In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Moral Sentiments and the Structure of the Treatise LOUIS E. LOEB ACCORDING TO NORMAN KEMP SMITH and Thomas Hearn, Hume classified moral sentiments as direct passions.' According to Pb.II A,rdal, Hume classified the basic moral sentiments of approval and disapproval of persons as indirect passions. if either of these interpretations is correct, there is an intimate connection between Books II (...) and 111 of Hume's Treatise. This is because the direct and indirect passions (together with the will) are the subject of Book 11 and moral sentiments are discussed in Book 111. So if moral sentiments are special cases of either direct or indirect passions, the treatment of passions in Book Ii is central to the understanding of Book 111. 1 contend, on the contrary, that Hume's moral sentiments are neither direct nor indirect passions. Consequently, the connection between Books 11 and 111 of the Treatise is much less intimate than A,rdal and Hearn have recently suggested.' i. Hume's Classification of the Impressions of Reflection In the four paragraphs of II, i, I Hume provides an exhaustive "Division of the Subject"--the "subject" being "all the perceptions of the mind. ''4 Nowhere else in the Treatise is a complete "division" to be found. As A,rdal points out, such introductory chapters "are likely to be written after the bulk of the book has been completed, or at least to be carefully revised in the light of the main arguments in the book. ''~ For these reasons, there is a strong presumption that the "division" in!I, i, 1should be taken as canonical. Hume's "division" is straightforward. In the first paragraph, perceptions are divided into ideas and impressions; in the first and second paragraphs, impressions are divided into those of sensation and those of reflection; in the third paragraph, impressions of reflection are divided into the calm and the violent; in the fourth (as I am indebted to Wdham Frankena, Ronald Glossop, and Peter Jones for their most helpful comments. ' Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (New York: St. Martm'~ Press, 1966), pp. 167-168; and Thomas K. Hearn, Jr., "Ardal on the Moral Sentiments in Hume's rreattse," Phtlosophy 48 (1973):290. z Passton and Value m Hume's "Treatise" (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), pp. I 1, 109-133. For a discussion heavily influenced by Ardal, see Stewart R. Sutherland, "Hume on Morality and the Emotions," Phllosophwal Quarterly 26 (1976) : 14-19 especially. ' See Ardal, pp. I-5, 109-133; and Hearn, pp. 288, 292. 9 A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 275; hereafter cited as T followed by page number. 9 Ardal, p. 94. 13951 396 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY indicated by the last sentence of the third), the violent impressions of reflection are divided into the direct and the indirect. The structure is of a genus-species sort, and none of the distinctions cut across each other: J calm i sense of beauty and deformity (T, 276), moral sentiments impressions of reflection = emotions (secondary impressions) violent = passions direct indirect desire, aversion, grief, joy, pride, humility, love, hope, fear (T, 277, 439) hatred (T, 276-277) This classification is based upon the only natural reading of paragraph three and the first sentence of paragraph four of II, i, I. I quote this material, adding my own emphasis and deleting Hume's: The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the calm and the violent. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. This division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly called passions, may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible. But as in general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity, these impressions have been commonly distinguish'd from each other. The subject of the human mind being so copious and various, I shall here take... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXIII, Number 2, November 1997, pp. 195-212 The Moral Self and the Indirect Passions SUSAN M. PURVIANCE David Hume1 and Immanuel Kant are celebrated for their clear-headed rejection of dogmatic metaphysics, Hume for rejecting traditional metaphysical positions on cause and effect, substance, and personal identity, Kant for rejecting all judgments of experience regarding the ultimate ground of objects and their relations, not just (...) judgments of cause and substantiality. Nevertheless, each argues that practical activity is not compromised by the rejection of metaphysical claims that others had taken to be crucial. Kant and Hume thought that political and moral life did not depend upon theoretical knowlege of the nature of the self, free will, or knowledge of the true motives of actions or the character of the agent. Because the grounds of morality and politics were too important to leave to the mercies of speculative metaphysics, each moved their foundations to higher ground, insulating the grounds of practical activity from the threat of metaphysical turmoil and skepticism. Contemporary philosophers have generally followed Hume and Kant in this regard, but often select very different strategies. Some think that the best way to avoid the problems associated with contemporary scientific ontologies is to separate ethics from the factual domain entirely. Some give moral and political language a noncognitivist interpretation, and others have interpreted values as a projection of the passions and affections of the subject or as the constructions of suitably situated practical reasoners.2 At the same time there has been a resurgence of interest in moral realism. Moral realists think that the objectivity of moral discourse, and hence the Susan M. Purviance is at the Department of Philosophy, The University of Toledo, Toledo OH 43606-3390 USA. 196 Susan M. Purviance possibility of moral truth, depend upon the existence of moral facts.3 Moral realists have tended to concentrate on the role of facts in establishing the truth of general moral principles, or the Tightness or moral value of particular individual actions. For moral realists, moral facts are the states of affairs that make general moral principles or particular moral judgments true. Whether these facts are of a naturalistic sort or not, whether they are literally on a par with natural facts, or whether they simply play the same role in practical knowledge that natural facts play in theoretical knowledge, is an open question. Moral realists often are naturalists, like David O. Brink and Jonathan Dancy, but they may be nonnaturalists, like G. E. Moore.4 Ethical naturalism accounts for moral motivation and the cultivation of good character in terms of moral qualities, and many hope to ground it in (or at least show that it is compatible with) the scientific understanding of objects and their relations and qualities. Naturalism is only one option, but realism has received support because it is not clear that antirealists have developed a convincing alternative to the grounding of concepts of moral agency and moral judgment in some sort of moral facts. Questions abound about what it means to ascribe responsibility to a moral self and how we can defend a notion of enduring character. Although moral realists have paid less attention to the ontological status of virtues and character traits than to moral principles, their status is equally important. Here the concern is with the sort of metaphysics of the self thought to be necessary to account for moral agency, responsibility, praise, and blame. I shall argue that there is a class of moral facts that justify or perhaps merely vindicate the ascription of moral powers to agents, and that these are the sorts of facts another sort of theorist is interested in, whereas the states of affairs that make moral judgments true are the sorts of facts that moral realists have been interested in. In order to distinguish this use of moral facts I shall call this sort of theory a Fact of Agency Theory, and it is a version of this theory that can be found in Hume's discussion of the problem of the self and the indirect passions. A realist metaphysics of morals needs to address two questions, the question of the reality of the... (shrink)

This discussion explores the moral psychology and metaethics of Michael Slote's Moral Sentimentalism. I argue that his account of empathy has an important lacuna, because the sense in which an empathizer feels the same feeling that his target feels requires explanation, and the most promising candidates are unavailable to Slote. I then argue that the (highly original) theory of moral approval and disapproval that Slote develops in his book is implausible, both phenomenologically and for the (...) role it accords to empathy. Finally, I suggest that these problems in moral psychology undermine Slote's metaethical argument for identifying rightness and wrongness with agential warmth and coldness in action. (shrink)

Do the moral sentiments move us to act, according to Hume? And if so, how? Hume famously deploys the claim that moral evaluations move us to act to show that they are not derived from reason alone. Presumably, moral evaluations move us because (as Hume sees it) they are, or are the product of, moral sentiments. So, it would seem that moral approval and disapproval are or produce motives to action. This raises three (...) interconnected interpretive questions. First, on Hume's account, we are moved to do many virtuous actions not by the sentiments of approval and disapproval, but by other sentiments, such as gratitude and parental love; so when and how do the moral sentiments themselves provide motives to act morally? The second question arises as a result of a position I defend here, that the moral sentiments are best understood as Humean indirect affections. Hume says that the four main indirect passions (pride, humility, love and hatred) do not directly move us to act. The second question, then, is whether their status as indirect affections nonetheless allows moral approval and disapproval to be or provide motives. Finally, if we make a natural assumption about how Hume thinks belief about future pleasure is connected to the desire to obtain it (I call it the signpost assumption), it turns out that the mechanisms for producing motives that most naturally come to mind are ones that are equally available to reason alone. This introduces the third question: given the constraints Hume imposes on the nature of the moral sentiments, is there a way in which they can move us to act that is not also a way in which reason alone does? I argue that, given the signpost assumption, while Hume has greatly constrained his options, his moral sentiments do have one very limited way of moving us to act that is not available to reason alone. However, there are reasons to doubt that Hume endorses the signpost assumption. Without it, our moral evaluations have a far greater capacity to produce motives to act. One important objection arises; but this problem can be solved by rejecting a further assumption about what counts as being produced by reason alone. (shrink)

This critical work proceeds in a scholarly manner to show that Hume's Treatise, which has been ignored as a source for his moral theory, is of definite value for a correct and complete interpretation of his ethics. It is the author's contention that Hume's moral theory is closely connected to his psychology, which is set out in the Treatise. The author presents various interpretations he considers incorrect, exposing their faults and then suggesting an alternative view. Árdal is not (...) attempting a reconstruction of Hume's ethics nor a complete explanation of the theory of passions. Rather it is his aim to show that the value expressions of approval-disapproval are passions, and a knowledge of the origins and causes of the indirect passions provides the key to their understanding. Also included in this discussion are accounts of the natural and artificial virtues and the role of evaluative language in Hume's philosophy.—E. C. (shrink)

This critical work proceeds in a scholarly manner to show that Hume's Treatise, which has been ignored as a source for his moral theory, is of definite value for a correct and complete interpretation of his ethics. It is the author's contention that Hume's moral theory is closely connected to his psychology, which is set out in the Treatise. The author presents various interpretations he considers incorrect, exposing their faults and then suggesting an alternative view. Árdal is not (...) attempting a reconstruction of Hume's ethics nor a complete explanation of the theory of passions. Rather it is his aim to show that the value expressions of approval-disapproval are passions, and a knowledge of the origins and causes of the indirect passions provides the key to their understanding. Also included in this discussion are accounts of the natural and artificial virtues and the role of evaluative language in Hume's philosophy.—E. C. (shrink)

The main goals of this paper are two. First, it articulates what kinds of knowing pure knowing is in its narrow sense pure knowing as the capacity of moral judgment; pure knowing as moral knowledge and standard. Besides, it analyses pure knowing’s different features through a phenomenological description. All these aspects of pure knowing are tied by moral feeling. Second, this paper addresses two sets of theoretical problems that have been raised in Confucian discourse with respect to (...) pure knowing and Heavenly principle, primarily those that render Wang’s notion of pure knowing to be static recognition toward particular moral issues, or immediate response, which reading cannot really admit the possibilities of extension, reflection, moral cultivation, and reform of institution; and those that understand pure knowing to be merely abstract without concrete content, such as merely being a metaphysical substance. When properly understood, that is, from the perspective of moral emotions, Wang Yangming’s account of pure knowing provides for the possibilities of enhancement and cultivation, while insisting that the content of pure knowing is always accessible to us. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Scepticism About Persons in Book II of Hume’s TreatiseDonald C. AinslieBook ii of Hume’s Treatise—especially its first two Parts on the “indirect passions” of pride, humility, love, and hatred—has mystified many of its interpreters.1 Hume clearly thinks these passions are important: Not only does he devote more space to them than to his treatment of causation, but in the “Abstract” to the Treatise, he tells us (...) that Book II “contains opinions that are altogether as new and extraordinary” (T 659) as those found in Book I. And, he says, these opinions constitute “the foundation” (T 646) for his treatment of morals and politics in Book III.2 The mystery arises, however, because in the actual text of [End Page 469] Book II Hume never spells out what makes his opinions on the passions “new and extraordinary,” nor why they are foundational for his moral theory.Thus some of his interpreters, notably Norman Kemp Smith, conclude that Hume was simply mistaken in his assessment of his treatment of the passions. While his accounts of the will and of motivation (in the early Sections of Part iii of Book II) are significant, Kemp Smith takes the extended analysis of the indirect passions to spring merely from his misplaced enthusiasm for associationist psychology. As such, the philosophical lessons to be learned from the first two Parts of Book II are slim.3 Páll Árdal, in contrast, tries to construct for Hume what he seems to have omitted—a philosophical rationale for his obvious interest in the indirect passions. Árdal starts by drawing attention to the role these passions play in Hume’s moral philosophy, in particular, his repeatedly connecting the indirect passions to the moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. Árdal concludes that Hume means to equate the moral sentiments with particular kinds of indirect passions. The first two Parts of Book II are of interest, on Ardal’s reading, because it is there that he shows us how moral sentimentalism can be founded on something more fully naturalistic than Hutcheson’s somewhat mysterious “moral sense.”4I argue against Árdal’s interpretation in §2. But this reopens the problem of accounting for Hume’s interest in the indirect passions. I offer my view in §§3–5 where, like Árdal, I provide a reconstruction of Hume’s discussion of these passions in order to show how it has an underlying philosophical motivation. My claim is that Hume relies on the indirect passions to explain how we form beliefs about persons as bearers of features that make them into who [End Page 470] they are. It is by feeling an indirect passion towards someone that we think of her as more than accidentally related to some quality, such as her country, her riches, her family, or even her character traits. In support of my interpretation I point to the many parallels Hume draws between the indirect passions and the associative mechanism he offers to explain our forming causal beliefs (I.iii). And I suggest that, just as Hume’s associative explanation of causal beliefs is necessitated by his scepticism about intrinsic “necessary connexions,” so also his associative mechanism for our beliefs about persons—the indirect passions—is necessitated by a certain kind of scepticism about persons. This is not the scepticism about persons that we find in “Of personal identity” (I.iv.6), where Hume argues against the view that our perceptions inhere in a simple soul; it is rather a scepticism about there being intrinsic features of persons that define them as who they are.But, before I explain in more detail what my claim amounts to, it will help to have available a brief description of the mechanism that Hume’s takes to explain the indirect passions.1. THE MECHANISM FOR THE INDIRECT PASSIONSA passion, for Hume, is a simple impression felt in response to various circumstances. Because of their simplicity, we cannot define passions by putting their characteristic feeling into words; instead, Hume thinks, we can only delineate “such circumstances, as attend them” (T 277). Passions are indirect if those circumstances include as an outcome the focusing of attention onto a person... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:David Hume on Personal Identity and the Indirect Passions Robert S. Henderson Scholarly reflection on Hume's "doctrine" ofselfand personal identity continues to focus on the sections "Of Personal Identity" and the "Appendix" toA Treatise ofHuman Nature. To answer the question of why we have so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successiveperceptions which make up experience, Hume says that we must distinguish betwixtpersonal identity, (...) as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves. He considers only the former in these sections. Towards the end of the personal identity section he writes that our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for ourpast or future pains or pleasures (T 261). In the advertisement to the Treatise Hume says that the subjects of the understanding and passions make a compleat chain of reasoning by themselves (T xii). In light of the importance Hume attaches to the distinction, and since there are many indications that the Treatise should be read as an integral whole, it is surprising that so little attention is given to what he says of personal identity in the other books. As the title suggests, this paper concentrates on the second part of the distinction and especially on the discussion ofthe indirectpassions in Book II of the Treatise. This is not to suggest that self does not play an important role elsewhere in Hume's science ofman; for example, it is selfwhich experiences the impression ofwill and the direct passions. However, the indirect passions have a particularly important part to play in ascriptions of personal identity and this justifies the present investigation. II We can safely predict that personal identity as it regards our passions will not be the idea??some philosophers whose views of self as having the philosophical (strict) relation ofidentity Hume has rejected in "Of Personal Identity." The relationship between thought and passion to which he draws attention suggests that the idea of selfin this context has a relation to the positive suggestions in that earlier section of why Volume XVI Number 1 33 ROBERT S. HENDERSON we do speak meaningfully of the identity of the self. We are able so to speak because ofarelationship which is felt to exist between a person's distinct and changing perceptions. The relationship has to do with the discovery by memory of the connection of a person's perceptions through the association ofideas by resemblance and causation (T 261). Examination of the idea of self to which Hume makes frequent reference in Book II requires some review ofthe method ofthe Treatise. Perceptions make up human experience. Perceptions are either impressions or ideas which derive from impressions. Hume describes the indirect passions as secondary or reflective impressions and these stem from original impressions or from their ideas. He distinguishes between direct andindirect passions. Directpassionsarise immediately fromgood or evil, frompain orpleasure (T 276). Examples are joy, hope and fear. Indirect passionsproceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction ofother qualities (T 276). That is, the indirect passions not onlyhave a cause (an impression which excites them), but also an object (to which the passion directs our view when excited). We shall see that a significant quality of the indirect passions is the relation of these impressions to their objects, which are either one's own or another's self. In Book II of the Treatise Hume examines the indirect passions: love, hate, pride and humility. These passions are evaluations of persons; of selfin the case of pride and humility, and of another in the case of love and hatred. Evaluation of persons is a central feature of Hume's moral philosophy: To have the sense ofvirtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration (T 471). We shall see that the indirect passions in particular make an important contribution to the answer ofHume's original question ofthe source?? owe propension to ascribe an identity. Ill... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 29, Number 2, November 2003, pp. 205-221 The Origin of the Indirect Passions in the Treatise: An Analogy between Books 1 and 2 HARUKOINOUE 1. The Analogy Between Book 1 and Book 2 If the central design of the Treatise is to demonstrate that "the subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves" (T 2; SBN xii), (...) as Hume advertises, it seems unquestionable that his intention lies in the illustration of the human mind as an integrated system dependent upon the cooperation of the understanding and the passions, which are discussed separately in Book 1 and Book 2, respectively.1 What is yet to be determined is whether any internal or systematic connection between these two books was originally intended by the author. Is it too fanciful to agree with John Passmore, and to suggest that some dynamic system of the human mind would emerge when we open the door which stands between the first two books?2 The key for this door seems to be found in Hume's account of personal identity. We may well remember how he distinguished two aspects of our identity, one regarding the understanding and another regarding the passions, and claimed that the latter "serves to corroborate" the former "by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures" (T 1.4.6.19; SBN Haruko Inoue is Professor of Philosophy, Sapporo University 3-7-3-1 Toyohira-ku, Sapporo 062-8520, Japan. e-mail: [email protected] 206 Haruko Inoue 261). It seems reasonable to agree with Jane Mclntyre, who suggests that "Hume recognized questions about personal identity not addressed in Book 1, and that Book 2 makes an important contribution to our understanding of Hume's account of the self and its identity."3 And once we get a good understanding of this integrated mechanism of the human mind operating with both wheels, as it were, of the imagination and the passions, all we have to do is to accept his invitation and enjoy the efficiency of this two-wheeled car, driving through the fields of "Morals, Politics, and Criticism." For, if we take his words in his Advertisement seriously,4 it seems quite likely that the Treatise was published first as a set of Book 1 and Book 2, as Passmore suggests,5 and that Book 3 was written as the demonstration of the consistency of his system through the application of the hypothesis established in the first two books. This paper is a modest attempt to illustrate the intimate connection between Book 1 and Book 2: the latter, planned as a proof and reinforcement of the system Hume had established in Book 1, depends on the former. His basic strategy in the Treatise is to explain both systems of the mind by means of the easy transition of the imagination, which connects different perceptions with each other according to two kinds of principles or "properties of human nature " (T 2.1.4.2; SBN 283), viz. "the association both of impressions and ideas, and the mutual assistance they lend each other" (T 2.1.5.5; SBN 284). In Book 1 Hume establishes the system of the understanding in terms of the first association, viz. the association of ideas, and in Book 2 he proceeds to illustrate the system of passions by involving not only the second association but also the concurrence of both kinds of association which he calls "a double relation of impressions and ideas." His basic strategy is thus to apply the same method of reasoning to the illustration of both systems, assuming that "there is an attraction or association among impressions, as well as among ideas" (T 2.1.4.3; SBN 283). The intimate connection between the two systems of the understanding and the passions is illustrated through the demonstration of the "influence of the imagination upon the passions" (T 2.3.6.1; SBN 424), or in terms of the dependence of the latter on the former. It is owing to the dependence of the association of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 29, Number 2, November 2003, pp. 205-221 The Origin of the Indirect Passions in the Treatise: An Analogy between Books 1 and 2 HARUKOINOUE 1. The Analogy Between Book 1 and Book 2 If the central design of the Treatise is to demonstrate that "the subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves" (T 2; SBN xii), (...) as Hume advertises, it seems unquestionable that his intention lies in the illustration of the human mind as an integrated system dependent upon the cooperation of the understanding and the passions, which are discussed separately in Book 1 and Book 2, respectively.1 What is yet to be determined is whether any internal or systematic connection between these two books was originally intended by the author. Is it too fanciful to agree with John Passmore, and to suggest that some dynamic system of the human mind would emerge when we open the door which stands between the first two books?2 The key for this door seems to be found in Hume's account of personal identity. We may well remember how he distinguished two aspects of our identity, one regarding the understanding and another regarding the passions, and claimed that the latter "serves to corroborate" the former "by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures" (T 1.4.6.19; SBN Haruko Inoue is Professor of Philosophy, Sapporo University 3-7-3-1 Toyohira-ku, Sapporo 062-8520, Japan. e-mail: [email protected] 206 Haruko Inoue 261). It seems reasonable to agree with Jane Mclntyre, who suggests that "Hume recognized questions about personal identity not addressed in Book 1, and that Book 2 makes an important contribution to our understanding of Hume's account of the self and its identity."3 And once we get a good understanding of this integrated mechanism of the human mind operating with both wheels, as it were, of the imagination and the passions, all we have to do is to accept his invitation and enjoy the efficiency of this two-wheeled car, driving through the fields of "Morals, Politics, and Criticism." For, if we take his words in his Advertisement seriously,4 it seems quite likely that the Treatise was published first as a set of Book 1 and Book 2, as Passmore suggests,5 and that Book 3 was written as the demonstration of the consistency of his system through the application of the hypothesis established in the first two books. This paper is a modest attempt to illustrate the intimate connection between Book 1 and Book 2: the latter, planned as a proof and reinforcement of the system Hume had established in Book 1, depends on the former. His basic strategy in the Treatise is to explain both systems of the mind by means of the easy transition of the imagination, which connects different perceptions with each other according to two kinds of principles or "properties of human nature " (T 2.1.4.2; SBN 283), viz. "the association both of impressions and ideas, and the mutual assistance they lend each other" (T 2.1.5.5; SBN 284). In Book 1 Hume establishes the system of the understanding in terms of the first association, viz. the association of ideas, and in Book 2 he proceeds to illustrate the system of passions by involving not only the second association but also the concurrence of both kinds of association which he calls "a double relation of impressions and ideas." His basic strategy is thus to apply the same method of reasoning to the illustration of both systems, assuming that "there is an attraction or association among impressions, as well as among ideas" (T 2.1.4.3; SBN 283). The intimate connection between the two systems of the understanding and the passions is illustrated through the demonstration of the "influence of the imagination upon the passions" (T 2.3.6.1; SBN 424), or in terms of the dependence of the latter on the former. It is owing to the dependence of the association of... (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction The Basic Features of the Indirect Passions Why These Four Emotions? The Foundations of the Distinction, between Direct and Indirect Passions The Moral Sentiments References Further Reading.

Hume thinks moral judgments are based on sentiments of approval and disapproval we feel when we contemplate someone from a "general point of view." We view her through the eyes of her "narrow circle" and judge her in accordance with general rules. Why do we take up the general point of view? Hume also argues that approval is a calm form of love, love of character, which sets a normative standard for other forms of love. In (...) this paper I explain why, and argue that character, as a form of causality, is constructed from the point of view of one's narrow circle. We take up the general view to view people as persons, that is, as possible objects of love. (shrink)

Hume claims that moral assessments refer to character; it is character of which we morally approve and disapprove. This essay explores what Hume means by “character.” Is it true that moral assessments refer to character, and should Hume think this given his other commitments in moral philosophy and moral psychology? I discuss two prominent themes—namely, Hume’s views on moral responsibility; and Hume’s comparison of moral feelings with feelings of love—to see what light these themes (...) can shed on Hume’s broader views about moral assessment. I argue that at least according to a traditional understanding of the term, character could not plausibly have a role to play in Hume’s account of moral assessment, but that Hume’s moral theory could require a conception of character different from this traditional one: a conception according to which character need not be the standard one that holds character to be consistent, stable, and well-integrated. In morally assessing others, we do not do so on the basis of their characters , but on the basis of their motivational states. My account of Hume’s theory of the responsibility, passions and the moral sentiments leaves intact the central Humean insights about the conditions for action and the arousal of the moral sentiment, suggesting what Hume could have said, both more plausibly and without undermining the key features of his moral psychology. And it also shows that Hume’s moral theory has no need for a robust conception of character. (shrink)

In the Treatise, Hume focuses on pride as an “indirect passion,” one indicative of self-valuing and moral virtue and contributing positively to our sense of who we are and, in particular, to our moral identity. This essay examines those features of pride that make Hume’s account of the indirect passions so distinctive, beginning with an examination of his application of the experimental method to explain the origin of the indirect passions and the double (...) relation of ideas and impressions as the efficient causes of these passions. Also examined is the relationship Hume draws between the principle of sympathy, pride, and the causes of pride; the relations among pride in virtuous character, moral confidence and, competence; and Hume’s account of pride in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Finally, the author considers the view of Humean moral agency as heteronomous in nature. (shrink)

Hume's position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the slave of the passions (see Section 3) (2) Moral distinctions are not derived from reason (see Section 4). (3) Moral distinctions are derived from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate (...) a character trait or action (see Section 7). (4) While some virtues and vices are natural (see Section 13), others, including justice, are artificial (see Section 9). There is heated debate about what Hume intends by each of these theses and how he argues for them. He articulates and defends them within the broader context of his metaethics and his ethic of virtue and vice. Hume's main ethical writings are Book 3 of his Treatise of Human Nature, Of Morals (which builds on Book 2, Of the Passions), his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, and some of his Essays. In part the moral Enquiry simply recasts central ideas from the moral part of the Treatise in a more accessible style; but there are important differences. The ethical positions and arguments of the Treatise are set out below, noting where the moral Enquiry agrees; differences between the Enquiry and the Treatise are discussed afterwards. (shrink)

Background:Moral distress and workplace bullying are important issues in the nursing workplace that appear to affect nurse’s burnout.Aim:To investigate the relationship between moral distress and burnout in Iranian nurses, as mediated by their perceptions of workplace bullying.Ethical considerations:The research was approved by the committee of ethics in research of the Urmia University of Medical Sciences.Method:This is a correlation study using a cross-sectional design with anonymous questionnaires as study instruments (i.e. Moral Distress Scale-Revised, Maslach Burnout Inventory and The (...) Negative Acts Questionnaire-Revised). Data were collected from 278 nurses from five teaching hospitals in Urmia, the capital of Western Azerbaijan, northwest of Iran. Structural equation modeling and bootstrapping procedures were employed to recognize the mediating role of their perceptions of workplace bullying.Results:The mean score of moral distress, burnout, and the Negative Acts Questionnaire-Revised Scale among the participants were 91.02 ± 35.26, 79.9 ± 18.27, and 45.4 ± 15.39, respectively. The results confirmed our hypothesized model. All the latent variables of study were significantly correlated in the predicted directions. The moral distress and bullying were significant predictors of burnout. Perception of bullying partially mediated the relationship between moral distress and burnout. The mediating role of the bullying suggests that moral distress increases burnout, directly and indirectly.Conclusion:Nursing administrators should be conscious of the role of moral distress and bullying in the nursing workplace in increasing burnout. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXII, Number 1, April 1996, pp. 23-48 Fantastick Associations and Addictive General Rules: A Fundamental Difference between Hutcheson and Hume MICHAEL B. GILL The belief that God created human beings for some moral purpose underlies nearly all the moral philosophy written in Great Britain in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. David Hume attacks this theological conception of human nature on all fronts. It (...) is out of these attacks that Hume develops his own "science of man" based solely on "experience and observation."1 Francis Hutcheson is often taken to be the most important positive influence on Hume. And there can be no doubt that Hume does take on board several crucial Hutchesonian elements. But Hutcheson's moral theory, like that of most of his contemporaries, is grounded in a theological conception of human nature to which Hume is adamantly opposed.2 In this paper I will examine how Hume's disagreements with Hutcheson embody the anti-theological purpose that defines Hume's work as a whole. I will look, in particular, at Hume's and Hutcheson's different positions on the principles of association. I hope to show how Hume's use of these principles in the Treatise advances his larger goal of placing "the science of man" on "a foundation almost entirely new" (T xvi). I will proceed, first, by explaining Hutcheson's conception of human nature and his use of the principles of association; second, by sketching in broad outline how Hume's accounts of the origins of justice and natural virtue undermine crucial components of Hutcheson's conception of human nature; and third, by elucidating in more detail an aspect of Hume's associationism that is particularly revealing of his distance from Hutcheson. Michael B. Gill is at the Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, 1360 Liberal Arts and Education Building, West Lafayette IN 47907 USA. email: [email protected]. 24 Michael B. Gill I. Hutcheson and Association Hutcheson discusses the mind's tendency to associate in all of his writings, but his most extensive treatment of the matter comes in his Essay on the Passions.3 Hutcheson begins the Essay by telling us that something is good if and only if the perception of it "Causes, or Occasions" a pleasurable feeling, and that something is evil if and only if the perception of it causes or occasions a painful feeling (EP 2). Crucially, Hutcheson denies that all of our pleasures and pains are of the same type (EP 1-8).4 He holds, rather, that there are at least five distinct types of pleasures and pains and that each of them grounds a different irreducible type of good and evil. There are, first, the pleasures and pains caused by things we perceive through the external senses of taste, touch, smell, etc.; things that cause such pleasures are called naturally good, while things that cause such pains are called naturally evil. Second, there are the "Pleasant Perceptions, arising from regular, harmonious, uniform Objects" (EP 5); the things that cause these pleasures are called beautiful.5 Third, there are the pleasures and pains we feel upon perceiving the happiness or misery of other human beings; the things that cause these pleasures are called public goods while those that cause the corresponding pains are called public evils. Fourth, there are pleasures and pains, usually called approval and disapproval, that we feel upon perceiving the actions of others; the actions that cause approval are called virtuous or morally good, while those that cause disapproval are called vicious or morally evil. Finally, there are the pleasures and pains we feel upon perceiving others' moral perceptions of our own actions; the pleasure of perceiving others' approval of one's actions is called the feeling of honor, while the pain of perceiving others' disapproval is called the feeling of shame. For Hutcheson, then, natural goodness, beauty, the public good, virtue and honor are all defined by our pleasures and pains. He does not think, however, that these are defined by just any of our actual or occurrent pleasures and pains. He holds, rather, that they are defined by the pleasures and pains we feel under certain privileged... (shrink)

If a reliable testifier tells you that a song is beautiful or that an act is wrong, do you thereby have a reason to approve of the painting and disapprove of the agent's action? Many insist that we don’t: normative testimony does not give us reasons for affective attitudes like approval. This answer is often treated as a datum in the literatures on moral and aesthetic testimony. I argue that once we correct for a common methodological mistake in (...) these literatures, the answer must be Yes. I then show why this matters for the broader discussion of the puzzle(s) posed by deference to moral and aesthetic testimony. (shrink)

Hume’s moral philosophy is a sentiment-based view. Moral judgment is a matter of the passions; certain traits of character count as virtues or vices because of the approval or disapproval they evoke in us, feelings that express concern we have about the social effects of these traits. A sentiment-based approach is attractive, since morality seems fundamentally to involve caring for other people. Sentiment-based views, however, face a real challenge. It is clear that our affections are (...) often particular; we favor certain persons over others. This poses a problem when it comes to determining the proper content of morality. The ties of sentiment would seem to be in tension with the aspirations of morality toward impartiality and universality. (shrink)

The dissertation addresses the relationship between common sense, skepticism, and naturalistic science in Hume. It is argued that Hume's moral science uncovers numerous common illusions of visual and moral perception; it is not a defense of common-sense experience. ;Firstly, Hume views the ordinary experience of causation and external reality as illusory. The former experience is a projection of human expectation; the latter a conflation of perceptions. ;Secondly, it is argued that, according to Hume, the moral judge overlooks (...) his biases by fictively projecting himself to an impartial standpoint. Impartial sentiments are weak, however, and their weakness generates another fiction: they are mistaken for the inferences of reason. Finally, the judge falsely imagines that he can "see" the character of the persons whom he judges, when all that he actually sees are their actions. ;Thirdly, the dissertation contends that, although the practice of justice arises out of self-interest, the moral agent mistakes his personal interest for public benevolence. When his hidden selfishness fails to move him, he acts justly in the hope of re-acquiring the "lost" benevolence that he never actually had. He saves himself from disappointment by misinterpreting his actions as signs of genuine reform. In the case of promising, the agent falsely imagines that he wills its moral obligation into being with the words "I promise." ;Fourthly, it is shown how Hume denies that we can find the historical root of political obedience in enlightened self-interest and instead stresses the founding role of usurpation and conquest, erased from memory by the passage of time and the efficacy of present government. ;Finally, we see that the appearance of virtue and vice is the illusory correlate of our sentiments: we project sentiments of approval and disapproval onto others and then mistake them for objective traits. ;Contrary to what some interpreters have asserted, I conclude that, according to Hume, the philosopher is never cured of his profound skepticism. Skepticism recurs as long as the philosopher philosophizes. This is problematic, however, because at its most radical, skepticism is incompatible with moral science. (shrink)

From the analysis of the Wave 5 National Income Dynamics Study – Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey 2021 dataset, the study conducted in South Africa, we developed a model of analysis based on three dimensions, namely, subjective well-being, material living conditions, and importance attributed to education during the COVID-19 pandemic. A cross-sectional analysis of the data for Gauteng area indicates that the dimension of subjective well-being of families in South Africa—even in relation to the factors such as conditions of deprivation —does (...) not necessarily influence the importance the respondents attach to their children’s education, this as reflected in whether or not they send them to school when COVID-19 restrictions allowed for schools to come back to face-to-face teaching. Subjective well-being of parents and guardians is, however, a predictor of concern about their children’s education and future. Our working hypothesis is that, although there is little evidence that subjective well-being has a significant association with the respondents’ willingness for their children to continue their schooling, there is a significant indirect effect of subjective well-being—which is especially determined by the gender as well as of the living material conditions—and the greater or lesser importance that the respondents attribute to their children’s education. Likewise, and in more general terms, subjective well-being is clearly related to gender, with women having the lowest levels of subjective well-being. (shrink)

Smithian (supposedly) irregular feelings reveal the internal structure of moral judgements by showing that they consist of two distinct elements. These elements belong to different dynamisms of human nature, are triggered by different causes, and produce different reactions in the agent. In the case of resentment, I call them animal resentment and moral resentment, respectively. Animal resentment closely resembles Hume's account of resentment and follows his theory of the passions. Moral resentment is different, for it is (...) not caused directly by pain, but by the recognition of the evil intention of the aggressor. Finally, plain moral resentment – or resentment caused by an unjust action and approved of by the impartial spectator – blends these elements into a unity articulated by Hume’s theory of the passions. (shrink)

Hume is committed, By one of his criticisms of reason as the route to moral knowledge, To an internalist position. In the argument from motivation, Hume starts by observing that morality is practical--That morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions. But, Hume argues, Rationalist moral theories cannot explain how moral considerations motivate. This is because reason alone is incapable of motivating us. The premise that morality is practical, However, May be interpreted in two ways--Either in (...) an externalist or internalist manner. Charity requires us to adopt the internalist reading because only then is the argument valid. An internalist reading of the argument, However, Commits hume, In his constructive phase, To construing the moral sentiments of approval and disapproval as possessing motivational influence by themselves. But an examination of what hume has to say about the motives that prompt us to do what is right shows that he fails to provide such an account himself. This points to an inconsistency in hume's moral theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Internalism1 Dorothy Coleman Hume is typically taken to be an internalist, that is, one who maintains that motivation is built into the acceptance or affirmation of a moral judgement.2However, Hume didnot provide any systematic defence of the internalist view, and consequently his views about moral motivation are problematic. Recently, for example, it has been argued that Hume is an externalist, one who maintains that the acceptance (...) of a mora] judgement does not itself motivate but requires independent desires to do so.3 This suggests thatclarification is needed to determine more precisely Hume's position on the issue ofmoral motivation. Since the distinction between internalism and externalism is a twentieth-century one,4 something should first be said about the wisdom of describing Hume in these terms. The contemporary debate between externalism and internalism concerns both the nature of moral motivation, whether moral judgements are themselves motivating, and the reason for this concern: internalists hold that motivation must be built into moraljudgements because it is "essential for an action's being or being shown to be obligatory."5 As Nagel puts it in ThePossibility ofAltruism, the problem with externalist accounts of motivation is that they cannot justify the requirement to perform one's obligations, "for they permit that someone who has acknowledged that he should do something and has seen why it is the case that he should do it, to ask ifhe has any reason for doing it."6 Seen in this way, the debate is about how to justify morality, how to account for our obligation to be moral at all, and how to answer the question, "Why ought I be moral?" Hume, on the other hand, was a thoroughgoing naturalist. He intended not tojustify morality but rather to provide its "natural history," a narration of the origin of moral concepts out of a set ofsocial and environmental conditions together with passions that constitute human nature. For example, concerning what he called the artificial virtues, such asjustice or the regardfor the public good, Hume argued that while the original motive to be just is self-interest, once individuals are educated and socialized into a community regulated by rules ofjustice, they come to "internalize" or moralize these norms so that their motive for being just is no longer self-interest but simply a regard for the public good, the sense ofjustice itself. Hume's concern with internalism, then, seems far removed from the problem of justifying morality that propels the current debate. Volume XVIII Number 2 331 DOROTHY COLEMAN Even though the internalist-externalist distinction applies only anachronistically to Hume, as long as those engaged in the contemporary debate insist on identifying historical figures as exemplars of one or the other of these viewpoints, and even disagree about who does and why,7 clarification of the extent to which this distinction can apply to Hume would be of assistance. Since the justification of morality is not a problem Hume addressed, for the purpose ofthis paper I will use the terms internalism and externalism to refer only to theories about moral motivation. To defend this interpretation ofHume, it will help first to clarify his terminology: whathe meantby moraljudgement, moral sense, and action from a sense ofduty. Hume claimed that moral judgements are based on feelings of pleasure or displeasure arising from impartial or disinterested reflection on the general influence ofmotives or traits of character. Those motives or passions that produce impartial feelings of approval are judged to be virtues; those that produce impartial feelings ofdisapproval arejudged to be vices.8 By moral sense or moral passions Hume meant feelings of approval and disapproval by which passions are judged to be virtuous or vicious.9 In defining duty or obligation, Hume stated that these are actions or qualities of mind whose neglect or non-performance causes disinterested displeasure or disapproval (T 517). To act from ásense ofduty or virtue would then be to be motivated by the sense whichjudges what our duties are, namely, bymoral passions, the feelings ofdisinterested approval ordisapproval ofmotives and the actions ofwhich they are signs. Thè Evidence for Hume's Internalism Hume's commitment to an internalist theory of ethical motivation is nowhere made explicit... (shrink)

ABSTRACT Ethical leaders can influence followers’ ethical behaviors by establishing an ethical climate. However, followers’ responses to an ethical climate may also differ according to the amount of attention they devote to moral questions. This study analyzes whether moral attentiveness augments the positive effect of an ethical climate on employees’ ethical behaviors, as well as the indirect effect of ethical leadership on employee ethical behavior through an ethical climate. Data from 270 employees in the Malaysian manufacturing industry (...) indicate that the positive impact of an ethical climate on ethical behavior is greater among employees who exhibit high rather than low moral attentiveness; this moderating role also applies to the relationship between ethical leadership and employee ethical behavior through the ethical climate. This study thus sheds new light on the notable role of moral attentiveness in ensuring that ethical leadership and ethical climate enhance ethical behavior in the workplace. (shrink)

The studies show a positive and direct relationship between basic psychological needs satisfaction and intrinsic motivation of the students. However, there is a lack of studies that analyze the psychological processes that affect these relationships. For this reason, the purpose of this study was to investigate the mediating role of academic integration on the relationship between basic psychological needs satisfaction and intrinsic motivation of Chilean university students. The participants were a total of 580 students from a university in northern Chile, (...) 359 women and 221 men. The mediation analysis was performed by structural equations modeling, using the maximum likelihood method and the bootstrapping procedure with 10,000 iterations. The results indicated that academic integration partially mediated the relationship between basic psychological needs satisfaction and intrinsic motivation of the students. Therefore, the basic psychological needs satisfaction had an indirect effect on the intrinsic motivation of the students through academic integration. It is concluded that the academic integration constitutes a psychological process that promotes the development of intrinsic motivation for learning. The practical implications are discussed along with the limitations of the study and recommendations for future research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 373 in the analysis of the "artificial" virtue of justice. Though he uses the term "faculties" as synonymous with energies or powers, he warns against the "faculty psychology" that uses faculties as explanations or causes. Hume writes: "By will I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel.., when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body or new perception of our mind." A (...) voluntary action, being "knowingly" aroused, is not a mere "direct " passion arising immediately from sensation; nevertheless, it belongs to the realm of passions rather than of judgments. It is included in the "bundle of impressions" psychology. Hume attempts to explain how the passion of sympathy serves to communicate impressions. Emotional expressions require the operation of the "imagination" to generate the social controls of conscience and to explain the origin of responsibility in terms of approvals and disapprovals. In this connection, /~rdal points out the differences between Hume's and Adam Smith's psychology of sympathy, ttume is content to rely largely on "imagination" to explain social sensitivities, whereas Adam Smith develops the theory that by sympathy men are led to put themselves in the place of others and thus to get a "disinterested spectator" view of passions. This seems to me a minor difference, and Hume, though he knew of Adam Smith's theory, and though he criticized him on other points, does not directly obiect to this particular doctrine of Adam Smith. It is, in fact, related to Hume's own analysis of justice as an "artificial" virtue, not directly related to the self-regarding passions. What separates Smith from Hume is his discussion of sympathy in the context of pity and benevolence which the Scottish moralists had made basic, whereas ttume keeps sympathy as a passion distinct from the virtues. In general, I have the "impression" that Hume, after he made this elaborate effort to apply experimental method to the passions and to valuational expressions, left the further development of this psychology to his close friend, Adam Smith, while he turned to "political essays" and to the more practical problems of the Enquiry. In his political essays, which brought him into public recognition in England and on the Continent while the Treatise continued to be basic for the Scottish social psychologists, Hume became especially concerned to call attention to the social operation of "opinions" and faiths. Therefore, it seems to me to be a mistake to regard the Enquiry as merely a "popular" edition of the Treatise. Hume shifted his interest from the critique of Locke's psychology to the practical problems of politics and morals. His History deals less with the psychological "origins" of customs, beliefs, and habits, more with their power in shaping the course of events. In other words, for Hume's ideas about judgments of value and the motivation of policies and principles, one must turn to Hume's later writings. The reader of ~rdal's excellent analysis of the Treatise cannot refrain from hoping that the author will make a similar examination of Hume's later "moral science." For, in addition to clarifying Hume, it will give.Ardal an opportunity to continue his own critical insights on present-day discussion of emotivist and intuitional ethics, which are not the least valuable feature of this volume. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, California Jean-Jacques Rousseau. By Jean Gu~henno. Translated from the French by John and Doreen Weightman. (2 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Vol. I, pp. xvi + 460. Vol. II, pp. xi + 316. set $17.50.) Rousseau and Jean-Jacques It has been Rousseau's peculiar fate to exercise a double fascination. A major philosopher, especially in the fields of education, politics, and morality, Jean-Jacques has also been read, loved, and hated as a man. In reading again Jean Gu~henno's impressive biography, recently published in an excellent English translation, one wonders why so much attention has been paid to Rousseau's private life. Surely it is not because he lacks the credentials of a serious thinker; the Second Discourse alone, not to mention the Emile and Social Contract, would presumably ensure Rousseau's place in any historical survey of Western... (shrink)

There is an ongoing debate as to whether there is a major difference between Hume's accounts of morality in the Treatise and the second Enquiry. This has tended to focus on the role of sympathy in each case, but more recently the greater emphasis on humanity in the Enquiry as compared with the Treatise has been used to support a non-reconciliation view of the relation between these accounts. So far as humanity's role in relation to the moral sentiments is (...) concerned, I question whether it can provide the moral point of view associated with moral approval and disapproval. Considered as a motive to action, I question whether humanity always results in the kinds of action which would meet with general approbation. I also stress the limitations of humanity when viewed from the impartial perspective associated with the moral point of view. I further attempt to show that there is no real contradiction between Hume's claim in the Treatise that sympathy is ‘the chief source of moral distinctions’ and his claim in the Enquiry that the sentiments dependent on humanity ‘are the origin of morals’. I therefore conclude in favour of a reconciliatory view of the two accounts. (shrink)

Ethical rationalism has recently dominated the philosophical landscape, but sentimentalist forms of normative ethics (such as the ethics of caring) and of metaethics (such as Blackburn's projectivism and various ideal–observer and response–dependent views) have also been prominent. But none of this has been systematic in the manner of Hume and Hutcheson. Hume based both ethics and metaethics in his notion of sympathy, but the project sketched here focuses rather on the (related) notion of empathy. I argue that empathy is essential (...) to the development of morally required caring about others and also to deontological limits or restrictions on self–concern and other–concern. But empathy also plays a grounding role in moral judgement. Moral approval and disapproval can be non–circularly understood as empathic reflections of the concern or lack of concern that agents show towards other people; and moral utterances can plausibly be seen not as projections, expressions, or descriptions of sentiment but as “objective” and “non–relative” judgements whose reference and content are fixed by sentiments of approval and disapproval. (shrink)

Many scholars have claimed that the psychology of the indirect passions in the Treatise is meant to capture how we come to regard persons as morally responsible agents. My question is exactly how the indirect passions relate to responsibility. In elucidating Hume’s account of responsibility, scholars have often focused not on the passionate responses themselves, but on their structural features. In this paper, I argue that locating responsibility in the structural features is insufficient to make sense (...) of Hume’s account of responsibility. I argue this on the grounds that without reference to the passions, Hume does not have the resources to distinguish between responsible and non-responsible entities. Instead, I attribute to Hume a distinctive, sympathy-based response-dependent conception of responsibility. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 373 in the analysis of the "artificial" virtue of justice. Though he uses the term "faculties" as synonymous with energies or powers, he warns against the "faculty psychology" that uses faculties as explanations or causes. Hume writes: "By will I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel.., when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body or new perception of our mind." A (...) voluntary action, being "knowingly" aroused, is not a mere "direct " passion arising immediately from sensation; nevertheless, it belongs to the realm of passions rather than of judgments. It is included in the "bundle of impressions" psychology. Hume attempts to explain how the passion of sympathy serves to communicate impressions. Emotional expressions require the operation of the "imagination" to generate the social controls of conscience and to explain the origin of responsibility in terms of approvals and disapprovals. In this connection, /~rdal points out the differences between Hume's and Adam Smith's psychology of sympathy, ttume is content to rely largely on "imagination" to explain social sensitivities, whereas Adam Smith develops the theory that by sympathy men are led to put themselves in the place of others and thus to get a "disinterested spectator" view of passions. This seems to me a minor difference, and Hume, though he knew of Adam Smith's theory, and though he criticized him on other points, does not directly obiect to this particular doctrine of Adam Smith. It is, in fact, related to Hume's own analysis of justice as an "artificial" virtue, not directly related to the self-regarding passions. What separates Smith from Hume is his discussion of sympathy in the context of pity and benevolence which the Scottish moralists had made basic, whereas ttume keeps sympathy as a passion distinct from the virtues. In general, I have the "impression" that Hume, after he made this elaborate effort to apply experimental method to the passions and to valuational expressions, left the further development of this psychology to his close friend, Adam Smith, while he turned to "political essays" and to the more practical problems of the Enquiry. In his political essays, which brought him into public recognition in England and on the Continent while the Treatise continued to be basic for the Scottish social psychologists, Hume became especially concerned to call attention to the social operation of "opinions" and faiths. Therefore, it seems to me to be a mistake to regard the Enquiry as merely a "popular" edition of the Treatise. Hume shifted his interest from the critique of Locke's psychology to the practical problems of politics and morals. His History deals less with the psychological "origins" of customs, beliefs, and habits, more with their power in shaping the course of events. In other words, for Hume's ideas about judgments of value and the motivation of policies and principles, one must turn to Hume's later writings. The reader of ~rdal's excellent analysis of the Treatise cannot refrain from hoping that the author will make a similar examination of Hume's later "moral science." For, in addition to clarifying Hume, it will give.Ardal an opportunity to continue his own critical insights on present-day discussion of emotivist and intuitional ethics, which are not the least valuable feature of this volume. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, California Jean-Jacques Rousseau. By Jean Gu~henno. Translated from the French by John and Doreen Weightman. (2 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Vol. I, pp. xvi + 460. Vol. II, pp. xi + 316. set $17.50.) Rousseau and Jean-Jacques It has been Rousseau's peculiar fate to exercise a double fascination. A major philosopher, especially in the fields of education, politics, and morality, Jean-Jacques has also been read, loved, and hated as a man. In reading again Jean Gu~henno's impressive biography, recently published in an excellent English translation, one wonders why so much attention has been paid to Rousseau's private life. Surely it is not because he lacks the credentials of a serious thinker; the Second Discourse alone, not to mention the Emile and Social Contract, would presumably ensure Rousseau's place in any historical survey of Western... (shrink)

This paper reports lab data from four games in order to analyze and compare the motivations behind monetary punishment and reward and their non-monetary counterparts, disapproval and approval, an important question given that both types of punishment/rewards affect cooperation and norm compliance. The results in our games support the hypothesis that a motivation akin to reciprocity plays the key role for approval and disapproval whereas payoff comparisons play the key role for monetary rewards and punishment.

Aims This study aimed to explore the relationship among moral distress, psychological capital, and burnout in registered nurses. Ethical consideration The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the School of Nursing, Hangzhou Normal University (Approval no. 2022001). Methods A cross-sectional descriptive survey was conducted with a convenience sample of 397 nurses from three Grade-A tertiary hospitals in Zhejiang Province, China. Participants completed demographic information, the Nurses’ Moral Distress Scale, the Nurses’ Psychological Capital Scale, and the (...) Maslach Burnout Inventory Scale. The data were analyzed using Pearson’s correlation analysis, structural equation modeling, and hierarchical multiple regression analysis. Results The study found that moral distress and burnout are positively correlated, while psychological capital is negatively correlated with both moral distress and burnout. The path analysis in structural equation modeling revealed that moral distress has a significant direct effect on psychological capital, while psychological capital has a significant direct effect on burnout. In addition, moral distress also had a significant indirect effect on burnout through psychological capital. Moreover, both the direct effect of moral distress on burnout and the total effect of moral distress on burnout were significant. Conclusion The findings suggest that psychological capital plays an important role in the relationship between moral distress and burnout. Promoting psychological capital among nurses may be a promising strategy for preventing moral distress and burnout in the workplace. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:77 KEMP SMITH, HUME AND THE PARALLELISM BETWEEN REASON AND MORALITY In a letter to a physician written in 1734 Hume expressed a dissatisfaction with the current state of philosophy and criticism, a dissatisfaction which he said had led him to strike out on his own and "seek out some new Medium, by which Truth might be establisht." He then went on to claim success: "After much Study, & (...) Reflection on this, at last, when I was about 18 Years of Age, there seem'd to be open'd up to me a new Scene of Thought, which transported me beyond Measure, & made me, with an Ardor natural to young men, throw up every other Pleasure or Business to apply entirely to it..." The wording suggests that the new Scene of Thought was a clear revelation, but nowhere does Hume tell us what the revelation was. (A clue, perhaps, is to be found in the "Abstract," where Hume says that if anything entitles him to the name of an inventor, "it is the use he makes of 2 the principle of the association of ideas.") Kemp Smith is convinced, however, that he knows what the new Scene of Thought was. According to Kemp Smith, Hume had already discovered that morality rests on feeling alone and depends in no way on insight or evidence, and the new discovery was simply the sudden realization that belief is equally independent of these considerations. I will argue in this paper that the great difficulty in this interpretation is that in those sections of the Treatise and the second Enquiry in which Hume expounds what could be called his moral epistemology he is concerned with pointing out what he considers to be important differences between reason and taste and between understanding and morality. I am not, however, questioning the validity of Kemp Smith's naturalistic interpretation, if it is broadly construed. 78 A curiosity of Kemp Smith's exposition is his citing of passages from Hume, which at first glance anyway seem to weaken, rather than strengthen, his case for the parallelism of moral and factual judgments. I will give two examples, the first being a quotation from the Green and Grose edition of the Enquiry. That Faculty, by which we discern Truth and Falsehood, and that by which we perceive Vice and Virtue had long been confounded with each other, and all Morality was suppos'd to be built on eternal and immutable Relations, which, to every intelligent Mind, were equally invariable as any Proposition concerning Quantity or Number. But a late Philosopher [Mr. Hutcheson, added as a note] has taught us, by the most convincing Arguments, that Morality is nothing in the abstract Nature of Things, but is entirely relative to the Sentiment or mental Taste of each particular [i.e. species] of Being; in the same Manner as the distinctions of sweet and bitter, hot and cold, arise from the particular feeling of each Sense or Organ. Moral Perceptions, therefore, ought not to be class 'd with the Operations of the Understanding, but with the Tastes or Sentiments. On the next page of this book Kemp Smith refers to this passage as part of the evidence for his claim that "the view here taken of our moral judgments of approval and disapproval can be extended to our beliefs regarding matters of fact and existence, and that 'logic', morals and 'criticism' may thus be brought 4 within the scope of the same general principles." The reference to "external and immutable Relations" may have led Kemp Smith to believe that Hume's thesis in this paragraph is the contrast between demonstrative and other kinds of judgment, but the last sentence is a decisive refutation of that interpretation. Hume frequently uses the term "understanding" to refer to causal reasoning, though in this sentence he seems to be using the term in 79 the more inclusive sense that would include demonstration and relations of ideas as well. But I know of no instances in which "understanding" is restricted to what Hume calls science, i.e., demonstration. Kemp Smith also quotes from the last section of Appendix I to the second Enquiry. This passage, appearing in the Selby-Bigge... (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introductory Remarks The Cartesian Background Impressions and Ideas Passions as Reflective Impressions Direct and Indirect Passions Association and the Individuation of Passions Perception and Perceiving Passions and Moral Sentiments Notes References Further reading.

According to Mencius, human nature is good because human beings are endowed with four sprouts of virtues, namely benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, and humans can become fully virtuous by growing these four ethical sprouts. Mencius believed that these four sprouts exist in the human mind mainly in the form of emotion or emotional sensibility, and they are sometimes translated in English as compassion, sense of honor, respect, and feeling of approval and disapproval. What I want to do (...) in this paper is to delineate Mencius’s view of emotion by analyzing his first sprout, which is often referred to by the Chinese term “cèyǐn zhī xīn” 惻隱之心. Previous scholars usually translate “cèyǐn zhī xīn” as “compassion,” “sympathy,” or “commiseration,” in the sense of thepainful feeling one feels at the misfortune of others. My goal in this paper is to clarify the nature of this painful feeling, and specifically I will show that 1) cèyǐn zhī xīn is primarily construing another being’s misfortune with sympathetic concern, and that 2) the painfulness of cèyǐn zhī xīn comes from this concern-based construal of the object of one’s compassion. Toward the end of my paper, I will also show the connection between Mencius’s view of cèyǐn zhī xīn and thecontemporary ethical discourse on emotions, by arguing that in Mencius emotions like compassion provide an important but only partial basis for all-things-considered ethical judgment. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:61 PROJECTIONISM, REALISM, AND HUME'S MORAL SENSE THEORY* Introduction The character of Hume's moral theory is currently a topic of considerable discussion.1 We find in the recent literature essentially two sorts of interpretation of Hume's theory. On the one side there is the view that, for Hume, the distinction between virtue and vice is reducible to the moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. Associated (...) with this view is the further claim that Hume ascribes to us the belief that virtue and vice exist as the counterparts to these sentiments; and, in addition, that this belief is, for Hume, a mistaken one. For reasons which will become obvious this may be described as the Projectionist account of Hume. On the other side, there is the attempt to represent Hume's moral theory as a form of realism, i.e., a theory according to which there are moral properties belonging to actions, or the agents who perform them, which provide objective correlates of the feelings which those actions, or the agents concerned, induce in us as spectators. Now clearly an important part of what is at stake between these different interpretations is the question of how seriously we should take Hume's own description of this theory as one according to which moral distinctions are derived from a moral sense. It is characteristic of the Projectionist interpretation to suggest that 'sense' is equivalent here to 'sentiment', and, indeed, that Hume's moral sense theory is tantamount to the denial that there is anything in Objects' themselves corresponding to our moral (or aesthetic) sentiments. The Realist interpretation, on the other hand, stresses the importance of Hume's references in 62 the Treatise to a moral (and aesthetic) sense, and the precedent provided in this respect by Hutcheson; and it takes seriously the idea that this sense enables us to become acquainted, via the sentiments involved, with the qualities of virtue and vice. My own interest in these different interpretations concerns their disagreement about the way in which we should understand Hume's notion of a moral sense. I wish to argue against the Projectionist interpretation, and its dismissive treatment of Hume's references to a moral sense, though it is a further question whether the view of Hume which emerges deserves the name of 'Realism'. 1. The Projectionist Interpretation It seems clear that the notion of a moral sense cannot be intended literally, i.e., as though there is a form of moral sense-perception strictly comparable to the modes of perception provided by the external senses. It is, presumably, part of the definition of a sense that it is a faculty whose function depends upon stimulation of an organ or, at least, receptors peculiar to that sense; and, furthermore, in the case of the various external senses there is -- except for the contact sense of touch -- a distinctive medium of perception. For both these reasons moral sense theorists can only be proposing an analogy with the external senses. In Hume's case in particular, however, there appear to be reasons for doubting whether the analogy can be more than superficial. Perhaps the most obvious of these lies with Hume's insistence on the action-guiding character of the distinction between moral good and evil (see e.g., T 437-462). For it seems clear that sense-perceptions g as such can have no direct influence upon our actions. 63 Then there is Hume's denial that morality consists in any matter of fact (T 468; EPM 292). If virtue and vice are to be considered the objects of some form of moral sense-perception their existence presumably does become a matter of fact. Finally, a moral sense theory seems to imply that judgements of virtue and vice are straightforwardly true or false, according to whether or not we perceive veridical Iy; while Hume's own discussion sometimes points to a non-propositional view of moral utterances as the expression of certain feelings or sentiments. These last two points remind us that Hume often appears to deny that values belong as intrinsic properties to the objects evaluated. This is obviously true of the following, much quoted, passage: Take any... (shrink)

While many argue investment-based criteria for immigration are wrong or at least problematic, skill-based criteria remain relatively uncontroversial. This is normatively inconsistent. This article assesses three prominent normative objections to investment-based selection criteria for immigrants: that they wrongfully discriminate between prospective immigrants that they are unfair, and that they undermine political equality among citizens. It argues that either skill-based criteria are equally susceptible to these objections, or that investment-based criteria are equally shielded from them. Indeed, in some ways investment-based criteria (...) are less normatively problematic than skill-based criteria. Given this analysis, the resistance to investment-based migration criteria, but not to skill-based criteria, is inconsistent. (shrink)

Cancer is a chronic disease that causes the most deaths in the world, being a public health problem nowadays. Even though breast cancer affects the daily lives of patients, many women become resilient after the disease, decreasing the impact of the diagnosis. Based on a positive psychology approach, the concept of co-vitality arises understood as a set of socio-emotional competencies that enhance psychological adaptation. In this sense, emotional intelligence is one of the main protective factors associated with resilience. However, it (...) is not always as beneficial as it seems, and can lead to collateral effects on psychological adjustment. Given this controversy, this study aims to find the specific processes through which the dimensions of Perceived Emotional Intelligence can act as a risk or protective factor in the development of resilience. The total sample was 167 women, 46.7% were breast cancer survivors, and 53.3% were healthy controls. The selection of women with breast cancer carries out randomly, recruited through the Oncology Units. The sample completed measures of resilience and PEI, through Resilience Scale and TMMS-24. The results showed that breast cancer survivors showed higher age and greater levels of resilience and mood repair than healthy women. The mediation analysis revealed that breast cancer survival and PEI predicted 28% of the variance of resilience. The direct effects showed that emotional clarity and mood repair increased resilience levels. Although breast cancer did not predict resilience directly, it does through mood repair by an indirect process. Besides, the analysis showed that emotional attention played a role in vulnerability, decreasing mood repair, and resilience. These research support theories that point to a possible dark side of PEI, thus, a great level of emotional attention makes dark the positive effect of mood repair and personal growth if a clear perception of emotions does not complement it. These results provide empirical support concerning the need to work complementary each dimension of PEI to avoid unwanted effects on intrapersonal adjustment. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:61 PROJECTIONISM, REALISM, AND HUME'S MORAL SENSE THEORY* Introduction The character of Hume's moral theory is currently a topic of considerable discussion.1 We find in the recent literature essentially two sorts of interpretation of Hume's theory. On the one side there is the view that, for Hume, the distinction between virtue and vice is reducible to the moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. Associated (...) with this view is the further claim that Hume ascribes to us the belief that virtue and vice exist as the counterparts to these sentiments; and, in addition, that this belief is, for Hume, a mistaken one. For reasons which will become obvious this may be described as the Projectionist account of Hume. On the other side, there is the attempt to represent Hume's moral theory as a form of realism, i.e., a theory according to which there are moral properties belonging to actions, or the agents who perform them, which provide objective correlates of the feelings which those actions, or the agents concerned, induce in us as spectators. Now clearly an important part of what is at stake between these different interpretations is the question of how seriously we should take Hume's own description of this theory as one according to which moral distinctions are derived from a moral sense. It is characteristic of the Projectionist interpretation to suggest that 'sense' is equivalent here to 'sentiment', and, indeed, that Hume's moral sense theory is tantamount to the denial that there is anything in Objects' themselves corresponding to our moral (or aesthetic) sentiments. The Realist interpretation, on the other hand, stresses the importance of Hume's references in 62 the Treatise to a moral (and aesthetic) sense, and the precedent provided in this respect by Hutcheson; and it takes seriously the idea that this sense enables us to become acquainted, via the sentiments involved, with the qualities of virtue and vice. My own interest in these different interpretations concerns their disagreement about the way in which we should understand Hume's notion of a moral sense. I wish to argue against the Projectionist interpretation, and its dismissive treatment of Hume's references to a moral sense, though it is a further question whether the view of Hume which emerges deserves the name of 'Realism'. 1. The Projectionist Interpretation It seems clear that the notion of a moral sense cannot be intended literally, i.e., as though there is a form of moral sense-perception strictly comparable to the modes of perception provided by the external senses. It is, presumably, part of the definition of a sense that it is a faculty whose function depends upon stimulation of an organ or, at least, receptors peculiar to that sense; and, furthermore, in the case of the various external senses there is -- except for the contact sense of touch -- a distinctive medium of perception. For both these reasons moral sense theorists can only be proposing an analogy with the external senses. In Hume's case in particular, however, there appear to be reasons for doubting whether the analogy can be more than superficial. Perhaps the most obvious of these lies with Hume's insistence on the action-guiding character of the distinction between moral good and evil (see e.g., T 437-462). For it seems clear that sense-perceptions g as such can have no direct influence upon our actions. 63 Then there is Hume's denial that morality consists in any matter of fact (T 468; EPM 292). If virtue and vice are to be considered the objects of some form of moral sense-perception their existence presumably does become a matter of fact. Finally, a moral sense theory seems to imply that judgements of virtue and vice are straightforwardly true or false, according to whether or not we perceive veridical Iy; while Hume's own discussion sometimes points to a non-propositional view of moral utterances as the expression of certain feelings or sentiments. These last two points remind us that Hume often appears to deny that values belong as intrinsic properties to the objects evaluated. This is obviously true of the following, much quoted, passage: Take any... (shrink)

Hume's moral philosophy makes sentiment essential to moral judgment. But there is more individual consistency and interpersonal agreement in moral judgment than in private emotional reactions. Hume accounts for this by saying that our moral judgments do not manifest our approval or disapproval of character traits and persons "only as they appear from [our] peculiar point of view..." Rather, "we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place (...) ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation" (T 581-82), in order to "correct" our situated sentiments. This seems to create two serious difficulties for Hume's theory. First, moral evaluations become inductive, empirical beliefs about what we would feel if we really occupied the imagined common point of view, and hence are the deliverances of causal reason; this contradicts Hume's claim that the making of a moral evaluation is not an activity of reason but of sentiment. Secondly, given Hume's thesis that the passions do not represent anything else, he cannot say that our moral evaluations will better represent the object being judged if they are made from the common point of view. This leaves no clear reason to adopt it, rather than making judgments from our real position. Hume says that left to our particular points of view, we will encounter contradictions and be unable to communicate, but it is hard to see why. My interpretation resolves these two difficulties. I argue that every time we reflect upon someone's character from the common point of view, we feel an actual sentiment of approbation or disapprobation, which may alter and merge with the situated sentiment or may fail to do so, leaving two different feelings about the same character. Furthermore, whenever we make moral evaluations we also simultaneously make objective, causal judgments about the love and hatred, pride and humility that the trait will produce. We routinely take up the common point of view in order to achieve truth and consistency in our causal judgments, to avoid grave practical problems. (shrink)

In a way reminiscent of Hume's approach in the Treatise, a reviving moral sentimentalism can use the notion of empathy to ground both its normative account of moral obligation and its metaethical account of moral language. A virtuous person is empathically caring about others and expresses such feeling/motivation in her actions. But the judgment that something is right or good is also based in empathy, and the sentimentalist can espouse a form of moral realism by making (...) use of a Kripkean reference-fixer theory of the role of feelings of approval and disapproval in moral judgment. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME, MOTIVATION AND MORALITY Hume remarks, in the Abstract, that his account of the passions in Book II of the Treatise has 'laid the foundation' (A 7 Ì1 for his theory of morals. Pall Ardal has shown how Hume's theory of certain indirect passions (pride, humility, love, hatred) underpins his theory of the evaluation of character. I propose to explore the links between Hume's account of (...) motivation and his treatment of an agent 'ß moral assessment of prospective action. Where Ardal stresses the moral spectator, my focus is on the agent. Hume himself attends primarily to the moral spectator, but the agent's perspective is central in two of his chief arguments concerning morals, that for the thesis that moral distinctions are derived from a moral sense, and that for the artificiality of justice. I shall take it that the argument of Treatise II, iii, 3 ("Of the influencing motives of the will") provides the framework for analysis: acting for moral reasons is like acting for any other reason; citing his moral principles to explain a man's actions is like citing his desire to preserve his health as an explanation of his taking exercise; deliberating about moral matters is like pondering the purchase of a pair of shoes. Of course there are differences; I shall look to them shortly. It is essential, however, to begin with the similarities. To a first approximation, the central doctrine is that the reasons that explain actions are rational causes of those actions. Reasons for actions are constituted by suitably related desires and beliefs; volitions are somehow implicated in intentional actions. Reasons are causes: the desires and beliefs that constitute reasons cause volitions, and thus actions. They are rational causes: there are links of special kinds between the contents of the desires and beliefs that constitute an agent's reasons for what he does, and the content of the volitions implicated in the actions done. Hume is at pains to deny that "reason [here: belief] alone can... be a motive to any action of the will" (T 413). But he insists there are "two principal parts [of human nature], which are requisite in all its actions, the affections and understanding' (T 493). I suggest that by "affections" he here means specifically (if broadly) desires, and so both the "direct passions" of desire and aversion and such "indirect passions" as benevolence, anger, pity, compassion and malice. Hume's official doctrines both of desires and of volitions are unsatisfactory as they stand; he treats each as simple impressions. To be sure, these simple impressions are said always to be accompanied by thoughts of (in Hume's phrase) their objects. Even such complex states, however, can play no satisfactory role in psychological theory. The insights that Hume's official doctrines mishandle can, I suggest, be incorporated into more defensible, and more-or-less Humean, analyses of the internal structure of desire and volition. Having made efforts along these lines elsewhere, however, I shall here concentrate on other features of desire and volition that are germane to Hume's moral psychology. Desires and volitions are alike in two linked respects, among others: neither takes a truth value (and so each differs from belief); each is a conative, not a cognitive, psychological state (and so, again, each differs from belief). Because desires and volitions are not capable of "an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact" it is "impossible... they can be pronounced either true or false" (T 458). Their general functional role is that of "propense and averse motions of the mind" (T 574). To be sure, there are differences. The principal difference is that of specific functional location: desires are constituents in reasons for acting: volitions are constituents of (or otherwise implicated in) actions done for such reasons. This functional difference is tied to differences of content. To grasp the many relations among belief, desire and volition, when the first two serve as 4 reason for (and so cause of) the third, it is useful to plot their causal relations onto the elements in an Aristotelian practical syllogism. Desires function as causally salient major premises... (shrink)