Arguments for Restrictivism – the position that we are rarely free– have been proposed by incompatibilists Peter van Inwagen and David Vander Laan among others. This article is concerned much more with these arguments than with quantifying the frequency of free actions. There are two general ways to argue for restrictivism. First, one may take a Negative Strategy, arguing that the situations in which one is not free are common and predominant. Second, one may focus on situations in which one (...) is apparently free, and argue directly that these situations are rare – the Inventory Strategy. I conclude that both types of arguments for restrictivism are unconvincing. (shrink)

The classical model of democracy that Schumpeter criticizes is manufactured out of a variety of earlier ideas, not those of any one thinker or even one school of thought. His critique of the central ideals by which he defines the model--those of the common will and the common good--remains persuasive. People's preferences are too messy and too manipulable to allow us to think that mass democracy can promote those ideals, as he defines them. Should we endorse his purely electoral model (...) of democracy then, and accept that people do not exercise any control over government? Not necessarily. We can expand democracy to include the constitutional and contestatory constraints that people impose on their rulers. We may hope that people can rely on such democratic controls to ensure that government operates by community standards. (shrink)

Pettit endorses a ‘republican’ conception of social freedom of the person as consisting of a state of non-domination, and takes this to refute Mill’s ‘liberal’ claim that non-domineering but coercive interference can compromise social freedom of choice. This paper argues that Pettit’s interpretation is true to the extent that Mill believes that the legitimate, non-arbitrary and just coercion of would-be dominators, for the sake of preventing them from dominating others, can render them unfree to choose to do so (...) without rendering them socially unfree (qua dominated) persons in their own right. However, contra Pettit, Mill is correct to reject the ‘republican’ view for at least two reasons. Firstly, it enables him to avoid commitment to the implausible implication that would-be dominators who sincerely deny any interest in a shared system of basic liberties are automatically rendered unfree persons by the coercion necessary to uphold such a system. Secondly, it enables him to avoid begging the question against ‘immoralists’ like Nietzsche, whose opposition to systems of reciprocal non-domination is at least partly motivated by the losses of social freedom of choice they entail for those they deem to be worthy of dominating others. (shrink)

I argue that an ambiguity exists between Philip Pettit's largely normative and Quentin Skinner's largely historical accounts of republican liberty. Historical republican liberty, as seen in Livy's narrative of the period following the expulsion of the Roman kings to the passage of the Licinian-Sextian laws, was largely defensive, in the form of the tribunate. Though republican liberty protected the plebeians from wanton patrician abuse, removing them from a formal dependence analogous to that of slave or child in Roman law, (...) it left them under the tutelage and guidance of a paternalistic order. Thus, while historical republican liberty was anti-patriarchal, it was normatively compatible with paternalism. Yet paternalism is probably undesirable for both normatively- and historically-minded advocates of republicanism. (shrink)

Abstract This paper offers an appraisal of Phillip Pettit's approach to the problem how a merely finite set of examples can serve to represent a determinate rule, given that indefinitely many rules can be extrapolated from any such set. I argue that Pettit's so-called ethnocentric theory of rule-following fails to deliver the solution to this problem he sets out to provide. More constructively, I consider what further provisions are needed in order to advance Pettit's general approach to (...) the problem. I conclude that what is needed is an account that, whilst it affirms the view that agents' responses are constitutively involved in the exemplification of rules, does not allow such responses the pride of place they have in Pettit's theory. (shrink)

I discuss Philip Pettit’s argument that appreciation is not a proper response to value because it fails to satisfy the non-iteration constraint, according to which, where V is a value and R is a response to value, R-ing V must not be distinct from R-ing R-ing V. After motivating the non-iteration constraint and conceding that appreciation fails to satisfy the constraint, I argue that the consequentialist’s preferred response to value, promotion, also violates the constraint, leaving Pettit with a (...) dilemma: if he insists on the constraint, then promotion is not a proper response to value; if he does not insist on the constraint, then his argument against appreciation as a proper response to value fails. (shrink)

Philip Pettit has identified some interesting apparent commonalities among core human values like love, friendship, virtue, and respect. These are all, Pettit argues, ‘robustly demanding’: they require us to provide certain benefits across ranges of alternative scenarios. Pettit also suggests a general ‘rationale’ for valuing such goods, which draws on his work on freedom. In this paper, I zoom in on love in particular. I critically assess whether Pettit’s schematic account of love’s value adequately captures what (...) we typically value in valuing love. And I scrutinize the analogy Pettit suggests between the rationale for valuing freedom and his rationale for valuing love. My conclusion is that whereas Pettit’s account of love and its value does not strictly speaking contain false propositions, it ends up being a somewhat skewed account of love’s value. Finally, I bring up some widely discussed aspects of love’s value not captured by Pettit’s account. (shrink)

Philip Pettit has argued that universalizability entails consequentialism. I criticise the argument for relying on a question-begging reading of the impartiality of universalization. A revised form of the argument can be constructed by relying on preference-satisfaction rationality, rather than on impartiality. But this revised argument succumbs to an ambiguity in the notion of a preference (or desire). I compare the revised argument to an earlier argument of Pettit’s for consequentialism that appealed to the theoretical virtue of simplicity, and (...) I raise questions about the force of appeal to notions like simplicity and rationality in moral argument. (shrink)

In Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Philip Pettit seeks to revive republicanism not only as a critical perspective on contemporary political life but as a guiding principle for the design of modern political institutions. His conception of republicanism sees it as aimed at securing a kind of liberty: freedom from domination, which he defines as dependence on the arbitrary will of another. Pettit contrasts his conception of liberty with the notion, traced to Hobbes, Bentham and “enlightenment” (...) thinkers, of freedom as noninterference, a conception of freedom that put things off on the wrong track. (shrink)

This volume documents the 16th Münster Lectures in Philosophy and examines five themes that are prominent in the work of philosopher and political theorist Philip Pettit. These themes are: Epistemology and Semantics, Philosophy of Mind, Consequentialism, Group Agency, and Republicanism. The book provides insight into Pettit's work and demonstrates the central role his work plays in a number of contemporary philosophical debates. Pettit’s contributions to the philosophy of mind and action, rational choice theory, the philosophy of the (...) social sciences, as well as metaethics, normative ethics and political philosophy are main points of reference, and have advanced ongoing and initiated new discussions. The book shows that a striking feature of Pettit's work has been the depth of his analyses and arguments regarding individual topics – ranging from rule-following to free will, from group agency to social ontology and the methodology of the social sciences, from a defense of consequentialism to the revival of the republican tradition in the theory of democracy and to value theory, but also their systematic overall coherence. The book contains Pettit’s lecture "Freedom and Other Robustly Demanding Goods", nine critical papers on Pettit’s philosophy, and a reply article entitled "Self-Defense on Five Fronts: A Reply to My Commentators". (shrink)

A thought, taken as a propositional attitude or the content of psychological predicates such as believe, wish, desire, hope, is ascribed to an entity with mental states. A thought is not only allegedly ascribed to particular non-mental things like computer, book, it is also ascribed to non-material things, linguistically in plural terms, e.g. plural pronouns (e.g. we, they), collective names or singular proper names (e.g. the United States), proper names in plural form or general terms (e.g. the Microsoft, feminists). Plural (...) terms are terms referring to groups of entities. The question is - what is it for a group to have a thought? Two main views are currently on centered stage – the literal view and the metaphorical view. This paper argues that the main argument supporting the literal view, in particular Pettit’s view, faces three main problems, namely, the problem of rule-following in propositional coawareness, the problem of an independent verifiability for group beliefs and the problem of the indexical ‘we’- thought. -/- Keywords: thoughts, collective intentionality, social ontology, group agency, group consciousness . (shrink)

In Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Philip Pettit seeks to revive republicanism not only as a critical perspective on contemporary political life but as a guiding principle for the design of modern political institutions. His conception of republicanism sees it as aimed at securing a kind of liberty: freedom from domination, which he defines as dependence on the arbitrary will of another. Pettit contrasts his conception of liberty with the notion, traced to Hobbes, Bentham and “enlightenment” (...) thinkers, of freedom as noninterference, a conception of freedom that put things off on the wrong track. (shrink)

La pensée politique de Philip Pettit incarne aujourd'hui une école "républicaine", qui tente de trouver une troisième voie entre le libéralisme de John Rawis et ses critiques communautariens comme Charles Taylor. Mais le républicanisme de Pettit ne peut se comprendre sans prendre en compte l'autre versant de ses travaux, qui poilent sur les fondements de l'économie et des sciences sociales. Sans paradoxe, il se qualifie lui-même "d'individualiste poliste". Le coeur de sa pensée tient dans cette articulation originale. dont (...) les conséquences politiques tonnent une théorie républicaine de la liberté et de la démocratie. Les hommes ne peuvent penser que les uns avec les autres, en commun. II faut donc briser le tabou moderne selon lequel toutes les valeurs politiques doivent pouvoir être traduites en termes individualistes. Si l'homme n'est homme que parce qu'il pense et échange avec ses semblables, les valeurs politiques doivent être représentées comme des valeurs sociales. A l'opposé de tout atomisme. Pettit développe ainsi une métaphysique sociale "holiste". Mais ces valeurs ne peuvent pour autant s'imposer aux individus. Quoique nous fassions ensemble, il faut que chacun puisse y donner son consentement, car chaque personne doit être considérée comme un être moral indépendant et d'égale valeur. (shrink)

This article discusses the concepts of freedom and liberty that Skinner and Pettit identify in Hobbes, and takes issue with them.

Philip Pettit’s The Birth of Ethics endeavours to illuminate the nature of morality by telling its genealogy. To help the reader appreciate the promise of this approach, Pettit begins by directing us to the case of money. If we want to understand what money is, we’re well advised to explore the social-historical conditions under which beings like us would have developed this medium of exchange. Doing so provides a more or less complete explanation of the emergence of money (...) that ‘demystifies’ its character. It is similar, Pettit suggests, with morality. If we want to understand what morality is, we should explore the ‘social conditions under which creatures of our ilk would have been more or less naturally driven, without conscious planning, to evolve and apply ethical concepts’. The reference to ‘creatures of our ilk’ is not idle. The leading idea is that we want to explain not how moral thinking in fact emerged among our actual ancestors, but rather how it more or less had to emerge among creatures like us in situations similar to ours. (shrink)

In this article I explore two aspects of Pettit's thesis about Hobbes' innovation with regard to the transformative and central role of language in thought and politics. First, I argue that while Hobbes had many debts to both traditionalists and innovators, he did break new ground in characterising language as in some ways constitutive of thought - a conclusion he came to as a consequence not only of his extreme nominalism, but also of his views on the exceptional sensibility (...) of words. Second, I argue that while language is part of a matrix of the forces which shape politics, it plays a powerful and indispensable part in both saving and cursing society. (shrink)

This study compares Philip Pettit’s account of freedom to Hegelian accounts. Both share the key insight that characterizes the tradition of republicanism from the Ancients to Rousseau: to be subordinated to the will of particular others is to be unfree. They both also hold that relations to others, relations of recognition, are in various ways directly constitutive of freedom, and in different ways enabling conditions of freedom. The republican ideal of non-domination can thus be fruitfully understood in light of (...) the Hegelian structure of ‘being at one with oneself (Beisichsein) in another’. However, while the Hegelian view converges with Pettit on non-domination and recognition, their comprehensive theories of freedom are based on radically different metaphysics. One key difference concerns the relationship between freedom and nature, and there is a further difference between Pettit’s (ahistorical) idea of the concept dependence of freedom, and the Hegelian (historical) idea of the conception dependence of freedom. -/- Keywords: Pettit; Hegel; freedom; non-domination; mutual recognition; republicanism; ‘being at one with oneself’; social freedom. (shrink)

Christian List and Philip Pettit argue that some groups qualify as rational agents over and above their members. Examples include churches, commercial corporations, and political parties. According to the theory developed by List and Pettit, these groups qualify as agents because they have beliefs and desires and the capacity to process them and to act on their basis. Moreover, the alleged group agents are said to be rational to a high degree and even to be fit to be (...) held morally responsible. And the group agents under consideration are autonomous, according to the List-Pettit Theory, because their beliefs and desires cannot easily be reduced to the beliefs and desires of the groups’ members. I want to show that we should not accept the List-Pettit Theory, because it implies the absurd claim that instrument-user units, like car-driver units, are rational agents over and above their user-parts, say drivers. The focus of my argument is on whether instrument-user units are autonomous in relation to their user-parts on the List-Pettit Theory. (shrink)

In an earlier paper [3], D. H. Mellor and I argued that physicalism faces a dilemma: 'physical' is either taken in very restrictive sense, in which case physicalism is clearly false; or it is taken in a very broad sense, in which case the doctrine is almost empty. The challenge to the physicalist is to define a doctrine which is both defensible and substantial. Philip Pettit [4] accepts this challenge, and responds with a definition of physicalism which he thinks (...) avoids the dilemma. Pettit's definition of physicalism involves four claims, two about entities, two about laws. Claims 1 and 3, concerning the existence of microphysical entities and microphysical laws, should not be questioned. Claims 2 and 4 are what make Pettit's theory physicalist: 2 says that microphysical entities constitute everything, 4 says that microphysical laws govern everything. I shall argue that the various ways Pettit offers of understanding these claims are in tension with one another, with the result that his definition does not avoid the dilemma posed in [3]. (shrink)

This is a short review of List and Pettit's influential book 'Group Agency'.

One of the primary goals of Pettit’s The Birth of Ethics is to offer a novel defense of a form of naturalistic realism in metaethics, drawing on a kind of “counterfactual genealogy” for ethical thought and talk, in a community he dubs “Erewhon”. We argue that Pettit’s argument faces a deep dilemma. The dilemma begins by noting the reasonable controversy about which metaethical view is true of our ethical thought and talk. We then ask: is the thought and (...) talk in Pettit’s Erewhon apt for the same reasonable controversy? If so, this raises doubts about Pettit’s case for naturalistic realism about Erewhonian “ethical” thought and talk. If not, this disanalogy between Erewhonian “ethical” thought and talk and our ethical thought and talk renders it difficult to argue smoothly from Erewhonian premises to conclusions about our own ethical thought and talk. We then consider an alternative use that someone might make of Pettit’s discussion of Erewhon: as part of a conceptual ethics argument that we should use “ethical” concepts that are relevantly similarly to the ones described in Erewhon. We conclude by reflecting on the broader methodological significance of the sort of dilemma that we have posed. (shrink)

Economists usually assume that rational actions are the ones motivated by a self-interested agent. However in our daily life we often see people doing altruistic actions which we praise and which we do not call irrational. How can we account for this paradox? This question and the tension underlying it, is at the heart of Philip Pettit’s classic essay, “The Virtual Reality of Homo Economicus” (1995). This dissertation constitutes a detailed analysis and evaluation of the claims that Pettit (...) makes there, in particular his original proposal of reconciliation between economic science and common sense, and the role that self-interest occupies in his model. Despite its importance, there are still few written commentaries or critiques of Pettit’s essay (1995). Among the few, most concentrate on the thesis of resilience explanation that Pettit presents at the end of the essay. What is lacking in the literature is a thorough examination of the central claim that Pettit makes there, and which gives the title to his essay: namely, the thesis of the "virtual self-interested control". In my view, this constitutes one of the most sophisticated defences of the assumption of self-interest in rational choice theory and economics. Therefore, it is surprising that it has not been subjected to more discussion, and published research. In section 1, present some of the central concepts of rational choice theory and economics, namely the homo economicus. In section 2, I introduce Pettit’s model, and then evaluate in which sense it is a plausible model to explain the behaviour in non-market contexts. Section 3 presents my criticism of the shortcomings of the model. (shrink)