some core insights from this early debate. (shrink)

The paper is concerned with the semantics of knowledge attributions(K-claims, for short) and proposes a position holding that K-claims are contextsensitive that differs from extant views on the market. First I lay down the data a semantic theory for K-claims needs to explain. Next I present and assess three views purporting to give the semantics for K-claims: contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism and relativism. All three views are found wanting with respect to their accounting for the data. I then propose a hybrid (...) view according to which the relevant epistemic standards for evaluating K-claims are neither those at the context of the subject (subject-sensitive invariantism), nor those at the context of the assessor (relativism), but it is itself an open matter. However, given that we need a principled way of deciding which epistemic standards are the relevant ones, I provide a principle according to which the relevant standards are those that are the highest between those at the context of the subject and those at the context of the assessor/attributor. In the end I consider some objections to the view and offer some answers. (shrink)

In his book The Conscious Mind David Chalmers introduced a by now familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection (Chalmers, 1996, 4, 1995, 200). All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means (...) of the standard repertoire of cognitive science and explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. This task might still be difficult, but it is within reach. In contrast, the hard problem—also known as the problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995, 201)—is the problem of explaining why mental states have phenomenal or experiential qualities. Why is it like something to ‘taste coffee’, to ‘touch an ice cube’, to ‘look at a sunset’ etc.? Why does it feel the way it does? Why does it at all feel like anything? Chalmers’s distinction confronts us with a version of the so-called ‘explanatory gap’. On the one hand, we have certain cognitive functions, which can apparently be explained reductively, and on the other hand, we have a number of experiential qualities, which seem to resist this reductive explanation. We can establish that a certain function is accompanied by a certain experience, but we have no idea why that happens, and regardless of how closely we scrutinize the neural mechanisms we don’t seem to be getting any closer at an answer. In his book, Chalmers also distinguished two concepts of mind: a phenomenal concept and a psychological concept. The first captures the conscious aspect of mind: Mind is understood in terms of conscious experience. The second concept understands mind in functional terms as the causal or explanatory basis for behavior.. (shrink)

In his bookThe Conscious MindDavid Chalmers introduced a now-familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection. All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means of the standard repertoire of cognitive science and explained (...) in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. This task might still be difficult, but it is within reach. In contrast, the hard problem — also known astheproblem of consciousness — is the problem of explaining why mental states have phenomenal or experiential qualities. Why is it like something to ‘taste coffee,’ to ‘touch an ice cube,’ to ‘look at a sunset,’ etc.? Why does it feel the way it does? Why does it feel like anything at all? (shrink)

Recently, some scholars have argued that testimonial injustice may not only be due to prejudice toward the speaker, but also prejudice toward the content of what the speaker says. I argue that such accounts do not merely expand our picture of epistemic injustice, but give us reason to radically revise our approach to reducing testimonial injustice. The dominant conception of this project focuses on reducing speaker prejudice. But even if one were to successfully do so, the frequency of content prejudice (...) means that one would still commit testimonial injustice in many of the same circumstances. I argue that we must reorient the project of reducing testimonial injustice toward critiquing the ideologies that produce it. I conclude with a sketch of what such a research program might look like. (shrink)

In Preludes to Pragmatism: Toward A Reconstruction of Philosophy, Phillip Kitcher argues in Chapter 6, “Does ‘Race’ Have a Future” that developments in evolutionary biology may support a separation of our species into subcategories that could be regarded as races. The human species, he argues, could possibly be divided, using a similar methodology to that employed by evolutionary biologists, into relatively stable and isolated breeding populations that bear distinctive and salient clusters of significant genotypic and phenotypic traits. Hence, the eliminativist (...) claim that there is nothing in the world that corresponds to our use of the term ‘race’ is mistaken. There is, in short, a scientifically legitimate.. (shrink)

Alain Locke, the central promoter of the Harlem Renaissance, is placed in conversation with leading philosophers and cultural figures in the modern world, from Aristotle to Obama. For teachers and students of contemporary debates in pragmatism, diversity, and value theory, these conversations' define new-and controversial-terrain.

An important feature of so-called rational decision making, at least in times of crisis, is arational: that is, our ability to decide manifests features of our characters or the values we hold rather than our reasoning abilities.1 Such a position stands in obvious opposition to the Western philosophical tradition. Consider, by comparison, the view of Immanuel Kant, who held that reason could, and perhaps sometimes ought to, operate independently of (and in opposition to) our sentiments. Contrary to Kant, William James (...) argues in "The Sentiment of Rationality" that arational mental states and phenomena—such as feelings, emotions, values, and attitudes—are indispensable to practical rationality (317). The attempt to .. (shrink)

Humans have two kinds of beliefs, intuitive beliefs and reflective beliefs. Intuitive beliefs are a most fundamental category of cognition, defined in the architecture of the mind. They are formulated in an intuitive mental lexicon. Humans are also capable of entertaining an indefinite variety of higher-order or "reflective" propositional attitudes, many of which are of a credal sort. Reasons to hold "reflective beliefs" are provided by other beliefs that describe the source of the reflective belief as reliable, or that provide (...) explicit arguments in favour of the reflective belief. The mental lexicon of reflective beliefs includes not only intuitive, but also reflective concepts. (shrink)

In response to the mental health crisis in science, and amid concerns about the detrimental effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on scientists, this study seeks to identify the role of a heretofore under-researched factor for flourishing and eudaimonia: aesthetic experiences in scientific work. The main research question that this study addresses is: To what extent is the frequency of encountering aesthetics in terms of beauty, awe, and wonder in scientific work associated with greater well-being among scientists? Based on a large-scale (...) and representative international survey of scientists in four countries, this study employs sets of nested regressions to model the associations of aesthetic experiences with flourishing while controlling for demographic factors and negative workplace and life circumstances such as burnout, job/publication pressure, mistreatment, COVID-19 impacts, other stressful life events, serious psychological distress, and chronic health conditions. The results show that the frequency of aesthetic experiences in scientific work in the disciplines of biology and physics has a very large and statistically significant association with flourishing and eudaimonia that remains robust even when controlling for demographic factors and negative workplace and life circumstances, including COVID-19 impacts. Aesthetic experiences in scientific work are even as strongly associated with flourishing as the presence of serious psychological distress and are most strongly associated with the flourishing domain of meaning in life, thus pointing to a link with eudaimonic well-being. In line with neurophysiological evidence and positive psychological models of flow, self-transcendence, and intrinsic motivation, aesthetics are a key source of flourishing for scientists in the disciplines of biology and physics. While future research needs to test the causal mechanism, the strength of the findings could encourage leaders of scientific labs and research organizations generally to remove obstacles to experiencing the aesthetic dimensions of science. Fostering cultures in which the aesthetic experiences that are intrinsic to scientific practice are fully appreciated might potentially protect or boost flourishing by reducing the impacts of burnout, job/publication pressure, and mistreatment-related experiences in science. (shrink)

行動経済学によって、さまざまに系統的な不合理さが見えてきた。手をかけることが高評価をもたらすIKEA効果、やる気をそいでいる高額ボーナス、自分で思いついた(と思わせられた)意見は好ましい、雑用は一気に 片づけるほうが楽...。行動経済学研究の第一人者が、わたしたちがなぜ、どのように不合理な行動をしてしまうのかをユニークな実験で紹介。わかりやすい数々の実例で経済の真の姿を解明し、よりよい決断へとつなげ る話題作。.

Philosophizing the Americas establishes the field of inter-American philosophy. Bringing together contributors who work in Africana Philosophy, Afro-Caribbean philosophy, Latin American philosophy, Afro-Latin philosophy, decolonial theory, and African American philosophy, the volume examines the full range of traditions that have, separately and in conversation with each other, worked through how philosophy in both establishes itself in the Americas and engages with the world from which it emerges. The book traces a range of questions, from the history of philosophy in the (...) Americas to philosophical questions of race, feminism, racial eliminativism, creolization, epistemology, coloniality, aesthetics, and literature. The essays place an impressive range of philosophical traditions and figures into dialogue with one another: some familiar, such as José Martí, Sylvia Wynter, Martin R. Delany, José Vasconcelos, Alain Locke, as well as such less familiar thinkers as Arturo Alfonso Schomburg, Hilda Hilst, and George Lamming. In each chapter, the contributors find fascinating and productive matrices of tension or convergence in works throughout the Americas. The result is an original and important contribution to knowledge that introduces readers from various disciplines to unfamiliar yet compelling ideas and considers familiar texts from novel and prescient perspectives. Philosophizing the Americas stands alone as a representation of current scholarly debates in the field of inter-American philosophy. Contributors: Stephanie Rivera Berruz, Jacoby Adeshei Carter, Nadia Celis, Tommy J. Curry, Hernando A. Estévez, Daniel Fryer, James B. Haile III, Chike Jeffers, Lee A. McBride III, Michael Monahan, Adriana Novoa, Susana Nuccetelli, Andrea J. Pitts, Dwayne A. Tunstall, and Alejandro A. Vallega. (shrink)

Humans have two kinds of beliefs, intuitive beliefs and reflective beliefs. Intuitive beliefs are a fundamental category of cognition, defined in the architecture of the mind. They are formulated in an intuitive mental lexicon. Humans are also capable of entertaining an indefinite variety of higher‐order or‘reflective’propositional attitudes, many of which are of a credat sort. Reasons to hold reflective beliefs are provided by other beliefs that describe the source of the reflective belief as reliable, or that provide an explicit argument (...) in favour of the reflective belief. The mental lexicon of reflective beliefs includes not only intuitive, but also reflective concepts. (shrink)

This study explored the extent to which perceived changes in religiosity from before to during the COVID-19 pandemic are associated with flourishing. Participants from a diverse set of faith communities in two United States metropolitan regions completed an online survey between October and December 2020. The survey included items capturing perceived changes in four dimensions of religiosity and a multidimensional measure of flourishing. Based on multilevel regressions, results indicated that self-reported decreases in each dimension of religiosity were associated with lower (...) overall flourishing. This pattern of findings was largely similar for the domains of flourishing, with some variation in the strength of associations that emerged. An increase in frequency of religious service attendance was associated with lower overall flourishing and lower scores on selected domains of flourishing, indicating possible evidence of religious coping. Faith communities might have to find ways of supporting members during the challenging COVID-19 period to prevent long-term declines in flourishing. (shrink)

The vision of integrating artificial intelligence in education is part of an ongoing push for harnessing digital solutions to improve teaching and learning. Drawing from Jasanoff and Hasse, this paper deliberates on how sociotechnical imaginaries are interrelated to the implications of new technologies, such as AI, in education. Complicating Hasses’s call for the development of Socratic ignorance to consider our predispositions about new technologies and open new prospects of thought, this paper revisits postphenomenology and Feenberg’s critical constructivist theories. While embracing (...) the notion of Socratic ignorance, this paper stresses the importance of developing a nuanced understanding of technology that realizes its lack of neutrality and supports the creation of a deeper understanding of how knowledge is produced, deployed, and interpreted in the digital age. Thus, this paper argues that an amalgam of Hasse’s call for advancing Socratic ignorance combined with postphenomenology and critical constructivism can support students in developing a critical understanding of technology and opening new landscapes of imaginaries. (shrink)

This article begins with a consideration of the standard argument for the moral equality of soldiers; namely, that soldiers are morally equal because they pose similar dangers to one another. Next, arguments for the equal application of the rules of war to both sides are considered and ultimately rejected. In the end, it is argued that if the justice of the cause for war is attributable to the warriors on either side, then modifying or unequally applying the rules of war (...) is in some cases the morally appropriate thing to do. (shrink)

This paper begins with a presentation of some important aspects of the science behind global warming. Following that, I argue that attempts to address global warming and climate change as problems facing humanity ought not to center around economic understandings of the problem or it solutions. Moreover, I argue that pragmatism is especially vulnerable to this sort of misappropriation in seeking solutions to climate change, and that environmental pragmatists ought to make a conscious effort to avoid potential mischaracterizations of pragmatism (...) by providing a clearer sense of the boundaries that delimit its approach to climate change, or any other environmental crisis. (shrink)

This paper considers the increasingly common suggestion that a new form of warfare has emerged. It clarifies the notion of new wars and responds to an argument for the claim that in order to achieve military parity non-state actors must violate just war principles. I reject the claim that violation of just war principles is necessary and argue that we can make reasonable normative judgments about new wars in terms of just war theory. From there, I consider the possibility that (...) military parity can be achieved in a way that does not violate these principles and argue that it is permissible for relatively weak non-state actors to fight with fewer restrictions than conventional states. (shrink)