In this 1999 book Pierre Keller examines the distinctive contributions, and the respective limitations, of Husserl's and Heidegger's approach to fundamental elements of human experience. He shows how their accounts of time, meaning, and personal identity are embedded in important alternative conceptions of how experience may be significant for us, and discusses both how these conceptions are related to each other and how they fit into a wider philosophical context. His sophisticated and accessible account of the phenomenological philosophy of (...) Husserl and the existential phenomenology of Heidegger will be of wide interest to students and specialists in these areas, while analytic philosophers of mind will be interested by the detailed parallels which he draws with a number of concerns of the analytic philosophical tradition. (shrink)

The main objective of this article is to capitalise on many years of research, and of practice, relating to the use of introspection in a research context, and thus to provide an initial outline description of introspection, while developing an introspection of introspection. After a description of the context of this research, I define the institutional conditions which would enable the renewal of introspection as a research methodology. Then I describe three aspects of introspective practice: 1) introspection as a process (...) of becoming aware, theorized through Husserl's model of consciousness modes; 2) introspection as recollection, through the model of retention and awakening in Husserl's theory of memory; 3) the use of universal descriptive categories for the description of all lived experiences, as a guide for skilled practice of introspection in research. Finally I examine the question of the validation of introspective data, suggesting a strong distinction between the ethical criterion and the epistemic criterion of truth. (shrink)

On parle beaucoup dans cet ouvrage de contresens, de contresens parfois createurs, qui ont fait progresser la pensee, mais aussi de contresens qui ne produisent qu'erreur et confusion, comme ceux que commettent certains tenants de la psychologie historique. On presente dans cet ouvrage plusieurs applications a des textes philosophiques d'une methode d'interpretation qui consiste a les replacer dans le contexte de l'enseignement et de la vie des ecoles philosophiques. A cote d'etudes de details consacrees a des termes philosophiques importants, on (...) trouvera dans ce volume plusieurs contributions generales, justement celebres, consacrees aux divisions de la philosophie, a l'organisation de l'enseignement dans les ecoles philosophiques, a la repartition des disciplines ou encore a la figure du sage. Les recherches de Pierre Hadot ont porte tout d'abord sur les rapports entre hellenisme et christianisme, puis sur la mystique neoplatonicienne et la philosophie de l'epoque hellenistique, et enfin sur la description du phenomene spirituel de la philosophie. (shrink)

Un aphorisme hante la philosophie occidentale. celui d'Héraclite, qui veut que " la Nature aime à se voiler ". Près de vingt-cinq siècles durant, ces quelques petits mots ont successivement signifié: que tout ce qui naît tend à mourir; que la Nature s'enveloppe dans des formes sensibles et dans des mythes; qu'elle cache en elle des vertus occultes ; mais également que l'Etre est originellement dans un état de contraction et de non-déploiement ; ou bien encore qu'il se dévoile en (...) se voilant. Ainsi cet aphorisme aura-t-il servi à expliquer les difficultés de la science de la nature, à justifier l'exégèse allégorique des textes bibliques ou à défendre le paganisme, à critiquer la violence faite à la nature par la technique et la mécanisation du monde, à expliquer enfin l'angoisse qu'inspire à l'homme moderne son être-au-monde. La même formule, illustrée par l'image du voile d'Isis et déployée par Pierre Hadot dans l'histoire de l'Occident, aura justifié, par suite de contresens créateurs, l'attitude prométhéenne - l'homme doit se rendre maître et possesseur de la Nature - comme l'attitude orphique - nul ne peut soulever le voile des mystères de la Nature, sinon le poète et l'artiste. Elle n'aura jamais cessé de tracer des perspectives nouvelles sur la réalité et de révéler les attitudes les plus diverses à l'égard de la Nature. Par là, elle confirme le propos de Nietzsche : " Une bonne sentence est trop dure à la dent du temps et tous les millénaires n'arrivent pas à la consommer, bien qu'elle serve à tout moment de nourriture. ". (shrink)

A new translation of Pierre Bayle's first great work, which undermines the influence of "superstition" in political life and laid the groundwork for the separation of church and state.

1. ptie. La nature des choses -- 2. ptie. La réalité mentale -- 3. ptie. La vie affective -- 4. ptie. La condition humaine -- 5. ptie. Les voies de la libération.

Tied to the apron strings of the church -- Researcher, teacher, philosopher -- Philosophical discourse -- Interpretation, objectivity and nonsense -- Unitary experience and philosophical life -- Philosophical discourse as spiritual exercise -- Philosophy as life and as a quest for wisdom -- From Socrates to Foucault : a long tradition -- Inacceptable? -- The present alone is our happiness.

This article reports two studies investigating the relationship between emotional feelings and respiration. In the first study, participants were asked to produce an emotion of either joy, anger, fear or sadness and to describe the breathing pattern that fit best with the generated emotion. Results revealed that breathing patterns reported during voluntary production of emotion were (a) comparable to those objectively recorded in psychophysiological experiments on emotion arousal, (b) consistently similar across individuals, and (c) clearly differentiated among joy, anger, fear, (...) and sadness. A second study used breathing instructions based on Study 1's results to investigate the impact of the manipulation of respiration on emotional feeling state. A cover story was used so that participants could not guess the actual purpose of the study. This manipulation produced significant emotional feeling states that were differentiated according to the type of breathing pattern. The implications of these findings for emotion theories based on peripheral feedback and for emotion regulation are discussed. (shrink)

Nous étudions un traité scientifique en langue arabe, achevé à Belgrade en 1779. Son titre est L’Offrande du converti pour ranimer la flamme éteinte. Il ne fut jamais imprimé, mais dix copies, d’aspect semblable à celui des manuscrits arabes traditionnels, attestent de sa circulation dans l’Empire ottoman. L’auteur, un converti à l’islam qu’on appelait Osman Efendi, y aborde la géométrie euclidienne, la géométrie d’arpentage, la dynamique galiléenne et leurs applications aux sciences militaires. Il affiche son ambition de « faire revivre (...) et renouveler » la géométrie, « science oubliée et délaissée », et révèle in fine avoir pour cela traduit des livres allemands et français. Après un essai de reconstruction de la biographie d’Osman Efendi, nous montrerons que son ouvrage est en réalité une production élaborée, dépassant largement la simple démarche de traduction. Montage soigneux de différentes sources européennes que nous identifierons, il incorpore aussi un grand nombre d’éléments directement empruntés au savoir islamique de la tradition vivante. Il est ainsi le témoin remarquable d’une tentative de constitution d’un savoir hybride euro-islamique. (shrink)

As is often the case when scientific or engineering fields emerge, new concepts are forged or old ones are adapted. When this happens, various arguments rage over what ultimately turns out to be conceptual misunderstandings. At that critical time, there is a need for an explicit reflection on the meaning of the concepts that define the field. In this position paper, we aim to provide a reasoned framework in which to think about various issues in the field of distributed cognition. (...) We argue that both relevant concepts, distribution and cognition, must be understood as continuous. As it is used in the context of distributed cognition, the concept of distribution is essentially fuzzy, and we will link it to the notion of emergence of system-level properties. The concept of cognition must also be seen as fuzzy, but for a different reason: due to its origin as an anthropocentric concept, no one has a clear handle on its meaning in a distributed setting. As the proposed framework forms a space, we then explore its geography and visit famous landmarks. (shrink)

As is often the case when scientific or engineering fields emerge, new concepts are forged or old ones are adapted. When this happens, various arguments rage over what ultimately turns out to be conceptual misunderstandings. At that critical time, there is a need for an explicit reflection on the meaning of the concepts that define the field. In this position paper, we aim to provide a reasoned framework in which to think about various issues in the field of distributed cognition. (...) We argue that both relevant concepts, distribution and cognition, must be understood as continuous. As it is used in the context of distributed cognition, the concept of distribution is essentially fuzzy, and we will link it to the notion of emergence of system-level properties. The concept of cognition must also be seen as fuzzy, but for a different reason: due to its origin as an anthropocentric concept, no one has a clear handle on its meaning in a distributed setting. As the proposed framework forms a space, we then explore its geography and visit famous landmarks. (shrink)

What, if anything, is wrong with high executive compensation? Is the common “lay reaction” of indignation and moral outrage justified? In this paper, my main goal is to articulate in a more systematic and philosophical manner the egalitarian responses to these questions. In order to do so, I suggest that we take some insights from recent debates on two versions of egalitarianism: a distributive one, according to which no one should be worse off than others because of unfair distributions of (...) goods and resources, especially ones based on matters of luck or arbitrary factors, and a relational one, which maintains that egalitarian justice requires members of a society to relate to one another as equals. Drawing on recent attempts to highlight the tricky nature of managerial authority, I argue that high inequalities in pay are not simply a distributional matter but should also be analyzed through a relational lens. I also attempt to show that relational egalitarians are well-equipped to question the now dominant “incentives” view of CEO compensation. (shrink)

The reissue of this work as a Routledge Classic brings some radical ideas to a new audience, and argues persuasively for a totally new way of reading.

We study normal ideals on Pκ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${P_{\kappa} }$$\end{document} that are defined in terms of games of uncountable length.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Montaigne and the Coherence of EclecticismPierre ForceSince the publication of Pierre Hadot's essays on ancient philosophy by Arnold Davidson in 1995,2 Michel Foucault's late work on "the care of the self"3 has appeared in a new light. We now know that Hadot's work was familiar to Foucault as early as the 1950s.4 It is also clear that Foucault's notion of "techniques of the self" is very close to (...) what Hadot calls "spiritual exercises." At the same time, there are important differences between the views of these two philosophers, and Hadot has often expressed his regret that Foucault's untimely death prevented them from exploring these differences.5 One important point of disagreement was the status of eclecticism. In Foucault's interpretation of ancient philosophy, the "constitution of the self" implied a personal choice among disparate philosophical references: "Writing as a personal exercise done by the self and for the self, is an art of disparate truth."6 In a 1989 article Hadot argued from a historical point of view that, so far as Stoicism and Epicureanism were concerned, [End Page 523] eclecticism had no place in a mature practice of philosophy. Foucault's favorite example, Seneca's Letters to Lucilius, in which Stoic arguments were invoked along with Epicurean arguments, was a work for beginners. In a mature practice of Stoicism, one would stick to the arguments of the Stoic school, choose them for their coherence, and instead of trying to forge a spiritual identity for oneself through writing, one would "liberate oneself from one's individuality in order to raise oneself up to universality."7 Hadot added that "it is only in the New Academy—in the person of Cicero, for instance—that a personal choice is made according to what reason considers as most likely at a given moment."8 This discussion of Foucault may give the impression that Hadot was somewhat dismissive of eclecticism. Yet in a 2001 interview Hadot claimed that he had always admired Cicero's intellectual independence, and he proposed a reappraisal "of an attitude that has always had a bad reputation: eclecticism."9Something very similar is a stake in the work of Alexander Nehamas, as Lanier Anderson and Joshua Landy showed in their study of his Art of Living. In the conception of philosophy as a "way of life" (Hadot) or "care of the self" (Foucault) or "self-fashioning" (Nehamas), a central issue is the relationship between theoretical coherence and the coherence of the person who theorizes. Elaborating on Nehamas's chapter on Montaigne, Anderson and Landy argue that there is a move in Montaigne away from doctrinal coherence and towards a coherence of the self. As they put it, "the harmonious whole Montaigne commends [... ] is not a coherent body of fact or theory; it is the unified self of the theorizer."10 Anderson and Landy show that this brings up all kinds of difficulties: can this unified self be other than a fiction? If that is the case, how can philosophy be a way of life? Nehamas's answer is very much in the spirit of the late Foucault: there is a coherence of the self in Montaigne, and this coherence is the product of writing as a philosophical activity. The self is fashioned through writing.Because Montaigne writes in the ancient tradition of philosophy as a way of life, one may recall Hadot's suggestion that Foucault's notion of [End Page 524] "writing the self" is an intriguing but historically inaccurate description of ancient philosophical practice. But perhaps Hadot agrees with Foucault after all, since in his most recent interviews, he speaks favorably of eclecticism, a notion that is central to Foucault's analysis of self-fashioning through writing. The case of Montaigne is particularly interesting for these purposes, not only because the Essays seem to be the prototypical example of "writing the self," but also because eclecticism is both discussed and practiced throughout the Essays. I propose to take a fresh look at this issue by investigating the status of eclecticism in Montaigne's Essays. This must start with an examination of the philosophical tradition most closely associated with... (shrink)

Drawing upon feminist, queer, and crip phenomenology, this essay argues that the distinct temporality of the lived, stuttering body disturbs the normalized “choreography” of communication and thereby threatens the disabled speaker's recognition as a speaking subject. Examined through the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Alfred Schutz, the disabled speaking body is temporally “out of step” with the normalized bodily rhythms and pace of communicative practices in relation to both lived and objective time. Disciplined for his incalculable and therefore irrational bodily (...) choreography, the disabled speaker is foregrounded against an objective, instrumentally ordered world constituted by a disembodied and hegemonic “straight-masculine” time. Although dominant communicative choreographies may often be unlivable for disabled speakers, cripping communicative time rejects the cardinal value of futurity and invites interlocutors to gather in a noninstrumentalized and nonproductive present. This reshaping of communicative space enacts new modes of relationality and opens up an array of communicative futures suppressed or cut off by straight-masculine time. (shrink)

Suppose that knowledge and ignorance are complements in the sense of being mutually exclusive: for person S and fact p, either S knows that p or is ignorant that p. Understood in this way, ignorance amounts to a lack or absence of knowledge: S is ignorant that p if and only if it is not the case that S knows that p. Let us call the thesis that knowledge and ignorance are opposites the “Complement Thesis”. In this article, I discuss (...) its deployment in an ingenious new argument advanced by Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson (2009) which, if sound, establishes that there is a kind of knowledge that amounts to nothing more than true belief. I rebut their argument and in doing so delineate some important epistemological lessons brought to light by the contrast between ignorance and knowledge. (shrink)

In order to account for how organisms can apprehend the contents of the external representations they manipulate in cognizing, the endorsement of representationalism fosters a situation of what I call cognitive overdetermination. I argue that this situation is problematic for the inclusion of these external representations in cognitive processing, as the hypothesis of extended cognition would like to have it. Since that situation arises from a commitment to representationalism (even minimal), it only affects the viability of representationalist versions of extended (...) cognition. (shrink)

Many papers have been devoted to the semantic turn Carnap took in the late 1930s after Tarski had explained to him his method for defining truth and his work on the establishment of scientific semantics. Commentators have often argued that the major turn in Carnap’s approach to languages had already been taken in the Logical Syntax of Language, but they have usually assumed that Carnap was happy to subsequently follow Tarski and adopt Tarskian semantics. In this paper, it is argued (...) that this assumption needs to be qualified and that Carnap was actually far from following Tarski when he decided to complement his syntactic method with a semantic one. Carnap and Tarski had different goals, divergent programs, and dissenting views on truth and semantics. After exploring several possible methods for the explication of logical concepts such as L-truth and L-implication, Carnap opted for definitions based on concepts he had found in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Waismann’s work on a logical interpretation of probability. Carnap’s reasons for taking a semantic turn are to be understood in the context of his principle of tolerance. He first hoped he could use Tarski’s technique to recover in the semantic setting the completeness result he had tried to establish in the Logical Syntax. His eventual adoption of non-Tarskian semantics can be accounted for by his program of a logical analysis of science—including empirical science—and his ambition to elaborate a unified logical framework for deductive, inductive, and modal logic, and for explicating analyticity. (shrink)

La quatrième des Considérations inactuelles de Friedrich Nietzsche est emblématique en ce qu'elle présente la notion d'événement de façon dialectique. Participant au premier festival de Bayreuth durant l'été 1876, c'est à la fois en tant que spectateur, historien et philosophe, que Friedrich Nietzsche interprète l'événement comme un « cas » ou un symptôme, et saisit la volonté de Richard Wagner dans sa « chute », où le spectacle et la décadence sont les valeurs de la culture européenne et de l'Allemagne (...) moderne. De plus, d’une volonté analogue, et d’abord impressionné par la hauteur du compositeur et la puissance de son œuvre totale, c’est à partir d’un « pathos de la distance » que le philosophe va « transvaluer » le cas Wagner après Bayreuth et le faire advenir comme le nouvel événement d’une histoire critique dans laquelle il se comprend lui-même. Alors, c’est comme un « grand » événement que nous interprétons Friedrich Nietzsche à Bayreuth décrit comme la synthèse d’un processus à la fois civilisationnel et culturel. (shrink)

La quatrième des Considérations inactuelles de Friedrich Nietzsche (Richard Wagner à Bayreuth) est emblématique en ce qu'elle présente la notion d'événement de façon dialectique. Participant au premier festival de Bayreuth durant l'été 1876, c'est à la fois en tant que spectateur, historien et philosophe, que Friedrich Nietzsche interprète l'événement comme un « cas » (« Der Fall ») ou un symptôme (« Das Symptom »), et saisit la volonté de Richard Wagner dans sa « chute » (« Der Vorfall »), (...) où le spectacle et la décadence sont les valeurs de la culture européenne et de l'Allemagne moderne. De plus, d’une volonté analogue, et d’abord impressionné par la hauteur du compositeur et la puissance de son œuvre totale (Gesamtkunstwerk), c’est à partir d’un « pathos de la distance » que le philosophe va « transvaluer » le cas Wagner après Bayreuth et le faire advenir comme le nouvel événement d’une histoire critique dans laquelle il se comprend lui-même. Alors, c’est comme un « grand » événement que nous interprétons Friedrich Nietzsche à Bayreuth décrit comme la synthèse d’un processus à la fois civilisationnel et culturel. (shrink)

P. Amandry, A propos de monuments de Delphes : questions de chronologie (I). p. 591-610 Dans leur entreprise de critique systématique de la chronologie traditionnellement admise pour l'art grec archaïque, Francis et Vickers ont mis en doute la date de 530-525 pour le trésor de Siphnos, à partir de divers arguments contestant l'interprétation ou la valeur du texte d'Hérodote, III 57-58, ou l'identification du trésor. Mais celle-ci est prouvée, avec une quasi-certitude, par un passage de Pausanias et par l'emploi avéré (...) de marbre siphnien. Les rapprochements faits par F. et V. entre le décor sculpté du trésor et le palais de Persépolis, ainsi que la supposition d'une symbolique anti-perse, sont au mieux gratuits, souvent inacceptables. (shrink)

Alors que la narratologie prétendait dévoiler les structures du récit en général, Vincent Descombes, dans son livre sur Proust, affirme qu’une science conséquente de la littérature doit rendre compte de la manière particulière qu’a chaque genre littéraire de produire du sens. Nous présentons dans cet article une approche noétique des genres qui, tentant de dépasser l’opposition entre sémiologie et herméneutique, s’intéresse à la manière dont les structures symboliques créent des modes de pensée particuliers. En remarquant que les fondateurs de la (...) narratologie, sous couvert de fiction, ont en réalité analysé le seul genre romanesque, elle propose de repartir de leur travail pour mettre au jour le fonctionnement des synthèses diachronique et synchronique propres au roman. N’en restant pas à cette analyse des structures sémiotiques, la noétique procède à leur interprétation phénoménologique, et montre que le mode de pensée du roman est celui de ce que Hegel appelle l’expérience de la conscience. (shrink)

Alors que la narratologie prétendait dévoiler les structures du récit en général, Vincent Descombes, dans son livre sur Proust, affirme qu’une science conséquente de la littérature doit rendre compte de la manière particulière qu’a chaque genre littéraire de produire du sens. Nous présentons dans cet article une approche noétique des genres qui, tentant de dépasser l’opposition entre sémiologie et herméneutique, s’intéresse à la manière dont les structures symboliques créent des modes de pensée particuliers. En remarquant que les fondateurs de la (...) narratologie, sous couvert de fiction, ont en réalité analysé le seul genre romanesque, elle propose de repartir de leur travail pour mettre au jour le fonctionnement des synthèses diachronique et synchronique propres au roman. N’en restant pas à cette analyse des structures sémiotiques, la noétique procède à leur interprétation phénoménologique, et montre que le mode de pensée du roman est celui de ce que Hegel appelle l’expérience de la conscience. (shrink)