Academia is a competitive environment. Early Career Researchers (ECRs) are limited in experience and resources and especially need achievements to secure and expand their careers. To help with these issues, this book offers a new approach for conducting research using the combination of mindsponge innovative thinking and Bayesian analytics. This is not just another analytics book. 1. A new perspective on psychological processes: Mindsponge is a novel approach for examining the human mind’s information processing mechanism. This conceptual framework is used (...) to construct models in studies. The framework is highly flexible and widely applicable for many different types of information processes. The mindsponge approach can help researchers discover interesting ideas or even formulate their very own theories when investigating psychosocial phenomena. This approach brings a fresh wind to the current landscape of social sciences and humanities (SSH). 2. Easy-to-follow analysis protocol: The Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF analytics) is useful in terms of computing and visualizing power but also easy to learn and apply. Contrary to being intimidating, the Bayesian analytics section of this book is presented in a reader-friendly manner with a detailed yet clear step-by-step procedure. Examples are from published BMF articles, allowing readers to immediately practice the method and quickly create their own applications. With educational purposes in mind, the book is very suitable for ECRs who are looking to innovate their research methods. 3. Advocating for low-cost, high-quality research: Doing science can be very costly. Mindsponge innovative thinking and BMF analytics help produce impactful studies using openly available data on online repositories. This is based on the authors’ previous works and experiences. The book presents examples of employing the open R package bayesvl on secondary data from different sources. With less financial constraints, researchers can have more freedom of thought to pursue their curiosity and creativity. ECRs in low- and middle-income countries may find this aspect crucial in their careers. 4. Support and collaboration: The authors share their insights from experiences in the academic publishing system to help readers get through the processes of manuscript writing and peer-reviewing more easily. The authors are also ready to support other researchers with further inquiries and collaboration opportunities at the following website, mindsponge(dot)info. This book is for: a) ECRs whose only abundant resources are their innovation capacity and strength of will; b) Researchers in SSH who want to explore a novel approach to thinking and study conducting; c) Low- and middle-income countries’ researchers looking for a cost-effective research protocol; and, d) Innovative thinkers who want to turn their interesting thoughts into good publications. (shrink)

Analytic theology can flourish in the secular academy, and flourish as authentically Christian theology. Analytic Theology and the Academic Study of Religion explains analytic theology to other theologians and scholars of religion, while simultaneously explaining those other fields to analytic theologians. William Wood defends analytic theology from some common criticisms, but also argues that analytic theologians have much to learn from other forms of inquiry. Analytic theology is a legitimate form of theology, and a legitimate form of academic inquiry, and (...) it can be a valuable conversation partner within the wider religious studies academy. Analytic Theology and the Academic Study of Religion articulates an attractive vision of analytic theology, fosters a more fruitful inter-disciplinary conversation, and enables scholars across the religious studies academy to understand one another better. (shrink)

This paper provides an overview of the history of the notion of essence in 20th century analytic philosophy, focusing on views held by influential analytic philosophers who discussed, or relied on essence or cognate notions in their works. It in particular covers Russell and Moore’s different approaches to essence before and after breaking with British idealism, the (pre- and post-)logical positivists’ critique of metaphysics and rejection of essence (Wittgenstein, Carnap, Schlick, Stebbing), the tendency to loosen the notion of logical necessity (...) to accommodate certain metaphysical truths in Wittgenstein and others, Quine’s logical rehabilitation of metaphysics and criticism of de re modality, the modal view of essence promoted by the development of quantified modal logic (C. I. Lewis, Barcan Marcus, Kripke) and direct reference theory (Barcan Marcus, Kripke, Putnam), and the emergence of the notion of metaphysical necessity (Kneale, Kripke), and finally Fine’s re-establishment of a Neo-Aristotelian, hyperintensional notion of essence in contemporary metaphysics. (shrink)

The aim of the Analytic of Concepts is to derive and deduce a set of pure concepts of the understanding, the categories, which play a central role in Kant’s explanation of the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition and judgment. This chapter is structured around two questions. First, what is a pure concept of the understanding? Second, what is involved in a deduction of a pure concept of the understanding? In answering the first, we focus on how the categories differ (...) from the pure forms of sensibility and examine whether they are known only to be the pure forms of human thinking or rather the forms of discursive cognition as such. In answering the second, we draw a distinction between the application and the exemplification of the categories and use it to identify different ways of understanding Kant’s project in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. These questions connect because the answer to the first determines how we should understand the kind of entitlement which is to be established in the Deduction. (shrink)

Analytic Philosophy: An Interpretive History explores the ways interpretation shaped the analytic tradition, from Frege to Dummet. It offers readers 17 chapters, written especially for this volume by an international cast of leading scholars. Some chapters are devoted to large, thematic issues like the relationship between analytic philosophy and other philosophical traditions such as British Idealism and phenomenology, while other chapters are tied to more fine-grained topics or to individual philosophers, like Moore and Russell on philosophical method or the history (...) of interpretations of Wittgenstein’s _Tractatus_. Throughout, the focus is on interpretations that are crucial to the origin, development, and persistence of the analytic tradition. The result is a more fully formed and philosophically satisfying portrait of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

In the middle of the twentieth century a dispute erupted between the chief architect of Logical Empiricism, Rudolf Carnap, and Logical Empiricism’s chief reformer, Willard van Orman Quine -- who was attempting to save what he took to be its main insights by recasting them in a more acceptable form. Though both eschewed metaphysics of the traditional apriori sort, and both were intent on making the investigation of science the center of philosophy, they disagreed about how to do so. Part (...) of the disagreement involved the nature of ontological disputes. The central documents in the debate are: (i) Quine’s 1948 article, “On What There Is,” which tells us how to discern ontological.. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: John McDowell: From the Problems of Empiricism to Hegel's Absolute Idealism Robert Brandom: From the Problems of “Representationalism” to Hegel's “Inferentialism” Hegel and Brandom on the Recognitive Infrastructure of Intentionality Dialectical Logic and Ontology.

Introducing analytic philosophy -- F.H. Bradley and monistic idealism -- G.E. Moore on idealism, the good, and common sense -- Gottlob Frege : logic and the philosophy of language -- Bertrand Russell on relations, descriptions, and knowledge -- E.E. Constance Jones on language and logic -- Ludwig Wittgenstein on language and philosophy -- Logical empiricism : meaning, metaphysics, and mathematics -- Susan Stebbing on logic, language, and analysis -- W.V.O Quine on analyticity and ontology -- Analytic philosophy since 1950.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Argentina Mexico The Southern Cone The Northern Part of South America and Central America Conclusion References Further Reading.

Martin Gustafsson: Quine's Conception of Explication – and Why It Isn't Carnap's: This chapter clarifies Quine's conception of explication and identifies its place in his overall view of the aims and methods of philosophy. It does so by way of comparing his conception with Carnap's, Carnap being the philosopher from whom Quine got the notion of explication to begin with. In contravention of Quine's own suggestion, and against the view of some commentators, it is argued that Quine's and Carnap's conceptions (...) are importantly different, especially with regard to how explication can help us dissolve verbal philosophical confusions and disputes. (shrink)

In the late 1980s, the American economist Jeremy Rifkin claimed that “a battle is brewing over the politics of time” because he felt that the pivotal issue of the twenty first century would be the question of time and who controlled it. I argue in this chapter that a battle over the politics of time (and the metaphysics of time) is also a major part of what is at stake in the differences between analytic and continental philosophy. Very different philosophies (...) of time, and associated methodological techniques, serve to define representatives of each of these groups and also to guard against their potential interlocutors. To begin to illustrate this, I offer a patchy history of philosophy of time in the early twentieth century, the period in which the idea of a ‘divide’ between two ways of doing philosophy began to be entrenched. (shrink)

Even after Willard Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Wilfrid Sellars maintained some forms of analyticity or truth in virtue of meaning. In this article, I aim to reconstruct (a) his neglected account of the analytic-synthetic distinction and the revisability of analytic sentences, (b) its connection to his inferentialist account of meaning, and (c) his response to Quine. While Sellars’s account of the revisability of analytic sentences bears certain similarities to Carnap’s and Grice and (...) Strawson’s accounts, it is still striking in that it is part of his broader picture of how our language develops dynamically in our ongoing inquiry. I aim to show how it relates to his account of how the diachronic continuity in meaning, language, or conceptual framework can be preserved through a revision of analytic sentences and to his evolutionary account of the development of our language or conceptual framework. (shrink)

This book explores and develops a new philosophical argument for the existence of God from metaphysics. It focuses on exploring the pressing questions of God's existence, the truth of theistic belief, and its relevance in modern philosophy. In doing so, it bridges the discussions and debates in the field of contemporary metaphysics with that of analytic philosophy of religion. At its core, metaphysics is dedicated to unveiling the fundamental structure of reality, playing a critical role in any intellectual endeavour in (...) the quest for truth. However, a noticeable gap has persisted between today's metaphysical conversations and the debates in analytic philosophy of religion, especially regarding the topic of God's existence. In this book, the author embarks on a rigorous exploration, presenting an innovative a posteriori argument for theism, rooted in the latest evidence and theories from contemporary metaphysics. The first part of the book details the explanatory framework of the analysis, which is focussed on introducing a new abductive methodology within metaphysics that provides a way for assessing the veracity of the Theism and the leading fundamental theories in contemporary metaphysics. The second part of the book then focuses on demonstrating how the central concepts and theories within contemporary metaphysics-such as quantum foundations, four-dimensionalism, formal ontology, essentialism, grounding, powerful causation, mereology, free will, personhood and the reality of suffering-are best explained by the existence of God, and thus justify theism, over that of the competing theories within contemporary metaphysics. Theism is thus the best working metaphysical theory and should take a central place in fundamental enquiries within the field of contemporary metaphysics and beyond. Analytic Theism: A Philosophical Investigation is a must-read for scholars and advanced students venturing into philosophy of religion and metaphysics. Beyond its appeal to those in analytic philosophy of religion and metaphysics, this work also resonates with those immersed in contemporary philosophy on a whole, and related fields of inquiry, serving as a pivotal read for anyone keen on the intersections of philosophy, theology, and science. (shrink)

This book collects Thomas Nagel's recent philosophical reflections on topics of fundamental interest: ethics, moral psychology, science and religion, death and the holocaust, and the metaphysics of mind. Among the figures discussed are Peter Singer, Alvin Plantinga, Christine Korsgaard, Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Iris Murdoch, T. M. Scanlon, Ronald Dworkin, Samuel Scheffler, Daniel Kahneman, Jonathan Haidt, Joshua Greene, and Daniel Dennett. Nagel consistently defends a realist interpretation of moral truth and resists reductive attempts to subsume ethics to psychology and evolutionary (...) theory. He also defends a pluralistic conception of the content of morality against utilitarianism, including deontological elements such as rights and special responsibilities. A realist outlook also informs his discussions of metaphysical and epistemological questions. The book closes with tributes to a number of people Nagel has known over the course of his career. The essays are all addressed to a general audience, and should appeal not only to philosophers but to anyone interested in current attempts to understand human life, human values, and how we fit into the world. (shrink)

This paper introduces the philosophy of Grace Andrus de Laguna in order to renew interest in it. I show that, in the 1910s and 1920s, she develops ideas and arguments that are also found playing key roles in the development of analytic philosophy decades later. Further, I describe her sympathetic, but acute, criticism of pragmatism and Heideggerian ontology, and situate her work in the tradition of American, speculative philosophy. Before 1920, we will see, de Laguna appeals to multiple realizability to (...) undermine reductionism in science, to support perspectival, scientific realism and, with help from a private language argument, to favour the view that mental states are classified by behavioural, teleological roles over what came to be called ‘type physicalism’. Her view of speech, mostly developed in the 1920s, tells us that its primary role is coordinating group behaviour rather than expressing thoughts. Belief is understood in terms of its causal role, including its causal relations to other kinds of mental states, when coordinating group behaviour. Thought is similarly understood. In developing her theory of mind, de Laguna rejects the pragmatist claims that belief can be reduced to dispositions to behaviour and that thought’s function is to address specific, rather than general, problems. She also favours meaning holism and rejects the analytic–synthetic distinction. In later work, de Laguna argues that individuals’ activity of self-maintenance brings universals, conceived of as irreducible potentialities, into being and makes them increasingly determinate. Further, she identifies the existence of all individuals with forms of self-maintenance and takes the existence of people to include maintenance of the cultural world. Such a unified treatment of existence, she holds, permits making its evolution intelligible. Heidegger’s view of being is rejected for not permitting this. All de Laguna’s work, we will see, fits a vision of philosophy as the systematic, imaginative and naturalistic examination of being as well as a source of criticism of science. (shrink)

This article focuses on the main methods used in analytic metaphysics. It first considers five important sources of constraints on metaphysical theorizing: linguistic and conceptual analysis, consulting intuitions, employing the findings of science, respecting folk opinion, and applying theoretical virtues in metaphysical theory choice such as preferring simpler theories, or preferring more explanatory theories. It then examines the role of formal methods in metaphysics as well as the role of metaphysical communities, traditions, and the place of the history of metaphysics (...) in contemporary work. It also discusses the issue of whether metaphysics should be seen as an enterprise that will yield knowledge of metaphysical matters or whether it should have more modest epistemic goals. Finally, it explores the question of how much of metaphysics is a priori. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a series of arguments in order to show that it is preferable for analytic philosophy to be practiced in different languages. In the first section, I show that the analytic tradition includes people developing their philosophical work in different natural languages. In the second section, I will address the question of the role of language in thought, and more specifically in philosophical thought, concluding that it is preferable to allow for the use of different languages (...) as a vehicle for philosophical ideas. Finally, I make some suggestions regarding changes that could be made in academic practices to better allow a plurality of languages and voices within the analytic tradition. (shrink)

Illustrations: Numerous B/w Figures Description: Key questions in the history of Navya-nyaya (New Nyaya) remain unresolved: when did this school of logic begin, who was its founder, what distinguishes Navya-nyaya from Pracina-nyaya (Old Nyaya), and so on. This book attempts to answer these key questions in Part I. Part II provides a translation, analysis, and critical edition of the Lion and Tiger Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Chapter (Simha-vyaghra-laksana: LT Chapter) of the Tattva-cintamani-rahasya (TCR) of Mathuranatha (16th-17th c.). The hypothesis adopted (...) by the author with regard to the first question is that Udayana, who lived in the 11th century, is the founder of Navya-nyaya. This hypothesis is closely linked to the hypothesis offered regarding the second question, which is that the feature that distinguishes Navya-nyaya from the earlier school is its description of concepts and the structure of the world in terms of relation. Early Navya-nyaya authors, who flourished between Udayana and Gangesa (14th c.), devised specific terminology, of which delimitor (avacchedaka) and describer (niËpaka) are the most important, in order to identify or specify relation. This book attempts to illustrate the function of these and other Navya-nyaya terms from the viewpoint of relation. The main sources upon which the author has based his conclusions are Udayana s Laksanavali and the chapters on invariable concomitance or pervasion (vyapti) of the Nyaya-siddhanta-dipa (NSD) of Sasadhara (13rd-14th c.), the Tattva-cintamaÆi (TC) of Gangesa, and the TCR. Of these Sanskrit texts no scholar has worked on the Invariable Concomitance Chapter (Vyapti-vada) of the NSD in detail or the LT Chapter of the TCR. The latter chapter follows in the TCR the Five Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Chapter (Vyapti-pancaka), which Ingalls edited, translated, and analyzed in his epoch-making book Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyaya Logic (1951). One major innovation of this book made in Part II is to explain the structure of Navya-nyaya analysis by employing 86 diagrams based on the dharma-dharmin (property and property-possessor) relation, which serve as a visual aid and help readers to more easily understand the complicated structure of its analysis. The diagrams are also helpful in ascertaining how the definitions of invariable concomitance apply to individual cases and how the entities are connected in the application of the definitions. Another major innovation is: almost every sub-section of the LT Chapter of the TCR contains Mathuranatha s clarification of part of the two definitions; but this clarification does not give the definition incorporating prior clarifications and insertions; this book provides such a definition accompanied by a diagram. In other words, Part II illustrates the structure of the whole definition at every process of the clarification, which (definition) is never presented as such in Mathuranatha s text. (shrink)

In this paper I put together insights from the ordinary-language approach and perspectival realism, and use them in developing and clarifying themes in African philosophy. I therefore appeal to language and how African individuals are using it in a particular context. In order to achieve this, I will firstly introduce the analytic philosophical framework in the context of Anglophone African philosophy. This exposition also aims at identifying gaps in the general studies that build on this approach. Secondly, I will clarify (...) the perspectival approach, indicating further how it is reflected in African thought. Thirdly, I will demonstrate the abstraction of philosophical themes using the perspectival approach through the analysis of how Africans are using language. It is argued that this approach leads to the development of African philosophy from the grassroots and helps in opening up a multiplicity of philosophical themes on the African continent. (shrink)

During the last 25 years, a large number of publications on the history of analytic philosophy have appeared, significantly more than in the preceding period. As most of these works are by analytically trained authors, it is tempting to speak of a 'historical turn' in analytic philosophy. The present volume constitutes both a contribution to this body of work and a reflection on what is, or might be, achieved in it. The twelve new essays, by an international group of contributors, (...) range from case studies on individual philosophers through discussions of broader themes in the history of analytic philosophy to related methodological reflections. (shrink)

Although an important part of the origins of analytic philosophy can be traced back to philosophy in Austria in the first part of the twentieth century, remarkably little is known about the specific contribution made by Austrian philosophy and philosophers. In The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy , prominent analytic philosophers take a fresh look at the roots of analytic philosophy in the thought of influential but often overlooked Austrian philosophers including Brentano, Meinong, Bolzano, Husserl, and Witasek. The contributors to (...) this volume investigate central topics in theoretical philosophy such as intentionality, consciousness, memory, attributes, and truth as well as political philosophy and aesthetics. This original collection will be of interest to anyone studying the origins of analytic philosophy as well as contemporary debates in philosophy of language, metaphysics and mind. (shrink)

A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls presents a comprehensive overview of the historical development of all major aspects of analytic philosophy, the dominant Anglo-American philosophical tradition in the twentieth century. Features coverage of all the major subject areas and figures in analytic philosophy - including Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, Gottlob Frege, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Kripke, Putnam, and many others Contains explanatory background material to help make clear technical philosophical concepts Includes listings of suggested further readings (...) Written in a clear, direct style that presupposes little previous knowledge of philosophy. (shrink)

The present paper is an attempt to give an account of the analytic-synthetic distinction both inside and outside of physical theory. It is hoped that the paper is sufficiently nontechnical to be followed by a reader whose background in science is not extensive; but it has been necessary to consider problems connected with physical science (particularly the definition of 'kinetic energy,' and the conceptual problems connected with geometry) in order to bring out features of the analytic-synthetic distinction that seem to (...) me to be the most important. (shrink)

Analytic theology is often seen as an outgrowth of analytic philosophy of religion. It isn’t fully clear, however, whether it differs from analytic philosophy of religion in some important way. Is analytic theology really just a sub-field of analytic philosophy of religion, or can it be distinguished from the latter in virtue of fundamental differences at the level of subject matter or metholodology? These are pressing questions for the burgeoning field of analytic theology. The aim of this article, then, will (...) be to map out several forms that analytic theology might (and in some cases actually does) take before examining the extent to which each can be thought to be distinct from analytic philosophy of religion. (shrink)

The relevance of analytic metaphysics has come under criticism: Ladyman & Ross, for instance, have suggested do discontinue the field. French & McKenzie have argued in defense of analytic metaphysics that it develops tools that could turn out to be useful for philosophy of physics. In this article, we show first that this heuristic defense of metaphysics can be extended to the scientific field of applied ontology, which uses constructs from analytic metaphysics. Second, we elaborate on a parallel by French (...) & McKenzie between mathematics and metaphysics to show that the whole field of analytic metaphysics, being useful not only for philosophy but also for science, should continue to exist as a largely autonomous field. (shrink)

Katzav and Vaesen have argued that control by analytic philosophers of key journals, philosophy departments and at least one funding body plays a substantial role in explaining the emergence of analytic philosophy into dominance in the Anglophone world and the corresponding decline of speculative philosophy. They also argued that this use of control suggests a characterisation of analytic philosophy as, at the institutional level, a sectarian form of critical philosophy. I test these hypotheses against data about philosophy job hires at (...) key philosophy departments in the USA during the period 1930-1979, and against data about PhD completions during the period 1956-1965. I argue, further, that Katzav and Vaesen’s hypotheses can fully explain the data and are more fully able to do so than are some other key accounts of the emergence of analytic philosophy in the USA. (shrink)

Sennett and Fisher: Quine on Paraphrase and Regimentation: Regimentation plays an integral role in Quine's influential approaches to metaphysics, philosophy of science, and semantics. In this paper we explore Quine's views on regimentation and its applications. We also consider how the Quinean view of regimentation interacts with his views on ontological commitment, holism, indeterminacy of translation, and the inscrutability of reference.

The main goal of the article is to briefly review the difference between analytical and synthetic in Hegel's philosophy, as well as to determine whether this philosopher was a follower of Kant's philosophy or not. First, in the "Introduction" section, the difference between analytical and synthetic in Kant's philosophy is shown; moreover, Kant's influence on Hegel and, generally, on the period in question and the conclusions of both scientists on this issue are analyzed. In the article, the main features of (...) Hegel's and Kant's worldviews and some conclusions related to the pair of concepts in Hegel's philosophy, i.e., analytical and synthetic concepts, are examined. In the conclusion of the article, Hegel's main philosophical views are identified, and the possibility of resolving the difference between analytical and synthetic through dialectical judgment is put forward. (shrink)

This paper shows that during the first half of the 1960s The Journal of Philosophy quickly moved from publishing work in diverse philosophical traditions to, essentially, only publishing analytic philosophy. Further, the changes at the journal are shown, with the help of previous work on the journals Mind and The Philosophical Review, to be part of a pattern involving generalist philosophy journals in Britain and America during the period 1925-1969. The pattern is one in which journals controlled by analytic philosophers (...) systematically promote a form of critical philosophy and marginalise rival approaches to philosophy. This pattern, it is argued, helps to explain the growing dominance of analytic philosophy during the twentieth century and allows characterising this form of philosophy as, at least during 1925-1969, a sectarian form of critical philosophy. (shrink)

/Analyticity theorists/, as I will call them, endorse the /doctrine of analyticity in ontology/: if some truth P analytically entails the existence of certain things, then a theory that contains P but does not claim that those things exist is no more ontologically parsimonious than a theory that also claims that they exist. Suppose, for instance, that the existence of a table in a certain location is analytically entailed by the existence and features of certain particles in that (...) location. The doctrine implies that the table's existence requires nothing more of the world than that those particles exist and bear the features in question. Analyticity theorists have alleged that this idea may be used to defend controversial existence claims against a battery of objections. I argue that this style of defense fails, because the doctrine faces counter-examples. An existence claim may be analytically entailed by some truth and still report a substantial further fact. (shrink)

Grace A. de Laguna was an American philosopher of exceptional originality. Many of the arguments and positions she developed during the early decades of the twentieth century later came to be central to analytic philosophy. These arguments and positions included, even before 1930, a critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a private language argument, a critique of type physicalism, a functionalist theory of mind, a critique of scientific reductionism, a methodology of research programs in science and more. Nevertheless, de Laguna identified (...) herself as a defender of the speculative vision of philosophy, a vision which, in her words, “analytic philosophy condemns.” I outline her speculative vision of philosophy as well as what is, in effect, an argument she offers against analytic philosophy. This is an argument against the view that key parts of established opinion, e.g., our best theoretical physics or most certain common sense, should be assumed to be true in order to answer philosophical questions. I go on to bring out the implications of her argument for the approaches to philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Willard V. Quine and David Lewis, and I also compare the argument to recent, related arguments against analytic philosophy. I will suggest that de Laguna offers a viable critique of analytic philosophy and an alternative approach to philosophy that meets this critique. (shrink)

Philosophy in the English-speaking world is dominated by analytic approaches to its problems and projects; but theology has been dominated by alternative approaches. Many would say that the current state in theology is not mere historical accident, but is, rather, how things ought to be. On the other hand, many others would say precisely the opposite: that theology as a discipline has been beguiled and taken captive by 'continental' approaches, and that the effects on the discipline have been largely deleterious. (...) The methodological divide between systematic theologians and analytic philosophers of religion is ripe for exploration. The present volume represents an attempt to begin a much-needed interdisciplinary conversation about the value of analytic philosophical approaches to theological topics. Most of the essays herein are sympathetic toward the enterprise the editors are calling analytic theology; but, with an eye toward balance, the volume also includes essays and an introduction that try to offer more critical perspectives on analytic theology. (shrink)