In a time of intensified interest in an "ethic of virtue," Josef Pieper stands out as one who has pondered and written about the virtues for many years. This paper explores some aspects of Pieper's thought about the virtues and focuses especially on four problems: (1) the question of the unity of the virtues; (2) the relation between natural and theological virtues; (3) the dangers for Christian ethics of picturing virtue as habitual; and (4) the question whether virtue needs any (...) reward beyond virtue itself. (shrink)

By first analysing the arguments of psychiatry's critics and the philosophical ideas of such thinkers as Freud, Eysenck, Laing, Szasz, Sedgwick and Foucault and by then providing answers to the many contentious and diverse questions raised, Dr. Reznek aims to establish a philosophical defence of the theory and practice of psychiatry. As both a qualified philosopher and psychiatrist, the author is exceptionally p[laced to undertake the examination of a subject which has hitherto remained untackled. It will be easily accessible to (...) a wide variety of non-specialists as well. It will be of specific interest to those involved in the practice of philosophy, psychiatry, clinical psychology, social work and psychiatric nursing. (shrink)

By first analysing the arguments of psychiatry's critics and the philosophical ideas of such thinkers as Freud, Eysenck, Laing, Szasz, Sedgwick and Foucault and by then providing answers to the many contentious and diverse questions raised, Dr. Reznek aims to establish a philosophical defence of the theory and practice of psychiatry. As both a qualified philosopher and psychiatrist, the author is exceptionally p[laced to undertake the examination of a subject which has hitherto remained untackled. It will be easily accessible to (...) a wide variety of non-specialists as well. It will be of specific interest to those involved in the practice of philosophy, psychiatry, clinical psychology, social work and psychiatric nursing. (shrink)

Lawrie Reznek addresses these questions and more in his controversial investigation of the insanity defense in Evil or Ill ? Drawing from countless intriguing case examples, he aims to understand the concept of an excuse, and explains why the law excuses certain actions and not others. In his easily accessible and elegant style, he explains that in law, there exists two excuses derived from Aristotle: the excuses of ignorance and compulsion. Reznek, however proposes a third excuse - the excuse of (...) character change. In introducing this third excuse, Reznek raises a controversial possibility - the abolition of the insanity defence. (shrink)

Lawrie Reznek addresses these questions and more in his controversial investigation of the insanity defense in _Evil or Ill_? Drawing from countless intriguing case examples, he aims to understand the concept of an excuse, and explains why the law excuses certain actions and not others. In his easily accessible and elegant style, he explains that in law, there exists two excuses derived from Aristotle: the excuses of ignorance and compulsion. Reznek, however proposes a third excuse - the excuse of character (...) change. In introducing this third excuse, Reznek raises a controversial possibility - the abolition of the insanity defence. (shrink)

The rapid growth of online media has led to new complications in journalism ethics and practice. While traditional ethical principles may not fundamentally change when information is disseminated online, applying them across platforms has become more challenging as new kinds of interactions develop between journalists and audiences. In Ethics for Digital Journalists, Lawrie Zion and David Craig draw together the international expertise and experience of journalists and scholars who have all been part of the process of shaping best practices in (...) digital journalism. Drawing on contemporary events and controversies like the Boston Marathon bombing and the Arab Spring, the authors examine emerging best practices in everything from transparency and verification to aggregation, collaboration, live blogging, tweeting and the challenges of digital narratives. At a time when questions of ethics and practice are challenged and subject to intense debate, this book is designed to provide students and practitioners with the insights and skills to realize their potential as professionals. (shrink)

Contains an overall account of morality in its philosophical format particularly with regard to problems of observation, evidence, and truth.

Psychiatry is plagued with philosophical questions. What is a mental illness? Is it different from brain disease? Is there any objective way of determining whether behaviors such as criminal activity are mental illnesses? Should we explain "abnormal" behavior by reference to psychological forces, learning processes, social factors, or disease processes? This book aspires to answer these and other questions. Broadly divided into two halves, the first analyzes the arguments of psychiatry's critics and covers the philosophical ideas of such thinkers as (...) Freud, Eysenck, Laing, Szasz, Sedgewick, and Foucault. The second aims to provide a resolution to the problems raised in the first half by establishing a philosophical defense of the theory and practice of psychiatry. Dr. Reznek's stimulating work is the first to provide a comprehensive philosophical account of the main issues in psychiatry, including free will and responsibility, the excusing power of mental illness, and involuntary hospitalization. (shrink)

I argued that a value-free account of our concept of disease cannot be given. Part of this argument consisted in showing that diseases as a class do not constitute a natural kind. To understand this, we need only see that we define and classify conditions into diseases and non-diseases not in terms of their causes but in terms of their effects. While no philosophical position is watertight, the arguments overwhelmingly favour the conclusion that diseases do not constitute a natural kind. (...) Keywords: Disease, natural kind, value-laden CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In this essay, I contend that feminist theories of citizenship in the U.S. context must go beyond simply acknowledging the importance of race and grapple explicitly with the legacies of slavery. To sketch this case, I draw upon W.E.B. Du Bois's “The Damnation of Women,” which explores the significance for all Americans of African American women's sexual, economic, and political lives under slavery and in its aftermath.

We argue that in the decision making process required for selecting assertible vague descriptions of an object, it is practical that communicating agents adopt an epistemic stance. This corresponds to the assumption that there exists a set of conventions governing the appropriate use of labels, and about which an agent has only partial knowledge and hence significant uncertainty. It is then proposed that this uncertainty is quantified by a measure corresponding to an agent’s subjective belief that a vague concept label (...) can be appropriately used to describe a particular object. We then apply Bayesian networks to investigate, in the case when knowledge of labelling conventions is represented by an ordering or ranking of the labels according to their appropriateness, how measure values allocated to basic labels can be used to directly infer the appropriateness measure of compound expressions. (shrink)

We argue that in the decision making process required for selecting assertible vague descriptions of an object, it is practical that communicating agents adopt an epistemic stance. This corresponds to the assumption that there exists a set of conventions governing the appropriate use of labels, and about which an agent has only partial knowledge and hence significant uncertainty. It is then proposed that this uncertainty is quantified by a measure corresponding to an agent’s subjective belief that a vague concept label (...) can be appropriately used to describe a particular object. We then apply Bayesian networks to investigate, in the case when knowledge of labelling conventions is represented by an ordering or ranking of the labels according to their appropriateness, how measure values allocated to basic labels can be used to directly infer the appropriateness measure of compound expressions. (shrink)

In this essay, I contend that feminist theories of citizenship in the U.S. context must go beyond simply acknowledging the importance of race and grapple explicitly with the legacies of slavery. To sketch this case, I draw upon W.E.B. Du Bois's "The Damnation of Women," which explores the significance for all Americans of African American women's sexual, economic, and political lives under slavery and in its aftermath.

Psychologism in logic holds that logic is a branch of psychology. This view has been vigorously defended by John Stuart Mill and by a number of German philosophers of logic, notably Erdmann. Its chief critics have been Husserl and Frege and, to a lesser extent, Russell. Husserl set forth a profound and detailed critique of psychologism in Logical Investigations. This paper examines this critique. First, I explain why the psychologistic theory is attractive. Then I show that Husserl's critique is not (...) convincing, partly because he does not take the theory in its most plausible form and partly because he ignores certain important distinctions (for example, between what a statement is about and what it is true in virtue of). Then I raise two new objections to the psychologistic theory. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the psychologistic theory remains an important and serious position from which we can learn much about the status of logic. (shrink)

This is a new release of the original 1949 edition.

Toni Morrison: Imagining Freedom explores Morrison’s reflections on the idea of freedom in her novels and nonfiction from the 1970s to 2019. While Morrison’s literary achievements are widely celebrated, her political thought has yet to receive its due. Morrison’s writing illuminates the meanings of freedom and unfreedom in a democratic society that was founded on both the defense of liberty and the right to enslave and dispossess. Toni Morrison: Imagining Freedom argues that Morrison’s fiction and her meditations on the power (...) of language contest the wishful thinking of color-blindness and repudiate complaints that it is time to get beyond race. Morrison’s attentiveness to the experiences of people “no one inquired of,” especially her interest in the lives of black women and girls, reorients democratic inquiry in the shadow of racial slavery, settler colonialism, and the ongoing processes of theft and domination they set in motion. Morrison’s writings, Balfour contends, kindle new practices of freedom-seeking that do not rely on the subjugation of others. (shrink)

This article explores a case study of a mindfulness teacher, Beth, and her experiences of teaching mindfulness to 11- to 16-year-olds in several English schools. It shows why Beth was drawn to teaching mindfulness, which was both to alleviate the stress amongst her pupils and improve her own mental health. It illustrates how and why she became a confident, successful mindfulness teacher: she learnt about mindfulness at various classes, retreats and teacher-education training sessions, spending thousands of pounds on her own (...) training. It argues that her positioning as a mindfulness teacher in an unmindful school system created an overwhelming demand for her services, but also huge stress upon her. It develops McCaw’s conceptions of ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ mindfulness (2020), arguing that while Beth began by practising ‘thin’ mindfulness – seeing it as a way of solving exam stress amongst her pupils – she became increasingly a ‘thick’ practitioner; her experiences of mindfulness led to profound personal change and, ultimately, to her becoming very disillusioned about teaching mindfulness in an unwelcoming educational, ‘unmindful’ environment. (shrink)

This paper first explains why the charge of self-refutation against extreme relativism is so important and then defends extreme relativism against two of the most recent and most sophisticated accusations of self-refutation. It is shown that these accusations seem plausible only because they illicitly employ principles appropriate only to absolute truth; hence these accusations are unsound. One central topic of discussion in the paper is the relation between "a believes that p" and "p is true for a".

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Jack W. Meiland INTERPRETATION AS A COGNITIVE DISCIPLINE Interpretation is the fundamental method of the humanities. The humanist is concerned first to understand what a text, a speech, a work of art, means; and interpretation has this understanding as its goal. All of the other activities and aims of the humanist depend on interpretation. One cannot properly appreciate a work of art until one grasps what it means. Nor (...) can one appropriately evaluate it until this condition is met. Moreover, the importance of interpretation reaches far beyond the humanities into everyday life, where we interpret what we hear and read in order to grasp meanings. Its importance reaches into the sciences: the social sciences where one must interpret this individual behavior and that institutional practice, and the natural sciences where one must interpret the results of one's experiments. Because interpretation is of such fundamental and pervasive importance in our lives, it is urgent for us to understand what interpretation is and what it should aim at. In this article, I investigate the activity of interpretation by focusing on the interpretation of literary texts and by beginning with the views of E. D. Hirsch, Jr. Eleven years ago, Hirsch published Validity in Interpretation, a book which delves into the nature of interpretation in great detail.1 Richard Palmer has said that Hirsch's book is "the first full-dress treatise in general hermeneutics written in English," and continues, "In the years to come, it will undoubtedly take its place among the significant American works on the theory of interpretation. In a systematic and carefully argued presentation, the book challenges some of the most cherished assumptions that have guided literary interpretation for some four decades."2 1 think that Palmer's prediction has been fulfilled. Hirsch's book remains a decade later one of the very few systematic American works in this field,3 and it has been widely read, much used in university courses, and has significantly influenced thought on its subject. Validity in Interpretation presents a carefully worked-out position buttressed by philosophically-informed 23 24Philosophy and Literature and systematic argumentation in a way which reveals the fundamental questions at issue. Although there have been scattered criticisms of Hirsch's views,4 in my opinion there has not so far appeared the kind of searching critique which this book deserves in view of its attempt to deal with these issues so seriously and at such a fundamental level and in view of the influence which the book has had. The necessity for a critique is now reinforced by the recent publication of another book by Hirsch, The Aims of Interpretation, more than half of which is devoted to a further explication and defense of these same views.5 In undertaking to reply to Hirsch's position, I hope not only to cast doubt on that position but also, and mainly, to provide better foundations for the view which I hold. It is one of the great merits of Hirsch's work that it facilitates that constructive effort by attacking the issues at such a basic level, enabling us to come to grips with them immediately. In what follows, I will describe Hirsch's view, make clear what kind of position he holds, and defend his view against criticisms which I consider misguided. Then we will be in a position to assess his contentions and to defend an alternative theory. Hirsch's view is, briefly, that the interpretation of a literary work should aim at re-creating (or, as he sometimes puts it, "re-cognizing") the meaning which the author of that work intended the work to have. He opposes all views which ignore authorial meaning; views which hold that the meaning of a work may change through the ages, so that the work may have one meaning at one time and another meaning at another time; views which hold that the work may have meaning in virtue of its relation to the interpreter's interests, to the needs and problems of the interpreter's times or the spirit of his age, or in fact to anything except the author's intended meaning.6 The first point that must be... (shrink)

v. 1. Critical essays.--v. 2. Collected essays, 1929-1968.

This paper first explains why the charge of self-refutation against extreme relativism is so important and then defends extreme relativism against two of the most recent and most sophisticated accusations of self-refutation. It is shown that these accusations seem plausible only because they illicitly employ principles appropriate only to absolute truth; hence these accusations are unsound. One central topic of discussion in the paper is the relation between "a believes that p" and "p is true for a".

It is sometimes said that our age is an age of relativism. For example, Paul Tillich has expressed his “uneasiness about the victory of relativism in all realms of thought and life today.” Karl Popper tells us that “the main philosophical malady of our time is an intellectual and moral relativism, the latter being at least in part based on the former.” What Popper refers to as “intellectual relativism” consists in part in a doctrine about truth which is sometimes expressed (...) as “There is no such thing as absolute truth.” At other times it is expressed by saying “truth is relative.”. (shrink)

Le proslogion de saint Anselme n'est pas une oeuvre tres connue, bien que les commentaires de ses chapitres 2 a 4 sur l'argument appele par Kant ontologique soient en nombre infini.

The most important epistemological problem in psychiatry is the detection of malingering. This is a consequence of the fact that there is no objective way to confirm any psychiatric diagnosis. Psychiatric diagnosis is based on subjective complaints. The discovery of objective markers for psychiatric diagnosis is problematic because it presupposes we can tell valid from faked subjective symptoms. But this is the difficulty. If we use pervasive irrationality as a sign of mental illness, we encounter the problem of identifying pervasive (...) irrationality. To understand someone's behaviour, we have to assume it is largely rational. This precludes us from using behaviour to separate genuine from faked mental illness. There are a number of strategies used to solve any epistemological problem, and the most successful is the hypothetico-deductive method. If we use this, we can solve our epistemological problem. Genuine mental illness can be identified when it is the best explanation of the person's overall behaviour. Consilience of inductions is critical in supporting the validity of such explanations. This implies that it is merely a hypothesis that mental illness exists, and that we might discover that many mental illnesses, perhaps all, do not exist. We must embrace this possibility - only if we take a risk will we gain any knowledge. (shrink)

This essay considers W. E. B. Du Bois’s Darkwater as a window onto Du Bois’s political theory at an underexamined stage of his career and onto a challenge at the heart of black political thought: how to formulate a conception of collective life that regards the humanity of black women and men as a central concern. Exploring Du Bois’s attempt to articulate what can be seen through the lens of an avowedly “black” perspective and his creative juxtaposition of different modes (...) of writing, the author suggests why Darkwater remains a valuable resource for democratic theory in an age misleadingly described as “post-racial.”. (shrink)

The end of the twentieth century witnessed a resurgence of demands for reparations for slavery and segregation in the United States. At the same time, a chorus of prominent political theorists warned against the threat "identity politics" poses for democratic politics. This essay considers whether it is possible to construct an argument for reparations that responds to these concerns, particularly as they are articulated by Wendy Brown. To do so, I explore how Brown's analysis of the dangers of political organizing (...) around "wounded identities" and of appealing to the state for redress might inform and be informed by arguments for black reparations. (shrink)

In his valuable book [3], Israel Scheffler presents an extended critique of Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science. Scheffler argues against Kuhn's “main thesis,” namely that “... paradigm change in science is not generally subject to deliberation and critical assessment”. Scheffler does recognize, though, that there are important elements of Kuhn's view that themselves seem to conflict with this “main thesis.” For these elements seem to make possible deliberation, critical assessment, and objectivity in the discussion of scientific paradigms. So it appears (...) from Scheffler's critique that Kuhn's position is inconsistent. The puzzle is compounded by Kuhn's admission—indeed, insistence—that his book does contain “a preliminary codification of good reasons for theory choice. These are... reasons of exactly the kind standard in philosophy of science: accuracy, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness, and the like”. In his recent reply to Kuhn, Scheffler quotes this passage from Kuhn and says: “If these reasons are not... to be construed as utterly free of all constraints or themselves paradigm-dependent, then they allow the comparison of rival paradigms and make paradigm debates intelligible. Such intelligibility is, however, at odds with Kuhn's statement that the proponents of competing paradigms ‘will inevitably talk through each other’”. In this interchange between Scheffler and Kuhn, one gets the impression of people, if not paradigms, talking “through each other.” I think that this nonmeeting of minds is due to interpreting Kuhn as an opponent of objectivity when in fact he is not an opponent but a proponent. It is this misinterpretation which produces the apparent inconsistency in Kuhn's position. In this paper I suggest a way of understanding Kuhn which resolves this apparent inconsistency in his work and might help to focus discussion on the real issue between Kuhn and many of his critics. This suggestion has the crucial consequence of shifting the focus from objectivity to the real issue, namely truth. (shrink)