Five experiments suggested that everyday free will and moral responsibility judgments about some hypothetical thought examples differed from free will and moral responsibility judgments about the actual world. Experiment 1 (N = 106) showed that free will intuitions about the actual world measured by the FAD-Plus poorly predicted free will intuitions about a hypothetical person performing a determined action (r = .13). Experiments 2–5 replicated this result and found the relations between actual (...) free will judgments and free will judgments about hypothetical determined or fated actions (rs = .22–.35) were much smaller than the differences between them (ηp2 = .2–.55). These results put some pressure on theoretical accounts of everyday intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility. (shrink)

Rigidity does interesting philosophical work, with important consequences felt throughout metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and so on. The authors’ aim in this article is to show that rigidity has yet another role to play, with surprising consequences for the problem of free will and determinism, for the phenomenon of rigidity has the upshot that some metaphysically necessary truths are up to us. The significance of this claim is shown in the context of influential arguments against free (...) will. The authors show that some virtually indisputable inference rules employed in formulations of the Consequence Argument, as well as in fatalistic arguments, fail with a variety of counter-examples. Along the way, the authors compare the present arguments to other, similar arguments made in recent years. (shrink)

“Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Which sort is the free will sort is what all the fuss is about. (And what a fuss it has been: philosophers have debated this question for over two millenia, and just about every major philosopher has had something to say about it.) Most philosophers suppose that the concept of (...) free will is very closely connected to the concept of moral responsibility. Acting with free will, on such views, is just to satisfy the metaphysical requirement on being responsible for one's action. (Clearly, there will also be epistemic conditions on responsibility as well, such as being aware—or failing that, being culpably unaware—of relevant alternatives to one's action and of the alternatives' moral significance.) But the significance of free will is not exhausted by its connection to moral responsibility. Free will also appears to be a condition on desert for one's accomplishments (why sustained effort and creative work are praiseworthy); on the autonomy and dignity of persons; and on the value we accord to love and friendship. (See Kane 1996, 81ff. and Clarke 2003, Ch.1.). (shrink)

My topic is recent scientific skepticism about free will. A leading argument for such skepticism features the proposition—defended by Daniel Wegner (2002, 2008) and Benjamin Libet (1985, 2004) among others that conscious intentions (and their physical correlates) never play a role in producing corresponding overt actions. This chapter examines alleged scientific evidence for the truth of this proposition.

데넷에 의하면 인간의 의식, 자유의지, 도덕성은 자신의 복제자를 더욱 많이 퍼트리기 위해 만든 밈의 기생공간이자 정보고속도로인 뇌와 신경계를 진화시킨 결과이다. 본 논문은 데넷 연구의 전체적인 구조를 라카토슈 연구프로그램으로 분석한다. 데넷의 연구프로그램은 이론을 특징지우는 견고한 핵과 이를 보완하는 보호대로 구성되어 있다. 연구프로그램의 핵심 원리인 견고한 핵은 자연선택의 특성을 집약적으로 표현하고 그 적용범위를 확대하는 ‘알고리즘으로서의 자연 선택’, ‘지향성 진화가설’, ‘밈 적응’으로 구성된다. 이들 견고한 핵이 가지는 추상성을 보완하여, 구체적인 가설을 첨부하는 보호대는 ‘만능산과 크레인 비유’, ‘생산과 검증의 탑’, ‘다중원고 모형’으로 구성된다. 궁극적으로 이들 (...) 가설은 인간의 의식, 자유의지, 문화, 도덕 등 인간의 독특성을 설명하는 신선한 예측의 토대가 된다. 이 과정에서 데넷은 다른 개체의 행동을 모방하고 심리에 공감하는 인간 본성에 대한 자연주의적 설명을 제공한다. (shrink)

The new edition of this highly successful text will once again provide the ideal introduction to free will. This volume brings together some of the most influential contributions to the topic of free will during the past 50 years, as well as some notable recent work.

Contrary to John Bramhall and critics like him, Thomas Hobbes takes the view that no account of liberty or freedom can serve as the relevant basis on which to distinguish moral from nonmoral agents or explains the basis on which an agent becomes subject to law and liable to punishment. The correct compatibilist strategy rests, on Hobbes’s account, with a proper appreciation and description of the contractualist features that shape and structure the moral community. From this perspective human agents may (...) indeed use their liberty to make themselves moral agents. In doing this, however, they are not employing a distinct kind of liberty but rather using a liberty that they share with animals and other nonmoral agents to perform a distinct kind of act (i.e., consent) whereby they become moral agents subject to law and any punishments that are required to enforce it. ____ -/- Originally published in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe - eds. D. Clarke & C. Wilson, OUP 2011 -/- Republished in Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy: Selected Essays - OUP 2021: Paul Russell]. (shrink)

In Buddhism, Meditation and Free Will: A Theory of Mental Freedom , Rick Repetti explains how the dynamics of Buddhist meditation can result in a kind of metacognition and metavolitional control that exceeds what is required for free will and defeats the most powerful forms of free will skepticism. This article argues that although the Buddhist path requires and enhances the kind of mental and volitional control Repetti describes, the central dynamic of the path (...) and meditation is better understood as a process of habituation. This not only involves the dis‐identification from mental and emotional content that Repetti discusses—and is commonly emphasized in modern presentations of mindfulness or insight (vipassanā ) meditation—but also a transformation of the heart that is effected through the complementary psychological and somatic qualities associated with calm abiding (samatha ) and concentration (samādhi ) and emphasized in the Pali Nikāyas and commentaries. (shrink)

One of the main philosophical puzzles is the question of free will: what is it? do we have it? how do we know we have it?

This article contends that recent attempts to construct Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) are irrelevant to the debate over free will. The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) states that moral responsibility requires indeterminism, or multiple possible futures. Frankfurt's original case purported to demonstrate PAP false by showing an agent can be blameworthy despite not having the ability to choose otherwise; however he admits the agent can come to that choice freely or by force, and thus has alternate possibilities. Neo-FSCs attempt (...) to show that alternate possibilities are irrelevant to explaining an agent's moral responsibility, but a successful Neo-FSC would be consistent with the truth of PAP, and thus is silent on the big metaphysical issues at the center of the free will debate. (shrink)

Benefiting from recent work in neuroscience, this paper rebuts a pair of neuroscience-based arguments for the non-existence of free will. Well-known neuroscientific experiments that have often been cited in support of skepticism about free will are critically examined. Various problems are identified with attempts to use their findings to support the claim that free will is an illusion. It is argued on scientific grounds that certain assumptions made in these skeptical arguments are unjustified—namely, assumptions (...) about the times at which decisions are made and the times at which the point of no re­turn for the making of a decision is reached. It is argued as well that alleged findings about decisions of the kind featured in these experiments—arbitrary decisions made in the absence of conscious reasoning about what to do—fail to support certain crucial claims about non-arbitrary decisions made after careful deliberation. The paper also examines a fallback position for skeptics about free will. Some scientific skeptics about free will contend that free will, by definition, depends on the existence of immaterial souls. Survey-style studies that bring free will down to earth are brought to bear on this contention. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In recent years, philosophy has witnessed the birth and development of a new research program that has provoked both enthusiasm and strong criticism: Experimental Philosophy. In this contribution, I will briefly examine the new field of experimental philosophy, its purposes and methodologies. I will then summarize some of the objections that have been raised against this research program, and the arguments with which experimental philosophers have used to counter these objections pointing to the usefulness of their studies for (...) philosophy in general. I will then focus on a specific subject that has drawn the attention of experimental philosophers: the problem of free will, its compatibility with determinism, and the related issue of the role of intentionality in action generation. Free will is one of the most ancient and debated problems in philosophy, and also one of the issues on which experimental philosophy methods can be most fruitfully applied, the concepts of free will and of moral responsibility being pervasive in everyday life and grounded in common sense. (shrink)

This paper is about an asymmetry in the justification of praising and blaming behaviour which free will theorists should acknowledge even if they do not follow Wolf and Nelkin in holding that praise and blame have different control conditions. That is, even if praise and blame have the same control condition, we must have stronger reasons for believing that it is satisfied to treat someone as blameworthy than we require to treat someone as praiseworthy. Blaming behaviour which involves (...) serious harm can only be justified if the claim that the target of blame acted freely cannot be reasonably doubted. But harmless praise can be justified so long as the claim that the candidate for praise did not act freely can be reasonably doubted. Anyone who thinks a debate about whether someone acted freely is truth-conducive has to acknowledge that reasonable doubt is possible in both these cases. (shrink)

This chapter is a commentary on the others, concentrating on themes that link many of them. It provides conceptual background on free will, distinguishes among distinct philosophical positions on the topic (including compatibilist and incompatibilist positions), discusses determinism and laws of nature, connects free will to consciousness, critically examines Benjamin Libet's work on free will and consciousness, and considers the light that Daniel Wegner's contribution to the volume sheds on the “the illusion of conscious (...) will” and free will. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente escrito tiene por objetivo discutir los alcances de la postura denominada escepticismo sobre el libre albedrío y evaluar si el debate compatibilismo - incompatibilismo supone una postura racionalista y/o necesitarista respecto a si un sujeto S actúa libremente. La discusión de los últimos diez años sobre este tópico permite establecer una distinción relevante entre que una acción sea libre, sin que ello descarte antecedentes causales de esa acción. En particular, sin que ello conduzca a un compromiso con (...) el denominado principio de posibilidades alternativas ni con el denominado argumento consecuencial. Se discutirá cómo el experimento desarrollado por Libet comprende el si una acción libre es equivalente a una acción consciente, considerando la relevancia de la libertad de veto y el rol del criterio de control de una acción. Una arista relevante en este análisis será la postura epifenomenalista. Finalmente, se evaluará la alternativa modal denominada imposibilismo y su rol en una postura escéptica respecto al libre albedrío.: This paper discusses the free will scepticism claim and discerns whether the compatibilism - incompatibilism debate presupposes a rationalistic/necessitarism stance about if a subject S acts freely. The last ten years makes it possible to establish a relevant distinction between an action being free, without discarding causal antecedents of that action. Specifically, this does not lead to a compromise with the so-called Principle of Alternative Possibilities or with the Consequence Argument. It will be discussed how the experiment developed by Libet comprises whether a free action is equivalent to a conscious action, considering the relevance of freedom of veto and the role of the control criterion of an action. A relevant edge in this analysis will be the epiphenomenalist stance. Finally, it will be evaluated the impossibilist modal alternative and its role in a sceptical position regarding free will. (shrink)

이 글은 후성유전학에 기초하여 전개되어온 철학적 논의를 비판적으로 검토하기 위해 쓰여졌다. 후성유전학은 개체의 영양 상태나 정신적 경험에 의해 결정되는 DNA메틸화, 히스톤변형, 비번역 RNA의 작용 등의 요인을 통해 유전자의 발현 여부와 발현정도가 조절되고 최종적으로 개체의 표현형질이 변한다는 사실을 밝혀냈다. 이러한 내용은 사람들이 스스로 환경을 선택하고 의도된 정신적 경험을 부여함으로써 유전자 발현을 조절할 수 있다는 내용을 함축하고 있어 자유의지 성립을 위한 주요한 근거로 제시되었다. 후성유전학과 연관된 자유의지 논증은 그동안 진화론, 유전공학, 신경과학 등의 분야에서 주장된 유전자결정론이나 유물론적 기계론을 극복하고 나아가 유전자 돌연변이로 인해 (...) 발생하는 다양한 질병을 치료하거나 원하는 대로 각자의 행동을 조절할 수 있는 가능성까지 함축하는 것이어서 사회적, 철학적 관심이 집중되기도 하였다. 하지만 후성유전학적 근거가 제대로 밝혀진 경우는 몇몇 사례에 불과하고 특히 분자적 수준에서의 인과성을 통해 전 과정을 체계적으로 설명한 경우는 극소수에 불과해 논의의 타당성에 의문이 제기될 수 있다. 이러한 문제는 앞으로 후성유전학 연구가 지속된다고 하더라도 쉽게 개선되기는 어려울 것이다. 과거 유전공학의 안정성 문제에 대한 논의에서 충분히 드러났듯이 인간은 기본적인 구조로 환원되기 어려운 유기체적 복잡성을 갖고 있기 때문에 DNA발현부위를 조절하는 보편적인 후성유전 법칙을 찾아내기란 쉬운 일이 아니기 때문이다. 후성유전학이 과거 본성과 양육의 대립논쟁을 뛰어넘어 이 둘을 하나의 메커니즘안에서 종합적으로 설명하고 유전자결정론을 극복할 수 있는 근거를 마련한 것은 높이 평가할 부분이다. 하지만 유전자발현부위 조절에 대한 일반적 원리가 정립되기 어려운 상황에서 후성유전학을 자유의지 성립 근거로 제시한다면 논리적으로 반박당할 가능성이 클 뿐만 아니라 사회적으로도 다양한 문제를 야기할 수도 있어 보다 신중한 태도로 접근할 필요가 있다. (shrink)

Rogers canvases the literature critical of recent experiments, adding new criticisms of her own. She argues these experiments should not undermine belief in human freedom and lists ethical and practical problems facing the attempt to study free will experimentally.

In this essay, I discuss David Hume’s reasoning on free will as he presents it in A Treatise of Human Nature and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. I proceed by showing how Hume’s compatibilist solution acquires meaning in the light of his sentimentally based science of human nature, which conceives human beings as reasonable, social, and active creatures. Within Hume’s empiricist, naturalistic, and sceptical approach, we deal only with perceptions and never with things themselves, and human experience is (...) structured in a causal order which allows us to organise both the way we experience the world and our existence in relation to that of others. In such a scenario, the question of free will depends on human practices, such as the attribution of responsibility, which follow a causal order and are not affected by metaphysical doubts about the loss of responsibility if determinism were true. I argue that Hume traces responsibility back to the expression of feelings for or against particular characters; people become the object of judgements of responsibility in so far as, through their actions, they show that they possess characters of a certain kind which reflect a whole series of dispositions and traits, empirically verifiable and causally explainable, acquired over time. I conclude by highlighting how free will may represent a problem on a practical level once moral or religious issues come into play and why this is not so for Hume. (shrink)

John Searle claims that reasoning requires libertarian free will. He hopes this can be reconciled with a naturalistic neuroscience through a sophisticated theory of emergence, which includes indeterminism, and topdown causation. This is allegedly naturalistic because each mental state is causally reducible to a realizing neuronal state. I argue that Searle’s theory fails to overcome four main problems and cannot account for reasoning without implicit appeal to nonnaturalistic entities.

In this article I try to refute the so-called "libertarian" theory of free will, and to examine how our conclusion ought to modify our common attitudes of praise and blame. In attacking the libertarian view, I shall try to show that it cannot be consistently stated. That is, my dscussion will be an "analytic-philosophic" one. I shall neglect what I think is in practice an equally powerful method of attack on the libertarian: a challenge to state his (...) theory in such a way that it will fit in the modern biology and psychology, which are becoming increasingly physicalistic. (shrink)

While philosophers have worried about mental causation for centuries, worries about the causal relevance of conscious phenomena are also increasingly featuring in neuroscientific literature. Neuroscientists have regarded the threat of epiphenomenalism as interesting primarily because they have supposed that it entails free will scepticism. However, the steps that get us from a premise about the causal irrelevance of conscious phenomena to a conclusion about free will are not entirely clear. In fact, if we examine popular philosophical (...) accounts of free will, we find, for the most part, nothing to suggest that free will is inconsistent with the presence of unconscious neural precursors to choices. It is only if we adopt highly non-naturalistic assumptions about the mind (e.g. if we embrace Cartesian dualism and locate free choice in the non-physical realm) that it seems plausible to suppose that the neuroscientific data generates a threat to free will. (shrink)

Restorative Free Will examines free will as an adaptive capacity that evolved in humans and many other species, and restores free will to species excluded by claims of human uniqueness. Restorative Free Will recognizes the basic biological value of both libertarian and compatibilist elements of free will, and explains how these traditionally opposed accounts of free will capture an essential element of foraging animals' free will.

The problem of free will as it is know in Western philosophical traditions is hardly known in China. Considering how central the problem is in the West, this is a remarkable fact. We try to explain this, and we offer insights into discussions within Chinese traditions that we think are related, not historically but regarding the issues discussed. Thus we introduce four central Chinese concepts, namely: (1) xīn 心 (heart, heart-mind), (2) xìng 性 (human nature, characteristic tendencies, inborn (...) capacity), (3) mìng 命 (lifespan, fate, command, allotment, endowment), and (4) zìrán 自然 (self-so, so of itself, nature, spontaneity), and we indicate how these concepts and their discussions can be related to discussions on free will. (shrink)

The problem of determinism and free will has occupied the minds of human beings since time immemorial. Philosophers have dwelt on it at great length. The problem is alike for both those who support determinism and those who do not. From one side, it is argued that since all the actions are causally determined, the belief that we are free is an illusion; from the other side, it is argued that since we know that we are (...) class='Hi'>free, universal determinism is false. Some others argue for both – truth of determinism as well as that of free will but then the question of morality is left aside. The paper attempts to deal with the problem in the light of Jaina philosophy. It is further aggravated when one takes into account one of the central theme of Jaina philosophy – omniscience. Determinism then becomes a necessary corollary of the doctrine that there is a person who knows everything – past, present and future. But, if determinism is true, how does Jainism account for free will? What would be the Jaina position when one talks of moral obligation / responsibility? Is the Jaina position on determinism absolutistic or non-absolutistic? If it is absolutistic, then how does it affect anekāntavāda? The paper seeks to address these issues with some plausible solutions. (shrink)

Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility. He argues that although we may not possess the kind of free will that is normally considered necessary for moral responsibility, this does not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents, or a robust sense of achievement and meaning in life.

A book review of Robert Kane's The Significance of Free Will.

In this comprehensive new study of human free agency, Laura Waddell Ekstrom critically surveys contemporary philosophical literature and provides a novel account of the conditions for free action. Ekstrom argues that incompatibilism concerning free will and causal determinism is true and thus the right account of the nature of free action must be indeterminist in nature. She examines a variety of libertarian approaches, ultimately defending an account relying on indeterministic causation among events and appealing to (...) agent causation only in a reducible sense. Written in an engaging style and incorporating recent scholarship, this study is critical reading for scholars and students interested in the topics of motivation, causation, responsibility, and freedom. In broadly covering the important positions of others along with its exposition of the author’s own view, Free Will provides both a significant scholarly contribution and a valuable text for courses in metaphysics and action theory. (shrink)

Free will, if such there be, involves free choosing: the ability to mentally choose an outcome, where the outcome is 'free' in being, in some substantive sense, up to the agent of the choice. As such, it is clear that the questions of how to understand free will and mental causation are connected, for events of seemingly free choosing are mental events that appear to be efficacious vis-a-vis other mental events as well as (...) physical events. Nonetheless, the free will and mental causation debates have proceeded largely independently of each other. Here we aim to make progress in determining how the free will and mental causation debates bear on one another. We first argue that the problems of free will and of mental causation can be seen as special cases of a more general problem, concerning whether and how mental events of a given type may be efficacious, qua the types of event they are---qualitative, intentional, freely deliberative---given their apparent causal irrelevancy for effects of the type in question; here we generalize what Horgan 1989 identifies as "the problem of mental quausation" (S1). We then build on this result to identify fruitful parallels between hard determinism and eliminative physicalism (S2) and soft determinism and non-reductive physicalism (S3). (shrink)