For most of the 20th century, it was possible to regard fertilisation as the identifiable point when life begins, because this moment could be defined unequivocally and was thought to be the single most essential biological step in the establishment of a new human entity. Since the successful reproductive cloning of Dolly and other mammals, it is clear that any human cell has the potential to supply the full genome of an embryo, and hence a person, without going through fertilisation. (...) At what point in time do such embryos acquire the respect accorded to human beings? The authors argue that the time of implantation is the most useful point at which the potential and the intention to create a new person are translated into reality, because from that point a new life develops. Implantation differentiates a somatic cell in culture from a human entity that has acquired its own identity and developmental potential. The authors examine the value of quickening or viability as alternative developmental stages in the process of acquiring respect for the Dolly embryo. (shrink)

Recent advances in natural language processing have given rise to a new kind of AI architecture: the language agent. By repeatedly calling an LLM to perform a variety of cognitive tasks, language agents are able to function autonomously to pursue goals specified in natural language and stored in a human-readable format. Because of their architecture, language agents exhibit behavior that is predictable according to the laws of folk psychology: they function as though they have desires and beliefs, and then make (...) and update plans to pursue their desires given their beliefs. We argue that the rise of language agents significantly reduces the probability of an existential catastrophe due to loss of control over an AGI. This is because the probability of such an existential catastrophe is proportional to the difficulty of aligning AGI systems, and language agents significantly reduce that difficulty. In particular, language agents help to resolve three important issues related to aligning AIs: reward misspecification, goal misgeneralization, and uninterpretability. (shrink)

This paper aims to integrate insights from psychoanalytic theory into business ethics research on the sources of ethical failures within organizations. We particularly draw from the analysis of sources and outcomes of neurotic processes that are part of human development, as described by the psychoanalyst Karen Horney and more recently by Manfred Kets de Vries; we interpret their insights from a stakeholder theory perspective. Business ethics research seems to have overlooked how “neurotic management styles” could be the antecedents of unethical (...) behavior within organizations. After showing the connection between five managerial neuroses and the corresponding potential ethical failures within organizations that have been already identified within business ethics research, we suggest three organizational strategies to counteract these failures. First, we argue that managers should pay greater attention at the complexity of human motivation, avoiding the simplistic view of compliance‐based approaches. Second, we discuss the importance of developing a conversation around values within organizations, enabling healthy individual growth and limiting the emergence of neurotic processes. Finally, we discuss the role of the business ethicist in facilitating such a process, suggesting a parallel between the role of the business ethicist and that of the psychoanalytic therapist. (shrink)

This paper critically assesses Sosa’s normative framework for performances as well as its application to epistemology. We first develop a problem for one of Sosa’s central theses in the general theory of performance normativity according to which performances attain fully desirable status if and only if they are fully apt. More specifically, we argue that given Sosa’s account of full aptness according to which a performance is fully apt only if safe from failure, this thesis can’t be true. We then (...) embark on a rescue mission on behalf of Sosa and work towards a weakened account of full aptness. The key idea is to countenance a distinction between negligible and non-negligible types of risk and to develop an account of full aptness according to which even performances that are endangered by risk can be fully apt, so long as the risk is of a negligible type. While this alternative account of full aptness solves the problem we developed for Sosa earlier on, there is also bad news for Sosa. When applied to epistemology, the envisaged treatment of barn façade cases as cases in which the agent falls short of fully apt belief will no longer work. We show that, as a result, Sosa faces a new version of a familiar dilemma for virtue epistemology. Either he construes full aptness as strong enough to get barn façade cases right in which case his view will run right into the problem we develop. Or else he construes full aptness as weak enough to avoid this problem but then he will not be able to deal with barn façade cases in the way envisaged. (shrink)

In this paper we describe a few interrelated issues for validating theories that posit levels of consciousness. First, validating levels of consciousness requires consensus about the ordering of conscious states, which cannot be easily achieved. This problem is particularly severe if we believe conscious states can be irreducibly smeared over time. Second, the relationship between conscious states is probably sometimes intransitive, which means levels of consciousness will not be amenable to a single continuous measure. Finally, even if a multidimensional approach (...) to levels of consciousness is adopted, we argue that there are further problems for its validation. (shrink)

Greg Ray (2014) believes he has discovered a crucial oversight in Donald Davidson’s semantic programme, recognition of which paves the way for a novel approach to Davidsonian semantics. We disagree: Ray’s novel approach involves a tacit appeal to pre-existing semantic knowledge which vitiates its interest as a development of the Davidsonian programme.

Judge Edwin Cameron (South African Supreme Court of Appeal) makes a plea for a radical change of approach and of formal health policy in relation to HIV/AIDS in South Africa. Cameron delivered this lecture at the University of KwaZulu-Natal Forum on 4 May 2006 as part of the Ronald Louw Memorial Campaign, 'Get Tested, Get Treated'. Ronald Louw was a Professor of Law at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, an AIDS treatment activist and co-founder of the Durban Gay and (...) Lesbian Community Centre. He died of AIDS in 2005. Cameron, who was appointed by Nelson Mandela to the high court in 1994, is a high profile AIDS activist and gay rights advocate. He has written about the experience of his decision to make public his own HIV positive status in the book, Witness to AIDS (Tafelberg). (shrink)

J. M. Cameron; XII—Poetic Imagination, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 219–240, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristote.

J. M. Cameron; XII—Poetic Imagination, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 219–240, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristote.

Essays by 13 contributors on the philosophical writings of Hume, Comenius, Kant, & Spinoza.

Helen Freeman; Interests and Educational Value, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 9, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 119–136, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.146.

Helen Freeman; On Women’s Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 11, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 113–135, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.197.

For Emily Dickinson, perhaps no more so than for the rest of us, there was a powerful discrepancy between what was "inner than the Bone"1 and what could be acknowledged. To the extent that her poems are a response to that discrepancy—are, on one hand, a defiant attempt to deny that the discrepancy poses a problem and, on the other, an admission of defeat at the problem's enormity—they have much to teach us about the way in which language articulates our (...) life. There is indeed a sense in which these poems test the limits of what we might reveal if we tried and also of what, despite our exertions, will not give itself over to utterance. The question of the visibility of interior experience is one that will concern me in this essay, for it lies at the heart of what Dickinson makes present to us. In "The Dream of Communication," Geoffrey Hartman writes: "Art represents a self which is either insufficiently present or feels itself as not presentable."2 On both counts one thinks of Dickinson, for her poems disassemble the body in order to penetrate to the places where the feelings lie as if hidden, and they tell us that bodies are not barriers the way we sometimes think they are. Despite the staggering sophistication with which we discuss complex issues, like Dickinson we have few words, if any, for what happens inside us. Perhaps this is because we have been taught to conceive of ourselves as perfectly inexplicable or, if explicable, then requiring the aid of someone else to scrutinize what we are explicating to validate it. We have been taught that we cannot see for ourselves—this despite the current emphasis on our proprioceptive functions. But Dickinson tells us that we can see. More important, she tells us how to name what we see. · 1. The Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson, ed. Thomas H. Johnson , n. 321.· 2. Geoffrey Hartman, "The Dream of Communication," in I. A. Richards: Essays in His Honor, ed. Reuben Brower et al. , p. 173. Sharon Cameron, associate professor of English at Johns Hopkins University, is currently preparing a theoretical study of the lyric and is examining the relationship between obsession and lyrical structures. The present essay is part of her Lyric Time: Dickinson and the Limits of Genre. (shrink)

Recent Developments Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11673-010-9235-5 Authors John Coggon, University of Manchester Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, Institute for Science, Ethics, and Innovation, School of Law Manchester UK Cameron Stewart, University of Sydney Centre for Health Governance, Law and Ethics, Sydney Law School Sydney NSW 2006 Australia Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 7 Journal Issue Volume 7, Number 2.

Immanuel Kant is often thought of as a great skeptic of religion. His onslaught against the traditional arguments for the existence of God in the Critique of Pure Reason is considered decisive evidence of his efforts to destroy theology. This text demonstrates that such an interpretation is mistaken. When Kant attacks the traditional arguments for the existence of God, he is doing so in order to clear the ground, as it were, in anticipation of a more convincing, moral apologetic.

Max Picard (1888-1965) was a Swiss-German writer, who converted to Catholicism from Judaism. A doctor and psychologist, Picard worked in Berlin but retired in the 1920s to Switzerland. He is often regarded as a "wisdom thinker," and his rich and penetrating writings continue to speak to us in the twenty-first century. The Flight from God is an incisive, profound description of many of the problems facing modern culture, and its analysis resonates with us more today than when first published in (...) 1934. Picard illustrates that modern culture is essentially in Flight, and so the individual is under pressure to make a choice; in earlier generations only an individual could be in flight because the culture itself was not in flight but in Faith. The flight does not require courage or guilt; yet it is to be found in, and is often destructive of, many facets of life including human relationships, art, economics, science, entertainment, even religion. Because of this it leaves many in anguish, from which we seek alternative avenues of structure and meaning. Yet, in every person there is a residue that will not yield itself to the flight, and this is bound up with love, which reminds us of God. Picard shows how God is always somehow present in the flight--just when we think we are arriving from the flight, we find that God is already there. Picard's identification and discussion of the roots of the distresses of modern culture, and its attempts to grapple with the spiritual dimension of human experience, along with tensions created by freedom and individuality, are clearly still of the greatest relevance for us today. (shrink)

La révolution par d’autres moyensLa politique féministe en tant que réinstitution dans la pensée de Merleau-PontyCet essai est une tentative pour surmonter l’impasse qui a été relevée par de nombreuses critiques féministes de Merleau-Ponty, à savoir que sa dernière ontologie bloque certaines perspectives de changement politique. De fait, comme le soutenait Luce Irigaray, l’ontologie de la chair semble être un discours normalisant et totalisant dépourvu de toute différence. « Il n’y a pas d’Autre, écrit-elle, pour garder le monde ouvert ». (...) Étant donné que Merleau-Ponty développe une ontologie qui opère en amont du niveau des personnes et des choses proprement dites, on a souvent supposé prima facie que les projets féqministes, qui cherchent à fournir des fondements pour éliminer l’oppression basée sur le genre, n’y ont rien à faire.Malgré la longue tradition de débat féministe avec la centralisation du corps dans des textes tels que la Phénoménologie de la perception, je cherche ici à rediriger les philosophes féministes vers la dernière ontologie de Merleau-Ponty. Je le fais en lisant son ouvrage politique trop souvent négligé, Les aventures de la dialectique, ainsi que les notes de cours, récemment traduites en anglais, de l’année 1954-1955 sur L’institution et la Passivité. Non seulement, ces textes émergent à un moment critique dans le corpus merleau-pontien, mais encore, ils contiennent des possibilités politiques qui résultent de ce moment particulier. Dans ces textes et à travers eux, je propose une réexamen de l’engagement féministe dans l’oeuvre de Merleau-Ponty, libéré du discours sur le corps et dirigé, en revanche, vers un désir de changement politique enraciné dans le cadre institutionnel que l’on pourrait appeler aussi l’« intermonde ». Pour ce faire, lepremier pas, comme je le montre dans cet essai, est de prendre au sérieux le concept de “revolution” et ses développements dans l’ensemble du corpus merleau-pontien.La rivoluzione con altri mezziLa politica femminista come reistituzione nel pensiero di Merleau-PontyQuesto saggio è un tentativo di chiarire come molte critiche rivolte a Merleau-Ponty da parte del femminismo rischino di condurre in un vicolo cieco. Il problemafondamentale è il seguente: se la tarda ontologia di Merleau-Ponty precluda, o meno, le strade del cambiamento politico. Effettivamente, come Luce Irigaray ha argomentato, l'ontologia della carne sembra essere un discorso tristemente normalizzatore e totalizzatore della differenza. “Non [c'è] nessun Altro,” scrive Irigaray, “capace di tenere il aperto mondo.” Dato che Merleau-Ponty sviluppa un'ontologia che opera al di sotto del livello delle persone e delle cose, molti hanno presunto prima facie che i progetti femministi, che si mettono in cerca di una fondazione in grado di cancellare l’oppressione basata sull’identità di genere, non possano in alcun modo appartenerle.Nonostante l’ormai lunga serie di critiche che il femminismo ha mosso all’accentramento del corpo che Merleau-Ponty opererebbe in testi come Fenomenologia della Percezione, cercheremo in questa sede di reindirizzare il pensiero femminista verso la tarda ontologia di Merleau-Ponty a partire da un suo testo politico largamente trascurato, Avventure della dialettica, e dalle notes de cours del 1954-1955, recentemente tradotte col titolo Istituzione e Passività. Questi testi non solo emergono ad una svolta critica nel corpus di Merleau-Ponty, nel corso della quale egli muove dal primato della percezione alla dimensione dell’istituzione, ma contengono possibilità politiche direttamente derivanti da questo slittamento teorico. È in questi testi e attraverso questi testi che proponiamo di riavviare il dibattito femminista su Merleau-Ponty, mostrando come il pensatore francese risulti, in questa fase della sua opera, libero dai vincoli del discorso sul corpo e incamminato in direzione di un pensiero del cambiamento politico radicato nella struttura istituzionale di quello che potremmo chiamare l’“intermondo.” Il primo passo per fare questo, come mostreremo in questo saggio, consiste nel prendere sul serio il concetto di rivoluzione ed i suoi sviluppiall’interno dell’intero corpus merleau-pontyano. (shrink)

La révolution par d’autres moyensLa politique féministe en tant que réinstitution dans la pensée de Merleau-PontyCet essai est une tentative pour surmonter l’impasse qui a été relevée par de nombreuses critiques féministes de Merleau-Ponty, à savoir que sa dernière ontologie bloque certaines perspectives de changement politique. De fait, comme le soutenait Luce Irigaray, l’ontologie de la chair semble être un discours normalisant et totalisant dépourvu de toute différence. « Il n’y a pas d’Autre, écrit-elle, pour garder le monde ouvert ». (...) Étant donné que Merleau-Ponty développe une ontologie qui opère en amont du niveau des personnes et des choses proprement dites, on a souvent supposé prima facie que les projets féqministes, qui cherchent à fournir des fondements pour éliminer l’oppression basée sur le genre, n’y ont rien à faire.Malgré la longue tradition de débat féministe avec la centralisation du corps dans des textes tels que la Phénoménologie de la perception, je cherche ici à rediriger les philosophes féministes vers la dernière ontologie de Merleau-Ponty. Je le fais en lisant son ouvrage politique trop souvent négligé, Les aventures de la dialectique, ainsi que les notes de cours, récemment traduites en anglais, de l’année 1954-1955 sur L’institution et la Passivité. Non seulement, ces textes émergent à un moment critique dans le corpus merleau-pontien, mais encore, ils contiennent des possibilités politiques qui résultent de ce moment particulier. Dans ces textes et à travers eux, je propose une réexamen de l’engagement féministe dans l’oeuvre de Merleau-Ponty, libéré du discours sur le corps et dirigé, en revanche, vers un désir de changement politique enraciné dans le cadre institutionnel que l’on pourrait appeler aussi l’« intermonde ». Pour ce faire, lepremier pas, comme je le montre dans cet essai, est de prendre au sérieux le concept de “revolution” et ses développements dans l’ensemble du corpus merleau-pontien.La rivoluzione con altri mezziLa politica femminista come reistituzione nel pensiero di Merleau-PontyQuesto saggio è un tentativo di chiarire come molte critiche rivolte a Merleau-Ponty da parte del femminismo rischino di condurre in un vicolo cieco. Il problemafondamentale è il seguente: se la tarda ontologia di Merleau-Ponty precluda, o meno, le strade del cambiamento politico. Effettivamente, come Luce Irigaray ha argomentato, l'ontologia della carne sembra essere un discorso tristemente normalizzatore e totalizzatore della differenza. “Non [c'è] nessun Altro,” scrive Irigaray, “capace di tenere il aperto mondo.” Dato che Merleau-Ponty sviluppa un'ontologia che opera al di sotto del livello delle persone e delle cose, molti hanno presunto prima facie che i progetti femministi, che si mettono in cerca di una fondazione in grado di cancellare l’oppressione basata sull’identità di genere, non possano in alcun modo appartenerle.Nonostante l’ormai lunga serie di critiche che il femminismo ha mosso all’accentramento del corpo che Merleau-Ponty opererebbe in testi come Fenomenologia della Percezione, cercheremo in questa sede di reindirizzare il pensiero femminista verso la tarda ontologia di Merleau-Ponty a partire da un suo testo politico largamente trascurato, Avventure della dialettica, e dalle notes de cours del 1954-1955, recentemente tradotte col titolo Istituzione e Passività. Questi testi non solo emergono ad una svolta critica nel corpus di Merleau-Ponty, nel corso della quale egli muove dal primato della percezione alla dimensione dell’istituzione, ma contengono possibilità politiche direttamente derivanti da questo slittamento teorico. È in questi testi e attraverso questi testi che proponiamo di riavviare il dibattito femminista su Merleau-Ponty, mostrando come il pensatore francese risulti, in questa fase della sua opera, libero dai vincoli del discorso sul corpo e incamminato in direzione di un pensiero del cambiamento politico radicato nella struttura istituzionale di quello che potremmo chiamare l’“intermondo.” Il primo passo per fare questo, come mostreremo in questo saggio, consiste nel prendere sul serio il concetto di rivoluzione ed i suoi sviluppiall’interno dell’intero corpus merleau-pontyano. (shrink)

John Searle began to discuss his recently published book `The Construction of Social Reality' with Anthony Freeman, and they ended up talking about God. The book itself and part of their conversation are introduced and briefly reflected upon by Anthony Freeman. Many familiar social facts -- like money and marriage and monarchy -- are only facts by human agreement. They exist only because we believe them to exist. That is the thesis, at once startling yet obvious, that philosopher (...) John Searle explores in The Construction of Social Reality. (shrink)

Samuel Freeman was a student of the influential philosopher John Rawls, he has edited numerous books dedicated to Rawls' work and is arguably Rawls' foremost interpreter. This volume collects new and previously published articles by Freeman on Rawls. Among other things, Freeman places Rawls within historical context in the social contract tradition, and thoughtfully addresses criticisms of this position. Not only is Freeman a leading authority on Rawls, but he is an excellent thinker in his own (...) right, and these articles will be useful to a wide range of scholars interested in Rawls and the expanse of his influence. (shrink)

'Chains of Being' argues that there can be infinite chains of dependence or grounding. Cameron also defends the view that there can be circular relations of ontological dependence or grounding, and uses these claims to explore issues in logic and ontology.

In artificial intelligence, recent research has demonstrated the remarkable potential of Deep Convolutional Neural Networks (DCNNs), which seem to exceed state-of-the-art performance in new domains weekly, especially on the sorts of very difficult perceptual discrimination tasks that skeptics thought would remain beyond the reach of artificial intelligence. However, it has proven difficult to explain why DCNNs perform so well. In philosophy of mind, empiricists have long suggested that complex cognition is based on information derived from sensory experience, often appealing to (...) a faculty of abstraction. Rationalists have frequently complained, however, that empiricists never adequately explained how this faculty of abstraction actually works. In this paper, I tie these two questions together, to the mutual benefit of both disciplines. I argue that the architectural features that distinguish DCNNs from earlier neural networks allow them to implement a form of hierarchical processing that I call “transformational abstraction”. Transformational abstraction iteratively converts sensory-based representations of category exemplars into new formats that are increasingly tolerant to “nuisance variation” in input. Reflecting upon the way that DCNNs leverage a combination of linear and non-linear processing to efficiently accomplish this feat allows us to understand how the brain is capable of bi-directional travel between exemplars and abstractions, addressing longstanding problems in empiricist philosophy of mind. I end by considering the prospects for future research on DCNNs, arguing that rather than simply implementing 80s connectionism with more brute-force computation, transformational abstraction counts as a qualitatively distinct form of processing ripe with philosophical and psychological significance, because it is significantly better suited to depict the generic mechanism responsible for this important kind of psychological processing in the brain. (shrink)

Ed Freeman’s influential ideas on stakeholder theory, business ethics, humanities, and capitalism became foundational in the management field and turned around the mainstream thinking about business. Stakeholder theory developed by Freeman and others posits that business is not as much about profits, but rather about creating value for its stakeholders, including employees, customers, communities, financiers, and suppliers. The relationship between a company and its stakeholders is the essence of business and should be of utmost attention to its managers. (...) Managers should avoid resorting to trade-offs by prioritizing one stakeholder group (e.g., shareholders) over the others and strive to run their companies in the interests of all stakeholders. The idea of pursuing the interests of all stakeholders became revolutionary in management and went far beyond the management field, expanding to Law, Health Care, Education, Public Policy and Administration, and Environmental Policy. This book is a collection of Ed Freeman’s most influential and important works on stakeholder theory as well as business ethics, humanities, and capitalism. (shrink)

[opening paragraph]: Walter Freeman discusses with Jean Burns some of the issues relating to consciousness in his recent book. Burns: To understand consciousness we need know its relationship to the brain, and to do that we need to know how the brain processes information. A lot of people think of brain processing in terms of individual neurons, and you're saying that brain processing should be understood in terms of dynamical states of populations?

The last 5 years have seen a series of remarkable achievements in deep-neural-network-based artificial intelligence research, and some modellers have argued that their performance compares favourably to human cognition. Critics, however, have argued that processing in deep neural networks is unlike human cognition for four reasons: they are (i) data-hungry, (ii) brittle, and (iii) inscrutable black boxes that merely (iv) reward-hack rather than learn real solutions to problems. This article rebuts these criticisms by exposing comparative bias within them, in the (...) process extracting some more general lessons that may also be useful for future debates. (shrink)

Liberalism and Distributive Justice discusses liberalism, capitalism, distributive justice, and John Rawls's difference principle. Chapters are organized in a narrative arc: from liberalism as the dominant political and economic system, to the laws governing interpersonal transactions in liberal society, to basic economic and political institutions that determine distributive justice.

Is there an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism? The answer to this question has implications for our understanding of the nature of epistemic normativity. For example, some philosophers have argued from claims that epistemic judgement is not necessarily motivating to the view that epistemic judgement is not normative. This paper examines the options for spelling out an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism. It is argued that the most promising approach connects epistemic judgements to doxastic dispositions, which are related (...) to motivation in a fairly tenuous sense. It is also argued that this approach currently lacks a plausible and informative account of the nature and workings of these doxastic dispositions, and, hence, an explanation of the range of phenomena internalist theses typically set out to explain. The most promising route for developing such an account, based on recent expressivist work, is investigated and found inadequate for the task. (shrink)

Damon Tweedy is a psychiatrist, lawyer, and writer. He's also Black. While in his first year as a medical student at Duke University, one of his professors approached him in the classroom and asked why the light bulb in the room hadn't been changed, as requested. Tweedy realized that his professor assumed he was a maintenance worker, not a student. Tweedy never took up this incident with the professor, nor did the professor ever apologize. Tweedy recounts that his best "revenge" (...) would be to excel in the class, which he ultimately did. At the end of the semester, upon learning that Tweedy received the second highest grade of over one hundred students, this professor invited him to work as a research assistant in his... (shrink)

Deep learning is currently the most prominent and widely successful method in artificial intelligence. Despite having played an active role in earlier artificial intelligence and neural network research, philosophers have been largely silent on this technology so far. This is remarkable, given that deep learning neural networks have blown past predicted upper limits on artificial intelligence performance—recognizing complex objects in natural photographs and defeating world champions in strategy games as complex as Go and chess—yet there remains no universally accepted explanation (...) as to why they work so well. This article provides an introduction to these networks as well as an opinionated guidebook on the philosophical significance of their structure and achievements. It argues that deep learning neural networks differ importantly in their structure and mathematical properties from the shallower neural networks that were the subject of so much philosophical reflection in the 1980s and 1990s. The article then explores several different explanations for their success and ends by proposing three areas of inquiry that would benefit from future engagement by philosophers of mind and science. (shrink)

In De Anima 2.4, Aristotle claims that nutritive soul encompasses two distinct biological functions: nutrition and reproduction. We challenge a pervasive interpretation which posits ‘nutrients’ as the correlative object of the nutritive capacity. Instead, the shared object of nutrition and reproduction is that which is nourished and reproduced: the ensouled body, qua ensouled. Both functions aim at preserving this object, and thus at preserving the form, life, and being of the individual organism. In each case, we show how Aristotle’s detailed (...) biological analysis supports this ontological argument. (shrink)

Our prominent definitions of cognition are too vague and lack empirical grounding. They have not kept up with recent developments, and cannot bear the weight placed on them across many different debates. I here articulate and defend a more adequate theory. On this theory, behaviors under the control of cognition tend to display a cluster of characteristic properties, a cluster which tends to be absent from behaviors produced by non-cognitive processes. This cluster is reverse-engineered from the empirical tests that comparative (...) psychologists use to determine whether a behavior was generated by a cognitive or a non-cognitive process. Cognition should be understood as the natural kind of psychological process that non-accidentally exhibits the properties assessed by these tests (as well as others we have not yet discovered). Finally, I review two plausible neural accounts of cognition's underlying mechanisms—one based in localization of function to particular brain regions and another based in the more recent distributed networks approach to neuroscience—which would explain why these properties non-accidentally cluster. While this notion of cognition may be useful for a number of debates, I here focus on its application to a recent crisis over the distinction between cognition and association in comparative psychology. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to enter the conversation about stakeholder theory with the goal of clarifying certain foundational issues. I want to show, along with Boatright, that there is no stakeholder paradox, and that the principle on which such a paradox is built, the Separation Thesis, is nicely self-serving to business and ethics academics. If we give up such a thesis we find there is no stakeholder theory but that stakeholder theory becomes a genre that is quite rich. (...) It becomes one of many ways to blend together the central concepts of business with those of ethics. Rather than take each concept of business singly or the whole of “business” together and hold it to the light of ethical standards, we can use the stakeholder concept to create more fine-grained analyses that combine business and ethics; or more simply, we can tell many more, and more interesting, stories about business. (shrink)