1. Sae sidae rŭl yŏrŏ gan saramdŭl -- 2. Ŏdum ŭi sidae.

I attempt to adjudicate the disagreement between those who seek to reconceptualize disability as mere difference and their opponents. I do so by reviewing a central conviction motivating the resistance, concerning the relationship between disability and well-being. I argue that the conviction depends on further considerations about the costs and extent of change involved in accommodating individuals with a particular disability trait. I conclude by considering three pay-offs of this clarification.

I propose a conception of Confucian feminism faithful to the original vision of the Confucian masters centered on the moral ideal of the junzi. Although the junzi 君子 has traditionally been conceived as male-gendered, my proposal for Confucian feminism is predicated on reclaiming the junzi as a gender-transcending feminist ideal. It follows in the footsteps of two premodern Korean female Confucian scholars, Yun-ji-dang and Chōng-il-dang, who deserve to be considered the first Confucian feminists. Recognizing their Confucian feminism’s limitations, however, I (...) explore necessary conditions for reimagining the ideal of the junzi as a feminist ideal in contemporary Confucian East Asia. (shrink)

A common assumption in the selection of nonhuman animal subjects for research and the approval of research is that, if the risks of a procedure are too great for humans, and if there is a so-called scientific necessity, then it is permissible to use nonhuman animal subjects. I reject the common assumption as neglecting the central ethical issue of the permissibility of using nonhuman animal subjects and as being inconsistent with the principle of justice used in human subjects research ethics. (...) This principle requires that certain classes of individuals not be subjected to a disproportionate share of the burdens or risks of research. I argue for an extension of this principle to nonhuman animal research and show that a prima facie violation of the principle occurs because nonhuman animals bear an overwhelmingly disproportionate share of the risks of research without sufficient justification or reciprocal benefit. (shrink)

What should we do about “tainted” public commemorations? Recent events have highlighted the urgency of reaching a consensus on this question. However, existing discussions appear to be dominated by two naïve opposing views – to remove or preserve them. My aims in this essay are two-fold. First, I argue that the two views are not naïve, but undergirded by concerns with securing self-respect and with the character of our engagement with the past. Second, I offer a qualified defence of vandalising (...) tainted commemorations. The defence comprises two parts. I consider two prominent suggestions – to install counter-commemorations and to add contextualising plaques – and argue that they are typically beset with difficulties. I then argue that in some circumstances, constrained vandalism is a response to tainted commemorations which effectively adjudicates the demands of the two opposing views. (shrink)

The term, "objectionable commemorations”, refers to a broad category of public artefacts – such as, and especially, memorials, monuments and statues – that are regarded as morally problematic in virtue of what or whom they honour. In this regard, they are a special class of public artefacts that are subject to public contestation. In this paper, we survey the general ethical and political issues on this topic. First, we categorise the arguments on offer in the literature, concerning the objectionable nature (...) of such commemorations. Second, we review common political responses to objectionable commemorations. Finally, we identify fruitful areas for further philosophical inquiry on this topic. (shrink)

According to a prominent argument, citizens in unjust societies have a duty to resist injustice. The moral and political principles that ground the duty to obey the law in just or nearly just conditions, also ground the duty to resist in unjust conditions. This argument is often applied to a variety of unjust conditions. In this essay, I critically examine this argument, focusing on conditions involving institutionally entrenched and socially normalised injustice. In such conditions, the issue of citizens’ duties to (...) resist is complicated. I conclude by considering how my discussions may clarify a contemporary problem about engaging in resistance to aid potential migrants who have been turned away by states in accordance with widely accepted rules. (shrink)

Figure originale de la pensée chinoise, Wang Chong passe en revue, dans cet ouvrage, les conceptions de son temps. Alors que dans leur majorité les penseurs chinois se préoccupent en priorité de morale, il se donne un programme d'ordre épistémologique : la lutte contre l'erreur et le mensonge.

What is it for something to be a disability? Elizabeth Barnes, focusing on physical disabilities, argues that disability is a social category. It depends on the rules undergirding the judgements of the disability rights movement. Barnes’ account may strike many as implausible. I articulate the unease, in the form of three worries about Barnes’ account. It does not fully explain why the disability rights movement is constituted in such a way that it only picks out paradigmatic disability traits, nor why (...) only the traits identified by the movement as constituting experiences of social and political constraint count as disability. It also leaves out the contribution of people other than disability activists, to the definition of disability. I develop Barnes’ account. On my account, a person is disabled if she is in some state which is constitutive of some constraint on her legitimate interests. This state must be the subject of legitimate medical interest and be picked out by the disability rights movement as among the traits for which they are seeking to promote progress and change. My account addresses the worries about Barnes’ account. It is also able to include all disabilities, rather than only physical ones. (shrink)

One recurring criticism of the best interests standard concerns its vagueness, and thus the inadequate guidance it offers to care providers. The lack of an agreed definition of ‘best interests’, together with the fact that several suggested considerations adopted in legislation or professional guidelines for doctors do not obviously apply across different groups of persons, result in decisions being made in murky waters. In response, bioethicists have attempted to specify the best interests standard, to reduce the indeterminacy surrounding medical decisions. (...) In this paper, we discuss the bioethicists’ response in relation to the state's possible role in clarifying the best interests standard. We identify and characterise two clarificatory strategies employed by bioethicists —elaborative and enumerative—and argue that the state should adopt the latter. Beyond the practical difficulties of the former strategy, a state adoption of it would inevitably be prejudicial in a pluralistic society. Given the gravity of best interests decisions, and the delicate task of respecting citizens with different understandings of best interests, only the enumerative strategy is viable. We argue that this does not commit the state to silence in providing guidance to and supporting healthcare providers, nor does it facilitate the abuse of the vulnerable. Finally, we address two methodological worries about adopting this approach at the state level. The adoption of the enumerative strategy is not defeatist in attitude, nor does it eventually collapse into (a form of) the elaborative strategy. (shrink)

Conscientious disobedients often face the demand to differentiate themselves from criminals whose law-breaking actions are not undergirded by conscientious convictions. In public and philosophical discourse, conscientious disobedients are often criticised on the basis that their actions render them no different from criminals. I provide a qualified defence of disobedients in this essay. I argue that the differentiation demand can be satisfied even by disobedients who engage in what are typically regarded as radical acts of disobedience. In practical terms, this means (...) that even disobedients who engage in actions such as arson, looting, rioting, vandalism or vigilantism can also successfully differentiate themselves from criminals. (shrink)

The paper outlines a deflationary interpretation of Hegel’s metaphysics, as presented in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. It focuses mainly on the Science of Logic as a theory of categories, which explores the movement of the Concept. The major idea is to read Hegel’s identification of logic and metaphysics as a thesis on deflating metaphysics into logic and semantics. Hegel’s metaphysics, which may better be called logico-metaphysics, does not describe the objective world directly. Rather, as a second-order theory, it (...) unfolds and makes transparent the fundamental concepts that are necessary for our understanding of the world and our orientation in it. -/- The paper begins with a brief discussion of Hegel’s idea of philosophy as system. The argument is made that Hegel should be interpreted holistically, in contrast to the popular approach of distinguishing between what is living and what is dead in his philosophy. In the second and third parts of the paper, an analysis is given of Hegel’s criticism of Kant, with an explanation of how Hegel’s Logic further develops Kant’s project of transforming traditional metaphysics. Here, the interesting fact that Hegel’s logical categories are not derived from an absolute first principle is pointed out. Instead, the task of Hegel’s Logic is to comprehend and systematize the concepts that have already been evolved in the history of philosophy. In the last part of the paper, the deflationary approach is extended to Hegel’s Realphilosophie. While Hegel’s Logic takes the place of ontology, his Philosophy of Nature and Spirit offers a comprehensive metaphysica specialis, laying conceptual foundations for understanding various dimensions of reality, from nature through the ethical-political world to different cultural domains. The paper takes Hegel’s Philosophy of Objective Spirit as an example to illustrate how the deflationary interpretation sheds light on Hegel’s “practical” philosophy as a second-order theory that does not aim to uncover first-order normative principles for guiding actions, but rather to develop the concepts necessary for normative judgments. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Clinical CommentaryChong Siow Ann, Associate ProfessorDr. G appears to experiencing symptoms of schizophrenia, which is arguably the most severe mental disorder and which afflicts about one in a hundred people. This is a psychotic disorder that causes disturbances and distortions in thinking, including neurocognitive impairments, perception and behaviour. There is no cure for this often devastating disorder. Current antipsychotic medications can alleviate some of the symptoms but it often (...) comes at a price as these antipsychotics have burdensome side effects.A feature of this disorder is anosognosia, which is a lack of awareness or “insight” that an illness is present. This lack of insight presents a particular challenge because these individuals would, as in the case of Dr. G, refuse needed treatment as they do not perceive that they are ill. This is not necessarily an all-or-none phenomenon but is rather more complex and multidimensional; there might be an unawareness or recognition on behalf of the patient that they are suffering from a mental illness, the failure to appreciate the necessity of treatment; and/or the inability to recognise and define the psychotic symptoms like unusual thoughts and hallucinations as signs of illness1 and in many instances, all three are present. It is also by no means uncommon. Studies have found that between 60% and 80% of people with schizophrenia lack awareness of their illness to varying degrees.2This phenomenon remains an enigma. Some regard it as a form of psychological defence against the harsh reality of a psychotic illness — awareness of having a chronic and devastating illness might lead to demoralisation, hopelessness and suicide.3 Recent research, however, [End Page 250] indicates that this psychological denial plays a small part, if any, and instead has found an association with certain neuropsychological and neurocognitive deficits,4 as well as functional and structural brain abnormalities in the frontal lobe of the brain.5The prevailing clinical view thus is that this is an intrinsic and organic aspect of the schizophrenic illness which has nothing to do with wilfulness but rather the incapacity to perceive the presence of the illness. Edwin Fuller Torrey, an eminent psychiatrist and executive director of the Stanley Medical Research Foundation, calls anosognosia the “single largest reason why individuals with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder do not take their medications”, and he has remarked that “to keep talking about civil liberty is illogical. Patients are anything but free when they’re at the beck and call of their own delusions”.6It is also this view that it is a product of a brain disorder that some — particularly patients — find unacceptable. At one level, it does not take into context the person’s own experiences, and at a deeper level it calls into question the conception of the self with its capacity to exercise judgements and the autonomy to make decisions.This is a perennial ethical issue in psychiatry when people with severe mental illnesses refuse treatment. This becomes a Catch-22 situation where part of the illness that needs treatment is also preventing any treatment to be given: implicit in the principle of informed consent for treatment is that the person should be aware of the nature and course of their illness and acknowledge the need for treatment. While there are laws for involuntary commitment, the bar is usually high in that there must be a clear and present risk of harm to the person or others. Alan Stone, a professor of law and psychiatry at Harvard University proposed a possible justification for involuntary treatment based on his “thank-you theory” which assumes that patients will become well and subsequently agree that the intervention was in their best interests but research suggests that only half of these patients would admit so.7One suggested mechanism is the use of advance directives — psychiatry’s version of the living will in which people can specify what sort of medical care they would like should they become mentally unwell and unable to exercise appropriate judgement. An intrinsic part of this might include a “Ulysses contract” — just as Ulysess instructed his crew to lash him to the mast of the his ship so that he could... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Underplayed Ethics and the Dilemmas of Psychiatric CareChong Siow Ann and Tamra LysaghtThe practice of psychiatry is fraught with uncertainty. The exact causes and the biological substrates underlying mental disorders remain to be elucidated; even the diagnosis of these disorders is descriptive and not based on an etiological understanding and no biological diagnostic markers have been validated. The manifestation of almost all mental disorders results from a complex interaction (...) of biological and environmental factors which encompasses the patient’s unique life history, experiences and relationship with others and the community. In the face of such uncertainties — at times extending to the types of treatment (psychiatry is generally acknowledged not be an exact science) — it has been argued that adopting a pragmatic approach is necessary.1 Accordingly, this approach necessitates high ethical standards among mental health practitioners.Some mental illnesses are associated with varying degrees and types of cognitive impairments. Others have certain symptoms like auditory hallucinations and delusions that might severely compromise the patients’ autonomy, distort their sense of reality, increase the risk of harm to themselves or others and render them incapable of making informed decisions in their treatment and participation in research.Consequently, there are issues that are particular to the provision of mental healthcare. These include the need for enforced involuntary treatment with the corollary of depriving a patient of his personal liberty even [End Page 173] though it is often justified on the grounds that it is in the patient’s best interests. However, at times, it is the legal and societal obligation of mental health practitioners to protect those who might be harmed from the patient’s action that might seem to be more pressing. In this situation of double agency, lies the tension of providing confidential care for patients and acting as “an agent of the state” where that patient’s confidentiality might be breached and his liberty infringed upon. This situation is further aggravated by the stigma that clings ever so tenaciously to those who suffer from mental disorders and where it is the norm to stereotype them as dangerous and unpredictable.Consideration of a patient’s autonomy is also challenged by characteristics that are unique to the practice of psychiatry. The prescription of certain psychotropic medications can alter how people think and feel, while psychotherapy works towards changing the patient’s views and values. The philosopher, Jennifer Radden, describes this process as “re-forming the patient’s whole self or character … akin to the responsibilities of raising children”.2 The psychotherapeutic relationship is thus particularly personal and intimate because patients are asked to provide information that often reveals their innermost feelings, fears and fantasies. This information is provided on the basis of trust and assurance of confidentiality, and with expectation of being helped.Jeremy Holmes and Gwen Adshead have elaborated on the vulnerability of patients seeking psychotherapy: they might be particularly susceptible to exploitation because their past experiences of being exploited have led to their distress and help seeking — their dependency and the extreme privacy of the therapeutic relationship make any transgression difficult to be uncovered.3 There is a calamitous combination of the “unconscious wish in the patient to be used” with the complicity of an unethical therapist seeking to fulfil his own interests.4As in any other doctor-patient relationship, the relationship between the mental healthcare practitioner and the patient is one of unequal power where the former is ascendant. While that power should be exercised to heal and to relieve suffering, it also gives the practitioner tremendous power “to harm, reject, misunderstand, or exploit patients who struggle with the experience of mental illness, which itself may generate helplessness, despair, distress, and exceptional dependence on the clinician”.5 Given the potential of doing good and harm coupled with the likelihood of being so significant in the life of the patient,6 providing care for those with mental disorders and distress is necessarily ethically exacting — arguably more so than in other medical practice settings. [End Page 174]This precariousness has led to the suggestion that ethics in psychiatry should have a special status and that the more general principles of biomedical ethics are too limited in scope to... (shrink)

ABSTRACT In recent years, progressive activists around the world have fought to remove ‘problematic’ commemorations – typically, monuments commemorating and honoring individuals responsible for injustice, or even unjust events. Many of these problematic commemorations are vandalized before they are eventually removed. In this essay, I consider how the vandalism of problematic commemoration can transform the public honoring of a target, to a public repudiation or humiliation of that target. I discuss four obstacles to realizing the transformative potential of vandalism, and (...) how they may be mitigated or overcome. (shrink)

One of the central claims of the neurodiversity movement is that society should accommodate the needs of autistics, rather than try to treat autism. People have variously tried to reject this accommodation thesis as applicable to all autistics. One instance is Pier Jaarsma and Stellan Welin, who argue that the thesis should apply to some but not all autistics. They do so via separating autistics into high- and low-functioning, on the basis of IQ and social effectiveness or functionings. I reject (...) their grounds for separating autistics. IQ is an irrelevant basis for separating autistics. Charitably rendering it as referring to more general capacities still leaves us mistaken about the roles they play in supporting the accommodation thesis. The appeal to social effectiveness or functionings relies on standards that are inapplicable to autistics, and which risks being deaf to the point of their claims. I then consider if their remaining argument concerning autistic culture may succeed independently of the line they draw. I argue that construing autistics' claims as beginning from culture mistakes their status, and may even detract from their aims. Via my discussion of Jaarsma and Welin, I hope to point to why the more general strategy of separating autistics, in response to the accommodation thesis, does not fully succeed. Finally, I sketch some directions for future discussions, arguing that we should instead shift our attention to consider another set of questions concerning the costs and extent of change required to accommodate all autistics. (shrink)

This paper intends to append the frame of dialectic upon St. John of the Cross’ delineation of mysticism. Its underlying hypothesis is that the dialectical structuring of St. John’s mystical theology promises to unravel the web of relational concepts embedded within his immense writings on this unique phenomenon. It is hoped that as a consequence of this undertaking, relevant pairs of correlative opposites that figure prominently in mysticism can be elucidated and perhaps come to some form of resolution.

Effective altruism is purportedly ecumenical towards different moral views, charitable causes, and evidentiary methods. I argue that effective altruists’ criticisms of purportedly less effective charities are inconsistent with their commitment to ecumenicity. Individuals may justifiably support charities other than those recommended by effective altruism. If effective altruists take their commitment to ecumenicity seriously, they will have to revise their criticisms of many of these charities.

This paper analyzes and compares the doctrines of categories of Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, each of which is first discussed separately. The paper explains the essential double perspective of the problem, showing how a logico-linguistic analysis of the form of rational discourse serves for them as an important clue to ontological problems. Although Aristotle and Kant’s doctrines differ significantly, they both endorse a kind of isomorphism between language/thought and reality. By contrast, Hegel, who takes a critical attitude toward the capability (...) of human language and discursive thinking, rejects the possibility of deriving the structure of reality from the forms of predication or judgment. Nevertheless, the forms of judgment do play an equally crucial role in Hegel’s doctrine, though in a very different way from his predecessors. It is the structural “deficiency” of the judgmental form that turns out to be the driving force for the dialectical movement of the Concept. By shifting the primary concern from the categories themselves to the transitions between them, Hegel opens up the possibility of a dynamic system of categories. (shrink)

Social movements often impose nontrivial costs on others against their wills. Civil disobedience is no exception. How can social movements in general, and civil disobedience in particular, be justifiable despite this apparent wrong-making feature? We examine an intuitively plausible account—it is fair that everyone should bear the burdens of tackling injustice. We extend this fairness-based argument for civil disobedience to defend some acts of uncivil disobedience. Focusing on uncivil environmental activism—such as ecotage (sabotage with the aim of protecting the environment)—we (...) argue that some acts of uncivil disobedience can be morally superior to their civil counterparts, when and because such acts target people who are responsible for environmental threats. Indeed, insofar as some acts of uncivil disobedience can more accurately target responsible people, they can better satisfy the demands of fairness compared to their civil counterparts. In some circumstances, our argument may require activists to engage in uncivil disobedienceeven whencivil disobedience is available. (shrink)

This is a study of 288 Korean and 323 Japanese Business executives. The result indicates that, (1) the business executives believe basically in higher level business ethics, but (2) they occasionally have to make unethical business decisions which conflict with their personal values, because of prevailing business practices. (3) However, they think higher ethical standards is useful for long-term profit and for improving workers' attitudes, and the standards can be improved, and (4) to improve ethical standards, model setting by superiors (...) is the most important and clear-cut company policies and code of ethics are essential. (shrink)

A central idea of public reason liberalism is that the exercise of political power is legitimate when supported only by reasons which all citizens accept. Public reason serves as a necessary standard for evaluating the legitimacy of political decisions. In this paper, I examine the directive to employ public reason from the citizens’ perspective. I suggest that employing public reason potentially involves them engaging in different types of compromise. I consider how acknowledging these compromises sheds light on public reason liberalism. (...) Public reason may not offer a necessary standard for evaluating the legitimacy of decisions, and the evaluation it offers may not have great weight relative to other moral and political considerations. (shrink)

There are at least five kinds of causative constructions in Chinese, the constructions of the collocation of verbs and prepositional phrases, verb-copying constructions, “ba” constructions with an object ahead, verb-copying constructions with their complements, and pivotal constructions with commands. But the current type-logical grammar has no tools representing the meanings of causative constructions. It would be neither intuitive nor simple to describe these constructions by means of the current type-logical grammar. So we intend to improve the type-logical grammar by adding (...) CAUSE as a logical constant, complementing the structure rules about the movement and addition or deletion of some components of causative constructions, assigning categories to Chinese nouns and prepositions; then we give an intuitive as well as simple analysis on these causative constructions. Based on this work we shall extend the multimodal system of type-logical grammar, increase structure postulates, make constraints on frame semantics, and then prove the soundness and completeness of that system. (shrink)

Photovoice, a community-based participatory research method, employs images and words to convey participants' needs, concerns, and desires. It proves particularly valuable in researching marginalized communities who face elevated health risks, disease transmission, and social and health disparities. This paper seeks to investigate the ethical considerations inherent in photovoice research projects. We conducted an extensive literature review spanning four databases to identify pertinent photovoice studies. Ethical issues from the selected articles were identified, categorized, and summarized. Our analysis of twenty-five photovoice studies (...) uncovered various ethical concerns, which had been grouped into informed consent, participant safety and disclosure, privacy and confidentiality, misrepresentation, power dynamics, and compensation. In essence, our findings underscore the importance of addressing these ethical concerns to uphold the rights and autonomy of participants, even as photovoice research strives for authenticity, inclusivity, and empowerment. (shrink)

John Rawls’s use of the “fully cooperating assumption” has been criticized for hindering attempts to address the needs of disabled individuals, or non-cooperators. In response, philosophers sympathetic to Rawls’s project have extended his theory. I assess one such extension by Cynthia Stark, that proposes dropping Rawls’s assumption in the constitutional stage (of his four-stage sequence), and address the needs of non-cooperators via the social minimum. I defend Stark’s proposal against criticisms by Sophia Wong, Christie Hartley, and Elizabeth Edenberg and Marilyn (...) Friedman. Nevertheless, I argue that Stark’s proposal is crucially incomplete. Her formulation of the social minimum lacks accompanying criteria with which the adequacy of the provisions for non-cooperators may be assessed. Despite initial appearances, Stark’s proposal does not fully address the needs of non-cooperators. I conclude by considering two payoffs of identifying this lack of criteria. (shrink)

Kant insists that the use of concepts must be subject to empirical conditions if they are to have objective validity. This article analyses Kants distinction between empirical and transcendental truths. Since transcendental concepts are pure concepts without spatio-temporal content, their objective validity is of the same second-order kind as that of unschematized categories. This characteristic of transcendental concepts implies that the cognitive powers picked out by them are not particular psychological mechanisms, but rather abstract functional structures. Transcendental concepts owe their (...) objective validity to the realizability of the functional structures by empirical cognizers like humans. This relation in turn helps to explain the nature of transcendental truths. (shrink)

In public discourse, activists are often criticized for directing their acts of political resistance against this or that specific target. Underlying these criticisms appears to be a strongly held, though underarticulated, intuitive moral judgment that some targets are legitimate whereas others are not. Little philosophical attention has been paid to this issue. My primary aim is to address this neglect. I specify a central part of this intuitive judgment – centering on persons and activities – and argue that there is (...) a principled way to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate targets. This specification relies on a novel conception of political resistance, which focuses on its defensive rather than communicative aspect. I then extend the idea of forfeiture to argue that acts of political resistance are correctly directed when they are aimed at those activities of liable persons that cause injustice. My discussion contributes to vindicating our intuitive judgments about several controversial cases of political resistance. (shrink)

Both Carnap and Quine made significant contributions to the philosophy of mathematics despite their diversed views. Carnap endorsed the dichotomy between analytic and synthetic knowledge and classified certain mathematical questions as internal questions appealing to logic and convention. On the contrary, Quine was opposed to the analytic-synthetic distinction and promoted a holistic view of scientific inquiry. The purpose of this paper is to argue that in light of the recent advancement of experimental mathematics such as Monte Carlo simulations, limiting mathematical (...) inquiry to the domain of logic is unjustified. Robustness studies implemented in Monte Carlo Studies demonstrate that mathematics is on par with other experimental-based sciences. (shrink)

An extensive body of literature in sociology and anthropology has shown that different societies have developed different structures for exchange of items such as goods, status and information. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how social exchange theory can help illuminate many of the underlying bases of different ethical perspectives in debates about social exchanges. Social exchange theory is applied to three common types of knowledge exchange – R&D joint ventures, commercial intellectual property exchange and academic exchange. Two (...) key factors that underlie different ethical perspectives are shown to be differences in structures for social exchange and differences in views of the alienability of knowledge from its originator. (shrink)

Transcranial magnetic stimulation, as a relatively new type of treatment, is a safe and non-invasive method for pain therapy. Here, we used CiteSpace software to visually analyze 440 studies concerning transcranial magnetic stimulation in pain research from 2010 to 2021, indexed by Web of Science, to clarify the research hotspots in different periods and characterize the process of discovery in this field. The United States ranked first in this field. Lefaucheur JP, Fregni F, and Andrade ACD made great contributions to (...) this field of study. The most prolific institution was University of São Paulo. The four main hot keywords were neuropathic pain, motor cortex, connectivity, and non-invasive brain stimulation. There were three main points that were generally accepted: definite analgesic effect of high-frequency rTMS of M1 contralateral to pain side in neuropathic pain; there are inconclusive recommendations regarding rTMS of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in fibromyalgia and neuropathic pain; there is low-quality evidence that single doses of high-frequency rTMS of the motor cortex may have short-term effects on chronic pain. This bibliometric analysis indicated that prospective, multi-center, large-sample, randomized controlled trials are still needed to further verify the effectiveness of various transcranial magnetic stimulation parameters in pain research. (shrink)

Increasing complexity and specialisation of modern sciences has led to increasingly collaborative publications, as well as the involvement of commercial services. Modern integrative taxonomy likewise depends on many lines of evidence and is increasingly complex, but the trend of collaboration lags and various attempts at ‘turbo taxonomy’ have been unsatisfactory. We are developing a taxonomic service in the Senckenberg Ocean Species Alliance to provide fundamental data for new species descriptions. This will also function as a hub to connect a global (...) network of taxonomists, assembling an alliance of scientists working on potential new species to tackle both the extinction and inclusion crises we face today. The current rate of new species descriptions is simply too slow; the discipline is often dismissed as old fashioned, and there is a crisis level need for taxonomic descriptions to come to grips with the scale of Anthropocene biodiversity loss. Here, we envision how the process of describing and naming species would benefit from a service supporting the acquisition of descriptive data. Also see the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/E8q3KJor_F8. (shrink)

For Kant, both morality and the possibility of objective knowledge presuppose freedom. His theory of freedom is based on the distinction between phenomena and noumena, concepts which represent two different ways of viewing things. The question, however, is whether it is justified to take the noumenal perspective in addition to the phenomenal one. Isn’t freedom an illusion, if we regard ourselves as free, while in fact we are not? The crux of the problem lies in recognizing that there is no (...) objective fact as far as freedom is concerned, for objective fact is a category that belongs to the phenomenal world. Nevertheless, it is argued that freedom must be presupposed in order to account for the objectivity of the phenomenal world as a whole. (shrink)

During crises and uncertain situations such as the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, social media plays a key function because it allows people to seek and share news, as well as personal views and ideas with each other in real time globally. Past research has highlighted the implications of social media during disease outbreaks; nevertheless, this study refers to the possible negative effects of social media usage by individuals in the developing country during the COVID-19 epidemic lockdown. Specifically, this study investigates (...) the COVID-19 fear using the survey data collected from a developing country. In total, 880 entries were used to analyze the COVID-19 fear using the AMOS software. Findings indicated that information-seeking and sharing behavior of individuals on social media has a significant impact on perceived COVID-19 information overload. Perceived COVID-19 information overload has a positive impact on COVID-19 fear. In addition, fake news related to COVID-19 strengthens the relationship between perceived COVID-19 information overload and COVID-19 fear. The implication and limitations of the study are also discussed in the final section of the study. (shrink)

The gulf between multinational enterprises’ focus on high income countries and the reality of 80% of the world living in developing, bottom of pyramid (Hahn, J Bus Ethics 84:313–324, 2009 ) economies could magnify the anti-globalisation movement and political backlashes in the twenty-first century. The global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 has increased such social tensions throughout the world and creates greater challenges for, responsible leadership. In this conceptual article, the authors analyse the value and identity of local managers, (...) and the liability of foreignness caused by over-reliance on expatriate managers and under-reliance on local managers in bottom of pyramid countries (Hahn, 2009 ). It is argued that multinational enterprises need to assess local managers’ knowledge and contributions as having not only operational and market value, but also institutional value, such as access to local knowledge and local social capital; such a holistic approach will ensure fairer, equal treatment of all managers in the multinational enterprise. Responsible leadership in the twenty-first century requires a greater appreciation of local managers’ institutional value and the overcoming of any psychological distance towards local managers of bottom of pyramid countries. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on features of Aristotle's work (discussed in the Poetics) that can enhance our appreciation of Classical Greek tragedies and some of Shakespeare's works. Most important of these features is the production of the tragic effect, which consists of two parts: (1) the arousal of pity and fear to their maximum and (2) the katharsis or purgation of these emotions. The concept of katharsis has been interpreted in many ways and I will seek the most appropriate (...) interpretation. I argue that the maximisation of fear and pity that leads to the katharsis of these emotions can only be achieved by the unfolding of a well structured tragic plot and the revelation of character qualities in the tragic play. The successful tragedies from Classical Greece and the Shakespearean era possess the plots that were structured in a manner so as to produce the tragic effect to its maximum. I pay particular attention to Oedipus Rex of Sophocles and King Lear of Shakespeare to illustrate my point. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nonexistent Objects in Buddhist Philosophy: On Knowing What There Is Not by Zhihua YaoChong Fu (bio)Nonexistent Objects in Buddhist Philosophy: On Knowing What There Is Not. By Zhihua Yao. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. Pp. 186. Hardcover £29.99, isbn 978-1-35-012148-5. Nonexistent Objects in Buddhist Philosophy: On Knowing What There Is Not, by Zhihua Yao, cogently strings together different Buddhist schools' varied philosophical approaches to the cognition of nonexistent objects (...) (asadālambanajñāna) or non-cognition (anupalabdhi). Non-being and the knowledge of non-being have long been central to nearly every philosophical tradition. Buddhist philosophy, in particular, invests extraordinary intellectual effort to deal with these topics, since non-being (asat/abhāva) occupies a central role in the Buddhist doctrine. Yao acutely reconstructs a brief history of this philosophical enterprise of Buddhism from the early sectarian period to the time when the so-called logico-epistemological school prevailed. The book consists of an introduction and eight chapters. These eight chapters are basically based on Yao's previously published articles. They are further arranged into two parts: (1) "Cognition of Nonexistent Objects: A Historical Development" and (2) "Epistemological Approaches to Nonexistence." The first part discusses how philosophers from the Mahāsāṃghika, the Dārṣṭāntika, and the Yogācāra analyze the cognition of nonexistent objects. The philosophical development concerning this particular topic is masterfully articulated by Yao. This mastery is best shown in his unveiling of Yogācāra's philosophical inheritance from its Abhidharma legacy. In addition, his reconstruction deepens our understanding of the intricate history of sectarian Buddhism in a broader sense. The second part centers on the philosophical issues of nonexistence raised by the Buddhist logico-epistemological school. Yao's translation, presentation, and comparison of these philosophical arguments is strikingly lucid and comprehensive. Overall, one salient contribution of this book is that it highlights the importance of Pāli and Chinese sources in studying the history of Buddhist philosophy, especially Indian Buddhist philosophy. In Part 1, Yao's reconstruction of sectarian Buddhist philosophies is heavily based on the Pāli text Kathāvatthu and the Chinese translations of Samayabhedoparacanacakra, Śāriputrābhidharma, Vijñānakāya, Mahāvibhāṣā, *Janakaparamopadeśa, and Nyāyānusāra, whose Sanskrit or Prakrit originals have long been lost. In part 2, in [End Page 1] addition to comprehensively assessing Sanskrit and Tibetan materials, Yao detects a much-hidden philosophical development from Īśvarasena to Dharmakīrti by relying on Chinese commentaries composed by Chinese and Korean monks in the Tang Dynasty. Chapter 1 is of the most importance in the book; in it, Yao traces "an early origin of the concept of the cognition of nonexistent objects among the Mahāsaṃghikas and some Vibhajyavādins under their influence" (p. 13). Yao sensitively points out that "the thesis that latent defilements (Pāli: anusaya/Skt: anuśaya) have no objects constitutes the first step toward the formation of the concept of the cognition of nonexistent objects" (p. 19). The next step, as Yao analyzes it, is the proposition of awareness (Pāli: ñāṇa/Skt: jñāna) without objects due to the Mahāsaṃghikas and its sub-schools. Yao's philosophical reconstruction is eloquent and perceptive, especially when he outlines a crucial conceptual transition from the awareness that is without objects (anālambanaṃ jñānam) to the awareness that has nonexistent objects as its objects (asadālambanajñāna). However, one of the main supporting materials that he believes mentions the awareness that has nonexistent objects as its objects -- a passage from the Śāriputrābhidharma -- might be found less supportive without a more detailed justification. This passage is concerned with the concept of wu jingjie zhi 無境界智:What is the awareness without objects (wu jingjie zhi 無境界智)? There is no awareness without objects. Or, the awareness that arises when conceptualizing the past and the future dharmas is called the awareness without objects.1《舍利弗阿毘曇論》卷 9〈4 智品〉：「云何無境界智？無無境界智。復次思惟過 去未來法智生，是名無境界智。」(CBETA 2022.Q4, T28, no. 1548, p. 593c16–18)。Yao chooses an alternative reading based solely on the Taisho Edition, which interpolates one more 境 in 無無境界智 as 無境無境界智. This reading might result in a wholly different meaning: "What is awareness without objects? Any awareness that... (shrink)