This chapter contains sections titled: References Further reading.

When it comes to eggs, two aspects are central—taste and nutritional value. And it is when eggs are fresh that these are at their peak. Hate “tastes” worst, that is, its negative intensity is highest, when it is fresh. Yet, when hate is not merely a temporary eruption but a constant feature, it distorts the agent’s behavior and attitudes. As such, its moral value worsens with maturity.

Cognition, writ broadly to include motivation and emotion, is best conceived of as control structure for autonomous agents . Autonomous agents are situated in a environment. They both sense and act on that environment, over time, so as to effect subsequent sensing. Examples of such agents include humans, animals, some mobile robots, some artificial life creatures (who "live" in a simulated environment on a computer) and some software agents (who "live" in a file system, a database, or on (...) a network). Their actions are in pursuit of their own agendas, as designed in by their maker or programmer, or as evolved and shaped by culture. Each such agent employs some control mechanism whose continual duty is to select the next action. The term "cognition," in its broad sense, refers to the workings of such control mechanisms. (shrink)

Time passed after the commission of a wrong can affect how we respond to its agent now. Specifically it can introduce certain forms of complexity or ambivalence into our blaming responses. This paper considers how and why time might matter in this way. I illustrate the phenomenon by looking at a recent real-life example, surveying some responses to the case and identifying the relevant forms of ambivalence. I then consider a recent account of blameworthiness and its development (...) class='Hi'>over time that purports to account for this ambivalence. Blameworthiness, on this account, consists in a psychological flaw; time matters because it brings the possibility of change in the agent, and ambivalence arises because it is hard to know to the extent of such change. This account, I argue, mischaracterises responses to the case and misidentifies the source of their ambivalence. Drawing on recent work in the philosophy of emotion, I sketch an alternative approach. Our responses, I suggest, make sense within processes through which we address wrongdoing. Time matters because these processes take time and because time’s having passed raises the question whether and how the wrong has been addressed. Unaddressed wrongs can elicit ambivalence of a specific form. (shrink)

Memory structures range across the dimensions that distinguish language-like thought. Recent work suggests agent- or situation-specific information is embedded in these structures. Understanding why this is, and pulling these structures apart, requires observing what happens under major changes. The evidence presented for the language-of-thought (LoT) does not look broadly enough across time to capture the function of representational structure.

Music education is a social act oriented around interactions between people in public spaces. These spaces provide opportunities for what Hannah Arendt calls natality, which we interpret as new and unexpected actions that arise in a shared space. Drawing from a range of ideas and experiences of Arendt, bell hooks, Joan Baez, Martha Nussbaum, and music education philosophers and practitioners, we argue that it is important for music educators to make room for this space by becoming more critically aware of (...) their emotions. Opening up to the unexpected in human interactions can at times be difficult and elicit fear. It also calls for a civic love. Cultivating this kind of love includes recognizing that our emotions and matters of the heart are instruments of power that can support or hinder others from becoming actors in their own right. As agents within music education, we can strive to realize this by developing a critical pedagogic consciousness and reflecting on the unexpected and emotional spaces of interaction. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Inheriting Identity and Practicing TransformationThe Time of Feminist PoliticsShannon HoffA human life unfolds over time. No moment of it can be considered apart from the others, independently of the fact that the human being was and will be, and so no moment is sufficient on its own to tell us of the nature of that identity. Each moment is insufficient as an expression of who we (...) are, as an answer to the question of what we want to be, or as a point at which a full account of our identity could be given. And we live each moment as if afflicted by a dual blindness with regard to the past and future that lend it significance; while exercising pervasive influence in the present, this past and future are relatively inaccessible to our reflective insight. We are always “growing up,” so to speak, from out of a childhood that can never be the purely transparent object of reflection, to an adulthood or “accomplishment” of identity that is always in the mysterious future, unimaginable in the terms of the adolescence in which we find ourselves.My purpose here is to show how this issue resonates in the context of feminist philosophy, feminist critique, and feminist practice—that is, how a consideration of time and its impact on human experience allows us to highlight the accomplishments of various avenues of feminist thought, to elaborate their shortcomings in relation to each other, to perceive the reasons behind the tensions among them, and to understand the way in which they are (and should [End Page 167] be understood as) connected. I will work through the issue of what it means to live in the temporal dimensions of past, present, and future—what it means to inherit an already meaningful world, to be an individual in the present, and to be propelled into an uncertain future—so as to provide a general framework by which to interpret the history of feminist thought. I will explain these different temporal dimensions in terms of the (respective) ideas of cultivation, universality, and transformation, identifying the positive and negative significance of each and also the demand that the tensions among them be negotiated. Finally, I will show that feminist justice is in fact found here, as answerability to all three—to communities of cultivation, to the demands of universality, and to the inconclusiveness and transformability of human identity. While much feminist thinking has been committed to exploring these elements singly, in abstraction from the others, and while such work is important, it is also valuable to explicitly explore the relationships and tensions among these different aspects, to articulate how to act and think in light of this underlying conceptual context, and to do so in a more explicit and self-conscious way.There is, of course, a disadvantage to not exploring these elements on their own terms: namely, that one handles their subtleties roughly. A further and related danger is that involved in trying to draw a broad picture of a tradition with complex and conflicting elements, one that does not count itself as a tradition at times—as a “we,” a feminism, or a feminist thought.1 While I will talk about “feminism” or “feminist thought,” I do not presume that these differences do not exist; my goal is simply to explore what is involved in an elaboration of a critical interpretation of society, when the society one critically interprets is an agent in one’s formation. The description of the dynamics of human becoming, agency, and critique I develop below has the purpose of showing that it is possible to understand differences between feminist positions as complementary, a process that will lead me to underemphasize stringent divisions and charged oppositions and to focus on drawing connections. Let us turn now to a preliminary description of the conceptual framework I seek to construct.Feminism and TimeTo advance feminist purposes is, one might presume, to hope for and work toward a new and transformed reality in the future. It would seem, however, that this reality cannot be clearly envisioned in the present, since that would require the transformation of the very people envisioning it. In... (shrink)

What are the freedom-relevant conditions necessary for someone to be a morally responsible person? I examine several key authors beginning with Harry Frankfurt that have contributed to this debate in recent years, and then look back to the writings or Søren Kierkegaard to provide a solution to the debate. In this project I investigate the claims of semi-compatibilism and argue that while its proponents have identified a fundamental question concerning free will and moral responsibility—namely, that the agential properties necessary for (...) moral responsibility ascriptions are found in scenarios where the agent acts on her own as opposed to her action resulting from freedom undermining external causes such as manipulation, phobias, etc.—they have failed to show that the freedom-relevant agential properties identified in those actual-sequence scenarios are compatible with causal determinism. My argument is that only a voluntarist-libertarian theory can adequately account for the kinds of cases that the semicompatibilist identify. I argue that there are three freedom-relevant conditions necessary for someone to be a morally responsible person: a hierarchical understanding of human desires [specifically and mental states generally], an incompatibilist (non-deterministic) understanding of human action, and a historical understanding of character development. The ability to reflect critically about one’s own desires and emotions, and thus to have a kind of self-knowledge and understanding with regard to the springs of one’s own actions, is required to make it possible for the agent to be the “source” of her own actions and character. The non-deterministic understanding of human action is needed for a similar reason: if determinism is true, then every action a person performs can be ultimately traced to and exhaustively explained in terms of factors outside the agent’s control, thus making the agent’s responsibility for his actions an illusion. And finally,human nature must be such that, over time, one’s choices leave a dispositional residue self-understanding and motivation in the person’s self, out of which, in mature understanding and motivation, the person acts as a fully responsible agent. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to show that instrumental rationality and utility that have been used in economics for many years does not work well. What is presented in the article is how significant the influence of utilitarianism has been on economics and why the economists get rid of humans’ goals and motivations. It is shown in the article that the human who decides in present is absolutely different from the human who decides over time. Many economists (...) neglected this problem because they wanted to have an effective and simple model. Becker’s economic method is presented as a dead end to which economics has been brought to. It is impossible to connect different selves of one human being by using the utility measure. The works of Schelling and J.S. Mill are used to explain this impossibility. The conclusion of this article is that instrumental rationality and utility have affected economics significantly. But, this simplified view on human nature is no longer valid. Hence, economics needs to think not only about the means but also about the human goals. Economics needs to rebuff relativism and show people how to achieve well-being. If we want to help people with their self-governance, we will have to choose reason over emotions. (shrink)

Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the benefits of anxiety. Among these is the proposal that anxiety is a moral emotion. If it is, we ought to cultivate it. But people who are anxious are also less happy. So it seems that asking people to be morally better persons involves asking them to be less happy than they might otherwise be. In this paper, I consider ways to avoid this consequence, all of which rely on emotion regulation. (...) Emotion regulation is supposed to balance one’s anxiety sufficiently so as to have relatively little impact on one’s happiness. As it turns out, emotion regulation is not as simple a solution as one might think. People who are very good at regulating their moral emotions do so at a cost: they assist others in need less and think of other people in demeaning or dehumanizing ways. This shows that using emotion regulation to maximize aspects of happiness—particularly happy feelings—reduces, rather than enhances, one’s moral goodness. One might therefore think that aiming towards equanimity instead promises a better solution since we avoid the over-exertion of emotion regulation and its consequent negative effects. Although that is true, we are still stuck with the problem that the ways people typically reduce their negative reactions to others that suffer—which I show is a form of moral emotions—are highly morally problematic. If we are to hope to solve the apparent conflict between cultivating anxiety and being happy, I argue, we need to take a different approach. Instead of proceeding by thinking about emotions in an almost atomistic way, according to which we experience only one definable type at a time, which can be understood statically, we must think of emotion more holistically. That is, we should consider more carefully the context in which an emotion occurs, how it unfolds over time, what other emotions arise alongside it or are otherwise connected to it, and the significance to the person of the experience as a whole. Such a richer picture of person’s affective experience in morally relevant situations shows how emotion regulation can be deployed without leading to the morally problematic thoughts and actions described earlier. I use empathic distress as an example of moral emotions to exemplify why such an approach does more justice to the phenomena, in addition to being friendlier to anxiety-positive views. (shrink)

There are many moral values that the Arab writers have written about either in prose or poetry. This emphasis on morality in classical Arabic literature has also been the subject of many academic studies. The abundance of the literary material in this field has attracted the attention of researchers. One of these is the emphasis on "naturalness" which we have seen in classical Arabic literature. In the Arab society which social ties are very strong the moral values have been summarized (...) with the concept of al-murūah/chivalry over time. In these sources that is including poems, parables and anecdotes about morality allthings on the moral values are brought together. Hereunder the main thing in the moral maturity is the naturality. Criticism of ostensible behaviors has taken place in an important part of these works. For example, ancient perception of morality is a predestination that comes from creation has found its response in Arabic poetry. Many Arab poets have stated that one's innate character will beat and the reason will be defeated. On the other hand, some poets tried to establish a balance between character and wisdom. Accordingly, it has been stated that people are innately inclined to falses but they also have the potential to restrain their innate evil tendencies with the ability of mind given to them. These poets liked to explain this balance through the simile stating he ambitious horse that wants to run at full speed is restrained with a bit. According to this simile the man is like a person on the back of a raging horse with the evil inclinations cultivated in his nature. The soul he carries wants to take him wherever it wishes. However, he has a mind that is like a bridle in return for the soul inside him. On the other hand, when we look at the encyclopedic sources of Arabic proverbs we see that there are proverbs comparing many moral attributes with animals. In Turkish proverbs, cunning is identified with the fox and industriousness with the ant, and in Arabic proverbs a very rich human character-animal pairings stand out. These proverbs are based on the idea that people's character is the product of nature. Because each animal species has appreciated characteristics and these features occur without learning and education. In addition, the issue of the naturalness of morality was also used for the purpose of praise and satire in the classical Arabic poets. The poet makes his reproach or anger towards someone through his character. When describing his lover he states that the beauties that adorn him come from creation. Therefore, it can be said that the emphasises of character/nature/temperament in the poems in which these and similar emotions are aroused, are the motifs that serve the purpose of the poet. Finally Arab writers have offered many recommendations in literary form on issues such as brotherhood, solidarity and cooperation for the healthy continuity of social relations in the Muslim society, and they have included anecdotes and poems within the framework of the subject. The study is mainly based on the descriptive method, however, the way the authors handled the subject is analysed when it is deemed to be appropriate. Considering that there is no specific study in Turkish and Arabic literature within the framework of the present study, it is aimed to investigate the literary material in the subject in question. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.4 (2001) 308-321 [Access article in PDF] Early Modern Emotion and the Economy of Scarcity 1 - [PDF] Daniel M. Gross Where do we get the idea that emotion is kind of excess, something housed in our nature aching for expression? In part, I argue, from The Passions of the Soul (1649), wherein Descartes proposed the reductive psychophysiology of emotion that informs both romantic expressivism and (...) latter-day psychology. Indeed, one goal of this article is simply to recall that we do not just naturally express emotions generated in our amygdala or wherever, but rather that we are first constituted as expressive agents by what the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment called "social passions." Contrary, however, to these largely optimistic philosophers, such as Hutcheson and Smith, who anchored social passions in a moral sense equally shared by all, I argue that the constitutive power of emotion derives from their unequal distribution. In what follows I work primarily with Aristotle's Rhetoric and Thomas Hobbes to outline a "political economy" wherein passions are (1) constituted as differences in power and (2) conditioned not by their excess but by their scarcity. Though we may reject the political conclusions reached by Aristotle and Hobbes, their analysis of emotion allows us to address important political questions neutralized in the Cartesian paradigm. 1. Descartes If you are tickled to learn that Aztec culture located passions in the liver, here is something at least as quaint from Descartes: "The ultimate and most proximate cause of the passions of the soul is none other than the agitation with which the spirits move the little gland which is in the middle of the [End Page 308] brain," that is, the pineal gland. Or so Descartes proposes in his 1649 treatise on the passions composed for Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. Now compare this to Aristotle's Rhetoric, where for instance anger is defined as "desire, accompanied by distress, for conspicuous retaliation because of a conspicuous slight that was directed, without justification, against oneself or those near to one" (1378a 31-33). For Aristotle anger may indeed be accompanied by physical distress, as in the boiling of blood expressed in crimson cheeks, but its proximate cause is anything but that little gland in the middle of the head. Anger is a deeply social passion provoked by perceived slightsunjustified, and it presupposes a public stage where social status is always subject to performative infelicities.Indeed, we can learn a good deal about the rhetoric of human nature in early-modern Europe simply by asking what passions were. When we do, we find not only that their descriptions disagree, but also that the things described as passions seem incommensurable. Are passions tangible "things" residing in the soul, or are they dispositions of the heart or beliefs of the mind? Is passion a matter of personal expression, or is it something essentially social that a person performs? Do they come from our interior, or from the things we perceive? Can they be measured and manipulated--their causes controlled--or do passions elude control by their very nature? Are they divine, diabolical, or human, and can we distinguish them according to the status of their origin? Are they the enabling condition of virtue or its enemy? Are they necessary or disposable? What is their number and what do they do? Exasperated by endless wrangling over such questions, Descartes complains: There is nothing in which the defective nature of the sciences which we have received from the ancients appears more clearly than in what they have written on the passions; for although this is a matter which has at all times been the object of much investigation, and though it would not appear to be one of the most difficult, inasmuch as since everyone has experience of the passions within himself, there is no necessity to borrow one's observations from elsewhere in order to discover their nature. (331) 2With this preliminary remark Descartes renders human nature in its quintessential modern form: it is something housed in a body subject to the self-evidence... (shrink)

This longitudinal study investigated the capability of various positive psychological resources to directly or indirectly protect specific well-being outcomes and moderate the effects on well-being of health and economic threats in a lockdown situation during the 2020 health crisis in France. At the beginning of lockdown, participants completed self-assessment questionnaires to document their initial level of well-being and state of nine different well-established psychological resources, measured as traits: optimism, hope, self-efficacy, gratitude toward the world, self-transcendence, wisdom, gratitude of being, (...) peaceful disengagement, and acceptance. Three weeks later, a weekly follow-up was started to record changes in well-being and reported threats for a duration of 5 weeks. Results show that psychological resources efficiently protected well-being in a variety of ways: they buffered the adverse effects of reported threats to health and wealth, increased the well-being averages, and reduced the decline in well-being over time. More specifically, emotional well-being was positively predicted by hope, gratitude of being, and, to a lesser level, by acceptance; psychological well-being by self-efficacy, personal wisdom, and gratitude of being; social well-being only by gratitude toward the world; and inner well-being by optimism, gratitude of being, and acceptance. The study emphasizes the importance of cultivating psychological resources in ordinary times to protect individuals' well-being when difficult and extraordinary circumstances occur. It also offers clues to the kind of resources one may want to develop. (shrink)

Self-serving hegemonic visions of history are institutionalized by dominant memory entrepreneurs, simultaneously imposing an authoritative version of “what happened” and their right to articulate it. These visions and the hierarchies of honour they consecrate are cultivated trans-generationally, aiming to ensure the community’s political cohesion, as well as the emotional attachments that can ensure its reproduction over time. This paper has three objectives. First, it brings insights from social epistemology to bear on a conceptualization of political memory-making and (...) proposes the concepts of “hermeneutical dissidence” and “hermeneutical seduction” to capture the critical interrogation of such mythologies. It highlights the obstacles facing any attempt at subverting them, particularly given the resilience of cognitive and emotional investments in particular schemas of perception and understanding in relation to the boundaries of the community and its history. Second, I transplant the descriptive concept of “affair” formulated by pragmatic sociologists into debates about political memory, infusing it with a dose of normativity in order to shed critical light on various types of hermeneutical dissidence from dominant, emotionally anchored, exclusionary imaginaries. Third, to render the theoretical proposal concrete, I introduce two “memory affairs,” both triggered by debates over the meaning and gender of political resistance. (shrink)

If it were followed by “I’m a president,” Richard Nixon’s televised denial (“I am not a crook”) would be tantamount to Jimmy McGill’s self-portrayal in Better Call Saul. Out of the crooked timber of humanity, an honest president or an ethical lawyer rarely emerges. They’re like needles in a haystack. Nevertheless, it’s worthwhile to search for these rare artifacts and, in the process, ask, “Why do so many lawyers (and presidents) fall from grace, transforming into morally bad or corrupt actors?” (...) The ability to be a good or ethical person can deteriorate over time. In their personal and professional lives, people can make consistently poor choices in their capacity as moral agents. In turn, they cultivate flawed habits or what are often referred to as vices. Jimmy McGill’s trajectory is, without a doubt, a harrowing story of moral decline. In some ways, his transformation into Saul Goodman resembles a trite story about how a profession, lawyering, corrupts its practitioners. On a deeper level, McGill’s journey involves a fundamental change in how he habitually interacts with his environment, a change of motivation and disposition that is, almost entirely, a change for the worse. To know the content of Jimmy’s character is to be familiar with his story, a story of moral decline and ethical failure. (shrink)

(In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Psychology of Forgiveness, edited by Glen Pettigrove and Robert Enright) This chapter discusses forgiveness conceived as primarily a volitional commitment, rather than an emotional transformation. As a commitment, forgiveness is distal, involving moral agency over time, and can take the form of a speech act or a chosen attitude. The purpose can be a commitment to repair or restore relationships with wrongdoers for their sake or the sake of the relationship, (...) usually by forswearing one’s hostile attitudes toward a particular wrongdoing; the commitment may also be to oneself for one’s own sake, to be a person with a virtue of forgivingness. It can be incident-specific, that is, a response to a particular occasion of harm, or a forward-looking disposition, an aim to cultivate the habit of being a forgiving person in advance. The enabling conditions of forgivingness as a virtue may be more basic master virtues including integrity and humility, motivations that also underpin commitments to be unforgiving, so this chapter concludes with some careful consideration of the ethics of unforgivingness to others, and the commitment to be unforgiving of oneself. (shrink)

This paper considers the relationship between scientific rationality and emotional value in determining ideas about canine biology in North America. While science has been assumed to be objective, unassailable and devoid of value judgments, esoteric theories concerning wild predators have changed radically over time. Biologists acted as important agents in the campaign to eradicate Canis lupus from the USA during the late 1800s and early 1900s. From the 1920s onwards, scientists promulgated ecological ideas in order to redeem native (...) carnivores. This paper suggests that, in extermination and rehabilitation phases, biologists formed their opinions of resident lupines using scientific dogma and moral precepts. By delineating the process of wolf rehabilitation in the USA, this paper situates science as a shifting body of knowledge, a way of comprehending the environment that cannot be viewed apart from cultural conceptions of biology, ethics and aesthetics. (shrink)

Emotions change over time. A comprehensive understanding of emotions will require that their temporal nature be observed and analysed. By observing emotion over time, one can disentangle and simultaneously analyse temporal variability within individuals and between-individual variability using a two-step process approach. First, within-person temporal patterns (e.g., covariation, lead–lag relation, periodicity, etc.) are assessed for each subject. Second, between-person analyses are conducted on the within-person patterns. These two steps can be done simultaneously with (...) hierarchical linear models (HLM) or in two actual steps with the process approach. HLM is limited to the intra-individual analysis of linear patterns (e.g., slope, intercept), whereas the process approach can be used to examine non-linear aspects of intra-individual change, such as multivariate patterns, within-subject skew, or phase relations between oscillating processes. In this paper we provide a description of the process approach and present several examples of, as well as suggestions for, intra-individual analysis applied to emotion and individual differences. (shrink)

Teams are considered to be extremely complex dynamic entities that suffer at the hand of constant evolution of their structure to meet and adapt to the varying situational demands they come face-to-face with (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). Agencies, industries, and government institutions are currently placing greater attention to the adaption of team dynamics and teamwork as they are important to key organizational outcomes. As greater attention is being placed on the maturation of team dynamics, the incorporation of efficient methodological (...) tools to understand how teams are being measured over time becomes critical. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to present a review of relevant academic articles detailing the science behind methodological tools and general approaches to study team dynamics over time. We provide an overview of the methodological tools used to understand team dynamics with accordance to specific temporal elements. Drawing from Kozloski, Gully, Nason, and Smith (1999) process model of team development, we highlight relevant emergent team constructs within each stage. As well, for each stage, we discuss the what and how to measure team dynamics. Our analyses bring to light relevant, novel and complex approaches being used by researchers to examine specific constructs within different team developmental phases (e.g., agent-based simulations, computational modeling) and the importance of transitioning from a single source methodology approach. Implications and future research are also discussed. (shrink)

This dissertation contains both a philosophical examination of the Huainanzi's views on morality and an historical investigation of the factors that led to the demise of Liu An, King of Huainan, and his kingdom in 122 B.C. It shows how in early Han times moral values, ideas about morality and historical praxis shaped and influenced one another. ;Part one argues that during the second decade of Emperor Wu's reign a major shift in morality occurred. When Liu An offered the Huainanzi (...) to Emperor Wu during an official court-visit in 139 B.C., he used the text to affirm himself as a person possessing both the practical expertise and the moral authority necessary to qualify as a player on the political scene. Officials whose primary goal lay in strengthening the grip of the central government over the empire, and who had risen to power during the twenties, sought to demonstrate how an independent moral stance was inherently disloyal. Around 122 B.C. they accused Liu An of plotting revolt and obtained a conviction. For the officials, loyalty coincided with submissiveness to the emperor's will. ;Part two shows that a reason for the officials' dislike of the Huainanzi is the text's refusal to articulate well-defined moral rules. How to act in a particular situation is up to the agent who has to rely on the judgment of his own heart. When an agent's heart is cultivated like the heart of a sage person, his actions will follow human nature and the hierarchy of values it contains and therefore be good actions. Part two further analyzes the Huainanzi's claim that persons who have cultivated their hearts according to the text's precepts are not only virtuous persons, but also extremely effective agents. Thus the Huainanzi puts forward pragmatic as well as moral reasons for why a person possessing the heart of a sage should be accorded a political voice. ;Even as the moral viewpoint that Liu An and the Huainanzi represent was condemned in 122 B.C., it retained its force as a vehicle for criticizing government practice. (shrink)

Actors may be called on to judge their reasons for action at two different points in time: once when they form an intention to act in the future and again at the time of action. At the time the actor forms her intention, her perspective is a general one, encompassing a range of possible circumstances that cannot be narrowed or fully specified in advance of action. At time of action, the actor's perspective is particularized, with (...) more evidence available about reasons for action. This difference in perspective presents a dilemma for rational agents. In many contexts, reliable advance planning has great value. It allows for intra-personal and interpersonal coordination and minimizes bias in favor of salient or emotionally charged facts. At the time of action, additional evidence about the context of the act clarifies, or appears to clarify, current reasons for action. I describe this dilemma in two contexts: rule-following and promissory commitment. In each case there may be significant practical reasons for agents to stand by their original intentions, treating them as exclusionary reasons for action. Yet, if the agent revisits her intentions at the time of action, her reasons for action may support, or appear to support, a change in course. I begin by examining theories of practical rationality that extend rationality over time and thus permit agents to act on their initial intentions. Understood in this way, practical rationality may require agents to follow rules or honor promises without further consideration of reasons for action. I argue, however, that on a plausible understanding of epistemic rationality and epistemic responsibility to respond to evidence, acting without reflection may be epistemically irrational. If this is correct, then the dilemma of general and particular decisionmaking persists, and affects important aspects of human life. We manage only by being imperfectly irrational. (shrink)

Humanity takes up space. Human beings, like many other species, also transform spaces. What is perhaps uniquely human is the disposition to qualitatively transform spaces into places that are charged with distinctive kinds of intergenerational significance. There is a profound, felt difference between a house as domestic space and a home as familial place or between the summit of a mountain one has climbed for the first time and the “same” rock pinnacle celebrated in ancestral narratives. Contemporary philosophical uses (...) of the word “place” often pivot on the distinction between “space” and “place” formalized by geographer-philosopher Yi-fu Tuan, who suggested that places incorporate the experiences and aspirations of a people over the course of their moral and aesthetic engagement with sites and locations. While spaces afford possibilities for different kinds of presence—physical, emotional, cognitive, dramatic, spiritual—places emerge as different ways of being present, fuse over time, and saturate a locale with distinctively collaborative patterns of significance. This approach to issues of place, however, is emblematic of what Edward S. Casey has argued are convictions about the primacy of absolute space and time that evolved along with the progressive dominance of the scientific imagination and modern imaginations of the universal. The recent reappearance of place in Western philosophy represents a turn away from abstract and a priori reasoning and back toward phenomenal experience and the primacy of embodied and emplaced intelligence. Places are enacted through the sustainably shared practices of mutually-responsive and mutually-vulnerable agents and are as numerous in kind as we are divergent in the patterns of values and intentions. The contributors to this volume draw on resources from Asian, European, and North American traditions of thought to engage in intercultural reflection on the significance of place in philosophy and of the place of philosophy itself in the cultural, social, economic, and political domains of contemporary life. The conversation of place that results explores the meaning of intercultural philosophy, the critical interplay of place and personal identity, the meaning of appropriate emplacement, the shared place of politics and religion, and the nature of the emotionally emplaced body. (shrink)

Humanity takes up space. Human beings, like many other species, also transform spaces. What is perhaps uniquely human is the disposition to qualitatively transform spaces into places that are charged with distinctive kinds of intergenerational significance. There is a profound, felt difference between a house as domestic space and a home as familial place or between the summit of a mountain one has climbed for the first time and the “same” rock pinnacle celebrated in ancestral narratives. Contemporary philosophical uses (...) of the word “place” often pivot on the distinction between “space” and “place” formalized by geographer-philosopher Yi-fu Tuan, who suggested that places incorporate the experiences and aspirations of a people over the course of their moral and aesthetic engagement with sites and locations. While spaces afford possibilities for different kinds of presence—physical, emotional, cognitive, dramatic, spiritual—places emerge as different ways of being present, fuse over time, and saturate a locale with distinctively collaborative patterns of significance. This approach to issues of place, however, is emblematic of what Edward S. Casey has argued are convictions about the primacy of absolute space and time that evolved along with the progressive dominance of the scientific imagination and modern imaginations of the universal. The recent reappearance of place in Western philosophy represents a turn away from abstract and a priori reasoning and back toward phenomenal experience and the primacy of embodied and emplaced intelligence. Places are enacted through the sustainably shared practices of mutually-responsive and mutually-vulnerable agents and are as numerous in kind as we are divergent in the patterns of values and intentions. The contributors to this volume draw on resources from Asian, European, and North American traditions of thought to engage in intercultural reflection on the significance of place in philosophy and of the place of philosophy itself in the cultural, social, economic, and political domains of contemporary life. The conversation of place that results explores the meaning of intercultural philosophy, the critical interplay of place and personal identity, the meaning of appropriate emplacement, the shared place of politics and religion, and the nature of the emotionally emplaced body. (shrink)

We investigated the week-to-week effects of a mindfulness intervention on emotional exhaustion, work engagement, and job satisfaction in a field study involving 218 participants who participated and reported their weekly outcomes during the 8-week program. To examine how mindfulness impacted work outcomes, we used intraindividual modeling of the 8-week data. Mindfulness increased over time, and time also had indirect effects on emotional exhaustion, work engagement, and job satisfaction, through mindfulness. Supplementary growth curve analyses on the improvement (...) of mindfulness over time showed a slight decrease in the positive effect of time on mindfulness. (shrink)

Our paper explores how the affective energies and cultural expectations set in motion by best-selling American sentimental novels like Hannah Foster's The Coquette and Susanna Rowson's Charlotte Temple informed the notorious mid-nineteenth-century American trial of Amelia Norman, who attempted to kill the man who seduced her. Once newspapers, defense lawyers, and reformers such as Lydia Maria Child recast the defendant as a sentimental heroine, the trial became about seduction, and Norman was acquitted against the weight of the evidence. Sentimental novels (...) turn on the contrast between the passive victim status of the heroine and the active libidinal quest of the rake-villain. As Cathy Davidson points out, this fiction is "about silence, subservience, stasis (the accepted attributes of women as traditionally defined) in contradistinction to conflicting impulses toward independence, action, and self expression (the ideals of the new American nation)." The seduction plot diverts attention from this disparity by establishing an affective solidarity between heroine and reader and elevating the ruined woman to a tragic status. The sentimental emplotment of Norman's life marshaled a powerful set of emotional responses and moral judgements on her behalf. Norman claimed insanity. And since sentimental heroines are supposed to go mad when they are seduced and abandoned, the jury was prepared to interpret her symptoms according to her lawyers' very strategy for establishing her innocence. Ultimately, however, Norman embodied the plight of the sentimental heroine at the same time that she contested her fictional counterpart's fate. In this way, her trial spectacularized the disparity which the sentimental novel conjures up and displaces but never resolves. The common law theory of coverture, which severely limited the legal personhood of married women, has received a great deal of scholarly attention. Cases like Norman's remind us that unmarried women were also subject to draconian constraints on their legal personhood. The tort of seduction is a key example. Legal historians trace the development of the seduction tort from its common-law origins, when men's property interest in women's bodies formed the basis of the cause of action, to 1851, when Field Code authors (including Norman's lawyer David Graham) persuaded several states to grant seduced women standing to bring their own cause of action. Consequently, courts were forced to reckon with the seduced woman as a moral agent capable of consenting to sex. As trials like Norman's demonstrate, sentimental novels helped lay the groundwork for this shift in the law by elucidating a subjectivity for the seduced woman. Yet the doctrinal implications of Norman's precedent-setting trial had a second, more ambiguous strain. Norman's sentimental strategy proved so powerful that men on trial for killing their wive's seducers appropriated it to bring their own stories before juries and to reinforce male sexual norms. In the end, then, Norman's trial fostered legal reform, but it also suggested - as Child's fictionalization of the case in "Rosenglory" recognized - that only sustained and multifaceted efforts to change cultural as well as legal norms could improve the sexual status of women. Scholars such as Wai Chee Dimock have argued for a focus "on the historical and historically shifting relations between law and literature" - a view we endorse. Where we differ from Dimock is in our diversion of attention away from abstract ideas of law laid out by treatise writers and philosophers in favor of law experienced and manipulated by individuals. So, too, we are interested less in representations of concepts such as justice in legal and literary texts than we are in the ways in which literature (broadly conceived) can create provisional and fragile opportunities for concrete instantiations of justice and even generate legal change (for good or ill). Going further, we would argue that to the extent legal change motivates rather than simply mirrors cultural change, it needs literature to be effective. Thus, we see no need to characterize - and indeed reject the depiction of - law as "a limited arena" in which ideas of morality have little place. This project, then, responds to Gregg Crane's call for attention to "the complex and slippery historical interactions of law and literature that shape and are shaped by an ever changing cultural idiom of justice." The extended story of Amelia Norman not only constitutes a case study in the inescapable interaction between the overlapping and interdependent discourses of law and literature, but also reveals the literary and legal consequences of that interaction. (shrink)

This conceptual article theorizes about the effect of emotions of individual organizational leaders during a period of sustainability-related upheaval within an industry. To illustrate the effect of emotions, it proposes to draw on the model of five stages of grief by Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, a conceptual framework describing terminally ill patients’ responses to their impending death. The authors adapt Kübler-Ross’s taxonomy and use anecdotal evidence from grieving top managers of energy companies in response to the nuclear phase-out in (...) Germany. The article conceptualizes the influence of emotions in the decision-making process of key agents in response to institutional pressures in their field. The article suggests that focusing on emotional influences will add an important dimension to the analysis of sustainability strategies, and discuss implications for further research at an individual and organizational level. (shrink)

Precautionary principles are frequently appealed to both in public policy and in discussions of individual decision-making. They prescribe omission or reduction of an activity, or taking precautionary measures whenever potential harmful effects of the activity surpass some threshold of likelihood and severity. One crucial appeal of precautionary principles has been that they seem to help guard against procrastinating on confronting certain kinds of risk. I raise a challenge for precautionary principles serving as effective action-guiding tools to guard against (policy) inaction, (...) procrastination, or recklessness. Since risks that are sufficiently harmful and sufficiently likely to fulfil the antecedent of a precautionary principle typically accumulate over time, precautionary principles are only effective if they constrain an agent’s decision-making over time. On the basis of this observation, I argue for two claims. First, to yield the verdicts proponents of precautionary principles would like to make, precautionary principles must be understood to be diachronic principles, which requires some added structure to how they are commonly formulated. Second, such diachronic precautionary principles invite policy procrastination and inaction in their own right, due to both the vagueness of thresholds, and because agents will often fail to abide by the principles if they ignore bygone risks. (shrink)

ABSTRACT These are replies to critical discussions by Chrisoula Andreou, Sergio Tenenbaum, and J. David Velleman of my Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality. I explain important differences between my appeal to a grounding role of the end of diachronic self-governance and Velleman’s view that ‘intelligibility is [the] constitutive aim of action.’ And I discuss both Velleman’s Quine-inspired conception of norms of plan rationality and his comments on methodology in the philosophy of action. In response to Tenenbaum, (...) I explain how appeal to a planning agent’s self-governance over time supports basic planning norms. And I explain why my appeal to the significance of the end of one’s diachronic self-governance need not lead to unacceptable bootstrapping. In response to Andreou, I explain why, on my view of rational willpower, the agent’s general assessment in favor of a general pattern of action, while common and important, need not play a fundamental role in a planning agent’s sticking with their prior resolution in the face of temptation. (shrink)

Is love best when it is fresh? For many, the answer is a resounding “yes.” The intense experiences that characterize new love are impossible to replicate, leading to wistful reflection and even a repeated pursuit of such ecstatic beginnings. Aaron Ben-Ze’ev takes these experiences seriously, but he’s also here to remind us of the benefits of profound love—an emotion that can only develop with time. In The Arc of Love, he provides an in-depth, philosophical account of the experiences that (...) arise in early, intense love—sexual passion, novelty, change—as well as the benefits of cultivating long-term, profound love—stability, development, calmness. Ben-Ze’ev analyzes the core of emotions many experience in early love and the challenges they encounter, and he offers pointers for weathering these challenges. Deploying the rigorous analysis of a philosopher, but writing clearly and in an often humorous style with an eye to lived experience, he takes on topics like compromise, commitment, polyamory, choosing a partner, online dating, and when to say “I love you.” Ultimately, Ben-Ze’ev assures us, while love is indeed best when fresh, if we tend to it carefully, it can become more delicious and nourishing even as time marches on. (shrink)

Although the sense of agency is often reduced if not absent in dreams, our agentive dream experiences can at times be similar to or enhanced compared to waking. The sense of agency displayed in dreams is perplexing as we are mostly shut off from real stimulus whilst asleep. Theories of waking sense of agency, in particular, comparator and holistic models, are analysed in order to argue that despite the isolation from the real environment, these models can help account for dream (...) experience. The dreamer might feel an increased sense of control of their dream bodies and a sense that they can directly control elements of the dream world. Such experiences may at times be caused by superstitious or delusional thinking due to altered cognition and changes to the sleeping brain. Here it is argued that some such experiences are akin to specific waking delusions, such as delusions of grandeur, with similar cognitive features. However, other instances of increased sense of agency in dreaming appear to be sui generis and nothing like what we experience when awake. Lucid control dreams, in which the dreamer realises that they are dreaming and that they can control the dream environment, are examples of such an experience although further nuance is required to account for their specific cognitive attributes. Future empirical research should focus on controlled dream reporting conditions in order to clarify the types of experience that occur and determine the relevant cognitive mechanisms that relate to each type. (shrink)

Although compassion in healthcare differs in important ways from compassion in everyday life, it provides a key, applied microcosm in which the science of compassion can be applied. Compassion is among the most important virtues in medicine, expected from medical professionals and anticipated by patients. Yet, despite evidence of its centrality to effective clinical care, research has focused on compassion fatigue or barriers to compassion and neglected to study the fact that most healthcare professionals maintain compassion for their patients. (...) In contributing to this understudied area, the present report provides an exploratory investigation into how healthcare professionals report trying to maintain compassion. In the study, 151 professionals were asked questions about how they maintained compassion for their patients. Text responses were coded, with a complex mixture of internal vs. external, self vs. patient, and immediate vs. general strategies being reported. Exploratory analyses revealed reliable individual differences in the tendency to report strategies of particular types but no consistent age-related differences between older and younger practitioners emerged. Overall, these data suggest that while a range of compassion-maintaining strategies were reported, strategies were typically concentrated in particular areas and most professionals seek to maintain care using internal strategies. A preliminary typology of compassion maintaining strategies is proposed, study limitations and future directions are discussed, and implications for the study of how compassion is maintained are considered. (shrink)

Awareness of illness in schizophrenia reflects complex storied understanding of the impact of the disorder upon one’s life. Individuals may be aware of their illness in different ways and this may be related to their functioning. A total of 76 adults with schizophrenia were assessed for their awareness of illness, neurocognition, social cognition, and social function concurrently and social function was also assessed at three later time points. A cluster analysis revealed 3 groups: generally full awareness, (...) generally limited awareness, and superficial awareness. Comparisons between these profiles revealed the superficial group had poorer executive function, emotion recognition ability, and capacity for social relationships than the full awareness group, yet had better verbal memory and more social contacts than the limited awareness group. These results suggest assessing the narrative qualities of awareness of illness may reveal unique links with cognition and function, and this may have implications for interventions. (shrink)

Research on applying signature character strengths demonstrated positive effects on well-being, health and work behavior. Future health care professionals represent a group at risk for impaired well-being due to high study demands. This study investigates potential long-term protective effects on well-being. In total, 504 medical students participated in a longitudinal online study, with at least 96 providing complete data at all three time points. Data on individual signature character strengths and their applicability, thriving, work engagement, burnout, mental and (...) physical health were collected. Longitudinal relations of signature character strengths’ applicability and well-being, mental and physical health were tested with cross-lagged panel analyses. Moreover, indirect longitudinal mediation effects via work engagement and emotional exhaustion were considered. Cross-lagged panel analyses demonstrated significant positive effects of thriving on signature character strengths’ applicability at later time points indicating that higher levels of well-being might be mandatory first to have access to one’s own signature character strengths in a naturalistic setting. Disentangling thriving, the effect was only significant for psychological well-being. Across all three time points, significant indirect effects via work engagement on the relation of the applicability of signature character strengths and well-being were identified, whereas significant indirect effects on mental and physical health were only evident at t2 and t3. A longitudinal mediation analysis via work engagement revealed a significant indirect effect. These results call for further research as previous studies showed that the applicability of signature character strengths affected well-being, not vice versa. The ‘broaden-and-build’ theory and the assumption of well-being in a “top-down” model could possibly explain these novel results. (shrink)

Over-time variability characterizes not only individual-level emotions, but also group-level emotions, those that occur when people identify with social groups and appraise events in terms of their implications for those groups. We discuss theory and research regarding the role of emotions in intergroup contexts, focusing on their dynamic nature. We then describe new insights into the causes and consequences of emotional dynamics that flow from conceptualizing emotions as based in group membership, and (...) conclude with research recommendations. (shrink)

The central theme and core objective of this comprehensive resource for elementary teachers on climate change and children’s emotions and resiliency is supporting children’s understanding of and respect for the interconnectedness all life: human, animal, plant, and clean air, water, and soil. Its broad social/cultural perspective emphasizes that social and ecological justice are interrelated. Challenging elementary teachers to more explicitly address current environmental issues with students in their classrooms, the book presents a diverse set of topics from a (...) variety of perspectives. Coverage includes descriptions of environmental education pedagogies such as nature-based experiences and place-based studies; peace-education practices; children doing environmental activism; and teachers supporting children emotionally in times of climate disruption and tumult. The pedagogies described invite student engagement and action in the public sphere. Children are represented as ‘agents of change’ engaged in social and environmental issues and problems through their actions both local and global. (shrink)

The aim of this commentary is to contextualise the findings of the study “Emotional intelligence impact on half-marathon finish times”, which concluded that trait emotional intelligence predicted half-marathon finish times above and beyond training. The aim of this commentary is to highlight some methodological and interpretation limitations that may undermine the conclusions of this paper. These limitations are concerning the acknowledgement of previous research, the choice of the variables included in the study, and the over speculation of findings with (...) respect to study design. The first recommendation is related to the acknowledgement of previous research findings. The authors do not recognise several pieces of prior work, which would directly inform their research hypotheses and build on pre-existing knowledge within the field. The first paper of interest which was not mentioned is the systematic review of emotional intelligence in the field of sport and exercise (Laborde, Dosseville, & Allen, 2016). The systematic review discussed the theoretical implications of trait emotional intelligence on short-term and long-term sport performance outcomes. It concluded that trait emotional intelligence, given its trait nature, was more likely to have a stronger influence on long-term outcomes in comparison to short-term outcomes. Short-term outcomes may also be impacted, however it is then critical to provide a convincing rationale about why this may be the case, and to choose... (shrink)

Conducting emotion analysis and generating users' feedback from social media platforms may help understand their emotional responses to video products, such as a documentary on the lockdown of Wuhan during COVID-19. The results of emotion analysis could be used to make further user recommendations for marketing purposes. In our study, we try to understand how users respond to a documentary through YouTube comments. We chose “The lockdown: One month in Wuhan” YouTube documentary, and applied emotion analysis as well as (...) a machine learning approach to the comments. We first cleaned the data and then introduced an emotion analysis based on the statistical characteristics and lexicon combination. After that, we applied the Latent Dirichlet Allocation topic modeling approach to further generate main topics with keywords from the comments and visualized the distribution by visualizing the topics. The result shows trust, joy, and anticipation are the most prominent emotions dominating the comments. The major three themes, which account for 70% of all comments, are discussing stories about fighting against the virus, medical workers being heroes, and medical workers being respected. Further discussion has been conducted on the changing of different sentiments over time for the ongoing health crisis. This study proves that emotion analysis and LDA topic modeling could be used to generate explanations of users' opinions and feelings about video products, which could support user recommendations in marketing. (shrink)

Current discussions of hermeneutical injustice, I argue, poorly characterise the cognitive state of victims by failing to account for the communicative success that victims have when they describe their experience to other similarly situated persons. I argue that victims, especially when they suffer moral wrongs that are yet unnamed, are able (1) to grasp certain salient aspects of the wrong they experience and (2) to cultivate the ability to identify instances of the wrong in virtue of moral emotions. (...) By moral emotions I mean emotions like indignation that reflect an agent’s ethical commitments and bear on her ethical assessments. Further, I argue that victims can impart their partial understanding of the wrong they suffer to others who are not similarly situated by eliciting moral emotions such as pity that are tied to broad notions of justice and fairness. (shrink)

How is ethical knowledge possible? One of the most promising answers is the moral sense view: we can acquire ethical knowledge through emotional experience. But this view faces a serious problem. Emotions are unreliable guides to ethical truth, frequently failing to fit the ethical status of their objects. This threatens to render the habit of basing ethical beliefs on emotions too unreliable to yield knowledge. I offer a new solution to this problem, with practical implications for how (...) we approach ethical decision-making. I argue that an agent can have a reliable belief-forming habit despite having unreliable emotions, so long as she is suitably attentive to defeaters. In moderately virtuous agents, unfitting ethical emotions are frequently accompanied by warning signs, such as negative metaemotions, epistemic feelings, moods, and social cues. An agent who cultivates the attentional skill of noticing these signs can prevent many of her unfitting emotions from translating into false beliefs. For a moderately virtuous agent with this skill, the habit of basing ethical beliefs on emotions will be reliable. The upshot is that emotion-based ethical knowledge is possible even for people whose emotions are unreliable, but only if we cultivate the skill of spotting defeaters. (shrink)

People in an emotional exchange form a temporal interpersonal emotion system (TIES), in which their emotions are interconnected over time (Butler, 2011). These systems can be in various states, defined by the pattern of emotional interconnections. We have defined coregulation as one such state involving coupled dampened oscillations between partners’ emotions that converge on a stable level. Coregulation could be distinguished from other states, such as stress buffering, by comparing statistical models that represent the theoretical (...) distinctions between states. Optimal data for such modeling includes assessments of both partners’ emotions over time and a contrast between securely attached partners, strangers, and being alone. Research of this sort is needed to uncover the mechanisms by which emotional interdependence promotes well-being. (shrink)

In a society where mobility, globalization and contact with people from other cultures have become its basic descriptors, the enhancement of plurilingualism and intercultural understanding seem to be of the utmost concern. From a Positive Psychology Perspective, agency is the human capacity to affect other people positively or negatively through their actions. This agentic vision can be related to mediation, a concept rooted in the socio-cultural learning theory where social interaction is considered a fundamental cornerstone in the development of (...) cognition. Social interactions in the language learning setting may be facilitated through musical activities due to its social bonding effect. This paper tries to offer insights on how a musical-mediated experience in language learning may develop students’ interpersonal and collaborative competences to become active members of a more inclusive society. Mediation, considered as a paradigm shift in the foreign language classroom and the different out-of-class language learning possibilities, could also provide an environment where learners maximize their emotional intelligence. Our paper focuses on this paradigm shift spearheaded by the CEFR Companion Volume and the considerable repercussions it is bound to have for foreign language didactics, as cooperative tasks become central to foreign language learning. We hypothesize that mediated language learning experiences imply a socioemotional change in learners, focusing on the others, on their needs and interests, by trying to help them understand texts, concepts or facilitating communication with their peers. An intervention with a musical-mediated language learning experience was designed and implemented in the classroom. A self assessment scale with mediation descriptors and the socioemotional expertise scale (SEE) were administered. Results show that students become more mindful of their strengths, of their capacity for collaborating and team working. This leads to more awareness of their mediation skills. Students’ mediation skills correlate significantly with their socio-emotional skills, more concretely with their expressivity. The implementation of a musical-mediated experience also promoted tolerance and enhanced learners’ intrinsic motivation for language learning at the same time as they acknowledged their diversity. (shrink)

This daily diary study examined the within-person coupling between four emotion regulation strategies and both subjective well-being and perceived stress in daily life of geriatric nurses. Participants (N = 89) described how they regulated their emotions in terms of cognitive reappraisal and suppression. They also indicated their subjective well-being and level of perceived stress each day over three weeks. At the within-person level, cognitive reappraisal intended to increase positive emotions was positively associated with higher subjective (...) well-being and negatively associated with perceived stress. Suppression of the expression of positive emotions was negatively associated with subjective well-being and positively associated with perceived stress. However, cognitive reappraisal intended to down-regulate negative emotions and suppression as a strategy to inhibit the expression of negative emotions were not associated with daily well-being or perceived stress. Off-days were rated as days with higher subjective well-being and lower perceived stress in contrast to working days. At the between-person level, individuals who reported more daily negative affect reported increased suppression of positive emotions, corroborating the within-person findings. Moreover, findings indicated that nurses with more years of experience in the job reported higher subjective well-being and less perceived stress. These results provide insights into important daily emotional processes of geriatric nurses, both at workdays and in their leisure time. (shrink)

This article examines how growing fears, insecurities and uncertainties during the COVID-19 pandemic have prompted an emotional distance from others. The aim is to explore how global solidarity and nationalism are challenged and constructed as collective emotional processes concerning ‘others’. Drawing on social theories of emotions during crises and emotions towards others, this study looks at policy decisions around vaccines and health services and their associated emotions in the context of Korea, which has a relatively small (...) migrant population and a short history of supporting people in lower-income countries. The study finds that the COVID-19 pandemic has strengthened nationalism, both ethnic nationalism and cosmopolitan nationalism. This points to the need to highlight global norms such as human rights and justice and cultivate foundational emotions such as empathy and compassion. This article suggests paying attention to the role of emotions in generating othering practices and developing global solidarity. (shrink)

Cognitive incompetence cannot adequately explain the special character of children's moral status. It is, in fact, because children lack preference structures that are sufficiently stable over time that they are not ’temporally extended agents’. They are best viewed as 'special agents’, and parents have the responsibility of fostering the development of temporally extended agency and other necessary related moral capacities. Parental authority should be exercised with the view to assisting children to acquire the capacities that facilitate their (...) transition from 'special agents’ to full and functioning members of the moral community. (shrink)

Parents, after learning of a life-limiting fetal condition (LLFC), experience emotional distress and must consider options that impact the remainder of the pregnancy, their future lives, and family members. For those who continue, little is known about their longterm presence or absence of regret about their choice, the reasons for this feeling, or its impact on their life. The aim of this research was to examine the concept of decision regret in parents who opted to continue (...) a pregnancy affected by an LLFC. The contextual factors, conditions, and consequences surrounding the presence or absence of regret were analyzed.Data were retrieved from a cross-sectional study using the Quality of Perinatal Palliative Care and Parental Satisfaction Instrument. Participants were parents (N = 405) who experienced a life-limiting prenatal diagnosis and opted to continue their pregnancy. Secondary data analysis examined qualitative responses (121/402) to an item addressing regret. Dimensional analysis was “I Would Do It All Over Again”: Cherishing Time and the Absence of Regret in Continuing a Pregnancy after a Life-Limiting Diagnosis Charlotte Wool, Rana Limbo, and Erin M. Denney-Koelsch used to examine data, identifying context, conditions, and consequences associated with the presence or absence of regret.Absence of regret was articulated in 97.5 percent of participants. Parents valued the baby as a part of their family and had opportunities to love, hold, meet, and cherish their child. Participants treasured the time together before and after the birth. Although emotionally difficult, parents articulated an empowering, transformative experience that lingers over time. (shrink)

PurposeWe explored two complex phenomena associated with effective education. First, teachers’ professional agency, the volitional actions they take in response to perceived opportunities, was examined to consider individual differences in its enactment. Second, “strong” emotions have been proposed as important in teaching and learning, and we wished to clarify which basic emotions might be involved, besides curiosity, which is a known emotional factor in engagement in teaching. We also explored how agency and basic emotions might be related.ApproachThirteen (...) teachers working in Scottish secondary schools were interviewed at the start of the covid pandemic in 2020 to discuss relevant feelings, thoughts and actions arising from unprecedented changes in their lives and professional practices. Thematic analysis was used to identify aspects of agentic behavior and basic emotions expressed.FindingsTeacher agency was expressed through adaptability, collective agency, constrained agency, and non-action. Four basic emotion percepts were identified, which we label as “CARE”, “CURIOSITY”, “COOPERATION”, and “CHALLENGE”.OriginalityWe extend the definition of agency to include volitional non-action as a response to opportunity. In contrast to prior research emphasizing emotions as an outcome of volitional behavior, we explore emotions preceding agency. We develop four theoretical propositions related to teacher emotions. Four emotion percepts substantially influence teachers’ voluntary motivated behavior. The amount and proportion of emotions experienced varies between individual teachers. The four percepts are experienced concurrently or in rapid succession in engaged teaching contexts. Professional experience and specific situational factors also influence teachers’ behavioral choices. For future consideration, we suggest that awareness of emotion percepts may encourage both teachers’ engagement and their professional agency for the benefit of their pedagogical practice and outcomes for their students. (shrink)

Education, gender, family or professional responsibilities, and the abrupt nature of certain lived experiences, often push people to conceal their emotions. Suppression represents a self-preservation or survival strategy. In some cases, inhibition goes as far as completely blocking the bodily expression of emotion. Over the centuries, many philosophers and wise thinkers have seen emotion as an affliction of the inner soul, troubled by excessive and irrational proclivities that lead it to wander off the path of the good (...) life. The remedies are manifold but tend to a culture of the self that exalts impassibility and perfect peace of mind. Yet emotion is what motivates us and gears us up for action. It enables us to connect with and adapt to the outside world. Inspired by a holistic vision of cognition, this book invites the reader to explore, through philosophical texts, a cultivation of the self that neither minimizes nor negates emotion. (shrink)

Emotion is critical for cultural dynamics, that is, for the formation, maintenance, and transformation of culture over time. We outline the component micro- and macro-level processes of cultural dynamics, and argue that emotion not only facilitates the transmission and retention of cultural information, but also is shaped and crafted by cultural dynamics. Central to this argument is our understanding of emotion as a complete information package that signals the adaptive significance of the information that the agent is processing. (...) It captures an agent’s appraisal about the relationship between themself and the object of emotional focus, as well as action orientation and allostasis in context. We discuss implications of this perspective in the context of the changing natural and geopolitical environment, and future cultural dynamics into the 21st century. (shrink)

Our capacity for planning agency is central to our human lives. These essays aim both to deepen our understanding of basic norms that guide our plan-infused thinking and to defend their status as norms of practical rationality. This defense appeals both to forms of pragmatic support and to the ways in which these norms track conditions of a planning agent's self-governance, both at a time and over time.

I advocate Time-Slice Rationality, the thesis that the relationship between two time-slices of the same person is not importantly different, for purposes of rational evaluation, from the relationship between time-slices of distinct persons. The locus of rationality, so to speak, is the time-slice rather than the temporally extended agent. This claim is motivated by consideration of puzzle cases for personal identity over time and by a very moderate form of internalism about rationality. Time-Slice (...) Rationality conflicts with two proposed principles of rationality, Conditionalization and Reflection. Conditionalization is a diachronic norm saying how your current degrees of belief should fit with your old ones, while Reflection is a norm enjoining you to defer to the degrees of belief that you expect to have in the future. But they are independently problematic and should be replaced by improved, time-slice-centric principles. Conditionalization should be replaced by a synchronic norm saying what degrees of belief you ought to have given your current evidence and Reflection should be replaced by a norm which instructs you to defer to the degrees of belief of agents you take to be experts. These replacement principles do all the work that the old principles were supposed to do while avoiding their problems. In this way, Time-Slice Rationality puts the theory of rationality on firmer foundations and yields better norms than alternative, non-time-slice-centric approaches. (shrink)