Perceptual fluency is the subjective experience of ease with which an incoming stimulus is processed. Although perceptual fluency is assessed by speed of processing, it remains unclear how objective speed is related to subjective experiences of fluency. We present evidence that speed at different stages of the perceptual process contributes to perceptual fluency. In an experiment, figure-ground contrast influenced detection of briefly presented words, but not their identification at longer exposure durations. Conversely, font in which the word was written influenced (...) identification, but not detection. Both contrast and font influenced subjective fluency. These findings suggest that speed of processing at different stages condensed into a unified subjective experience of perceptual fluency. (shrink)

The multifunctional zinc‐finger protein CCCTC‐binding factor (CTCF) is a very strong candidate for the role of coordinating the expression level of coding sequences with their three‐dimensional position in the nucleus, apparently responding to a “code” in the DNA itself. Dynamic interactions between chromatin fibers in the context of nuclear architecture have been implicated in various aspects of genome functions. However, the molecular basis of these interactions still remains elusive and is a subject of intense debate. Here we discuss the nature (...) of CTCF‐DNA interactions, the CTCF‐binding specificity to its binding sites and the relationship between CTCF and chromatin, and we examine data linking CTCF with gene regulation in the three‐dimensional nuclear space. We discuss why these features render CTCF a very strong candidate for the role and propose a unifying model, the “CTCF code,” explaining the mechanistic basis of how the information encrypted in DNA may be interpreted by CTCF into diverse nuclear functions. (shrink)

P3 is the most prominent of the electrical potentials of the human electroencephalogram that are sensitive to psychological variables. According to the most influential current hypothesis about its psychological significance [E. Donchin's], the “context updating” hypothesis, P3 reflects the updating of working memory. This hypothesis cannot account for relevant portions of the available evidence and it entails some basic contradictions. A more general formulation of this hypothesis is that P3 reflects the updating of expectancies. This version implies that P3-evoking stimuli (...) are initially unexpected but later become expected. This contradiction cannot be resolved within this formulation. The alternative “context closure” hypothesis retains the concept of “strategic information processing” emphasized by the context updating hypothesis. P3s are evoked by events that are awaited when subjects deal with repetitive, highly structured tasks; P3s arise from subjects' combining successive stimuli into larger units. The tasks in which P3s are elicited can accordingly be classified in terms of their respective formal sequences of stimuli. P3 may be a physiological indicator of excess activation being released from perceptual control areas. (shrink)

Perceptual fluency is the subjective experience of ease with which an incoming stimulus is processed. Although perceptual fluency is assessed by speed of processing, it remains unclear how objective speed is related to subjective experiences of fluency. We present evidence that speed at different stages of the perceptual process contributes to perceptual fluency. In an experiment, figure-ground contrast influenced detection of briefly presented words, but not their identification at longer exposure durations. Conversely, font in which the word was written influenced (...) identification, but not detection. Both contrast and font influenced subjective fluency. These findings suggest that speed of processing at different stages condensed into a unified subjective experience of perceptual fluency. (shrink)

THIS paper consists essentially of three parts. The first part argues the case for construing Nietzsche's remarks about Übermenschlichkeit as endorsing some specific set of character traits, of "virtues" if you like. To be an Übermensch, on this reading, is to possess or exhibit certain traits of character, traits which in the typical case are associated with notions of self-overcoming, sublimation, creativity, and self-perfection. An Übermensch, construed in this way, expresses Nietzsche's vision of the human ideal, of what human beings (...) should or might be like. In this sense Nietzsche merely continues the ancient project of articulating the human ideal, the conception of human perfectibility. Although Nietzsche's answer may appear to be shockingly different, the project of articulating a human ideal is scarcely radical. The project qua project is no different than that of Plato or Aristotle, the Stoics, Spinoza or Kant. For Plato, the philosopher-king represents the ideal of human self-perfection; for Aristotle megalopsychic man conjoined with the life of contemplation; for the Stoics apatheia and right reason; for Spinoza the intellectual amor dei was a necessary and perhaps a sufficient condition for human liberation; for Kant, the genuinely moral person qualifies as the human ideal, the person whose actions are always and only governed by the categorical imperative, although Kant would probably have called such a will a "holy" will rather than a human one. (shrink)

The paper tries to illustrate the influence of Aristotle's thought upon Brentano by arguing that the view that all psychological phenomena have objects was proably derived from the Aristotelian conception that the mind can know itself only en parergo, and that this knowledge presupposes that some other thing be in the mind "objectively". Brentano's contribution to Aristotle scholarship is illustrated by reviewing some of his arguments against Zeller's claim that Aristotle's God, contemplating only himself, is ignorant of the world. The (...) paper concludes with an attempt to explain the relative neglect into which Brentano's exegetical efforts have fallen. (shrink)

Auf der Basis einer Klärung des Begriffs des Vertrauens zu klären werden mit dem Vertrauen verbundenen sozialen Probleme analysiert. Es wird argumentiert, dass Vertrauen emotionalen Charakter trägt, dass es eine gemeinsame normative Basis und eine teilnehmende Haltung der sozialen Akteure zueinander voraussetzt. Die Argumentation entwickelt sich ausgehend von einer entscheidungstheoretischen Analyse typischer Situationen, die Vertrauen erfordern, aber in kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit einer Position, die glaubt, Vertrauen sei in einer solchen entscheidungstheoretischen Analyse bereits vollständig zu erfassen. Vertrauen wird als eine emotionale (...) Haltung charakterisiert. Darunter wird ein mentaler Zustand verstanden, der seinem Träger ein besonderes Bild der Welt vermittelt. Auf der Basis einer genaueren Charakterisierung der Weise, in der ein Vertrauender grundsätzlich die Welt und seinen Partner wahrnimmt, werden unterschiedliche Formen des Vertrauens in verschiedenen sozialen Kontexten, vom Vertrauen in Wirtschaft und Politik bis zu Vertrauen in engen persönlichen Beziehungen, Selbstvertrauen und Gottvertrauen, genauer analysiert. Abschließend wird argumentiert, dass die Fähigkeit, Mitmenschen auf der Basis akzeptabler Werte im Vertrauen gerecht werden zu können, eine Tugend im aristotelischen Sinne ist. Sie ist mit rationalem Handeln nicht nur vereinbar, sondern fördert unter gewissen Bedingungen eine rationale Bewältigung des Lebens. (shrink)

In den letzten zehn Jahren sind, angestossen durch Debatten in der Religions-und Kulturwissenschaft, auch in der Altorientalistik, in der Agyptologie, in der Bibelwissenschaft, in der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft und in der Judaistik neue Aspekte zur Anthropologie der Antike und ihrer europaischen Nachgeschichte in den Vordergrund getreten, die sich in die integrative Formel vom ganzen Menschen fassen lassen. Diese Formel wendet sich gegen eine dichotomische bzw. trichotomische Anthropologie und nimmt damit den bereits in der Anthropologie der Aufklarung formulierten Protest gegen die Trennung (...) von Geist und Korper auf. Die Geschichte und Absicht dieser Formel wird vom Herausgeber einleitend erlautert. Der Band dokumentiert diese neuen Diskussionen und erganzt sie um die klassischen Beitrage von E. Brunner-Traut und J.-P. Vernant.". (shrink)

The topic of the reduction of mental processes to biophysical mechanisms touches at the core of the mind–body problem, a puzzle in the philosophy of mind since the days of Descartes. This book is about philosophical aspects of neuroscience, centred on perspective dualism. The topic unfolds in the discussion of mechanisms in world and mind. Neuronal mechanisms of differing complexity are described in a general way. It is shown how models of such mechanisms may be classified and assigned to levels (...) of systems theory. Reduction strategies are applied to processes of life, mind, and consciousness. The aim is physicalistic, to explore if and how the mental may be understood in terms of biophysics and its mechanisms. (shrink)

While Rational Choice Theory (RC) may be understood as a theory of choice, which does not necessarily reflect actual deliberative processes, rule-following behavior is definitely based on a certain form of delibera- tion. This article aims at clarifying the relationship between the two. Being guided by instrumental rules, i.e., rules reducible to the maximiza- tion principle, is perfectly consistent with the fundamental behavioral assumptions of RC. But human individuals use other forms of rules in decision making, especially tie-breaking rules and (...) coordination rules. It is argued that within RC no satisfying account of such rule-following behav- ior can be given. In particular it is impossible to determine suitable pref- erence orderings such that coordinating may be understood as maximizing relative to these orderings. Still, once there is coordination, following a coordination rule may be perfectly consistent with the basic assumptions of RC. So there might be a more complex theory of action that incorpo- rates RC as well as a satisfying theory of rule-guided behavior. (shrink)

Im Zentrum der Untersuchung steht die Philosophie des modernen japanischen Philosophen Kitar??o?? Nishida (1870-1945) und ihr Bezug zur Frage nach der Interkulturalität. Nishidas Philosophie ist einerseits _interkulturell orientierte Philosophie_ - entstanden aus der interkulturellen Begegnung zwischen westlicher und japanischer Kultur im Rahmen des modernen Japans - und andererseits bietet sie einen Ansatz zu einer _Philosophie der Interkulturalität_. Der Ansatz gibt einen neuen Blick auf die globalen geschichtlichen Vorgänge frei - gesehen durch die Augen eines außereuropäischen Denkers. Mit Nishidas Philosophie und (...) ihrer geschichtlichen Stellung wird somit die Frage nach der Moderne im interkulturellen Kontext auf neue Weise virulent, so daß sich neue Fragehorizonte für das Denken der Gegenwart ergeben. (shrink)

The extent to which trust prevails can be measured by the subjective probability with which an agent expects another one to act in desired ways. An agent´s trust in other agents forms in repeated social interactions which typically have the structure of an elementary game of trust. The process of trust formation in such interactions may be described by a reputation function. It is argued that in view of real world processes of trust formation any adequate reputation function must satisfy (...) certain conditions. A simple model conforming to these conditions is presented. Analysing this example it is shown that there is a co-operative Nash equilibrium in a trust supergame which is in line with the basic conditions of trust formation. However, it is also proved that no process of trust formation can be reasonably similar to real world mechanisms and at the same time lead to subgame perfect equilibria in a trust supergame. (shrink)

The essay critically engages Woltertorff’s account of justice by challenging the political status of its archaeological defence of rights language, its prioritizing of ‘primary’ and therefore ‘procedural’ justice, its suggestion to think of rights as ‘social bonds’ and the validity of subjecting God and world under one and the same concept of ‘worth’.

Unlike the supergame model assumes agents in exchange situations will normally not be perfectly informed on past behaviour of their partners. Also, they will be able to choose their partners to a certain extend. A formal model is presented that attempts to take account of these facts. It is supposed that for any actor the probability of finding a partner for a lucrative exchange depends on his past behaviour. A model of reputation formation is presented as a formal description of (...) this interdependency. Based on this model it is shown that under certain conditions only co-operative conduct will pay in the long run. Thus it is confirmed that - given the mechanism of trust - rational agents may act trustworthy. (shrink)

Immanuel Kants "Grundlegung" ist ohne Zweifel einer der bedeutendsten Texte der abendlandischen Moralphilosophie. Sie gilt mitunter allerdings auch als einer der "dunkelsten" Texte Kants - wenn nicht sogar der abendlandischen Philosophie uberhaupt. Der Kommentar macht deutlich, dass die vorgebliche Dunkelheit im Wesentlichen der Tatsache geschuldet ist, dass der Text seit langem im Schatten der falschen Annahme gelesen wird, Kant wolle eine Begrundung (oder Rechtfertigung) des Sittengesetzes liefern, um damit den moralischen Skeptizismus abzuwehren. Liest man ihn stattdessen unter der (auch historisch (...) angemesseneren) Perspektive, dass Kant mit dem kategorischen Imperativ 'nur' eine neue Formel fur das Prinzip der allgemein im Schwange gehenden Sittlichkeit 'angeben und rechtfertigen' will, um so den moralischen Eudaimonismus durch eine Moral der Autonomie zu ersetzen - dann zeigt sich, dass der Text nicht bloss ein philosophisches, sondern zugleich ein schriftstellerisches Meisterwerk ist. (shrink)

David Hume behauptet im Kapitel X der ersten Enquiry, eine "ewige Schranke" gegen den Wunderglauben entdeckt zu haben. Das Argument beruht wesentlich auf Humes innovativer, strikter Unterscheidung von demonstration, proof und probability, sowie dem Nachweis, daß jedem Wunder um seines Wundercharakters willen immer schon ein proof entgegensteht. Wunderzeugnisse hingegen können, aufgrund ihres speziellen Gegenstandes und angesichts der menschlichen Natur, diesem proof allenfalls eine probability entgegensetzen : Wunder lassen sich somit grundsätzlich nicht durch fremde Zeugnisse belegen.—Anders als in der Hume-Literatur zumeist (...) unterstellt, hängt Humes Argument grundsätzlich nicht von einer Abwägung einander entgegenstehender Wahrscheinlichkeiten ab, sondern ausschließlich von seiner inhaltlichen Unterscheidung zwischen proof und probability. Nach einer genauen Bestimmung dieser zumeist vernachlässigten Unterscheidung wird das Humesche Argument als unter diesen Voraussetzungen schlüssig nachgewiesen; abschließend wird seine Reichweite bestimmt. (shrink)

Descartes' place in history, by L. J. Lafleur.--A central ambiguity in Descartes, by S. Rosen.--Doubt, common sense and affirmation in Descartes and Hume, by H. J. Allen.--Some remarks on logic and the cogito, by R. N. Beck.--The cogito, an ambiguous performance, by J. B. Wilbur.--The modalities of Descartes' proofs for the existence of God, by B. Magnus.--Descartes and the phenomenological problem of the embodiment of consciousness, by J. M. Edie.--The person and his body: critique of existentialist responses to Descartes, by (...) P. A. Bertocci. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger's fame and influence are based, for the most part, on his first work, Being and Time. That this was to have been the first half of a larger two-volume project, the second half of which was never completed, is well known. That Heidegger's subsequent writings have been continuous developments of that project, in some sense, is generally acknowledged, although there is considerable disagreement concerning the manner in which his later works stand related to Being and Time. Heidegger scholars (...) are deeply divided over that question. Some maintain that there is a sharp thematic cleavage in Heidegger's thought, so that the later works either refute or, at best, abandon the earlier themes. Others maintain that even to speak of a shift or a "reversal" in Heidegger's thinking is mistaken and argue, in conse quence, that his thinking develops entirely consistently. Lastly, there are those who admit a shift in emphasis and themes in his works but introduce a principle of complementarity - the shift is said to repre sent a logical development of his thi.nking. Too often the groups re semble armed camps. (shrink)

This reading of Heidegger’s reading of the history of philosophy divides into three unequal parts. The first section glosses Heidegger’s construal of philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche as the metaphysics of presence, as ontotheology, as Being’s own historic destiny, a destiny of Seinsvergessenheit; and it glosses Heidegger’s construal from within the standard canons of historiography, from the perspective of today’s conventional wisdom. In brief and unsurprisingly, viewed from the strict constructionist standpoint—viewed as a “straight” reading of philosophy’s history—Heidegger’s interpretation cannot (...) stand. The fact that it is an historical misreading proves to be stunningly uninteresting, however, and fails to account for its influence. So an altogether different approach to Heidegger’s reading is proposed in the second section of this paper. Turning the historical tables, the tables of influence, Heidegger’s appropriation of the tradition, his deconstruction of it, is construed—in Bloom’s terms—as poetic misprision, as a strong misreading, one which responds to its own imperatives. The temptation to construe the straight reading /strong misreading distinction as like the “historical” vs. “philosophical” distinction in reading the history of philosophy is entertained briefly. It is later urged that we give up altogether the distinction in kind between historical and philosophical readings of the history of philosophy; for that distinction makes sense only if we accept the picture of philosophy as an enterprise whose business it is to confront a reasonably fixed list of issues within a timeless neutral matrix: To give up this picture is to give up the distinction at the same time. These two readings of Heidegger—strict constructionist straight reading and deconsructionist strong misreading—appear irreconcilable; so an attempt is made in section III to trope this difference in readings. Specifically, the incommensurability of the two perspectives, the two readings of philosophy’s history, is analyzed in terms of the difference between normal and abnormal discourse. Abnormal discourse, like Kuhn’s “revolutionary science,” may well be tomorrow’s normal discourse; but in exploring this suggestion further some important points of contrast between Kuhnian and Heideggerian readings emerge. In Kuhn’s reading of, for example, the history of science the question whether the normal science of the day is to be supplanted by the new paradigm may be decided by a complex gestalt-switch, a reorientation occasioned by anomalous cases, a reexamination of data hitherto ruled out by the discourse of the day. Kuhn’s “revolutionary” paradigms drive practitioners back upon data; but Heidegger’s metahistorical reading of the history of philosophy does not drive us back to data, back to the texts. This raises the question of the sense in which Heidegger’s abnormal discourse ever could become normal discourse, ever could function as a new paradigm. I conclude, with Rorty, that Heidegger’s metahistory of philosophy cannot be institutionalized as some abnormal discourse can and that, in consequence, Heideggerians who approach the history of philosophy as if he had found the key to unlock its mysteries—or its horrors, if you prefer—are confused about Heidegger’s discourse, confused about its possibilities in a way that he himself was not. (shrink)

Die Geltung der Menschenrechte kann verteidigt werden. Wer zwischen der imperialen Behauptung, die Menschenrechte seien ein triumphales Produkt des "Westens", und der relativistischen Beteuerung, sie seien "bloss" westlich, nicht wahlen mochte, tut gut daran, die Debatte um die "affirmative Genealogie", die Hans Joas in seiner Apologie der Menschenrechte entwickelt hat, genau zu verfolgen. In "Der Westen und die Menschenrechte" plausibilisiert Joas noch einmal seinen Standpunkt und reagiert scharfsinnig auf die Debatte, die in diesem Buch durch namhafte Wissenschaftler gefuhrt wird. Wer (...) mit menschenrechtlichen Fragen zu tun hat - sei es akademisch, politisch oder in anderen Engagements - und diese gegen ihre Ideologisierung oder Relativierung in Schutz nehmen will, wird zu diesem Buch greifen mussen. Mit Beitragen von Heiner Bielefeldt, Daniel Bogner, Bernd Irlenborn, Christian Hillgruber, Hans Joas, Michael Kuhnlein, Hans Maier, Christoph Mollers, Matthias Sellmann, Ludwig Siep, Tine Stein, Jean-Pierre Wils und Rolf Zimmermann. (shrink)