The article discusses Friedman's classic claim that economics can be based on irrealistic assumptions. It exploits Samuelson's distinction between two "F-twists" (that is, "it is an advantage for an economic theory to use irrealistic assumptions" vs "the more irrealistic the assumptions, the better the economic theory"), as well as Nagel's distinction between three philosophy-of-science construals of the basic claim. On examination, only one of Nagel's construals seems promising enough. It involves the neo-positivistic distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical ("observable") terms; so (...) Friedman would in some sense argue for the major role of theoretical terms in economics. The paper uses a model-theoretic apparatus to refine the selected construal and check whether it can be made to support the claim. This inquiry leads to essentially negative results for both F-twists, and the final conclusion is that they are left unsupported. (shrink)

Logics in which a relation R is semantically incomplete in a particular universe E, i.e. the union of the extension of R with its anti-extension does not exhaust the whole universe E, have been studied quite extensively in the last years. (Cf. van Benthem (1985), Blamey (1986), and Langholm (1988), for partial predicate logic; Muskens (1996), for the applications of partial predicates to formal semantics, and Doherty (1996) for applications to modal logic.) This is not so with semantically (...) incomplete generalized quantifiers which constitute the subject of the present paper. The only systematic study of these quantifiers from a purely logical point of view, is, to the best of my knowledge, that by van Eijck (1995). We shall take here a different approach than that of van Eijck and mention some of the abstract properties of the resulting logic. Finally we shall prove that the two approaches are interdefinable. (shrink)

A rejoinder to commentators of the paper by P. Mongin, "Le réalisme des hypothèses et la "Partial Interpretation View"", Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 18, 1988, p. 281-325. (This paper is listed and made available by Philpapers.).

In Law's Empire Prof. Ronald Dworkin has advanced a new theory of law, complex and intriguing. He calls it law as integrity. But in some ways the more radical and surprising claim he makes is that not only were previous legal philosophers mistaken about the nature of law, they were also mistaken about the nature of the philosophy of law or jurisprudence. Perhaps it is possible to summarize his main contentions on the nature of jurisprudence in three theses: First, jurisprudence (...) is interpretive: “General theories of law… aim to interpret the main point and structure of legal practice”. Second, legal philosophy cannot be a semantic account of the word “law.” Legal philosophers “cannot produce useful semantic theories of law”. Third, legal philosophy or jurisprudence “is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law”. (shrink)

Various contributors to recent philosophy of mathematics havetaken Richard Dedekind to be the founder of structuralismin mathematics. In this paper I examine whether Dedekind did, in fact, hold structuralist views and, insofar as that is the case, how they relate to the main contemporary variants. In addition, I argue that his writings contain philosophical insights that are worth reexamining and reviving. The discussion focusses on Dedekind''s classic essay Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?, supplemented by evidence from Stetigkeit und (...) irrationale Zahlen, his scientific correspondence, and his Nachlaß. (shrink)

Situated within the framework of Confucian family-oriented ethics, this book explores the issue of familial partiality and specifically discusses whether it is morally praiseworthy to love one's family partially. In reviewing the tension between familial partiality and egalitarian impartiality from different perspectives while also drawing on binary metrics to understand the issue - that is, the weak and strong sense of familial partiality in Confucian moral theory - the author carefully discusses the efficacy of three major arguments to justify moral (...) partiality. It is concluded that the tree argument fails to justify moral partiality in Confucianism, the evolutionary argument only justifies moral partiality in the weak sense that we should devote more resources to our family, and the care argument fails to justify moral partiality in the strong sense that family takes priority in any case even at the expense of the principle of justice. Seeking to address the quandary, the author advances an alternative argument based on Thomas Aquinas' theory of love to interpret Confucian view of partial relationships, holding that partial treatment is assumed in partial relationships. The title will appeal to scholars and students interested in Confucianism, Chinese Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, and Comparative Philosophy. (shrink)

In response to a charge of subjectivism, Kuhn in his Postscript emphasizes the importance of "values" (accuracy, simplicity, explanatory power, etc) that are shared by scientists generally. However, Kuhn adds, these values are applied differently by different scientists. By employing a comparison with partially subjective views of Carnap on confirming evidence, this paper raises questions about Kuhn's position on values by considering ways it might be interpreted as subjective and ways it may not.

Elgin has argued that scientific models that are, strictly speaking, inaccurate representations of the world, are epistemically valuable because the “falsehoods” they contain are “felicitous”. Many, including Elgin herself, have interpreted this claim as offering an alternative to scientific realism and “veritism”. In this paper, I will argue that there is a more felicitous interpretation of Elgin’s work: “felicitous falsehoods” do play a role in the epistemic value of inaccurate models, but that role is of instrumental value. Elgin’s (...) class='Hi'>view is not best understood as claiming that falsehoods provide scientific understanding in and of themselves, only that they facilitate epistemic access to the fundamental, even if partial, truths that are contained within models. While falsehoods may be felicitous in that they facilitate exemplification, the epistemic value of inaccurate models ultimately relies on their partial accuracy. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the self-knowledge of emotions. I first argue that several of the leading theories of self-knowledge, including thetransparency method(see, e.g., Byrne 2018) andneo-expressivism(see, e.g., Bar-On 2004), have difficulties explaining how we authoritatively know our own emotions (even though they may plausibly account for sensation, belief, intention, and desire). I next consider Barrett’s (2017a) empirically informedtheory of constructed emotion. While I agree with her that we ‘give meaning to [our] present sensations’ (2017a, p.26), I disagree with her that (...) we construct our emotions, as this has some unwelcome implications. I then draw upon recent data from the science of emotions literature to advance a view I call partial first-person authority. According to this view, first-person authority with respect to our emotions is only partial: we can introspect and authoritatively know our own sensations, and beliefs, in ways others cannot; but we still need to interpret those sensations and beliefs, to know our emotions. Finally, I consider self-interpretational accounts of self-knowledge by Carruthers (2011) and Cassam (2014). I argue that while these accounts are implausible when applied to beliefs, desires, and intentions, they are more plausible when applied to our emotions. (shrink)

One of the greatest challenges facing materialist theories of the human mind is the problem of intentionality. As many non-materialists of various stripes have pointed out, it is very difficult to say, if the human mind is a purely material thing, how this material thing can be about or represent another thing wholly distinct from itself. However, for their part, these same non-materialists have relied heavily or exclusively on this intuition that one material thing cannot be about another. In this (...) paper, that hole in the intentionality objection to materialist theories of mind is filled by way of providing the germ of a new theory of the metaphysics of intentionality. On this view, intentionality just is partial identity. Partial identity is a concept introduced by David Armstrong and used by Donald Baxter to give a metaphysics of instantiation. The aboutness exhibited by our mental activity is simply a partial identity relation between the mind and the object of thought. This thesis, I contend, is a faithful interpretation of Brentano’s “intentional inexistence,” which the objects of thought have in the mind and which he held to be characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. Some interesting and fortuitous consequences, including an elucidation of precisely why one material thing can never be about something distinct from itself, are then examined, and finally a defense against some objections is given. (shrink)

The essay, divided in two parts, examines the event of the running of the bulls (encierro in Spanish). The phenomenon of the encierro, a complex cultural activity of deep historical roots, demands to be understood: What drives people to risk injury or death at the horns of untamed bulls? How should we make sense of this, subjective and objectively? To answer these questions, I use a framework that relies on explanation and assessment of popular views on the way to arguing (...) for a philosophical alternative. This arrangement is readily adaptable to many other sporting (and non-sporting) activities where risk and/or mass participation are key factors. Its unorthodox format – organised around an opening narrative of a paradigmatic, skilled and lucky run with the bulls, as well as hors texte (direct appeals to the reader) – brings the reader straight into the fray, philosophical and otherwise. Part I begins by presenting the history of the encierro. It also explains the dynamics of the event, often via images with pedagogical and critical side-commentaries. It proceeds to introduce and critically engage with prevalent explanations, most with ethnological tendencies, that conceive the running as tradition, rite, ritual and sport. This part ends with a dilemma whereby we either try to explain matters by resorting to particular and partial interpretations, or a ‘democratic’ conglomerate of superficial and confusing boundaries, or in the end we simply concede our inability to understand the phenomenon of the running of the bulls in toto. This philosophical impasse will be evaded in part 2 (Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 2, 1) via existentialist and phenomenological analysis. (shrink)

In 1954 Hempel wrote “Once the idea of a partial specification of meaning is granted, it appears unnecessarily restrictive, however, to limit the sentences effecting such partial interpretation to reduction sentences in Carnap's sense. … Generally, then, a set of one or more theoretical terms, t1, t2 ⃛, tn, might be introduced by any set M of sentences such that M contains no extralogical terms other than t1, t2 ⃛, tn, and observation terms, M is logically consistent, (...) and M is not equivalent to a truth of formal logic. The last two of these conditions serve merely to exclude trivial extreme cases. A set M of this kind will be referred to briefly as an interpretative system, its elements as interpretative sentences.” This is the last move in a process in which the idea of definition has been widened beyond the explicit or equivalence definition which was the basis of earlier thought on the subject of introducing new words into a language. It would seem that the scheme proposed by Hempel must represent the final move, for it would seem difficult to conceive any more liberal description of a purely direct and verbal scheme. Among the predecessors of Hempel in this liberalising movement I will mention Ramsey and Braithwaite whose views stem ultimately from Campbell, and are based on the idea that the “interpretative system” is essentially a scientific theory, and Carnap who introduced the particular notion of a “reduction sentence”, and who was more directly the source of Hempel's own ideas. (shrink)

Achinstein, Putnam, and others have urged the rejection of the received view on theories (which construes theories as axiomatic calculi where theoretical terms are given partial observational interpretations by correspondence rules) because (i) the notion of partial interpretation cannot be given precise formulation, and (ii) the observational-theoretical distinction cannot be drawn satisfactorily. I try to show that these are the wrong reasons for rejecting the received view since (i) is false and it is virtually impossible (...) to demonstrate the truth of (ii). Nonetheless, the received view should be rejected because it obscures a number of epistemologically important features of scientific theorizing. I show this by sketching an alternative analysis which reveals some of these features and gives a more faithful picture of scientific theorizing. (shrink)

Is the Bible the unembellished Word of God or the product of human agency? There are different answers to that question. And they lie at the heart of this book's powerful exploration of the fraught ways in which money, race and power shape the story of Christianity in American public life. The authors' subject is the Museum of the Bible in Washington, DC: arguably the latest example of a long line of white evangelical institutions aiming to amplify and promote a (...) religious, political, and moral agenda of their own. In their careful and compelling investigation, Jill Hicks-Keeton and Cavan Concannon disclose the ways in which the Museum's exhibits reinforce a particularized and partial interpretation of the Bible's meaning. Bringing to light the Museum's implicit messaging about scriptural provenance and audience, the authors reveal how the MOTB produces a version of the Bible that in essence authorizes a certain sort of white evangelical privilege; promotes a view of history aligned with that same evangelical aspiration; and above all protects a cohort of white evangelicals from critique. They show too how the Museum collapses vital conceptual distinctions between its own conservative vision of the Bible and 'The Bible' as a cultural icon. This revelatory volume above all confirms that scripture – for all the claims made for it that it speaks only divine truth – can in the end never be separated from human politics. (shrink)

The view that scientific theories are partially interpreted deductive systems (theoretical deductivism) is defended against recent criticisms by Hempel. Hempel argues that the reliance of theoretical inferences (both from observation to theory and also from theory to theory) uponceteris paribus conditions orprovisos must prevent theories from establishing deductive connections among observations. In reply I argue, first, that theoretical deductivism does not in fact require the establishing of such deductive connections: I offer alternative H-D analyses of these inferences. Second, I (...) argue that when the refined character of scientific observation is taken into account, we find that a theorymay after all establish such deductive connections among scientific observations, without reliance on provisos.These conclusions are based on the multi-level Popperian contextualist account of empirical interpretation sketched in a previous paper. As before, I claim that the supposed objections to theoretical deductivism depend upon questionable empiricist theses unnecessarily conjoined with theoretical deductivism by the Logical Positivists. Theoretical deductivism itself is unaffected by these arguments, and remains (when empirical interpretation is properly analyzed) the best account of scientific theories. (shrink)

Can there be a theory of law? -- Two views of the nature of the theory of law : a partial comparison -- On the nature of law -- The problem of authority : revisiting the service conception -- About morality and the nature of law -- Incorporation by law -- Reasoning with rules -- Why interpret? -- Interpretation without retrieval -- Intention in interpretation -- Interpretation : pluralism and innovation -- On the authority and (...) class='Hi'>interpretation of constitutions : some preliminaries -- Postema on law's autonomy and public practical reasons : a critical comment. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mahāyāna Interpretation of Christianity:A Case Study of Zhang Chunyi (1871–1955)Lai Pan-chiu and So Yuen-taiMahāyāna Buddhism is one of the most popular religions in East Asia. It reflects the characteristics of the culture of East Asia and has had a tremendous impact on the culture(s) of the region. When Christianity was introduced into East Asia, it did not enter a religious vacuum. Because the people of East Asia have (...) their own culture, including their worldviews, values, and preunderstandings of religion, it is expected that they may interpret the Christian religion in a way significantly different from the Western interpretation of Christianity. One of these possible ways of reinterpreting Christianity is facilitated by the Mahāyāna Buddhist framework.This paper consists of an analysis of the Mahāyāna interpretation of Christianity made by Zhang Chunyi (1871–1955).1 Zhang was a rather well-known Sinologist who published several commentaries on Chinese classics, including Mozi, Laozi, and Zhuangzi. Though he had been well trained in Chinese classics, he was attracted to Christianity, with the hope that Christianity might contribute to the social reform of China. He even received baptism in an Anglican church in 1905. However, because of his in-depth study of Buddhism and his disappointment with the actual practices of the Christian churches at that time, he eventually converted to Buddhism during the 1920s. From that point, he formally promoted the slogan "Buddhicizing Christianity" (Fohua Jidujiao). His proposal for Buddhicizing Christianity includes a severe criticism of the "foreign" form of Christianity being "imported" to China mainly by the Western Protestant missionaries who, according to Zhang, preached a simplistic and even distorted "gospel" for they lacked the spiritual training (nei xue, lit., "inner learning") as well as the intellectual ability to understand sophisticated Chinese philosophy and genuine Christianity. Partially under his influence, some of his contemporary Chinese Christians were converted to Buddhism. In fact, he published at least eight books on interpreting and reforming Christian doctrines from the perspectives of Buddhism, Confucianism, and so on.2 He was probably the most prolific writer on the subject of his generation and one of the pioneers [End Page 67] in what is now called Mahāyāna theology. This brief outline of his rather unusual religious journey might have indicated the importance of the study of his Buddhist interpretation of Christianity. However, owing to mainly sociopolitical turmoil as well as the religious atmosphere at that time and in the subsequent decades, his Buddhist interpretation of Christianity has not been formally studied for decades.In recent years, more and more studies of Buddhist-Christian dialogue take place in the Chinese context.3 It is important to study previous cases of Buddhist-Christian dialogue, Mahāyāna theology, and so on. Some of these cases, including Zhang's, have been studied.4 This paper aims to examine Zhang's thought critically and to show that although Zhang advocated a Mahāyāna interpretation of Christianity before and after his conversion to Buddhism, his interpretations before and after his conversion to Buddhism are significantly different. It is proposed that whereas his interpretation before his conversion aimed at the indigenization of Christianity and thus, the evangelization of the Chinese, his interpretation after conversion was made with a view to converting the Christians to Buddhism, even though both aimed at the reformulation, or even reform, of Christianity.Zhang's Proposal of "Buddhicizing christianity"Zhang was a scholar of classical Chinese literature, active during the Republican era. He was knowledgeable in Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, and Moism. His study of Moism remains highly regarded.5 Zhang became a Christian and worked for the Christian Literature Society for China (Guan xue hui) in Shanghai for some years. He published several books with a view to indigenizing Christian theology by interpreting it through Chinese philosophical and religious concepts. Zhang's attempt aimed at reinterpreting Christian doctrines within the Buddhist framework in order to make Christianity more acceptable to the Chinese. However, in the 1920s, he himself converted to Buddhism and began to promote his proposal of "Buddhicizing Christianity" (Fohua Jidujiao),6 aiming to convert Christians to Buddhism.Because Zhang had... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mahāyāna Interpretation of Christianity:A Case Study of Zhang Chunyi (1871–1955)Lai Pan-chiu and So Yuen-taiMahāyāna Buddhism is one of the most popular religions in East Asia. It reflects the characteristics of the culture of East Asia and has had a tremendous impact on the culture(s) of the region. When Christianity was introduced into East Asia, it did not enter a religious vacuum. Because the people of East Asia have (...) their own culture, including their worldviews, values, and preunderstandings of religion, it is expected that they may interpret the Christian religion in a way significantly different from the Western interpretation of Christianity. One of these possible ways of reinterpreting Christianity is facilitated by the Mahāyāna Buddhist framework.This paper consists of an analysis of the Mahāyāna interpretation of Christianity made by Zhang Chunyi (1871–1955).1 Zhang was a rather well-known Sinologist who published several commentaries on Chinese classics, including Mozi, Laozi, and Zhuangzi. Though he had been well trained in Chinese classics, he was attracted to Christianity, with the hope that Christianity might contribute to the social reform of China. He even received baptism in an Anglican church in 1905. However, because of his in-depth study of Buddhism and his disappointment with the actual practices of the Christian churches at that time, he eventually converted to Buddhism during the 1920s. From that point, he formally promoted the slogan "Buddhicizing Christianity" (Fohua Jidujiao). His proposal for Buddhicizing Christianity includes a severe criticism of the "foreign" form of Christianity being "imported" to China mainly by the Western Protestant missionaries who, according to Zhang, preached a simplistic and even distorted "gospel" for they lacked the spiritual training (nei xue, lit., "inner learning") as well as the intellectual ability to understand sophisticated Chinese philosophy and genuine Christianity. Partially under his influence, some of his contemporary Chinese Christians were converted to Buddhism. In fact, he published at least eight books on interpreting and reforming Christian doctrines from the perspectives of Buddhism, Confucianism, and so on.2 He was probably the most prolific writer on the subject of his generation and one of the pioneers [End Page 67] in what is now called Mahāyāna theology. This brief outline of his rather unusual religious journey might have indicated the importance of the study of his Buddhist interpretation of Christianity. However, owing to mainly sociopolitical turmoil as well as the religious atmosphere at that time and in the subsequent decades, his Buddhist interpretation of Christianity has not been formally studied for decades.In recent years, more and more studies of Buddhist-Christian dialogue take place in the Chinese context.3 It is important to study previous cases of Buddhist-Christian dialogue, Mahāyāna theology, and so on. Some of these cases, including Zhang's, have been studied.4 This paper aims to examine Zhang's thought critically and to show that although Zhang advocated a Mahāyāna interpretation of Christianity before and after his conversion to Buddhism, his interpretations before and after his conversion to Buddhism are significantly different. It is proposed that whereas his interpretation before his conversion aimed at the indigenization of Christianity and thus, the evangelization of the Chinese, his interpretation after conversion was made with a view to converting the Christians to Buddhism, even though both aimed at the reformulation, or even reform, of Christianity.Zhang's Proposal of "Buddhicizing christianity"Zhang was a scholar of classical Chinese literature, active during the Republican era. He was knowledgeable in Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, and Moism. His study of Moism remains highly regarded.5 Zhang became a Christian and worked for the Christian Literature Society for China (Guan xue hui) in Shanghai for some years. He published several books with a view to indigenizing Christian theology by interpreting it through Chinese philosophical and religious concepts. Zhang's attempt aimed at reinterpreting Christian doctrines within the Buddhist framework in order to make Christianity more acceptable to the Chinese. However, in the 1920s, he himself converted to Buddhism and began to promote his proposal of "Buddhicizing Christianity" (Fohua Jidujiao),6 aiming to convert Christians to Buddhism.Because Zhang had... (shrink)

Philosophers of language and linguists tend to think of the interpreter as an essentially non-creative participant in the communicative process. There’s no room, in traditional theories, for the view that correctness of interpretation depends in some essential way on the interpreter. As a result, there’s no room for the possibility that while P is the correct interpretation of an utterance, u, for one interpreter, P* is the correct interpretation of that utterance for another interpreter. Recently, a (...) number of theorists have, for separate reasons, argued in favour of a radically different view of communication – a view in which the interpreter and her context play what should be thought of as a content-creating role. According to such views, natural languages contain what I’ll call interpretation sensitive terms: terms the correct interpretation of which varies across interpreters (or, more generally, contexts of interpretation).3 An interpretation sensitive sentence can have one content relative to one interpreter and another content relative to another interpreter. This paper is a development and (partial) defence of the view that interpretation sensitivity is ubiquitous in natural language. I call the view that there are interpretation sensitive terms content relativism. Before starting the discussion of content relativism, it is worth pointing out that recent attempts to develop semantically motivated versions of truth relativism should be seen as part of this trend of giving the interpreter a more active role. (shrink)

According to the traditional interpretation, Aristotle’s ethics, and ancient virtue ethics more generally, is fundamentally grounded in self-interest, and so in some sense egoistic. Most contemporary ethical theorists regard egoism as morally repellent, and so dismiss Aristotle’s approach. But recent traditional interpreters have argued that Aristotle’s egoism is not vulnerable to this criticism. Indeed, they claim that Aristotle’s egoism actually accommodates morality. For, they say, Aristotle’s view is that an agent’s best interests are partially constituted by acting morally, (...) so that the virtuous person sees morality as essential to her happiness. (Call this, ‘the Constitutive Thesis’.) In this paper, I argue that the constitutive thesis is unpersuasive, both from a theoretical standpoint and (for similar reasons) as an interpretation of Aristotle. It is unpersuasive because it is much more demanding in both respects than several nonegoist alternatives. My argument builds on an objection originally offered by John McDowell. McDowell claimed (1) that the Constitutive Thesis requires that there are independent standards of self-interest that can be agreed upon in advance by all parties to the dispute, both virtuous and nonvirtuous; and (2) that there are no such standards. I argue that McDowell is mistaken. The orthodox position requires much less than McDowell claims if it makes an appeal to the distinctiveness of the virtuous person’s point of view. However, unfortunately for traditionalists, the price of this point of view defence is high. First, to be even remotely plausible, the revised orthodox view must be almost frighteningly complex. Second, once this complexity is exposed, the orthodox view is much less plausible than its major rivals, in particular those which appeal directly to moral reasons. (shrink)

Early period (h. I-III) works are the most basic data sources in tafsīr studies. However, the related works were shaped within the conditions of the period. In this process, the literacy and schooling rate is low. It is not easy to obtain sufficient writing materials. For this reason, the information was initially transferred as a verbal, some of the original material that has been written has not survived. The information, which is usually narrated and sometimes written, can be learned through (...) the written copies of the next dates. However, there are serious time intervals between the author and the manuscript copies. This time period has led to some problems. There are such works that the author is controversial. There is such information that it is obvious that it was added later. Although some works belonging to the period were compiled from the sources of the following centuries, they were printed under the name of some people who lived in the early period, as if they gave the impression of author copy. Each of these matters has the quality to affect the nature of the information to be used as reference and the perception to be created on it. The relation of the subject with the interpretation of the Qur'ān and the fact that it is binding has a special importance, therefore, it requires knowing the formation stages of the reference source, especially in the commentary of tafsīr. In the article, the author-work relation in early tafsīr works has been tried to be processed on a sufficient number of examples with their respective dimensions.Summary: Early works in tafsīr studies are the most basic data sources. However, the related works were shaped within the conditions of the period. The data at the beginning were verbally transmitted, but some original material that has been written has not survived until nowadays. Therefore, the information about tafsīr are derived from the mainly Buhkārī (d. 256/870), Muslim (d. 261/875), Tirmidhī (d. 279/892), Nasā’ī (d. 303/915) which have tafsīr contents, and encyclopedic sources which have been contended narrations suhc as Țabarī (d. 310/923) and Ibn Abī Ḥātim (d. 327/938).Some later dated work/s belonged to people who lived in the early period alo contribute to this accumulation. However, in scientific studies it is necessary to pay attention to the harmony or difference between the author manuscripts and copies which have been survived. Because the limited possibilities of the period, the time interval between the author and the writing copy, the corrosion that occurred in the texts over time, the capacity or thought the scribe has caused the addition and reduction of the original copy of the text. Although it is rare, it is also possible to attribute the work to a well-known person of the period in order to gain the reputation of the views in the work.In this regard, the article first draws attention to the time difference between the author and the copies that have survived to the present day. Accordingly, it was emphasized that there may be works with controversial belonging to the author. Because, it may be that the names of those who expand, explain or shorten the work with additions are given as the author's name.It is shown with examples that additions to the work could be made in the time interval between the author and the manuscript that has survived to the present day. However, sometimes the difference between copies can be based on many reasons, from the ignorance of the obscene to its forgetfulness and even deliberate replacement. Even in the hadith narrations that attribute special importance to its narration, it is quite possible that the additions were made intentionally or unknowingly, even after the transition to the written period.However, this study was carried out only on tafsīr works. Because even the sampling on a limited number of tafsīr works pushes the limits of the article.In the study, the original texts of the selected works as samples such as Ibn ʿAbbās, al-Farrāʾ, Abū ʿUbayda, etc. were reviewed, and the master's and doctorate studies on the relevant works and the period, especially their editorial evaluations, were tried to be examined as much as possible. In the evaluations, the classical period sources such as Ibnu-Nadīm, Thaʻlabī and Ibn Khallikān, where tafsīr works were subject, as well as the Ottoman period like Edirnevī; Modern era works such as Brockelman and Sezgin were used. Books, articles and encyclopedia articles evaluating the manuscripts were also used.The study revealed that when the early tafsīr references were given, the author-copy relationship should be taken into consideration. Because, although some names are mentioned as mufassīr in the sources, it is controversial whether some of them convert the relevant information into written form. Because the period of the compilation is started in the period of tâbiûn in its earliest form. It is understood that even though the writing is partially activated, the tendency to convey information by narration continues from the examples given.The fact that no original work of the period reaches the present day, there is a serious time gap between the oldest manuscripts carrying the relevant information to the present day and its authors raises the issue of the reliability of the information. This is an issue to be considered in research and updating of information. Because it was seen that some information was difficult to determine the author. In addition, it has been understood that there may be additions afterwards besides the possibility of missing or misreported information due to various factors during the transfer. The fact that narration analysis has not been done properly in the context of the tafsīr science can lead to wrong conclusions in some works, if the possibility of reaching the information added later has not been taken into consideration.In addition, creating author copies from manuscripts is a challenging process with some difficulties in itself. No matter how fastidious it is shown, it should not be forgotten that the work is compiled from manuscripts, it should be known that errors may occur despite the maximum sensitivity.It is another point to consider that some information should be associated with the author and turned into a book based on the narrations in the sources of the next period. It should not be forgotten that some works were created by collecting the narrations of the next period. When the process in its formation is not taken into account, there is a possibility that the relevant information creates an early perception of false perception, as well as the belief that it expresses correct and precise information in all aspects due to its connection with the sacred. It is obvious that there is a difference between the original information from the author's pen and the quality and knowledge value of the information collected by claiming belonging to the author from later works. It is necessary to pay attention to this difference in information transfer.Therefore, during the investigation of the envoy, whose main task is to determine the will of Allah, he has to take into account the mentioned features of the early works. Reliable knowledge transfer and correct religion perception can only be achieved with this care. (shrink)

This study investigated Finnish nurses’ experiences and views on end-of-life decision making and compared them with physicians’ views. For this purpose, a questionnaire was sent to 800 nurses, of which 51% responded. Most of the nurses had a positive attitude towards and respect for living wills, more often than physicians. Most also believed that a will had an effect on decision making. Almost all of the nurses considered it their responsibility to talk to physicians about respecting living wills. Do-not-resuscitate (DNR) (...) orders were often interpreted to imply partial or complete palliative (symptom-orientated) care, which may cause confusion. Half of the nurses reported that a DNR decision was discussed always or often with a patient who was able to communicate; physicians were more positive in this respect. Surprisingly, many nurses (44%) stated that active treatment continued too long. Two-thirds thought that their opinions were taken into account sufficiently, even though only half believed that, in general, they had some impact. (shrink)

I show that what Quine calls 'pressing from above' is an argument for indeterminacy of translation that is generated by assuming the partial interpretation view of scientific theories. Furthermore, I argue that Quine's thesis should be understood as a reductio ad absurdum of partial interpretation and/or the view that the meaning of a term determines a unique extension for the term.

We consider a “polarized” version of bi-intuitionistic logic [5, 2, 6, 4] as a logic of assertions and hypotheses and show that it supports a “rich proof theory” and an interesting categorical interpretation, unlike the standard approach of C. Rauszer’s Heyting-Brouwer logic [28, 29], whose categorical models are all partial orders by Crolard’s theorem [8]. We show that P.A. Melliès notion of chirality [21, 22] appears as the right mathematical representation of the mirror symmetry between the intuitionistic and (...) co-intuitionistc sides of polarized bi-intuitionism. Philosophically, we extend Dalla Pozza and Garola’s pragmatic interpretation of intuitionism as a logic of assertions [10] to bi-intuitionism as a logic of assertions and hypotheses. We focus on the logical role of illocutionary forces and justification conditions in order to provide “intended interpretations” of logical systems that classify inferential uses in natural language and remain acceptable from an intuitionistic point of view. Although Dalla Pozza and Garola originally provide a constructive interpretation of intuitionism in a classical setting, we claim that some conceptual refinements suffice to make their “pragmatic interpretation” a bona fide representation of intuitionism. We sketch a meaning-asuse interpretation of co-intuitionism that seems to fulfil the requirements of Dummett and Prawitz’s justificationist approach. We extend the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation to bi-intuitionism by regarding co-intuitionistic formulas as types of the evidence for them: if conclusive evidence is needed to justify assertions, only a scintilla of evidence suffices to justify hypotheses. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Guillaume Budé, Andrea Alciato, Pierre de l’Estoile: Renaissance Interpreters of Roman LawMichael L. MonheitIn the Renaissance, jurists and other scholars intensely debated the problem of how to interpret correctly the Corpus iuris civilis (CIC), Justinian’s great sixth-century-ad compilation of Roman law. 1 Yet by the sixteenth century jurists had been closely interpreting its texts for four centuries; indeed Roman law jurists, much more than pre-Reformation theologians, innovated through close (...) commentary on the text (a characteristic sometimes wrongly considered a humanist innovation). Assuming that these texts were fully consistent, largely lacking a sense of historical distance, they “found” the CIC’s dictum on a given question by weaving many passages that seemed to address it partially into a complex logical fabric, and eliminated apparent internal conceptual disparities in the same way. 2But from the fifteenth century such humanists as Lorenzo Valla (1407–57) and Angelo Politiano (1454–94) applied humanist critical methods to the CIC and ridiculed the methods of the civilians. In the early sixteenth century the work of Guillaume Budé (1468–1540), Andrea Alciato (1492–1550), and Ulrich Zasius (1461–1535) intensified the crisis in legal interpretation. Budé, the [End Page 21] period’s leading French humanist, was the first humanist to publish an exhaustive study of Justinian’s Digest, while the Milanese jurist Alciato and the German jurist Zasius were among the first humanist-trained Roman lawyers to tackle the CIC. Across the century’s first three decades these humanists debated each other and other jurists, including the eminent Orléans professor of Roman law, Pierre de l’Estoile (1480–1537), best known to scholars as the teacher of a youthful law student named Jean Calvin. 3 We consider here a debate between Budé, Alciato, and Estoile, which also involved Nicolas Duchemin, Estoile’s student and partisan, and Calvin himself, who made his first appearance in print by contributing a preface to the work of his friend Duchemin. Though often referred to in Calvin scholarship, the debate has never been thoroughly explored. 4 [End Page 22]Unlike some recent studies of interpretation in the Renaissance, this study focuses on each interpreter’s practice, rather than his explicit methodological pronouncements alone, on what Wittgenstein calls a writer’s “language game”—here the meaning of each interpreter’s statements in the context of his interpretive practices. Indeed we shall view this debate as a clash of three “forms of life,” since the three protagonists could not agree as to what rules to follow to determine the meaning of a particular expression. 5In the passage in question, Lex Nec quicquam, §Ubi decretum, from the Digest section On the Duties of the Proconsul and Legate (D.1.16.9.1), the third century Imperial jurist Ulpian, declares:Ubi decretum necessarium est per libellum id expedire proconsul non poterit: Omnia enim quaecunque causae cognitionem desiderant per libellum non possunt expediri. (Where a decretum [decree] is required, the proconsul will not be able to dispose of the matter per libellum. All matters whatsoever requiring causae cognitio [judicial investigation] cannot be disposed of per libellum.)In unravelling the meaning of such key terms as decretum and libellus, the interpreters applied assumptions and practices rooted in both the humanist and [End Page 23] scholastic traditions—sometimes the same individual applied both. The debate presents the issue of interpretation apart from that of textual recovery, for no participant claimed any passage involved had been corrupted or offered a significant variant. Had they possessed the Mommsen edition of the CIC (albeit without necessarily understanding its principles of construction), each would have faced little added difficulty.I. Guillaume Budé on §Ubi decretumGuillaume Budé sparked the debate with his comments on the passage in the first part of his famous study of Justinian’s Digest, the Annotationes in quattuor & viginti Pandectarum libros (1508). He argued that the term libellus as used in the passage meant a supplicatory petition addressed to the Emperor. The matters involved could include both controversial cases, for which the Emperor would rely on the judgment of his council, and uncontested matters in which Emperors acted by their own “liberality or beneficence.” Budé confined himself to the... (shrink)

In recent years some moral philosophers and political theorists, who have come to be called “luck egalitarians,” have urged that the essence of social justice is the moral imperative to improve the condition of people who suffer from simple bad luck. Prominent theorists who have attracted the luck egalitarian label include Ronald Dworkin, G. A. Cohen, and John Roemer.1 Larry Temkin should also be included in this group, as should Thomas Nagel at the time that he wrote Equality and Partiality.2 (...) However, each of these theorists asserts a different position. The common ground, if any, is obscure. The idea of luck that is invoked is not transparently clear. Anyway, the term “luck egalitarianism” was coined by a critic of the doctrine, and tendentiously defined to denote an extreme version of the view that looks implausible from the start.3 With some justice Ronald Dworkin, perhaps the chief architect of the luck egalitarian position, has denied that he is a luck egalitarian. (shrink)

Metaphysical orthodoxy holds that a privileged minority of properties carve reality at its joints. These are the so-called fundamental properties. This thesis concerns the contemporary philosophical debate about the nature of fundamental properties. In particular, it aims to answer two questions: What is the most adequate conception of fundamental properties? What is the “big picture” world-view that emerges by adopting such a conception? I argue that a satisfactory answer to both questions requires us to embrace a novel conception of (...) powerful qualities, according to which properties are at once dispositional and qualitative. By adopting the proposed conception of powerful qualities, an original theory of fundamental properties comes to light. I call it Dual-Aspect Account. In this thesis, I defend the Dual-Aspect Account and its superiority with respect to rival views of fundamental properties. I illustrate this claim by examining Dispositionalism, the view defended among others by Alexander Bird and Stephen Mumford, Categoricalism, which has been advocated notably by David Lewis and David Armstrong, and the Identity Theory of powerful qualities, primarily championed by C. B. Martin and John Heil. The latter is the standard conception of powerful qualities. However, in the literature, the Identity Theory faces the charge of contradiction. A preliminary task is therefore to show that a conception of powerful qualities is coherent. To accomplish this aim, I introduce the notion of an aspect of a property. On this interpretation, powerful qualities can be thought of as having dispositional and qualitative aspects. I show that such a conception allows us to disambiguate the claim that a property’s dispositionality is identical with its qualitativity, and evade the charge of contradiction. Aspects bring us other theoretical benefits. I illustrate this claim by showing how the Dual-Aspect Account offers us a promising theory of resemblance. I then compare its merits with David Armstrong’s theory of partial identity. The conclusion of this thesis is that the Dual-Aspect Account is better suited to capturing the world as we find it in everyday life and scientific investigation as compared to the theoretical positions examined. (shrink)

A questionnaire study was performed among Swedish organic livestock farmers to determine their view of animal welfare and other ethical issues in animal production. The questionnaire was sent to 56.5% of the target group and the response rate was 75.6%. A principal components analysis (exploratory factor analysis) was performed to get a more manageable data set. A matrix of intercorrelations between all pairs of factors was computed. The factors were then entered into a series of multiple regression models to (...) explain five dependent variables. Respondents were well educated and had long experience of farming. 81% were full-time farmers. They generally had a very positive attitude towards organic animal husbandry. They considered allowing animals their natural behavior a central aim, which is in accordance with organic philosophy. Farmers tended to be less approving of concepts like animal rights, dignity, and intrinsic value. When analyzing correlations between the factors, two groups of farmers emerged that were only partially correlated, representing different attitudes and behavioral dispositions. These may be interpreted as two subpopulations of organic livestock farmers in Sweden: those who saw organic farming as a lifestyle (``pioneer attitude'''') and entrepreneurs, who considered making money and new challenges more important. Their view of animal welfare differed. While the pioneers considered natural behavior a key issue, this was less important to the entrepreneurs, who also had a more approving attitude towards invasive operations such as castration and were more critical of the organic standards. (shrink)

Many psychological studies of categorization and reasoning use undergraduates to make claims about human conceptualization. Generalizability of findings to other populations is often assumed but rarely tested. Even when comparative studies are conducted, it may be challenging to interpret differences. As a partial remedy, in the present studies we adopt a 'triangulation strategy' to evaluate the ways expertise and culturally different belief systems can lead to different ways of conceptualizing the biological world. We use three groups (US bird experts, (...) US undergraduates, and ordinary Itza' Maya) and two sets of birds (North American and Central American). Categorization tasks show considerable similarity among the three groups' taxonomic sorts, but also systematic differences. Notably, US expert categorization is more similar to Itza' than to US novice categorization. The differences are magnified on inductive reasoning tasks where only undergraduates show patterns of judgment that are largely consistent with current models of category-based taxonomic inference. The Maya commonly employ causal and ecological reasoning rather than taxonomic reasoning. Experts use a mixture of strategies (including causal and ecological reasoning), only some of which current models explain. US and Itza' informants differed markedly when reasoning about passerines (songbirds), reflecting the somewhat different role that songbirds play in the two cultures. The results call into question the importance of similarity-based notions of typicality and central tendency in natural categorization and reasoning. These findings also show that relative expertise leads to a convergence of thought that transcends cultural boundaries and shared experiences. (shrink)

It will be useful to connect the following survey with Giovanni Reale’s important book on Plato, because it reflects forcefully and lucidly the current state of Platonic scholarship. According to Reale, the three historical models of Plato—the Neoplatonic, the Romantic and the currently emerging one—are all paradigms or “disciplinary matrices” in the sense of Thomas Kuhn’s work on scientific theories. This view is fundamentally correct. Reale has adduced sufficient evidence to support it, and Kuhn himself is said to regard (...) favorably the application of his theory to Plato. In the succession of the three paradigms, we may further see a development in which the new view of Plato, which I shall sketch here, assumes the role of a synthesis of the Neoplatonic thesis and its Romantic antithesis in the work of Schleiermacher and Schlegel. Avoiding equally the extremes of too much and too little, the new view neither succumbs to the unhistorical adaptation and systematic transformation of Plato, as does Neoplatonism, nor does it abbreviate his philosophy to the extant literary corpus, as do the Romantics. It takes instead a mediate, historically scrupulous and balanced position between the allegorical interpretation, which prevailed into the eighteenth century, and the subsequently dominant literary interpretation by combining the doxographic tradition, which has its origin in Plato’s oral teaching, with the dialogues and the epistles. This view is careful to include and preserve all the tenable elements of the Romantic paradigm, as, for instance, the correct elements of Schleiermacher’s theory of the dialogue-form. The relation of the new paradigm to the older ones may thus be seen as the correction of the latter and their integration as partial theorems into a more comprehensive general theory. (shrink)

In their contribution to the Review of philosophy and psychology (19 March 2010), David Faraci and David Shoemaker object to Susan Wolf’s sane deep self view of moral responsibility, which is supposed to accord with our pretheoretical intuitions about deprived childhood victims better than the plain deep-self view. Wolf’s account hinges on the intuitiveness of a particular example, which asks us to consider JoJo, the son of an evil dictator of a small, undeveloped country who grows up to (...) adopt his father’s sadistic values. Faraci and Shoemaker conduct a survey to test naïve reasoners’ intuitions on this case. From the study results, they draw three general conclusions: (i) that Wolf’s view is false, (ii) that DSV is basically adequate, subject to the addition of a scalar dimension which measures degrees of responsibility, and (iii) that JoJo is partially excused by naïve moral reasoners because he is seen as suffering from a rare and peculiar form of moral ignorance, “different in kind from the moral ignorance people usually experience” (p. 327). I dispute these conclusions and present an alternative interpretation of the study, which defends an externalist, Strawsonian account of moral responsibility, and I use this approach to show that JoJo’s circumstances are inherently extenuating (at least to a significant degree). Unlike Wolf’s view and DSV, my preferred account is capable of accommodating the fact that JoJo’s formative circumstances were the only factor that made a statistically significant difference to the subjects’ moral judgments. This is because it is the only view capable of according any degree of intrinsic relevance to such external factors. (shrink)

For the greater part of this century Hegel was largely ignored by philosophers—and historians of philosophy—from the analytic tradition. No doubt many factors have shaped Hegel’s reception, but chief among them is the very origin of the analytic tradition. When Russell and Moore rebelled against the philosophical orthodoxy of their day and began the analytic movement, they argued against two Idealist doctrines: the doctrine of internal relations and the radical holistic claim that no part of the universe can be understood (...) on its own. The British Idealists, of course, claimed Hegel as the source and inspiration of these ideas, and Russell and Moore never doubted the veracity of their interpretation. From that point on, the analytic tradition thought of Hegel as a philosopher whose main doctrines had been demolished long ago by Russell and Moore. I want to argue in this paper that Hegel’s reception has been predicated on a mistake. Russell and Moore were wrong—not in their criticisms of the British Idealists but in their interpretation of Hegel, who advocated neither the standard internal relations doctrine nor a radical holism. The real views of Hegel, it seems to me, are largely immune to the criticisms of Russell and Moore. (shrink)

Limited attention has been paid to the potential of tort law to address the harm of sexual violence. Based on interviews with 35 victim-survivors of sexual violence in Iceland, this study asks: How do victim-survivors understand monetary compensation? How can tort law meet victim-survivors’ justice interests? The findings suggest that in addition to the financial risk involved, most participants had ambivalent views towards pursuing and receiving monetary compensation. Many thought that, given their often extensive pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, it was (...) only fair to receive compensation; but at the same time, they did not want to accept ‘dirty money’ they considered that pursuing monetary compensation could undermine their credibility, and monetary compensation only partially aligned with their ideas about justice. The findings are interpreted in the context of tort law theory, taboo trade-offs and survivor-centred justice. It is suggested that state intervention is needed to better meet victim-survivors’ justice interests. (shrink)

One contentious issue in contemporary interpretations of medieval Islamic philosophy is the degree of esotericism espoused by its proponents, and therefore the degree of interpretive effort required by its modem readers to ascertain the author's real beliefs. One philosopher who has been accused of esotericism is Averroes (Ibn Rushd), particularly because he is quite explicit in distinguishing among the different types of reasoning appropriate to different classes of people: philosophers, theologians, and laypersons. But on closer inspection Averroes appears to have (...) at his disposal some subtle strategies for achieving partial reconciliation between religion and philosophy, strategies which do not actually involve falsifying the views of either side, although that is how it might appear at first sight. These polemical devices appear most clearly in his exchanges with the theologians (mutakallimun) of the Ash'arite school, of which Ghazali is the most original representative. In this paper I will examine Averroes's position on two sensitive matters, the creation of the universe and the possibility of miracles, in order to illustrate the use of what may be called his "method of re-interpretation," whereby certain key terms are interpreted in such a way as to emphasize the agreements between the two sides while downplaying the differences. (shrink)

Carnap’s work was instrumental to the liberalization of empiricism in the 1930s that transformed the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle to what came to be known as logical empiricism. A central feature of this liberalization was the deployment of the Principle of Tolerance, originally introduced in logic, but now invoked in an epistemological context in “Testability and Meaning”. Immediately afterwards, starting with Foundations of Logic and Mathematics, Carnap embraced semantics and turned to interpretation to guide the choice of (...) a theoretical language for science. The first thesis of this paper is that recourse to an intended interpretation led to a partial retrenchment of the conventionalism implied by the Principle of Tolerance. It required that the choice of a language be based on abstraction from a context; this procedure later became a component of the process of explication that was distinctive to Carnap’s mature views. The interpretive origin of formal systems also ensured their likely syntactic consistency, an issue on which Carnap was strongly criticized by figures such as Beth and Gödel. The second thesis of this paper is that this reliance on an intended interpretation enabled constructed formal systems to be relevant to the development of empirical science. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Slavoj Žižek’s Hegelian ReformationGiving a Hearing to The Parallax ViewAdrian Johnston (bio)Slavoj Žižek. THE PARALLAX VIEW. Cambridge: MIT P, 2006. [PV]Near the end of a two-hour presentation at Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michigan, on November 10, 2006, Slavoj Žižek confesses that, in terms of the intellectual ambitions nearest to his heart, “my secret dream is to be Hegel’s Luther” [“Why Only an Atheist Can Believe”]. This confession (...) comes just months after the publication of his latest major work, The Parallax View, a book described as a new magnum opus. There are ample justifications within this text to license retroactively rereading it through the lens of Žižek’s subsequent public admission that he is now preoccupied with rescuing Hegel from the numerous misinterpretations to which this giant of German idealism (who casts such a long shadow over the Continental European philosophical tradition) has been repeatedly subjected over the past two hundred years. The Parallax View, at certain points explicitly and in other places implicitly, can be seen as centered on an effort to confront aggressively the various received versions of Hegel widely accepted as official and orthodox exegetical renditions. The motif of the “parallax gap,” elaborated in a plethora of guises throughout this 2006 tome, condenses and reflects the axiomatic theses of what could be called Žižek’s Hegelian reformation.The critical assessment of The Parallax View offered here seeks to go straight to its theoretical heart by highlighting a single line of argumentation running through the full span of this text’s different moments and phases. Žižek’s own Hegelian-style conceptions of truth (as fiercely partisan rather than calmly neutral) and universality (as immanently concrete rather than transcendently abstract) validate such an interpretive approach—“universal Truth is accessible only from a partial engaged subjective position” [PV 35]. Deliberately extracting particular conceptual constellations and forcing them to link up with each other according to the plan of a certain directed philosophical agenda promises to be much more revealing of the essential features of Žižekian thought than a comprehensive survey of this latest of his major works.The specific argumentative thread to be isolated here is the new extended engagement with the terrain covered by cognitive science and the neurosciences. Apart from the task of denouncing falsifying popular pictures of Hegel, one of Žižek’s other driving ambitions in this book is the desire to formulate a fundamental ontology appropriate to the theory of subjectivity mapped out over the course of his entire intellectual itinerary (a theory informed by Kant and post-Kantian German idealism combined with Lacanian psychoanalytic metapsychology). And, herein, the articulation of such an ontology appropriately gets entangled, via reflections on the nature of the brain, with the latest instantiations of the perennial philosophical problem of the relationship between mind and [End Page 3] body. Žižek grants that the central nervous system is, in at least several undeniable and important senses, the material, corporeal ground of the subject, the bodily being without which there cannot be the parlêtre (speaking being). But, in the spirit of Schelling and Hegel (especially their philosophies of “productive” nature), the fashions in which Žižek attempts to tie together systematically a materialist ontology with an account of more-than-material, transontological subjectivity illuminate a normally obscured and ignored set of implied consequences flowing from the gesture of dissolving hard-and-fast dualist distinctions between body and mind, nature and spirit.The past few decades of philosophical engagement with the neurosciences, an engagement almost completely monopolized by the Anglo-American Analytic philosophical tradition and neglected by the Continental European philosophical tradition to an equal degree, has emphasized (to put this in the vernacular of German idealism) the naturalization of spirit resulting from the collapse of any strict nature-spirit dichotomy. The materialisms promoted by those Analytic philosophers amenable to grounding the mental on the neuronal simply assume that the outcome of folding mind and matter into each other is a becoming-material of the mind, namely, a naturalization of the spirit (that is, the mind comes to resemble the brain conceived of as just another part... (shrink)

A physical theory is a partially interpreted axiomatic formal system, where L is a formal language with some logical, mathematical and physical axioms, and with some derivation rules, and the semantics S is a relationship between the formulas of L and some states of affairs in the physical world. In our ordinary discourse, the formal system L is regarded as an abstract object or structure, the semantics S as something which involves the mental/conceptual realm. This view is of course (...) incompatible with physicalism. How can physical theory be accommodated in a purely physical ontology? The aim of this paper is to outline an account for meaning and truth of physical theory, within the philosophical framework spanned by three doctrines: physicalism, empiricism, and the formalist philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

There is a curious asymmetry in cases where the use of religious language involves a breakdown in communication and leads to a seemingly intractable dispute. Why does the use of religious language in such cases almost always arise on the side of patients and their families, rather than on the side of clinicians or others who work in healthcare settings? I suggest that the intractable disputes arise when patients and their families use religious language to frame their problem and the (...) possibilities of solution. Unlike clinicians, they are not bilingual and thus lack the capacity to understand and negotiate differences in terms that are responsive to those who work in healthcare settings. After considering a representative case, I explore whether an ethics consultant or chaplain can function as a translator and suggest that, at best, such efforts at mediation depend on contingent aspects of a case and will only be partially successful. To appreciate limits on the role for bilingual translators, I consider a futility dispute where a parent using religious language demands that everything be done for a permanently unconscious child. I challenge the traditional interpretation that says the parent values “mere duration of biological life irrespective of quality.” From a religious perspective, human life is never “merely biological.” This effort to slot the dispute into standard philosophical schemas misses what is crucial in the dispute. I suggest that a better interpretation views the dispute at a meta-level as one about whether withholding and withdrawing care is morally distinguishable from killing. Curiously, this interpretation makes the advocate of futile care into an ally of those “quality of life” advocates who also challenge this distinction. The crux of their dispute now rests on the normative ethics of killing. While I think my interpretation comes much closer to the views of many who demand ‘futile care,’ I suggest that it still falls short because of the way it reconstructs the religious concerns in nonreligious terms. I close by considering an analogy between the language of suffering and the language of faith, suggesting that both require a much richer understanding of the narratives that orient the lives of patients and their families. (shrink)

This second part of the essay deals with the horns of the dilemma at the conceptual level and ?on the street?. The first part ended with that quandary where a deep understanding was precluded no matter which way one turned, whether an inadequate comprehension based on individual and partial notions, a perplexing pluralist path or a relinquishment of the hermeneutic enterprise altogether. The philosophical solution of existential overtones presently put forward deftly avoids the sharp ends of the predicament by (...) means of a three-tiered phenomenological analysis of the event. First, death is considered via Heidegger's and Sartre's existential examination; next, risk and related concepts, such as fear, are scrutinised; and third, Nietzsche's and Ortega y Gasset's life-affirming views lead us to the liberating conclusion: facing danger and death are means to an enhanced and joyful experience of life. As in the first part, this one also presents several photographs that complement the text at different levels. Once several objections are disposed of, readers are left with a philosophical elucidation of a sense of joy predicated on the ability to face daring challenges willingly undertaken for the fun of it. (shrink)

Those who think that general historical interpretations do no more than express a personal point of view deny that arguments over their credibility can have any point. They commonly believe that historians decide upon particular facts about the past in the context of a general interpretation of those facts. Consequently they deny that there is any independent basis for judging the credibility of general interpretations of the past, and conclude that each coherent account is as good as every (...) other. Similarly, those who think causal explanations are arbitrary can make no sense of arguments about their adequacy. They assume that historians simply pick out causes that interest them, and that there is no objective basis for judging the adequacy of the explanations they provide. This essay defends the credibility of interpretations against the skeptics, and the adequacy of causal explanations too. It shows that historians do discover a mass of particular facts independently of the general interpretations they finally provide, facts that provide a basis for assessing the credibility and fairness of those interpretations. It will also show that there is an objective basis for judging the adequacy of causal explanations, as some causes of an event are far more influential in bringing it about than others. A much more difficult problem concerns the need for historical interpretations to provide not just a credible account of the past, but also one that is fair, balanced, not misleading. Historians frequently argue about the fairness of general interpretations. Does this mean that fairness is always required? Quite often historians produce partial interpretations, in both senses, with no apology. It would be wrong to call such interpretations “biased” because they do not pretend to be comprehensive. So long as they are credible, they are acceptable. On the other hand, many interpretations are intended to present a fair, comprehensive account of their subject. When judging the adequacy of interpretations, it is necessary to know whether they are meant to be fair or not. (shrink)

In this age when idealistic themes such as contextualistic theories of meaning and coherence theories of truth are again becoming commonplace in epistemology and philosophy of science, it should be profitable to recall some of the great representatives of the idealistic tradition in order to reexamine their views on the issues of epistemology and their interpretations of science. The purpose of this paper is to examine, if only partially, idealistic views on this latter issue, i.e., on the nature of science.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Towards a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes”Cristiano Castelfranchi (bio) and Maria Miceli (bio)Keywordsgrief, suffering, attachment, agent architectureThis paper is significant in many respects: its approach (the design-based analysis); its proposed architecture; its description of grief; and its self-control/perturbance theory. We would offer some remarks on each of these aspects.AI: Back to the FutureAfter some years of crisis, AI seems now to have recovered its original challenging attitude (...) and its identity. In particular all the original ambitions of AI have been renewed under the label of “autonomous agents” (see, for example, Russell and Norvig 1995; Wooldridge and Jennings 1995). This paper and its authors are good representatives of this challenging attitude. Of course, the AI appearing at century’s end is different from, say, the AI of the 1980s. AI systems and models are now conceived for reasoning and acting in open unpredictable worlds, with limited and uncertain knowledge, in real time, with bounded (both cognitive and material) resources, with hybrid architectures, interfering—either co-operatively or competitively—with other systems. The new password for the AI of the 1990s is interaction (Bobrow 1991): interaction with an evolving environment; among several, distributed and heterogeneous artificial systems in a network; with human users; and among humans through computers.This renewed AI, however different though it is in some ways, can be understood as returning to its original aim of modeling “intelligence”: not only static and isolated sub-functions of intelligence but the integrated and pragmatic functioning of autonomous agent architectures as against algorithms. Our renewed AI, based on architectures, can again have important exchanges with other (psychological and social) sciences. This paper is a good example of the fruitful cross-fertilization of ideas which may result from such exchanges. It was indeed just this which originally gave rise to cognitive science.The ArchitectureThe proposed architecture, although quite speculative, and—as the authors themselves emphasize—very much a first sketch, is directly relevant to this new AI. In fact, recent research efforts in the agent-architecture domain are focused exactly on the problem of “goal dynamics” [End Page 129] or “motive processing,” which is the core of this architecture, and on the problem of integrating reactivity and deliberation. Compared with current AI architectures (for example, BDI systems) it is important to note that this “motive-processing” architecture is not yet formalized or implemented to the same extent. On the other hand, it is more interesting from a psychological point of view, and is already able to give us some important insights into human emotions, in particular those emotions (like grief) that involve all or total loss of control of management processes.The Report-Based Analysis of GriefThe report-based description of grief provides a persuasive and rich basis for both modeling and discussing the model. The relevant features of this emotion are well characterized with reference to the self-control problem and motive-processing (though, as we shall see, to use grief as an example of those emotions that involve all or total loss of control of thought processes may provide a partially distorted view of grief itself). In particular, we would stress the relevance of the “intrusive” character of grief-related contents; the rejection of certain beliefs due to the psychic pain they cause; the coping strategies people describe; and the second order motivations related to the control of the emotional state. We believe that psychological models especially of these aspects are usually less specific and explanatory.Let us now try to synthesize some criticisms one could advance of this analysis. We will first address two core notions of the model—perturbance and self-control—and then consider more specifically the treatment of grief.PerturbanceThis notion is potentially very interesting, unless it is reduced to an information processing perspective (e.g., perturbance of attentive processes). An information processing perspective is much more limited than a motive-processing one—at least in the limitative sense of the term, as it is generally used in the psychology of cognitive processes—and is in our view insufficient for understanding human emotions and their role. This limiting interpretation of perturbance fails... (shrink)

This impressive volume presents the results of a symposium on the structure of scientific theories held at the University of Illinois, Urbana, on March 26-29, 1969; lest this create the wrong impression, let it be noted at the outset that the volume is much more than a collection of papers. Indeed, when one takes into account Frederick Suppe’s book-length introduction, the editing of the critical comments, the extensive bibliography, and the fine index, the work must be seen as the best (...) account of scientific theory now available, one that surely commends itself to every philosopher of science with the slightest interest in metaphysics. The thrust of the symposium was to examine the view of scientific theories that has enjoyed great vogue among logical positivists, who have seen such theories as "axiomatic calculi in which theoretical terms and statements are given a partial observational interpretation by means of correspondence rules." Suppe refers to this as the "Received View," although it has been increasingly questioned in recent years, particularly by philosophers who have some proficiency in the history of science and by scientists who question its fidelity to actual scientific practice. One of the major aims of the symposium was to subject the Received View to analysis and debate by its proponents and by its critics, to assess its present status, and to see if any consensus has begun to develop on this topic—which plays such a key role in the philosophy of science. Suppe performs the analytic function in his critical introduction, and Stephen Toulmin adds a postscript that attempts to chart a course for future research. The message seems to be that the Received View has run its course and has proved to be more a hindrance than a help to philosophizing about science; what will take its place, however, does not emerge with any clarity. Participants in the symposium include all the luminaries in the philosophy of science movement: Carl Hempel, Patrick Suppes, David Bohm, Hilary Putnam, Thomas Kuhn, and Dudley Shapere, among others. Especially noteworthy are Suppe’s account of the development of the Received View and the criticisms that have been lodged against it, viz., its reliance on the analytic-synthetic distinction; the tenability of the observational-theoretical distinction; the notion of partial interpretation; its failure to include models as integral components; its analysis of correspondence rules; and its reliance on axiomatization. Suppe also details some of the proposed alternatives to the Received View, giving in the process lucid expositions of the thought of Toulmin, Kuhn, Hanson, Popper, and Feyerabend—all of which he treats under the rubric of "Weltanshauungen [[sic]] Analyses." Those interested in the relationships between history of science and philosophy of science will find the interchange between I. Bernard Cohen and Peter Achinstein stimulating as well as illuminating. Kuhn takes this occasion to offer his "Second Thoughts on Paradigms," and Shapere continues his criticism of both Kuhn and logical positivism—now more constructively than heretofore—with a penetrating essay entitled "Scientific Theories and their Domains." About the only thing that is lacking is a treatment of recent developments in England, particularly the work of Rom Harré at Oxford and related thinkers, who likewise reject the Received View and offer interesting alternatives to it that have yet to be appreciated and critiqued in the U.S.—W.A.W. (shrink)