At first glance, atheism seems simple to define. If atheism is the negation of theism, and if theism is the view that at least one god exists, then atheism is the negation of this view. However, the common definitions that follow from this insight suffer from two problems: first, they often leave undefined what “god” means, and, second, they understate the scope of the disagreement between theists and atheists, which often has as much to do with the fundamental character of (...) reality as with the existence of one being in it. Some writers address the second problem by reinterpreting atheism as the logical consequence of particular metaphysical views, such as naturalism or physicalism, which are then taken as the true meaning of atheism. These interpretations, though more satisfactory in some respects, can result in concepts of atheism that are unclear or too narrow, and they often still leave “god” undefined. In this paper, I propose that atheism be defined as the proposition that reality is solely an impersonal order. Theism is the proposition that reality is not solely an impersonal order, being either a personal order, that is, an order founded by at least one person, or an impersonal order plus at least one transcendent person. A god is a person who is not subject to the laws governing that order and thus transcends it. I explain these definitions and briefly discuss some of their implications. First I survey prior definitions of atheism to display the problems they raise. (shrink)

David Lewis n’a pas développé de philosophie complète de la religion à proprement parler mais il s’est penché précisément sur différents thèmes religieux comme le rapport entre Dieu et le possible, l’argument ontologique ou la théodicée. Bien que dénuées de toute systématicité, les publications de Lewis sur le religieux défendent un athéisme très argumenté. L'article vise à montrer comment son athéisme s'articule à l'existence d'une pluralité de dieux.

본 연구는 데리다 철학의 신학적 면모에 대한 논쟁을 살피고, 해체가 신학적이라는 관념을 비판적으로 검토한다(2장). 데리다가 바타이유로부터 차용한 “부재신학”이라는 용어에 주목함으로써 본고는 데리다의 그라마톨로지가 단지 그것이 “에크리튀르의 학”이라는 이유만으로도 이미 부재신학적임을, 그리고 신학에 긍정 신학과 부정 신학이 존재하듯 부재신학에도 동일하게 두 종류가 존재함을 보인다(3장). 나아가 본고는 긍정 부재신학과 부정 부재신학이 데리다가 자신의 해체를 규정하기 위해서 사용한 거의 번역 불가능한 정식인 “plus d’un”의 이중구속과 공명한다고 주장한다(4장). 마지막으로 본고는 부재신학과 무신론이 어떤 점에서 구별되어야 하는지 설명하면서 부정 부재신학과 긍정 부재신학이 모두 불가결할지라도 데리다가 부정 (...) 부재신학보다는 긍정 부재신학에 더 가깝다고 결론 내린다(5장). (shrink)

La preuve ontologique fait plus qu'appuyer celles de la IIIe Méditation. Elle vise à répondre enfin à ceux « qui aimeront mieux nier l'existence d'un Dieu si puissant, que de croire que toutes les autres choses sont incertaines », donc à des mathématiciens athées, reprenant ainsi, pour l'éliminer, une des alternatives déployées à la Ie Méditation. Dieu, condition suffisante de la connaissance (Méditations III & IV), en devient la condition nécessaire aussi (Méditation V). Cette preuve permet donc à Descartes de (...) parer à la possibilité d'un rationalisme – cartésien certes – mais athée. Nous concluons en faisant le point sur le débat qui opposa MM. Gueroult et Gouhier, sur ce sujet, vers 1958. The ontological proof does more than corroborate those of Meditation III. It seeks to answer at last those « who would prefer to deny the existence of so powerful a God, rather than to believe that everything else is uncertain » (atheistic mathematicians), thus taking up again, in order to rule it out, one of the alternatives presented in Meditation I. God, the sufficient condition of knowledge (Meditations III & IV), now becomes its necessary condition as well (Meditation V). This proof thus enables Descartes to forestall the possibility of an atheistic, even though Cartesian, rationalism. We conclude with an assessment of the debate which opposed Messrs. Gueroult and Gouhier, on this topic, around 1958. (shrink)

"Les Dieux n'étant plus, et le Christ n'étant pas encore, il y a eu, de Cicéron à Marc Aurèle, un moment unique où l'homme seul a été". Ainsi Flaubert s'adresse en 1861 à l'une de ses correspondantes. L'homme aurait-il vécu "sans dieu", à un moment privilégié de ce que nous appelons l'Empire romain? Une telle hypothèse est-elle recevable? Notre ouvrage traite ces problèmes, à la lumière des recherches historiques récentes, et à l'examen des textes concernés. Il est l'occasion de reconsidérer (...) notre vision du monde romain. L'avènement du christianisme était-il nécessairement inscrit dans l'évolution d'une société soi-disant décadente? Ou bien une voie pour l'athéisme était-elle tracée, préfigurant l'humanisme laïc contemporain, mais livrant l'homme "seul" à ses démons? Des questions qui valent aussi pour notre temps. (shrink)

"Le Theophrastus redivivus, volumineux traité clandestin et anonyme rédigé en 1659, témoigne non seulement que l'athéisme existe au XVIIe siècle, mais qu'il peut être une position philosophique à part entière. Sans citer ses contemporains, en se fondant essentiellement sur Aristote - le plus souvent à travers Pomponazzi - Épicure et les cyniques, il nie explicitement l'existence des dieux (traité I), la création du monde (traité II), l'immortalité de l'âme et l'existence des Enfers, du Paradis, des anges et des démons (traité (...) IV), dénonce la fausseté des religions (traité III) et prône une morale naturelle (traité VI). En forgeant une méthode de lecture fondée sur l'analyse précise du texte et de sa structure, nous avons pu montrer que celui-ci n'est pas un pur collage de citations tirées de l'Antiquité et de la Renaissance italienne mais qu'il présente une argumentation rendue cohérente par la « raison véritable et naturelle» et même un système matérialiste complet: canonique, physique, morale. Se dessine aussi l'idée d'une politique fondée sur un droit naturel individuel. Sur le plan ontologique le Theophrastus nous apporte un nouvel éclairage de l'histoire des idées: son naturalisme dynamique qui hérite de l'aristotélisme padouan tout en rompant avec l'animisme et le panthéisme de la Renaissance annonce celui de Spinoza. La modernité peut donc être indépendante de Descartes et de la physique moderne."--Back cover. (shrink)

Si l'oxymore désignant Spinoza comme " athée vertueux " est attribué à Bayle, le philosophe fait très tôt l'objet d'une singulière réputation, mélange de fascination et de répulsion. L'accusation d'athéisme, dont il se défend énergiquement, est et sera formulée de toute part : au sein de la communauté juive, chez les chrétiens et chez les philosophes, à commencer par Leibniz. Dans le même temps, les témoignages concernant la vie de Spinoza sont unanimes : même ses ennemis les plus acharnés lui (...) reconnaissent une existence moralement exemplaire. Voilà l'énigme. Ou bien, en effet, on nie l'existence de Dieu et, par conséquent, on est immoral ; ou bien on se conduit de manière irréprochable et l'on n'est pas athée. Or beaucoup s'accordent à dire que Spinoza est athée et, en même temps, vertueux. La présente étude ambitionne de résoudre l'énigme. La première difficulté réside dans son athéisme ou prétendu tel. La seconde dans sa " doctrine de la vertu ", pour parler comme Kant. Il s'agira d'essayer de comprendre s'il y a une unité et, si oui, comment elle se conçoit, entre sa conception de l'Etre, celle de la vertu et le comportement quotidien de l'individu Baruch Spinoza. Chez un philosophe, l'écart entre la pensée et la vie ne serait-il pas insupportable? (shrink)

N Rennes le 10 janvier 1716, dom Deschamps entra dans les ordres le 8 septembre 1733. Il resta au prieur de Montreuil-Bellay, pr s de Saumur le 19 avril 1774. Il fut nomm procureur du couvent, c'est- -dire simplement conome. A partir de 1761, il r sida au ch teau des Ormes o le marquis d'Argenson lui donna asile. En 1774 il mourut au couvent muni des sacraments. Il entreprit une r futation du syst me de la nature du baron (...) d'Holbach et une r futation de Spinoza. Il tenta beaucoup de d marches, ce qu'il appelle ses tentatives, aupr s des principaux esprits de son temps, Helv tius, Alembert, Voltaire, Rousseau; c'est surtout avec Robinet qu'il eut une longue correspondance. Dans cet uvre Jean Wahl montre que ce moine qui pr tend au titre d'ath e clair, cet homme qui tait en contact avec Voltaire et Rousseau et dont les id es ont gagn l'admiration de Diderot, m rite plus d'attention et d'int r t qu'il n'a re u jusqu'ici. (shrink)

The present essay aims to offer some reflections concerning the cultural and political aspects of veganism, on the basis of the available surveys and statistics, plus some more gathered by the authors—with the tools of different methodologies, including the semiotic one. After an introduction to veganism as phenomenon and movement, with general reflections and also a number of specific data, the essay proceeds to focus on the more political aspects, with an emphasis on some of the most intriguing and multifaceted (...) data, such as the prevalence of female gender, leftist political inclinations and atheism within the vegan community. While the first connection has already been widely discussed since the times of Adams, much less has been said about the significance leftist ideologies and atheism within veganism. Moreover, within the domain of semiotics, this topic is entirely unexplored. (shrink)

A metaphysical system engendered by a third order quantified modal logic S5 plus impredicative comprehension principles is used to isolate a third order predicate D, and by being able to impredicatively take a second order predicate G to hold of an individual just if the individual necessarily has all second order properties which are D we in Section 2 derive the thesis (40) that all properties are D or some individual is G. In Section 3 theorems 1 to 3 suggest (...) a sufficient kinship to Gödelian ontological arguments so as to think of thesis (40) in terms of divine property and Godly being; divine replaces positive with Gödel and others. Thesis (40), the sacred thesis, supports the ontological argument that God exists because some property is not divine. In Section 4 a fixed point analysis is used as diagnosis so that atheists may settle for the minimal fixed point. Theorem 3 shows it consistent to postulate theistic fixed points, and a monotheistic result follows if one assumes theism and that it is divine to be identical with a deity. Theorem 4 (the Monotheorem) states that if Gg and it is divine to be identical with g, then necessarily all objects which are G are identical with g. The impredicative origin of D suggests weakened Gaunilo-like objections that offer related theses for other second order properties and their associated diverse presumptive individual bearers. Nevertheless, in the last section we finesse these Gaunilo-like objections by adopting what we call an apathiatheistic opinion which suggest that the best concepts `God’ allow thorough indifference as to whether God exists or not. (shrink)

Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) ne cesse de fasciner ses lecteurs, par les controverses internes de ses ecrits. Dans une societe mondialisee, confrontee regulierement aux extremismes religieux qui tentent d'imposer leur vision du monde par la violence, peut-on encore entendre son verdict dans les Lettres ecrites de la Montagne : "La Religion est utile et meme necessaire aux Peuples"? Devant les theories de la laicisation, developpees dans une perspective de secularisation a sens unique, orientees vers l'expulsion de la religion de la (...) sphere publique, la relecture de la pensee politique de Rousseau est indispensable pour elaborer un contrat social acceptable par tous. La contribution du philosophe de Geneve a une analyse critique du theologico-politique, et son opposition aux perspectives atheistes de ses contemporains, est d'un grand interet dans le debat autour de la laicite des Etats postmodernes. En effet, le paradoxe, qui traverse la pensee de Rousseau, trouve son point culminant dans sa controverse avec les encyclopedistes sur le lien entre la politique et la religion. Plus que tout autre philosophe des Lumieres, Jean Jacques Rousseau eclaire la comprehension des defis que posent a notre temps la relation du politique et du religieux. (shrink)

This article shows that Sartre's theatrical works offer a reflection on morality, in particular The Flies , The Devil and the Good Lord , and The Sequestered of Altona . The ethical reflections that we find in his plays fill a philosophical gap left after Being and Nothingness . The plays offer an exploration of freedom's rootedness in situation which complements the more theoretical notes of the posthumously published Notebooks for an Ethics . Additionally, I link Sartre's ethics and Nietzsche's (...) ethics showing that both thinkers rest their philosophies on a strict atheism. Further, their elaborations on morality follow a similar path by emphasizing individual freedom and thus subsequently the responsibility of the individual as the creator of values. French Cet article fait la démonstration que les œuvres théâtrales de Sartre, plus particulièrement Les Mouches , Le Diable et le bon dieu et Les Séquestrés d'Altona , tiennent lieu de réflexion morale chez Sartre. La réflexion éthique qu'on y retrouve comble un manque laissé par les écrits philosophiques suivant L'Être et le néant . Les pièces et leur exploration de l'ancrage de la liberté dans la situation offrent un complément aux notes plus théoriques des Cahiers pour une morale, publiés à titre posthume. En plus de faire cette démonstration, cet article explore les liens entre la morale des pièces sartriennes et la morale nietzschéenne. Il ressort de cet examen que ces deux morales s'appuient sur un athéisme pur et dur et s'élaborent de même façon en mettant l'emphase sur la liberté de l'individu et son rôle en tant que créateur de valeurs. (shrink)

L'objet de ce livre est le rapport complexe et assez conflictuel du socialisme/ communisme avec la religion (ou les religions), comme conséquence de la sécularisation, du développement de la pensée matérialiste-athée et de la critique radicale de la religion par Feuerbach, Marx et tous les autres représentants d'une pensée socialiste, communiste ou athée aux XIXe et XXe siècles. Après avoir abordé la problème de la "guerre" déclarée à la religion, au nom de l'athéisme et de la vision du monde scientifique (...) du matérialisme historique et dialectique, par Lénine, Staline et les bolcheviks, pendant les campagnes anti-religieuses, menées en Union Soviétique, notamment à partir de l'année 1925, ainsi que la situation a priori difficile des Eglises dans les pays satellites de l'URSS, en Europe de l'Est, dans l'après-guerre, l'auteur consacre une partie importante de ce livre à l'analyse de l'amorce d'un dialogue entre marxistes (athées) et chrétiens, dans les pays de l'Est, dans la période 1960 à 1975, en focalisant notamment sur la situation en R.D.A. et sur la contribution importante et originelle à ce dialogue par le philosophe marxiste allemand Ernst Bloch dont le livre Athéisme dans le christianisme (1968) avait été assez favorablement accueilli par certains théologiens protestants progressistes allemands (J. Moltmann, C.H. Ratschow...) mais surtout par les représentants de la Théologie de la Libération en Amérique Latine (L. Boff, Gutierrez, Dussel, E. Cardinal) qui s'en sont inspirés pour leur combat en faveur d'une Eglise des pauvres et une alliance des chrétiens avec les forces politiques progressistes. En effet, il s'agissait, pour Ernst Bloch, de plaider en tant que philosophe "athée-religieux" pour une alliance constructive d'un marxisme authentique libéré de ses scories dogmatiques, avec les chrétiens de gauche, libérés des entraves de l'orthodoxie religieuse, afin de construire ensemble un monde meilleur, démocratique et plus égalitaire, libéré des injustices et des violences. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage étudie des formes d'humanisme contemporain qui, dans leur compréhension de la nature humaine, se sont opposées aux conceptions religieuses, et en Occident plus particulièrement au Christianisme. Trois formes d'humanisme athée sont considérées qui sont le Marxisme, le Freudisme et le Rationalisme scientiste, qui prend aujourd'hui la forme d'un messianisme 'technoscientiste.' Chacune de ces formes a pu constituer une avancée théorique notable dans un champ défini, mais a pu aussi donner naissance à une conception idéologique néfaste, voire criminelle, sans (...) pourtant épuiser la charge d'espérance dont elle est aussi porteuse. L'Église n'en est plus aujourd'hui aux anathèmes du Syllabus, mais est engagée dans un processus de dialogue avec les principales composantes du monde contemporain, dont elle peut partager certaines attentes. Jean XXIII, et le concile Vatican II, ont su distinguer entre des proclamations ouvertement athées, auxquelles un chrétien ne peut évidemment souscrire, et des analyses temporelles, voire des objectifs concrets, en vue desquels des engagements communs peuvent être encouragés dans le respect des convictions de chacun. Tout effort de dialogue doit, à ce titre examiner les principales questions que se pose l'Humanité contemporaine, à la fois pour chercher des réponses communes, et souligner la contribution que le Christianisme apporte, en un message d'amour de tous les humains, qui, selon lui, ne trouve sa source profonde que dans un amour plus élevé. (shrink)

L'accusation d'atheisme, qui couta a Fichte sa chaire a l'Universite d'Iena et compromit gravement, et pour longtemps, la reputation de sa doctrine, concentre tous les anathemes par lesquels l'esprit de calomnie pouvait tenter, avec un certain succes, d'empecher une pensee trop libre d'agir sur son siecle en forgeant une image plus forte et plus courageuse de l'avenir du monde. Au mepris de toute contradiction, les accusateurs firent suspecter la philosophie transcendantale de conduire, a travers le developpement pratique qu'en donnait la (...) Doctrine de la science, autant au scepticisme en matiere de religion qu'au pantheisme, autant a l'anarchisme qu'a l'autoritarisme revolutionnaire. On trouvera dans le present volume la traduction des articles par lesquels Fichte se defendit publiquement contre cette accusation, ainsi que l'ensemble des textes qu'il consacra a la question religieuse depuis la fin de ses etudes de theologie jusqu'au declenchement de la Querelle de l'atheisme. (shrink)

" Si, après Auschwitz, croire en un Dieu-raison n'est plus possible, reste, d'un côté, la foi simple - la foi qui n'est qu'un cri -, de l'autre la raison, pure de religion. Philosopher comme avant, on ne le peut, mais seulement mieux qu'avant - ou pas du tout. Refermée, pour la philosophie, la parenthèse judéo-chrétienne ; fini le temps des castors - des Descartes, Kant, Hegel, des bâtisseurs de digues pour dompter le flot de la Libre Pensée issu de la (...) source grecque. L'heure est aux philosophies du refus. Refus de toute logicisation philosophico-théologique du monde, où le mal absolu n'est plus qu'un détail. De là une vision a-théiste et a-cosmique du monde, une vision déréalisante du " réel ", mais aussi, devant la vie, l'appel à un nouveau courage. Car, dans la défaite des absolus sécurisants, reste, comme corrélat du mal absolu, l'absolu de la mort et du Temps. " M. C. (shrink)

This excellent book consists of a translation of Plato's Euthyphro, plus "interspersed comment" intended "partly as a help to the Greekless reader in finding his way, and partly as a means of embedding the discussion of the earlier theory of Forms which follows it." That subsequent discussion is a series of sections aimed at establishing "that there is an earlier theory of Forms, found in the Euthyphro and other early dialogues as an essential adjunct of Socratic dialect" and that it (...) is not the same as the theory of Forms found in the Phaedo, Republic and other middle dialogues. In the Euthyphro Socrates' question of what holiness is assumes that there is a Form of holiness, "that this Form is a universal, the same in all holy things;... that that Form may be used as a standard, by which to judge what things are holy and what are not...; that it is an essence, by which or in virtue of which holy things are holy." As essences Forms are causes--formal, not efficient. They are "causes in the sense that they are that by which things are what they are. They therefore affect the career of the world, in that if they did not exist, the world would not be what it is." They "are not identical with their instances and [are] prior to their instances" and, hence, they are not in their instances. In fact, "Forms are as 'separate' from their instances in the early dialogues as they are" in the later ones. Do they not differ, then, from these latter Forms? Yes, because "of the way in which separation is conceived." In the Phaedo and other middle dialogues separation "involves something more than... nonidentity, independence, or priority. It involves the claim that instances of Forms are deficient imitations or resemblances of Forms.... To that theory was later conjoined, as a natural corollary, the theory that sensibles and Forms differ in their degree of reality, that Forms are more real than their instances." There are, in fact, "Two Worlds, Visible and Invisible.... The objects of the Visible World... are in a perpetually changing mortal realm, never the same with respect to each other or themselves. By contrast, Forms, the reality of whose existence we render an account in questioning and answering, exist always in the same way with respect to the same things, single in nature, alone by themselves, never in any way under any circumstances admitting alteration." This contrast between the Two Worlds is not drawn in the Euthyphro and earlier writings. Hence, between them and the middle dialogues there is a development in the theory of Forms. Of course, there also is "a unity to Plato's thought; but it is not the unity of a monument. It is the unity of growth and development, the unity of life." In these splendid pages one point remains unclear: how can a Form be universal and thus distinct from its instances and yet be their formal cause? Allen leaves no doubt that this is his position: "In Plato's early dialogues Forms are not the being of that of which they are Forms. A universal, being one, cannot constitute the being of a plurality--precisely why Aristotle was led to distinguish substantial form from universal. The Euthyphro does not imply that holiness is the being of any given holy thing or action as holy; it implies only that holiness is that by which holy things are holy. It implies, to borrow another bit of Aristotelian vocabulary, that holiness is a cause." But precisely in what way is a Form "that by which" something is what it is? Plato subsequently answers by distinguishing the Form itself, its character as participated by a particular thing, and the participant : the Form is that by which some thing is what it is through the participated character which the thing has. Is this answer implied in the Euthyphro? Or in what sense is a Form distinct from particular things? In what sense a formal cause? That puzzlement, though, is minor in the context of the entire book, which is valuable not only for the interpretation Allen gives of the early and middle dialogues but also for all sorts of unexpected bonuses. These are points either newly made or brilliantly reiterated--for example, the influence of Anaxagoras on Plato re the notion of essence and in philosophical vocabulary; Aristotle's abandonment of the contrast made in the Categories between primary and secondary substance; the crucial difference between genus/species in Aristotle and in Plato (enriched/impoverished; the analogy of a Platonic definition to mapping a field; the evaluation of Aristotle's interpretation of Plato's Forms, of his report on the "unwritten doctrines," of esoteric and exoteric teachings. This last culminates in a paragraph which all students of Plato should reflect upon constantly: "It is possible to treat Plato's text, not as evidence for something else, but as itself the primary object of historical understanding. The aim of the inquiry is then to interpret a set of literary documents, not to fathom the entertained beliefs of their author. It is reasonable, of course, to assume that the documents are a reliable index to the beliefs; but the connection, after all, is contingent, and as far as interpretation is concerned, unimportant. If Plato, in his heart of hearts, had been a nominalist, an atheist, a sceptic about immortality, and a hedonist, and had yet gone on to write the dialogues which he wrote for some obscure motive now unknown, this would not change the proper interpretation of what he wrote and privately disbelieved by one iota: when a man says what he does not believe, we may still perfectly well understand what it is he has said. The question, then, of whether Plato had beliefs he did not express, or beliefs contrary to what he did express, may be left to those with skill in the arts of divination; the historian may more reasonably limit himself to the study of texts and their meaning. If inquiry is construed in this way, it is self-referentially inconsistent to prefer the testimony of Aristotle to the evidence of Plato's text in the interpretation of Plato."--L. S. (shrink)

This is an excerpt from the contentWhen Christopher Hitchens died in 2011 from cancer of the esophagus, he was arguably the best-known writer of non-fiction in the English language. His books include political journalism, history, and polemic in the most serious sense although those who value his politics regret that he may be most widely known for his militant atheism. His best-selling memoir, Hitch-22, had just been published when he was diagnosed in 2010. Mortality comprises seven articles that Hitchens wrote (...) for Vanity Fair in which he chronicles his experiences in “Tumortown,” plus a collection of fragmentary notes.Writers who have brought considerable insight to other topics are expected to rise to the occasion of their own critical illnesses and death’s imminence. Hitchens’s expected himself to remain witty, effortlessly well-informed, and perhaps most of all, conversational. “The most satisfying compliment a reader can pay is to tell me that he or she feels personally addressed,” Hitchens writes . He recalls. (shrink)

Difficult Atheism shows how contemporary French philosophy is rethinking the legacy of the death of God in ways that take the debate beyond the narrow confines of atheism into the much broader domain of post-theological thinking. Christopher Watkin argues that Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy and Quentin Meillassoux each elaborate a distinctive approach to the post-theological, but that each approach still struggles to do justice to the death of God.

The doctrine of intelligent design is often the subject of acrimonious debate. Seeking God in Science cuts through the rhetoric that distorts the debates between religious and secular camps. Bradley Monton, a philosopher of science and an atheist, carefully considers the arguments for intelligent design and argues that intelligent design deserves serious consideration as a scientific theory. -/- Monton also gives a lucid account of the debate surrounding the inclusion of intelligent design in public schools and presents reason why students' (...) science education could benefit from a careful consideration of the arguments for and against it. (shrink)

In this paper we defend structural representations, more specifically neural structural representation. We are not alone in this, many are currently engaged in this endeavor. The direction we take, however, diverges from the main road, a road paved by the mathematical theory of measure that, in the 1970s, established homomorphism as the way to map empirical domains of things in the world to the codomain of numbers. By adopting the mind as codomain, this mapping became a boon for all those (...) convinced that a representation system should bear similarities with what was being represented, but struggled to find a precise account of what such similarities mean. The euforia was brief, however, and soon homomorphism revealed itself to be affected by serious weaknesses, the primary one being that it included systems embarrassingly alien to representations. We find that the defense attempts that have followed, adopt strategies that share a common format: valid structural representations come as “homomorphism plus X”, with various “X”, provided in descriptive format only. Our alternative direction stems from the observation of the overlooked departure from homomorphism as used in the theory of measure and its later use in mental representations. In the former case, the codomain or the realm of numbers, is the most suited for developing theorems detailing the existence and uniqueness of homomorphism for a wide range of empirical domains. In the latter case, the codomain is the realm of the mind, possibly more vague and more ill-defined than the empirical domain itself. The time is ripe for articulating the mapping between represented domains and the mind in formal terms, by exploiting what is currently known about coding mechanisms in the brain. We provide a sketch of a possible development in this direction, one that adopts the theory of neural population coding as codomain. We will show that our framework is not only not in disagreement with the “plus X” proposals, but can lead to natural derivation of several of the “X”. (shrink)

In current debates concerning atheism, two positions are considered possible: naturalistic atheism or anti-naturalistic theism. Anti-naturalistic theism is motivated by the failure of naturalism to explain the fundamental nature of reality. We, however, endorse anti-naturalistic atheism by reviving the ‘anthropomorphic critique’, arguing that theism misattributes human traits to the deity. Anti-naturalistic atheism is better suited to refute theists, since it undercuts their appeal to science's inadequacies. We trace the anthropomorphic critique from Hume's Dialogues, through Kant's epistemology, and conclude with its (...) reception in Feuerbach. The anthropomorphic critique is an epistemological – not metaphysical – thesis, hence, it is agnostic about the fundamental nature of reality. Yet it convincingly shows that theism is not a tenable position. In essence, we aim to decouple atheism from naturalism, on the basis of a salient critique in the history of modern philosophy, in order to ameliorate current debates between atheists and theists.Export citation. (shrink)

How important is atheism for Jewish history and Jews for the history of atheism? Modern Jewish histories have tended to focus on Jewish secularization rather than atheism, and historical surveys of atheism in the West have tended to neglect the Jewish experience which is subsumed in the Judeo-Christian tradition. It is possible to make the case that the secularization narrative privileges social change over Jewish intellectual engagement with non-belief, and that just as Jewish and Christian conceptions of theism differ, so (...) do their atheisms. Jewish historical attitudes towards atheism are complicated and have shifted over time. Here, skeptical tendencies, that is, attitudes and ideas that would be associated later with atheism, will be considered alongside claims about atheism per se. (shrink)

This paper defends a novel sceptical response to the fine-tuning argument for the existence of God (FTA). According to this response, even if FTA can establish, what I call, the confirmation proposition: ‘fine-tuning confirms the God hypothesis’, there is no reason to think that a strengthening of FTA can establish the evidence-favouring proposition: ‘fine-tuning favours the God hypothesis over its competitors’. My argument is that, any criteria for the explanation of fine-tuning that permit us to take the God hypothesis seriously (...) ought to make us sceptical that fine-tuning favours the God hypothesis over its competitors. As taking the God hypothesis seriously requires us to give a fair hearing to all sorts of non-theistic explanations, including the so-called weird sorts of atheism. (shrink)

Dennis Whitcomb argues that there is no God on the grounds that God is supposed to be omniscient, yet nothing could be omniscient due to the nature of grounding. We give a formally identical argument that concludes that one of the present co-authors does not exist. Since he does exist, Whitcomb’s argument is unsound. But why is it unsound? That is a difficult question. We venture two answers. First, one of the grounding principles that the argument relies on is false. (...) Second, the argument equivocates between two kinds of grounding: instance-grounding and quasi-mereological grounding. Happily, the equivocation can be avoided; unhappily, avoidance comes at the price of a false premise. (shrink)

With the publication of The God Delusion Richard Dawkins became enthroned as the unofficial ‘Emperor’ for a cadre of writers advancing a rhetorically robust form of anti-theism dubbed ‘The New Atheism’ by Wired Magazine contributing editor Gary Wolf. Many have cheered Dawkins and his court, seeing in their writings just what they long to see. For, after the fashion of the fairy-tale Emperor's fabled new clothes, the ‘new atheism’ has seen naturalism wrapping itself in a fake finery of counterfeit meaning (...) and purpose. (shrink)

Two of the most prominent evolutionary debunking arguments are Sharon Street's Darwinian Dilemma for Normative Realism and Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Atheism. In the former, Street appeals to evolutionary considerations to debunk normative realism. In the latter, Plantinga appeals to similar considerations to debunk atheism. By a careful comparison of these two arguments, I develop a new strategy to help normative realists resist Street's debunking attempt. In her Darwinian Dilemma, Street makes epistemological commitments that ultimately support Plantinga's structurally similar (...) argument. If Street succeeds in debunking normative realism, I argue, then she also succeeds in debunking atheism. But atheism is a suppressed premise of the Darwinian Dilemma as well as a commitment of almost all normative anti-realists. If Street's argument entails theism, then the Darwinian Dilemma is internally incoherent and should be abandoned by almost everyone. (shrink)

William Rowe’s a posteriori arguments for the non-existence of God are well-known. Rather less attention has been given, however, to Rowe’s intriguing a priori argument for atheism. In this paper, I examine the three published responses to Rowe’s a priori argument (due to Bruce Langtry, William Morris, and Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder, respectively). I conclude that none is decisive, but I show that Rowe’s argument nevertheless requires more defence than he provides.

Cet article vise à justifier, puis à appliquer une éthique climatique centrée sur les intérêts des acteurs économiques. Après avoir expliqué pourquoi le changement climatique pose un problème important de motivation, je montre pour quelles raisons les incitations peuvent au moins partiellement y remédier. Je développe ensuite deux possibilités d’institutionnalisation de l’éthique des incitations. La première consiste en une taxe internationale augmentant progressivement le coût des émissions de dioxyde de carbone, un dispositif auquel il convient d’ajouter des subsides pour la (...) recherche, le développement et le déploiement des énergies renouvelables. La seconde consiste en un marché global du carbone qui vise également à décourager l’utilisation des combustibles fossiles et à encourager l’utilisation de sources alternatives d’énergie. L’objectif est de montrer qu’une éthique climatique prenant en compte le problème de la motivation est plus efficace qu’une position qui se limite aux devoirs moraux incombant aux consommateurs et producteurs, soit de réduire leurs émissions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXII, Number 1, April 1996, pp. 193-202 Why Hume Wasn't an Atheist: A Reply to Andre BERYL LOGAN In a recent issue of Hume Studies,1 Shane Andre argues that, as Hume's position on theism can be read primarily from Philo's position in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and since Philo's position in the Dialogues is one of "limited theism," Hume was also a "limited theist" and (...) therefore not an atheist. According to Andre, a "limited theist" is one like Epicurus, "who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs" and, he continues, "...at least in philosophical circles, the term 'atheist' is generally restricted to people who disbelieve any form of theism, and this is the sense in which I propose to enquire whether Hume was an atheist" (142). Andre's claim then is that Hume is not an atheist in this latter sense, but is a limited theist in the former sense. This is shown in "three major objections to standard theism" in the Dialogues: those addressing the Argument from Design and the problem of evil, as well as the lack of debate on whether or not God exists. Philo's criticisms of the Argument from Design amount to the claim that, "not that there is no God, but that, if there is a God," empirical evidence cannot show that God has any of the traditional characteristics of wisdom, power or goodness. The "proper conclusion" of Philo's argument from evil does not concern God's existence, but establishes that God is "limited in some important respect." Philo's "limited theism" is expressed in his ambivalent attitude toward Cleanthes' Argument from Design in Part 12 ("that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human Beryl Logan is at the Department of Philosophy, Scarborough College, University of Toronto, 1265 Military Trail, Scarborough, Ontario MlC 1A4, Canada, email: logan@lake.'scar.utoronto.ca 194 Beryl Logan intelligence"). In sum, Philo and Cleanthes never debate God's existence, and they accept a limited Deity, therefore they hold positions of limited theism, therefore Philo is not an atheist. While I agree with Andre's conclusion that Hume is not an atheist, I will show in this paper first, that the interpretation which provides his means for arriving at this conclusion is not consistent with the text and faces a number of difficulties, and second, that the sense in which Hume is a limited theist has to do with the limitations of human reason and experience, and not with God's limited nature. My criticisms of Andre's position will be directed at three points in his argument: (1) his claim for Philo's theism based on Philo's lack of scepticism about God's existence; (2) what he regards to be the "proper conclusion" (153) to the problem of evil, as this directly influences his view of Philo's scepticism and the nature of the Deity; and (3) his view that Philo's theism is to be found in his acceptance of the Argument from Design (Philo's limited theism). My arguments will centre upon the "suspense of judgement," and where and how this.mental stance is used by Hume in the arguments of the Dialogues.2 Scepticism about God's Existence Andre claims that the arguments in the Dialogues are directed only to God's nature and do not address God's existence in spite of the fact that Cleanthes concludes his Argument from Design by claiming that the data in the world provide conclusive analogical support for the existence and (human-like) intelligence of the (traditional) Deity.3 Cleanthes' anthropomorphic Argument from Design purports to "prove" that the world has an intelligent divine designer just like machines have intelligent human designers and the only difference between the causes based on the effects is one of degree and not one of kind: the designer of the world is far grander than the designer of a computer because the world is more complex than a computer. I would urge, though, that Philo's scepticism is directed at both aspects of the Argument... (shrink)

This article provides a review and critique of Animal Liberation and Atheism: Dismantling the Procrustean Bed by English professor, activist, and avowed political atheist Kim Socha. Socha engages in a twofold argument as she makes the case for animal liberation as a natural imperative of atheism. On the one hand, she denounces religious arguments for animal liberation as dead ends that rely on intellectual gymnastics and present what is actually secular thinking in religious guise. On the other hand, she identifies (...) contamination of atheist’s thinking by religious perspectives, primarily hierarchy, as the root of the failure of atheists to embrace animal liberation. Methodological difficulties are identified and critical questions raised in response to both the premises and conclusions of the work. (shrink)

This article provides a review and critique of Animal Liberation and Atheism: Dismantling the Procrustean Bed by English professor, activist, and avowed political atheist Kim Socha. Socha engages in a twofold argument as she makes the case for animal liberation as a natural imperative of atheism. On the one hand, she denounces religious arguments for animal liberation as dead ends that rely on intellectual gymnastics and present what is actually secular thinking in religious guise. On the other hand, she identifies (...) contamination of atheist’s thinking by religious perspectives, primarily hierarchy, as the root of the failure of atheists to embrace animal liberation. Methodological difficulties are identified and critical questions raised in response to both the premises and conclusions of the work. (shrink)

The question of whether or not God exists is profoundly fascinating and important. Now two articulate spokesmen--one a Christian, the other an atheist--duel over God's existence in an illuminating battle of ideas. In God? A Debate between a Christian and an Atheist, William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong bring to the printed page two debates they held before live audiences, preserving all the wit, clarity, and immediacy of their public exchanges. Avoiding overly esoteric arguments, they directly address issues such as (...) religious experience, the Bible, evil, eternity, the origin of the universe, design, and the supposed connection between morality and the existence of God. Employing sharp and humorous arguments, each philosopher strikes quickly to the heart of his opponent's case. For example, Craig claims that we must believe in God in order to explain objective moral values, such as why rape is wrong. Sinnott-Armstrong responds that what makes rape wrong is the harm to victims of rape, so rape is immoral even if there is no God. By assuming a traditional concept of God in their discussion, the authors ensure that they are truly addressing each other's viewpoints and engaging in a disagreement over a unified issue. The book is composed of six chapters that alternate between Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong, so that each separate point can be discussed as it arises. Ideal for courses in the philosophy of religion and introduction to philosophy, this lively and direct dialogue will stimulate students and anyone interested in the existence of God, regardless of whether or not they believe in God. (shrink)

_Radical Atheism_ presents a profound new reading of the influential French philosopher Jacques Derrida. Against the prevalent notion that there was an ethical or religious "turn" in Derrida's thinking, Hägglund argues that a radical atheism informs Derrida's work from beginning to end. Proceeding from Derrida's insight into the constitution of time, Hägglund demonstrates how Derrida rethinks the condition of identity, ethics, religion, and political emancipation in accordance with the logic of radical atheism. Hägglund challenges other major interpreters of Derrida's work (...) and offers a compelling account of Derrida's thinking on life and death, good and evil, self and other. Furthermore, Hägglund does not only explicate Derrida's position but also develops his arguments, fortifies his logic, and pursues its implications. The result is a groundbreaking deconstruction of the perennial philosophical themes of time and desire as well as pressing contemporary issues of sovereignty and democracy. (shrink)

Le phénomène de l’attention ne fut investi par la science qu’au début du xxe siècle. Dans la phénoménologie et la psychologie de l’époque, il est caractérisé à l’unisson comme un « phare de la perception » jetant une lumière particulièrement vivifiante et clarifiante sur les choses simplement perçues. Ce n’est qu’avec l’émergence de la psychologie comme science purement empirique que les deux disciplines ont commencé, chacune de son côté, à thématiser le phénomène de l’attention. Nous voudrio...

"An illuminating and powerful reading of three of the most important contemporary professedly antireligious thinkers... stinging critiques of Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche."-C. Stephen Evans, Society of Christian Philosophers.

Within Jean Paul Sartre’s atheistic program, he objected to Christian mysticism as a delusory desire for substantive being. I suggest that a Christian mystic might reply to Sartre’s attack by claiming that Sartre indeed grasps something right about the human condition but falls short of fully understanding what he grasps. Then I argue that the true basis of Sartre’s atheism is neither philosophical nor existentialist, but rather mystical. Sartre had an early mystical atheistic intuition that later developed into atheistic mystical (...) experience. Sartre experienced the nonexistence of God. (shrink)

In John Schellenberg’s important trilogy he offers us reasons, individually and cumulatively impressive, for adopting a sceptical attitude towards religious claims, both positive and negative. Part of Schellenberg’s argument consists in reminding us of the necessity of not overestimating our present state of intellectual development. In this paper, while allowing the force of the overestimation points, I consider the very real strength of the arguments he develops for atheism, and suggest that they outweigh his sceptical arguments in favour of non-commitment.Whenever (...) I hear that a writer of real ability has demonstrated away the... existence of God, I am eager to read the book, for I expect him by his talents to increase my insight into these matters. Already, before having opened it, I am perfectly certain that he has not justified... his specific [claim] because... as reason is incompetent to arrive at affirmative assertions in this field, it is equally unable, indeed even less able, to establish any negative conclusion in regard to these questions. (shrink)

Let us consider Flew’s main contention, that the onus of proof lies on the theist. The “proof” which is required of the theist involves showing that his concept of God is such that the existence of God is theoretically possible and providing sufficient reasons, though not necessarily a demonstration, to warrant believing that God exists. The “onus” which is on the theist does not preclude the possibility of a theistic proof. It is similar to the “onus” which is on the (...) prosecutor in an English court: it is up to the prosecutor to prove guilt, but such proof is possible. And just as the prosecutor does not have to drop his personal conviction—if he has one—that the defendant is guilty, the theist does not have to drop his own theistic belief. What Flew is asking the theist to do is to accept a procedure. Like the affirmative side in a debate, the theist is asked to concede that if he has not provided grounds for what he affirms, he has lost the debate— whether or not the opposition says anything. If a theist moves, “Resolved that this house affirms the existence of God”, the presumption in the debate is atheistic; the theist has to prove his claim or lose the debate. He is like a prosecutor in a court where the procedural rule is that innocence is presumed; the prosecutor must prove guilt or lose his case. Flew holds that the presumption of atheism is a better procedure than the presumption of theism, where the atheist would affirm, “Resolved that this house affirms the non-existence of God”, and the atheist would have to prove his claim or lose the argument. (shrink)

In this article the author discusses aspects of the existence of New Atheism. It states that the idea of New Atheism was started by anti-religious books such as "The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason," by W. W. Norton, "Breaking the Spell," by Daniel C. Dennett, and "The God Delusion," by Richard Dawkins. Furthermore, it says that there is no New Atheism, and all that Norton, Dennett, and Dawkins have done was repackage arguments against religion that (...) already existed. (shrink)

The logic TM is the result of adding the mingle axiom, M to Ticket Entailment logic, T. In the present study, it is proved that TM has the variable-sharing property . Ternary relational semantics for TM is provided. Finally, an interesting extension of TM with the vsp is briefly discussed.

In current debates concerning atheism, two positions are considered possible: naturalistic atheism or anti-naturalistic theism. Anti-naturalistic theism is motivated by the failure of naturalism to explain the fundamental nature of reality. We, however, endorse anti-naturalistic atheism by reviving the ‘anthropomorphic critique’, arguing that theism misattributes human traits to the deity. Anti-naturalistic atheism is better suited to refute theists, since it undercuts their appeal to science's inadequacies. We trace the anthropomorphic critique from Hume's Dialogues, through Kant's epistemology, and conclude with its (...) reception in Feuerbach. The anthropomorphic critique is an epistemological – not metaphysical – thesis, hence, it is agnostic about the fundamental nature of reality. Yet it convincingly shows that theism is not a tenable position. In essence, we aim to decouple atheism from naturalism, on the basis of a salient critique in the history of modern philosophy, in order to ameliorate current debates between atheists and theists. (shrink)