Glavni zadatak ove rasprave predstavlja analiza i interpretacija problema obicajnosti centralne kategorije Hegelove prakticne filozofije. Autor u drugom delu rada daje pregled ruzlicitih oblika recepcije problema obicajnosti u savremenim interpretacijama Hegelove politicke filozofije.

Immanuel Kant was one of the leading lights of 18th-century philosophy; his work provided the foundations for later revolutionary thinkers such as Hegel and Marx. This work contains the keystone of his critical philosophy - the basis of human knowledge and truth.

This new translation of The Science of Logic (also known as 'Greater Logic') includes the revised Book I (1832), Book II (1813), and Book III (1816). Recent research has given us a detailed picture of the process that led Hegel to his final conception of the System and of the place of the Logic within it. We now understand how and why Hegel distanced himself from Schelling, how radical this break with his early mentor was, and to what extent it (...) entailed a return (but with a difference) to Fichte and Kant. In the introduction to the volume, George di Giovanni presents in synoptic form the results of recent scholarship on the subject, and, while recognizing the fault lines in Hegel's System that allow opposite interpretations, argues that the Logic marks the end of classical metaphysics. The translation is accompanied by a full apparatus of historical and explanatory notes. (shrink)

In the Critique of Judgement, Kant offers a penetrating analysis of our experience of the beautiful and the sublime. He discusses the objectivity of taste, aesthetic disinterestedness, the relation of art and nature, the role of imagination, genius and originality, the limits of representation, and the connection between morality and the aesthetic. He also investigates the validity of our judgements concerning the degree in which nature has a purpose, with respect to the highest interests of reason and enlightenment. The (...) work profoundly influenced the artists, writers, and philosophers of the classical and romantic period, including Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. In addition, it has remained a landmark work in fields such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, the Frankfurt School, analytical aesthetics, and contemporary critical theory. Today it remains an essential work of philosophy, and required reading for all with an interest in aesthetics. (shrink)

This translation of The Science of Logic (also known as 'Greater Logic') includes the revised Book I (1832), Book II (1813) and Book III (1816). Recent research has given us a detailed picture of the process that led Hegel to his final conception of the System and of the place of the Logic within it. We now understand how and why Hegel distanced himself from Schelling, how radical this break with his early mentor was, and to what extent it entailed (...) a return (but with a difference) to Fichte and Kant. In the introduction to the volume, George Di Giovanni presents in synoptic form the results of recent scholarship on the subject, and, while recognizing the fault lines in Hegel's System that allow opposite interpretations, argues that the Logic marks the end of classical metaphysics. The translation is accompanied by a full apparatus of historical and explanatory notes. (shrink)

Hegel's The Phenomenology of Spirit is one of the most influential texts in the history of modern philosophy. In it, Hegel proposed an arresting and novel picture of the relation of mind to world and of people to each other. Like Kant before him, Hegel offered up a systematic account of the nature of knowledge, the influence of society and history on claims to knowledge, and the social character of human agency itself. A bold new understanding of what, after (...) Hegel, came to be called 'subjectivity' arose from this work, and it was instrumental in the formation of later philosophies, such as existentialism, Marxism, and American pragmatism, each of which reacted to Hegel's radical claims in different ways. This edition offers a new translation, an introduction, and glossaries to assist readers' understanding of this central text, and will be essential for scholars and students of Hegel. (shrink)

'beauty has purport and significance only for human beings, for beings at once animal and rational' In the Critique of Judgement Kant offers a penetrating analysis of our experience of the beautiful and the sublime, discussing the objectivity of taste, aesthetic disinterestedness, the relation of art and nature, the role of imagination, genius and originality, the limits of representation and the connection between morality and the aesthetic. He also investigates the validity of our judgements concerning the apparent purposiveness of (...) nature with respect to the highest interests of reason and enlightenment. The work profoundly influenced the artists and writers of the classical and romantic period and the philosophy of Hegel and Schelling. It has remained a central point of reference from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche through to phenomenology, hermeneutics, the Frankfurt School, analytical aesthetics and contemporary critical theory. J. C. Meredith's classic translation has been revised in accordance with standard modern renderings and provided with a bilingual glossary. This edition also includes the important 'First Introduction' that Kant originally composed for the work. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more. (shrink)

Avec l'ecrit sur le Droit naturel, Foi et Savoir constitue la voie d'entree, strategiquement fondamentale, dans le systeme hegelien, comme Theorie et Doctrine du Logos. En sa conclusion Hegel ayant expose la coeur de la philosophie de la reflexion dont les hautes figures sont Kant, Jacobi et Fichte, celebre le Vendredi Saint de l'esprit qui abolit le Dieu perdu de Pascal (Br. 441). Ainsi est annoncee la derniere page de La Phenomenologie de l'esprit ou dans le Golgotha de l'Esprit (...) absolu, comme Savoir absolu, depassant le savoir en devenir (Werdend Wissen) se dit la fin de l'histoire dont emerge le sens depuis le Calice auquel reve Schiller (La Phenomenologie de l'esprit, page derniere). (shrink)

The Hegel Lectures SeriesSeries Editor: Peter C. Hodgson Hegel's interpretation of the history of philosophy not only played a central role in the shaping of his own thought, but also has had a great influence on the development of historical thinking. In his own view the study of the history of philosophy is the study of philosophy itself. This explains why such a large proportion of his lectures, from 1805 to 1831, the year of his death, were about history of (...) philosophy. The text of these lectures, presented here in the first authoritative English edition, is therefore a document of the greatest importance in the development of Western thought: they constitute the very first comprehensive history of philosophy that treats philosophy itself as undergoing genuine historical development. And they are crucial for understanding Hegel's own systematic works such as the Phenomenology, the Logic, and the Encyclopedia, for central to his thought is the theme of spirit as engaged in self-realization through the processes of historical change. Furthermore, they played a crucial role in one of the determining events of modern intellectual history: the rise of a new consciousness of human life, culture, and intellect as historical in nature. This third volume of the lectures covers the medieval and modern periods, and includes fascinating discussion of scholastic, Renaissance, and Reformation philosophy, and of such great modern thinkers as Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, and especially Kant. (shrink)

In this essay, Hegel attempted to show how Fichte’s Science of Knowledge was an advance from the position of Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, and how Schelling (and incidentally Hegel himself) had made a further advance from the position of Fichte.

Why these lectures? -- Hegel between the ancients and the moderns -- Divisions and topics in philosophy of subjective spirit -- Anthropology : slumbering spirit -- Animal magnetism and clairvoyance -- Dementia -- Phenomenology of spirit -- Reciprocal recognition, spirit, and the concept of right -- Recognition and self-actualization -- Psychology : theoretical spirit -- Spirit for itself : from the found to the posited -- Imagination, sign, memory -- Mechanical memory and transcendental deduction -- Psychology : practical spirit : (...) the synthesis of Kant and Aristotle -- The formalism of the psychology -- Unresolved issues : the unity of the philosophy of spirit -- Notes on the text and translation -- Introduction -- Anthropology -- Natural soul -- The dreaming soul -- Sentience -- Self-feeling -- Habit -- Actual soul -- Phenomenology of spirit -- Consciousness as such -- Self-consciousness -- Reason -- Psychology -- Theoretical spirit -- Intuition -- Representation -- Thought -- Practical spirit. (shrink)

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was not only a great philosopher but a great historian of philosophy. He invented the idea of the philosophical tradition as a discussion among philosophers extending over centuries centering on a few main philosophical problems. The conceptual scheme, widely accepted in histories of philosophy, emerged in Hegel's lectures at the same time as German idealism itself. This new abridgment of a well-known edition makes the main insights of Hegel's famous Lectures on the History of Philosophy widely (...) available in an inexpensive edition. In this student-oriented text, Professor Tom Rockmore selects the most significant material in a one-volume abridgment. A short introduction explains the purpose and principles of the selections and assesses the continued importance of the work. This is followed by selections that include parts of the introduction to the discussion of Greek philosophy, as well as the sections on Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; the introduction to modern philosophy; and then the sections on Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and the "Final Result.". (shrink)

In 1828, G. W. F. Hegel published a critical review of Johann Georg Hamann, a retrospective of the life and works of one of Germany’s most enigmatic and challenging thinkers and writers. While Hegel’s review had enjoyed a central place in Hamann studies since its appearance, Hegel on Hamann is the first English translation of the important work. Philosophers, theologians, and literary critics welcome Anderson’s stunning translation since Hamann is gaining renewed attention, not only as a key figure of German (...) intellectual history, but also as an early forerunner of postmodern thought. Relationships between Enlightenment, Counter Enlightenment, and Idealism come to the fore as Hegel reflects on Hamann’s critiques of his contemporaries Immanuel Kant, Moses Mendelssohn, J. G. Herder, and F. H. Jacobi. Hegel on Hamann also includes an introduction to Hegel’s review by Anderson, as well as an essay on the role of friendship in Hamann’s life, in Hegel’s thought, and in German intellectual culture more broadly. Rounding out the volume are its extensive annotations and bibliography, which facilitate further study of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy in English and German. This book is essential both for readers of Hegel or Hamann and for those interested in the history of German thought, the philosophy of religion, language and hermeneutics, or friendship as a philosophical category. (shrink)

This article examines two modes of the canceling of time in a comparative analysis that ought to show the passage from the aesthetic over coming of the form of time in Kant to the historical over coming of natural time in Hegel. The essay begins with a problematization of the form of time in Kant?s first Critique and with the question whet her Kant displaces time outside the framework of mere condition of receptivity. Thereafter we will analyze (...) the key passage from Analytics of the Sublime where Kant writes about the cancellation of time-condition and we will interpret this in the light of an ontology of the eventuality and in the historico-political context of French revolution. Although Kant still does not think time as historical time, the cancellation of time-condition in the experience of the sublime shall be considered as the act of the structuring of time that is emancipated from natural linearity and causal continuity. The thinking of historical time will take place only with He gel, i.e. with his identification of time and concept. In this sense we will analyze Hegel?s notion of "conceptual history" in order to draw a conclusion that in Phenomenology of Spirit is al so at work a modus of annihilation of the natural, linear time, but unlike Kant it is truly articulated as historical occurrence. Time is constituted only as annihilated, since it is the intuitive, sensible, natural and external meaning of time what is sublated, while time in its originary dimension is produced only as hi story-time. nema. (shrink)

The article challenges the first premise of?speculative realism?, according to which, with Kant, the contact with the outside world was lost. Instead, it will be shown that the possibility of realism received its major impulse from two grand figures of German Idealism, from Kant as a precursor of the Romantic period and from Hegel as its, albeit critical, philosophical culmination. Based on three possible relations of knowledge to its outside, three ontologies will be distinguished, the ontology of immediacy, (...) stretching from rationalists to the last empiricists, Kant?s ontology of totalization, and, finally, Hegel?s?ontology of release? or?de-totalization?. As opposed to Descartes?s thing being constantly doubted in its existence, as opposed to Malebranche?s occasion being invariably induced by God, as opposed to Leibniz?s monad being an immediate embodiment of an idea, as opposed to Berkeley?s object vanishing when not perceived, and as opposed to Hume?s world lacking necessity, Kant philosophically warranted a world that does not have to be perpetually verified and can, hence, exist devoid of ideas produced by God and outside the constancy of the human gaze. Kant secured the normal and necessary existence of the world behind our backs and procured us with the common-sense normality of the world, but it was only Hegel?s absolute subjectivism that granted us the first glimpses into the radical meaninglesness of the facticity. It was not until Hegel?s logic of indifference of the notion to its immediate content that an egress of the circle of Kant?s totalization was made possible. nema. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Despotie der Vernunft? Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant HegelBernd LudwigArmin Adam. Despotie der Vernunft? Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant Hegel. Reihe praktische Philosophie. Műnchen: Karl Alber Verlag, 1999. Pp. 304. Cloth, DM 74.00.Eine Philosophie der Vernunft bedroht die Freiheit, weil der Versuch einer konsequenten Begründung der politischen Institutionen aus Freiheit und Vernunft den Absolutismus ebendieser Institutionen begünstigt (285). Das ist die These, die Armin Adams politikwissenschaftliche Habilitationsschrift anhand einer Analyse (...) der politischen Philosophie der Aufklärung, genauer, anhand der Lektüre von Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant und Hegel expliziert: Hobbes' individualistische Revolution des Naturrechts führt zum Absolutismus des Leviathan, Rousseaus Ideal der Volkssouveränität [End Page 591] zur Mystik der volonté générale, Kants Verrechtlichung des Politischen zur Leugnung des Widerstandsrechts und Hegels Pathos der Freiheit schließlich zum Mythos des Staates. Bei allen vier Autoren wird der aus der Freiheit geborene Staat vor den Gerichtshof der Vernunft zitiert und am Ende steht die Aufhebung (Hobbes) oder die radikale Umdeutung (Rousseau bis Hegel) des Begriffs der Freiheit, welche die ursprünglichen Freiheits-Intuitionen vergessen macht.Deutungen, welche die Aufklärung an ihren befreienden Leistungen messen, sind für Adam zwar genauso berechtigt wie jene, die ihre "dunkle Seite" (288) thematisieren. Ihm geht es gleichwohl darum, gerade die letztere nicht als bloß-akzidentell zu begreifen, sondern vielmehr die Kritik der philosophischen Aufklärung "aus dem Inneren der philosophischen Arbeit" zu leisten (288) und so der Apologie der Aufklärung eine "zweite Geschichte" zur Seite zu stellen.]Ausgangspunkt für die Politische Philosophie der Aufklärung wie auch für Adams Auseinandersetzung mit ihr ist die Vertragstheorie des Staates (22 ff.). Bei Hobbes und Rousseau findet die politische Gegenwart in der "Urszene des Vertrages" ihre Legitimitätsquelle (288). Erst mit Kant (und Hegel) wird der Vertrag verpflichtungstheoretisch entlastet, als Scharnierstück zwischen Motivation und Obligation entbehrlich, weil eine reichere praktische Philosophie die Rede von der Pflicht zum Staat rechtfertigen kann (159 ff.). Hobbes setzt noch auf die individuelle ökonomische Rationalität als movens zum Staat. Die Freiheit ist aber nur das Prinzip der Herrschaftsbegründung, sie wird durch das Prinzip der Souveränität in die Vorgeschichte des politischen Körpers verbannt (44, 70). Rousseau behält die Hobbessche Interessenlogik bei, doch durch die Konstitution der volonté générale wird der Selbsterhaltungswille des Einzelnen in den Willen zur Erhaltung des Gemeinwesens transformiert (94). Von der Herrschaftsbegründung verschiebt sich der Blick auf die Herrschaftspraxis (98). Entsprechend schwankt Rousseau zwischen einer Interpretation seiner volonté générale als bien commun(Économie Politique) und als volonté de tous (Du Contrat social). (104 ff.) Die Freiheit im Staat wird mit der Vernunft identifiziert und so der bloßen Willkür entgegengesetzt, der Gesellschaftsvertrag ist nicht mehr nur die Legitimationsgrundlage der Herrschaft, sondern "die Stunde Null" des Projekts der politischen Volkserziehung durch Institutionen. (133) Kant endlich löst die Pflicht vom Nutzen (168) und kann so auf die individuelle Freiwilligkeit, d. i. auf jegliche kontraktualistische Herrschaftslegitimation verzichten: Das "exeundum e statu naturali" wird zur Pflicht und der Vertrag degeneriert zur (moralphilosophischen) Idee (175): "Die Abkehr vom Prinzip empirischer Freiwilligkeit zugunsten des moralphilosophischen Prinzips der Universalisierung von Freiheit ersetzt auch die empirischen Subjekte der Staatsbegründung durch die Vernunft selbst" (178). Hegel verabschiedet dann endgültig die "epistemische und moralische Priorität des Individuums" (246) indem sein Konzept der Sittlichkeit es ihm erlaubt, die Freiwilligkeit in der "substanziellen Freiheit" aufgehoben zu sehen (241). Der "fundamentalistisch-kritische Gestus" der Aufklärung wird durch das Vertrauen in die Wirklichwerdung des Vernünftigen ersetzt. Indem Hegel das Recht als entwickelte Idee der Freiheit versteht, bildet seine Rechtsphilosophie den Gipfel einer politischen Philosophie der Aufklärung (252). [End Page 592]Adams Buch will ein Korrektiv für jenen Aufklärungsoptimismus liefern, der mit dem Zeitalter der Vernunft das Ende der Geschichte eingeläutet sieht. Ohne Frage: Das Ideal einer "vollendeten Herrschaft der Vernunft" (289), wie es Adam als Leitmotiv bei dem von ihm behandelten "Quartetts" entdecken will, überforderte jede menschliche Form der Politik. Aber möglicherweise wird man zumindest einigen dieser Autoren eher gerecht, wenn man ihr Unternehmen gerade umgekehrt als den kritischen Versuch begreift, menschliche Herrschaft vom Glorienschein arkaner Wahrheiten zu entkleiden... (shrink)

?Hegel? and?human rights? are rarely conjoined, and the designation?human rights? appears rarely in his works. Indeed, Hegel has been criticised for omitting civil and political rights all together. My surmise is that readers have looked for a modern Decalogue, and have neglected how Hegel justifies his views, and hence just what views he does justify. Philip Pettit has refocused attention on republican liberty. Hegel and I agree with Pettit that republican liberty is a supremely important value, but appealing to its (...) value, or justifying it by appeal to reflective equilibrium, are insufficient both in theory and in practice. By reconstructing Kant?s Critical methodology and explicating the social character of rational justification in non-formal domains, Hegel shows that the republican right to non-domination is constitutive of the equally republican right to justification - both of which are necessary requirements for sufficient rational justification in all non-formal domains, including both claims to rights or imputations of duties or responsibilities. That is the direct moral, political and juridical implication of Hegel?s analysis of mutual recognition, and its fundamental, constitutive role in rational justification. Specific corollaries to the fundamental republican right to non-domination must be determined by considering what forms of illicit domination are possible or probable within any specific society, in view of its social, political and economic structures and functioning. nema. (shrink)

Although similar in some respects, Rawls' and Kant' visions of world order fall apart on the question of sovereignty. Rawls never advocates of an international single state with international authority. Kant, on the other hand, inspired by the project of Enlightenment, as a final form of international sovereignty sees federative state of states as a provider for eternal peace among peoples. Ideje o svetskom poretku medjunarodnih odnosa kod Rolsa i Kanta se ne poklapaju mada Rols smatra da mu (...) je Kant inspiracija u prakticnoj filozofiji. Rols je protiv svetske drzave, a kod Kanta postoji projekt koji podrazumeva medjunarodnu federativnu drzavu drzava. (shrink)

_Grounds of Pragmatic Realism_ shows Hegel is a major epistemologist, who disentangled Kant’s critique of judgment, across the Critical corpus, from transcendental idealism, and augmented its enormous evaluative and justificatory significance for commonsense knowledge, the natural sciences and freedom of action.

Iako je tek u Kantovoj kritickoj filozofiji pojam "uma" dobio precizno znacenje i jasno omedjeno podrucje svog vazenja, ovaj termin ima dugu genezu u evropskoj duhovnoj istoriji. Koreni pojma uma nalaze se u grckom pojmu logosa i mogu se svesti na sest osnovnih znacenja kojima se oznacava logicka struktura ljudskog misljenja i racionalna struktura sveta. Anaksagora je sveopsti duhovni princip nus smatrao izvorom svekolike racionalnosti. Kod filozofa Stoe izraz logos spermaticos predstavlja aktivni princip koji deluje na pasivnu materiju da bi (...) se stvorio svet. Za Stoike pojam logosa cini temeljni princip celokupnog morala. U hriscanskoj teologiji bog je logos, sveti duh - pneuma, dusa. U novovekovnoj filozofiji osnovna znacenja grckog logosa preuzeli su latinski termini "intellectus" i "ratio". Ovi pojmovi sasvim jasno ocrtavaju dve glavne linije evropskog misljenja koje karakterise neposredno i posredovano diskurzivno shvatanje istine. Kant je prvi u istoriji filozofije uveo bitnu razliku izmedju razuma i uma (Verstand i Vernunft). Razum je analitican i apstraktan, a um je izvor apriornih principa kojima se povezuje i utemeljuje celokupno nase saznanje i volja. Stoga Kant razlikuje teorijski i prakticki um. Za razliku od teorijskog uma, cije pojmove i nacela primenjuje, prakticki um ima primat jer za njega ima prakticki realitet i ono sto je teorijski nesaznatljivo (sloboda, bog i besmrtnost duse). Primat praktickog uma u svom Ucenju o nauci posebno je naglasio Fihte. Um je za njega cista svrsishodna delatnost. Potpunu artikulaciju ideja uma dobija u Hegelovoj filozofiji apsolutnog duha. Kod Hegela um je pre svega svetski princip a ne samo ljudska sposobnost. Za razliku od Kanta ciji um je u osnovi statican, bitna novina Hegelovog shvatanja objektivnog uma jeste njegov dinamizam koji mu omogucava da u svom dijalektickom razvitku sve vise dolazi do svesti o "samom sebi". Ukljucujuci ideju progresa u svoje shvatanje uma Hegel je uneo jedan vrednosni elemenat u pojam umnosti i time omogucio povezivanje uma i etosa u epohi moderne. Najdublji razdor izmedju uma i etosa izazvala je moderna nauka, koja je s jedne strane svojim otkricima i novim saznanjima unapredila ljudski zivot, oslobadjajuci coveka od religijskog sujeverja i drugih oblika potcinjenosti, ali je s druge strane pokazala restriktivan odnos, ne samo prema svim vrstama vrednosnih sudova, vec i prema mnogim dimenzijama uma. Pozitivno znanje novovekovne nauke bez ikakvog etosa liseno je bilo kakve kriticke samosvesti o svrsi znanja, o tome kako se ono moze upotrebiti na dobro coveka i kako moze biti zloupotrebljeno. Za uspostavljanje humanisticke naucne kulture neophodna je reafirmacija veze uma i etosa u modernoj nauci. (shrink)

Le fait que Hegel ne se soit pas joint au groupe de lecture qui s’est formé au Stift de Tübingen en 1790, dans le but de discuter de la philosophie kantienne, est généralement évoqué comme preuve de son manque d’intérêt pour la première Critique. Or les premières références à Kant, dès 1787, dans les extraits que Hegel a recopiés à partir de sources premières et secondaires, nous montrent qu’il s’était déjà approprié des éléments essentiels au développement de sa propre (...) pensée. Ces éléments s’accordaient mal avec les tendances théoriques du groupe, animé par le « Kantianer enragé » Carl Diez, qui rendaient impossible le langage spéculatif tel que Hegel le trouvait en germe dans les antinomies de la raison pure. (shrink)

This paper analyzes hegel's critique of kant's theoretical philosophy in terms of three specific objections to kant's transcendental deduction (concerning the representation of the i, The necessity of the categories, And the problem of a preliminary epistemology) and three specific objections to kant's transcendental idealism (concerning the thing in itself, The antinomies, And other specific problems of the transcendental dialectic).

Despite the rapid growth of interest in Hegel among English-speaking philosophers, surprisingly little has been directed at Hegel's relationship toward Kant. This collection of essays by eleven eminent philosophers meets this deficiency by critically examining Hegel's attitude to Kant over a wide range of issues: the nature of space and time; the possibility of metaphysics, categories, and things-in-themselves; dialectic and the self; moral and political philosophy; aesthetics; the philosophy of history, and teleology. All the essays provide channels to (...) a fuller understanding of the forks of theoretical deviation between Hegel and Kant. (shrink)

The young Hegel was entranced by the notion of intellectual intuition, and this notion continues to entrance many of Hegel’ commentators. I argue that Kant provided three distinct conceptions of an intuitive intellect, that none of these involve aconceptual intuitionism, and that they differ markedly from Fichte’s and Schelling’s conceptions of intellectual intuition. I further argue that by 1804 Hegel recognized that appealing to an aconceptual model, or to Schelling’s model, or to his own early model of intellectual intuition (...) generates inevitable and insoluble problems of question-begging. By incorporating several important points from Kant’s Transcendental Ideal into his reinterpretation of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and Refutation of Idealism, Hegel’s mature discursive and conceptual account of ‘absolute knowing’ performs some of the functions Kant assigned to the intuitive intellect, though without invoking any such intuitive intellect. I discuss several of these functions. (shrink)

In der 1970 gegr ndeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien ver ffentlicht. Gr ndungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), G nther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von J rgen Mittelstra mitherausgegeben.

Can Kant's theory of freedom be defended in contemporary "incompatibilist" terms, as Henry Allison believes, or is it vulnerable to Hegelian criticisms of the "compatibilist" sort that Allen Wood presents? I argue that the answer to both of these questions is negative, and that there is a third option, namely that Kant's real theory of freedom is not as well off as Allison contends, nor as weak as Wood claims. Allison tries to save Kant's theory of freedom (...) from both what he takes to be traditional and improper interpretations, notably including Hegel's and Wood's, of what that theory means, as well as from traditional and improper objections to its defensibility. I argue in part with Wood (and Hegel) against Allison on the issue of the meaning of Kant's theory, and in part with Allison against Wood (and Hegel) on the issue of the defensibility of Kant's theory. (shrink)

Dans laScience de la logiqueet dans l’Encyclopédie des sciences philosophiques,Hegel reconstruit la philosophie critique de Kant en développant i) une logique transcendantale dans laScience de la logiqueet dans laPhilosophie de la nature; ii) une conception pragmatique de l’a priori; et iii) une caractéristique-clé de l’usage du verbe «réaliser» en relation avec les concepts et les principes. Chacun de ces trois éléments constitue un aspect central de la sémantique spécifiquement cognitive de Hegel, que celui-ci développe, en partant de la thèse (...) kantienne de la référence cognitive singulière, en un réalisme pragmatique systématique. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Kant's Anti‐Cartesianism Kant on the Highest Good and the Practical Necessity of Belief in God's Existence The Moral Proof at the Tübinger Stift and Its Fate Self‐Positing and the “Only True and Thinkable Creation out of Nothing” The Way to Absolute Knowing in Hegel's Phenomenology.

Since the 1970s, debates about Hegel’s Science of Logic have largely turned around the metaphysical or non-metaphysical nature of this work. This debate has certainly issued many important contributions to Hegel scholarship. Yet it presupposes, in my view, a set of oppositions that thwart an adequate assessment of Hegel’s indebtedness to Kant. I hope to show in this paper that Hegel is deeply indebted to Kant, but not to the Kant who is commonly brought into play to (...) argue for the non-metaphysical nature of the Science of Logic. If Kant ’s own Critique of Pure Reason defies oppositions such as that between epistemology and metaphysics, then they cannot be employed to determine the extent to which Hegel’s Logic moves beyond Kant. By focusing instead on the system of pure reason that Kant intended to elaborate, I hope to bring out the ontological thrust of both Kant’s transcendental philosophy and Hegel’s Science of Logic. My paper thus intends to highlight the deep continuity between Kant’s transcendental philosophy and Hegel’s Logic, yet without reducing the latter to the kind of epistemology commonly attributed to Kant. (shrink)

Hegel’s most abiding aspiration was to be a volkserzieher (an educator of the people) in the tradition of thinkers of Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781), and Friedrich Schiller (159-1786). No doubt, he was also deeply interested in epistemology and metaphysics, but this interest stemmed at least in part from his belief (which Kant also shared) that human beings could become truly liberated to fulfill their vocations as human beings, only if they were also liberated from the illusions (...) and contradictions that plagued uncritical thinking about self, world, and God. Thus to appreciate Hegel’s work in epistemology and metaphysics, one must first appreciate how he (following Kant) sought to think beyond the “special metaphysics” of self, world, and God as developed by Descartes and other pre-critical philosophers. The aim of this chapter is to analyze aspects of Hegel’s critical appropriation and transformation of Kantian thought, shedding light not only on Hegel’s own understanding of his move beyond Kant, but also on the philosophical reasons that might justify such a move. (shrink)

Peirce's study of Kant, and later of Hegel, and Dewey's (1930) retention of much of Hegel's social philosophy are recognised idealist sources of pragmatism. Here I argue that the transition from idealism to pragmatic realism was already achieved by Hegel. Hegel's ‘Objective Logic’ corresponds in part to Kant's ‘Transcendental Logic’ (WdL,GW21:47.1-3). Hegel faults Kant for relegating concepts of reflection to an Appendix to his Transcendental Logic (WdL,GW12:19.34-38), and for treating reason as ‘only dialectical’ and as ‘merely regulative’ (...) (WdL,GW12:23.12,.16-17). I present three important yet neglected features of Kant'sCritique of Pure Reasonwhich are key enthymemes undergirding Hegel's critical reconstruction of Kant's Critical philosophy (§2). I then summarise some features of the philosophical context within which Hegel begins to re-assess and reconstruct Kant's Transcendental Logic (§3), and review several key steps in this direction Hegel undertook in the 1807Phenomenology(§4). (A related paper extends these results to Hegel'sLogicandEncyclopaedia.) These points show that Hegel's reanalysis of Kant's Critical philosophy is the first and still one of the most sophisticated and adequate pragmatic — specifically pragmatic realist — accounts of thea priori. (shrink)

From the various discussions of Kant’s theoretical philosophy throughout Hegel’s works, it is not difficult to come away with the impression that Hegel thinks that the Kantian categories are derived from experience, and that the method of a “transcendental” investigation of the forms of subjectivity is nothing other than that of generalization upon observation. As early as the 1802-03 essay, Faith and Knowledge, for example, he characterizes the critical philosophy as the “completion and idealization” of Lockean “empirical psychology.” In (...) § 41 of the Encyclopedia he tells us that Kant’s systematization of the “special forms of the a priori element … of thought … is solely based upon psychological and historical grounds.” Moreover, in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, he refers to Kant as going “psychologically,” i.e., “historically,” to work in his accounts of intuition, understanding, and reason in a manner that is “entirely empirical, and not developed out of the concept.”. (shrink)

Above all else, Hegel can be said to be the master of context, the philosopher who insisted that properly understanding anything involves putting it in its full context, reconstructing its development and its relation to all that is around it. From the beginning of his career, Hegel did not hesitate to put into its place the work of his fellow philosophers; his analysis, critique, and supersession of them occurred all at once, and culminated when he located them within hisPhenomenology of (...) Spiritand the final system of hisEncyclopedia. Long after Hegel's own era, and even after the sharp decline in the appeal of his specific system and of ambitious systematic philosophy in general, a looser form of Hegel's contextual approach remains very popular, and with good reason. Without giving in entirely to this approach, it is hard to resist the temptation to turn the tables on Hegel himself a bit. Hence, in casting a philosophical glance at the specific phenomenon of Hegel's own aesthetics, in an attempt to begin to evaluate just a few of its most distinctive characteristics, I will proceed by first offering a sketch of how I believe his philosophy as a whole should be situated in the context of its own age and the development of German philosophy in general.Of course, my own interpretive perspective has its own context, external and internal. The external context is furnished by two other accounts providing slants on Hegel's aesthetics, slants that I believe are very understandable but in the end inadequate. The first of these slants is given by what I will call the “standard account,” which buys into most of Hegel's own characterization of his aesthetics as largely a welcome “objective” corrective to the supposedly “subjective” approach of Kant and the allegedly even more radically “subjectivistic” and arbitrary approach of the German Romantics. The second slant is to be found in Jean-Marie Schaeffer's recent book,Art of the Modern Age: Philosophy of Art from Kant to Heidegger. Schaeffer accepts much of the standard account, but he goes on to argue in an original way that the main aesthetic tradition of Germany — after Kant, from the early Romantics to Hegel and others until Heidegger — shares a large set of influential and highly questionable “speculative” presumptions, and that the sharing of this speculative approach is far more significant — and unfortunate — than whatever incidental differences can be found between various figures within this tradition. (shrink)

Neste artigo abordo a questão da interpretação de Hegel acerca do conceito de apercepção pura transcendental em Kant. Como procuro mostrar, Hegel inicialmente faz uma análise positiva do argumento kantiano acerca da apercepção, concordando com Kant sobre a unidade e o caráter pensante e autorreferente do eu. Com efeito, para Hegel, Kant elabora uma compreensão muito importante sobre a natureza do conhecimento, ao afirmar que a unidade conceitual da autoconsciência constitui a unidade do objeto. Contudo, por outro (...) lado, Hegel analisa o argumento kantiano sob outra perspectiva, sustentando que Kant não desenvolve coerentemente a tese da unidade da apercepção pura e acaba por considerar a autoconsciência apenas do ponto de vista subjetivo, em uma relação externa com o objeto. Neste contexto, minha leitura é que Hegel incorpora em sua Lógica aquilo que ele concebe como um elemento especulativo no interior do argumento kantiano sobre a apercepção pura transcendental, transformando, assim, a compreensão kantiana sobre o eu penso em sua concepção lógico-especulativa sobre o conceito subjetivo. Nestes termos, dialogo com a interpretação de Robert Pippin em Hegel ́s Idealism, discordando da afirmação do autor, segundo a qual, a concepção hegeliana sobre o conceito na Ciência da Lógica consiste em uma continuidade da concepção kantiana sobre a apercepção pura transcendental. (shrink)

Bien que Hegel occupe dans les préoccupations philosophiques d'aujourd'hui une place prépondérante, nos contemporains sont peu enclins à accepter, et même à comprendre, ses audaces métaphysiques et systématiques. Tout aussi inacceptable paraît, à première vue, sa prétention d'être l'héritier légitime de Kant, le couronnement nécessaire de l'idéalisme allemand. L'auteur du présent article ne s'attaque pas au problème de la valeur du système et de la méthode de Hegel. C'est en historien qu'il essaie de dégager leur allure propre, en les (...) étudiant à la lumière de l'évolution de l'idéalisme allemand à partir de Kant. Il montre combien les prétentions métaphysiques de Hegel, vues dans cette perspective, sont naturelles. Ce n'est pas, pourtant, que son analyse confirme l'idée d'une connexion nécessaire entre les systèmes. Il souligne l'originalité profonde des grandes idéalistes, dont chacun cherche sans doute son inspiration dans la problématique de son prédécesseur, mais plutôt sous la forme d'un schéma de pensée, qu'il étoffe d'une manière très personnelle. Chez les idéalistes, l'enthousiasme messianique de l'Aufklärung prend une allure presque eschatologique ; ce trait explique pour une part l'ardeur qu'ils ont mise à édifier leur système, ainsi que la tendance de Hegel à présenter sa philosophie comme le sommet de l'histoire. Dans son interprétation de Hegel, l'auteur s'appuie surtout sur la Préface et l'Introduction de la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit. Pour éclairer celles ci à la lumière de l'histoire de l'idéalisme, il suit l'itinéraire dressé par Hegel lui-même dans son premier essai philosophique, sur la différence entre le système de Fichte et celui de Schelling. Il décrit l'évolution de la philosophie depuis Kant jusqu'à Hegel comme une réalisation progressive de l'idée d'identité absolue, que Hegel hérite de Schelling mais qu'il interprète d'une manière différente. Cette analyse permet à l'auteur de préciser la méthode de Hegel, les relations entre la Phénoménologie et le système, ainsi que les concepts de vérité, de sujet, d'esprit, d'en soi et de pour soi, dont Hegel se sert pour définir l'Absolu. Par la force même des choses, elle trace également l'évolution de l'idée de Dieu dans l'idéalisme. La conception hégélienne de Dieu est susceptible d'interprétations diverses. Tout en ne cachant pas ses préférences personnelles, l'auteur estime que l'état des études hégéliennes ne permet pas encore de se prononcer avec certitude. C'est sur cette invitation au travail qu'il termine son article. (shrink)