Dans cet article, nous nous proposons d?établir une analyse comparative entre l?approche de la notion de schéma corporel dans la Phénoménologie de la perception 1 et dans les Cours de Sorbonne , réalisés entre 1949 et 1952, et dédiés, surtout, à la psychologie de l?enfant. Dans la Phénoménologie de la perception , Merleau-Ponty critique le caractère associationiste qui a marqué l?émergence de la notion de schéma corporel dans la neuropsychiatrie au passage du xix e au xx (...) e siècle. Pour le philosophe, le sens vraiment fructueux de ce dispositif repose dans son caractère intentionnel. Merleau-Ponty opère une désubstantialisation de la notion concernée. De représentation ou de no­yau cognitif organisateur de notre expérience corporelle, elle passe à fonction pré-cognitive, expression de la perméabilité des parties de notre corps les unes en relation aux autres, et, également, de la perméabilité du corps au monde et à autrui. Après la Phénoménologie de la perception , cette perméa­bilité sera pensée de plus en plus dans les termes d?une « proximité vertigi­neuse » entre nous et les objets, entre nous et autrui. Le passage, que réalise Merleau-Ponty, de l?idée d?incarnation à la conception de chair commence à être conçu dans la période entre 1945 et 1952, et se nourrit de discussions concernant la corporéité à l?intérieur, principalement, de la psychologie de l?enfant et de la psychanalyse, ainsi. (shrink)

What resources does Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body schema offer to the Fanonian one? First I show that Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body schema is already a theory of affect: one that does not oppose affects to intentionality, positioning them not only as sense but as force, cultivating affective agencies rather than constituting static sense content. Then I argue that by foregrounding the role of affect in both thinkers, we can understand the way in which the historical-racial schema innovates, anticipating (...) and influencing feminist theories of the affective turn – especially Sara Ahmed’s theory of affective economies. The historical-racial schema posits the constitution of affective agencies on a sociogenic scale, and these affective economies in turn account for the possibility of the collapse of the body schema into a racial epidermal schema, a disjunction of affective intentionality Fanon calls “affective tetanization.” Quelles ressources l’analyse du schéma corporel faite par Merleau-Ponty fournit-elle au schéma historico-racial proposé par Fanon? En premier lieu, je vise à montrer que la théorie du schéma corporel de Merleau-Ponty est déjà une théorie de l’affect : une théorie qui n’oppose pas les affects à l’intentionnalité, qui ne les considère pas seulement comme un sens, mais comme une force, en cultivant des agentivités affectives plutôt qu’en constituant des contenus de sens statiques. Ensuite, j’affirmerai qu’en mettant en premier plan le rôle de l’affect chez ces deux penseurs, nous pouvons comprendre les innovations qu’apporte le schéma historico-racial, en anticipant et en influençant les théories féministes du tournant affectif – surtout la théorie de Sara Ahmed au sujet des économies affectives. Le schéma historico-racial établit la constitution d’agentivités affectives sur une échelle sociogénique, et ces économies affectives expliquent à leur tour la possibilité d’une dégradation du schéma corporel en schéma épidermique racial, une disjonction de l’intentionnalité affective que Fanon appelle « tétanisation affective ».Quali risorse può offrire la nozione merleau-pontiana di schema corporeo a quella di Fanon? In primo luogo, mi propongo di mostrare che la teoria dello schema corporeo elaborata da Merleau-Ponty è allo stesso tempo una teoria dell’affetto: una teoria che non oppone la dimensione degli affetti all’intenzionalità, poiché li considera non solo come senso ma come forze, in quanto implicano delle agentività affettive piuttosto che costituire meri contenuti statici di senso. Intendo quindi sostenere che mettendo in evidenza il ruolo dell’affetto in questi due autori sia possibile comprendere il portato innovativo dello schema storico-razziale, che anticipa e influenza le teorie femministe legate all’affective turn – e in particolare la teoria delle economie affettive elaborata da Sara Ahmed. Lo schema storico-razziale afferma la costituzione di agentività affettive a un livello sociogenetico, mentre le economie affettive rendono conto della possibilità del collasso dello schema corporeo in uno schema razziale epidermico, una disgiunzione dell’intenzionalità affettiva che Fanon definisce “tetanizzazione affettiva”. (shrink)

Following on from Shaun Gallagher's influential 2005 book How the Body Shapes the Mind, this volume brings together leading experts from the fields of philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry in a productive dialogue, exploring key questions and debates about the relationship between body schema and body image.

Dans cette contribution nous analysons l’interprétation de Merleau-Ponty du schéma corporel et du mouvement, en relation avec les découvertes récentes en neurosciences cognitives, afin de proposer une esquisse d’une phénoménologie du politique. Plus précisément, nous nous focaliserons, d’une part, sur le concept dynamique de schéma corporel chez Merleau-Ponty et sur sa compréhension de l’intentionnalité motrice et corporelle, ainsi que sur l’image du miroir qu’il utilise souvent, notamment dans la « Note sur Machiavel », et, d’autre part, (...) sur la théorie des neurones miroirs proposée par le neurophysiologiste Giacomo Rizzolatti sur la compréhension de la compréhension. C’est précisément la figure du miroir, et les théories pertinentes sur le réflexe et les réflexions, qui constituent la clé pour relier les études phénoménologiques du corps, du mouvement et de l’empathie avec les approches neuroscientifiques sur ces mêmes questions. Le concept de miroir se révèle comme essentiel afin de comprendre le fonctionnement des neurones miroirs ainsi que la base de l’empathie, qui doit être comprise comme compréhension et imitation incarnées. L’autre se révèle comme notre miroir. Nous fournissons ainsi, suivant à la fois les théories phénoménologiques et neuroscientifiques, la preuve qu’il existe effectivement une connexion entre phénoménologie et pensée politique, ainsi qu’une communication inter-corporelle entre moi et autrui, qui peut servir de base pour développer une théorie de l’intersubjectivité en tant qu’intentionnalité corporelle partagée, voire une introduction à une phénoménologie politique. (shrink)

Être transgenre implique des relations uniques à son propre corps, ainsi que la question du récit dans la formation du sujet – deux thèmes-clés chez Merleau-Ponty. Mais même si l’on accepte d’aller au-delà de l’histoire stéréotypée d’être « pris·e dans le mauvais corps », tant dans les communautés trans que dans le discours public plus large il existe une tendance fâcheuse à universaliser de tels récits – et ce, en dépit de l’hétérogénéité apparente que l’on retrouve dans les descriptions individuelles (...) à la première personne. La question émerge donc à savoir : comment rendre compte philosophiquement de cette différence à la première personne tout en visant une politique de solidarité? Cet essai cherche à utiliser la phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty dans un sens pratique, en se concentrant sur sa description du « schéma corporel » pour atténuer cette tension. En effet, tandis que Merleau-Ponty nous fournit un ensemble général d’instruments pour comprendre la relation entre incarnation et comportement, ses exemples phénoménologiques sont souvent fortement singuliers. De la sorte, dans le contexte des subjectivités transgenres, le but est de creuser davantage cet espace discursif, comme prologue pour une praxis qui soit plus réceptive à l’expérience vécue des personnes trans. (shrink)

Les divers visages du mouvement. Questions phénoménologiques et ontologiques sur le rapport entre la perception, l’expression et le mouvement dans le cours de Merleau-PontyLe monde sensible et le monde de l’expressionLe cours professé par Merleau-Ponty dans l’année 1952-53 est encore inédit, mais grâce au travail de Emmanuel de Saint Aubert et Stefan Kristensen il est possible de le lire en transcription en vue de sa publication. Ce cours, inaugurant les leçons au Collège de France, contient des analyses détaillées concernant la (...) relation entre monde sensible perceptif et monde de l’expression (non seulement linguistique). Il s’agit d’analyses importantes, possédant un caractère programmatique en vue des recherches effectuées ensuite par Merleau-Ponty jusqu’à l’époque de Le visible et l’invisible. Au sein de cette analyse une place importante est réservée au thème du mouvement, d’abord étudié en tant que médiateur entre perception et pensée, mais vite devenu question centrale du cours.Merleau-Ponty aborde le problème du mouvement par rapport à sa manifestation, considérée comme originale et non pas réductible à des éléments plus fondamentaux qu’elle, tels que l’espace et du temps. Il étudie ensuite le sujet du mouvement, en le liant avec le concept de schéma corporel, ce qui est amplement illustré et contient des développements intéressants à l’égard de la Phénoménologie de la perception. Enfin il étudie la question de la représentation du mouvement dans la peinture et le cinéma.Toutes ces approches au problème du mouvement esquissent, sans le dire ouvertement, la question de sa signification ontologique. Dans cet essai, j’ai essayé d’articuler cette question, en essayant d’en extraire les différentes valeurs: celle relative au statut du mouvement, celle portant sur la relation entre le mouvement et la manifestation, à savoir la manifestation comme mouvement, et enfin celle de la pluralité de sens ontologique inhérente à la conception de Merleau-Ponty, avec une attention particulière aux concepts d’altération, métamorphose, trace de l’être.De la discussion des ses remarques tout aussi pénétrantes que réticentes on est amené à conclure que Merleau-Ponty a vu la possibilité d’une ontologie «cinétique», c’est à dire d’une signification ontologique radicale du mouvement, mais sans arriver à une formulation explicite de cette perspective. Perspective qui semble refaire surface dans les oeuvres et dans les leçons suivantes, sans jamais recevoir une définition accomplie.I molti volti del movimento. Problemi fenomenologici e ontologici relativi alla relazione tra percezione, espressione e movimento nel corso su Il mondo sensibile e il mondo dell’espressione di M. Merleau-PontyIl corso tenuto da Merleau-Ponty nell’anno accademico 1952-53 è ancora inedito ma grazie al lavoro di Emmanuel de Saint Aubert e Stefan Kristensen è ora divenuto possibile leggerne la trascrizione in vista della sua pubblicazione. Questo corso, inaugurale delle lezioni al Collège de France, contiene analisi dettagliate relative al problema del rapporto tra mondo sensibile percettivo e mondo dell’espressione (anche ma non soltanto linguistica). Si tratta di analisi importanti anche per il carattere programmatico che esse posseggono in riferimento alle successive indagini condotte da Merleau-Ponty fino all’epoca della redazione di Il visibile e l’invisibile. All’interno di tali analisi un posto importante è riservato al tema del movimento, inizialmente indagato nella sua valenza di mediazione tra percezione e pensiero, ma presto assurto a tema centrale della riflessione.Merleau-Ponty discute il problema del movimento in relazione alla sua manifestazione, ritenuta originaria e non riconducibile, o peggio riducibile, a elementi più fondamentali come lo spazio e il tempo. Indaga poi il soggetto del movimento, articolandolo in connessione alla nozione di schema corporeo, che viene illustrata ampiamente e contiene interessanti sviluppi rispetto a Fenomenologia della percezione. Infine studia la questione della rappresentazione del movimento in pittura e nel cinema.Tutti questi approcci al movimento delineano, senza esplicitarla apertamente, la questione della valenza ontologica del movimento. In questo saggio ho provato ad articolare tale questione cercando di estrarne le diverse valenze: quella relativa allo statuto del movimento, quella concernente il nesso tra movimento e manifestazione, ossia la manifestazione come movimento; infi ne quella della pluralità di sensi ontologici intrinseca alla trattazione di Merleau-Ponty, con un’attenzione particolare per le nozioni di alterazione, metamorfosi, traccia d’essere.Dall’analisi di queste osservazioni insieme penetranti e reticenti mi pare di poter concludere che Merleau-Ponty abbia intravisto la possibilità di una ontologia “cinetica”, cioè di un significato ontologico radicale del movimento, senza però arrivare ad una formulazione esplicita di tale prospettiva. Prospettiva che sembra a tratti riaffiorare nelle opere e nelle lezioni successive, senza mai ricevere una compiuta definizione. (shrink)

Les divers visages du mouvement. Questions phénoménologiques et ontologiques sur le rapport entre la perception, l’expression et le mouvement dans le cours de Merleau-PontyLe monde sensible et le monde de l’expressionLe cours professé par Merleau-Ponty dans l’année 1952-53 est encore inédit, mais grâce au travail de Emmanuel de Saint Aubert et Stefan Kristensen il est possible de le lire en transcription en vue de sa publication. Ce cours, inaugurant les leçons au Collège de France, contient des analyses détaillées concernant la (...) relation entre monde sensible perceptif et monde de l’expression (non seulement linguistique). Il s’agit d’analyses importantes, possédant un caractère programmatique en vue des recherches effectuées ensuite par Merleau-Ponty jusqu’à l’époque de Le visible et l’invisible. Au sein de cette analyse une place importante est réservée au thème du mouvement, d’abord étudié en tant que médiateur entre perception et pensée, mais vite devenu question centrale du cours.Merleau-Ponty aborde le problème du mouvement par rapport à sa manifestation, considérée comme originale et non pas réductible à des éléments plus fondamentaux qu’elle, tels que l’espace et du temps. Il étudie ensuite le sujet du mouvement, en le liant avec le concept de schéma corporel, ce qui est amplement illustré et contient des développements intéressants à l’égard de la Phénoménologie de la perception. Enfin il étudie la question de la représentation du mouvement dans la peinture et le cinéma.Toutes ces approches au problème du mouvement esquissent, sans le dire ouvertement, la question de sa signification ontologique. Dans cet essai, j’ai essayé d’articuler cette question, en essayant d’en extraire les différentes valeurs: celle relative au statut du mouvement, celle portant sur la relation entre le mouvement et la manifestation, à savoir la manifestation comme mouvement, et enfin celle de la pluralité de sens ontologique inhérente à la conception de Merleau-Ponty, avec une attention particulière aux concepts d’altération, métamorphose, trace de l’être.De la discussion des ses remarques tout aussi pénétrantes que réticentes on est amené à conclure que Merleau-Ponty a vu la possibilité d’une ontologie «cinétique», c’est à dire d’une signification ontologique radicale du mouvement, mais sans arriver à une formulation explicite de cette perspective. Perspective qui semble refaire surface dans les oeuvres et dans les leçons suivantes, sans jamais recevoir une définition accomplie.I molti volti del movimento. Problemi fenomenologici e ontologici relativi alla relazione tra percezione, espressione e movimento nel corso su Il mondo sensibile e il mondo dell’espressione di M. Merleau-PontyIl corso tenuto da Merleau-Ponty nell’anno accademico 1952-53 è ancora inedito ma grazie al lavoro di Emmanuel de Saint Aubert e Stefan Kristensen è ora divenuto possibile leggerne la trascrizione in vista della sua pubblicazione. Questo corso, inaugurale delle lezioni al Collège de France, contiene analisi dettagliate relative al problema del rapporto tra mondo sensibile percettivo e mondo dell’espressione (anche ma non soltanto linguistica). Si tratta di analisi importanti anche per il carattere programmatico che esse posseggono in riferimento alle successive indagini condotte da Merleau-Ponty fino all’epoca della redazione di Il visibile e l’invisibile. All’interno di tali analisi un posto importante è riservato al tema del movimento, inizialmente indagato nella sua valenza di mediazione tra percezione e pensiero, ma presto assurto a tema centrale della riflessione.Merleau-Ponty discute il problema del movimento in relazione alla sua manifestazione, ritenuta originaria e non riconducibile, o peggio riducibile, a elementi più fondamentali come lo spazio e il tempo. Indaga poi il soggetto del movimento, articolandolo in connessione alla nozione di schema corporeo, che viene illustrata ampiamente e contiene interessanti sviluppi rispetto a Fenomenologia della percezione. Infine studia la questione della rappresentazione del movimento in pittura e nel cinema.Tutti questi approcci al movimento delineano, senza esplicitarla apertamente, la questione della valenza ontologica del movimento. In questo saggio ho provato ad articolare tale questione cercando di estrarne le diverse valenze: quella relativa allo statuto del movimento, quella concernente il nesso tra movimento e manifestazione, ossia la manifestazione come movimento; infi ne quella della pluralità di sensi ontologici intrinseca alla trattazione di Merleau-Ponty, con un’attenzione particolare per le nozioni di alterazione, metamorfosi, traccia d’essere.Dall’analisi di queste osservazioni insieme penetranti e reticenti mi pare di poter concludere che Merleau-Ponty abbia intravisto la possibilità di una ontologia “cinetica”, cioè di un significato ontologico radicale del movimento, senza però arrivare ad una formulazione esplicita di tale prospettiva. Prospettiva che sembra a tratti riaffiorare nelle opere e nelle lezioni successive, senza mai ricevere una compiuta definizione. (shrink)

Quelle est la signification du « corps anonyme » ou, plus simplement, de l’anonymat dans l’usage qu’en fait Merleau-Ponty? Peut-elle offrir des ressources pour une critique féministe radicale et une politique émancipatrice? Certaines philosophes féministes en ont traité comme un idéal universel abstrait du corps qui est à la fois exempt de toute particularité et qui présume tacitement que le corps blanc masculin servirait de norme et aurait une puissance normative. D’autres ont voulu montrer que l’anonymat éclaire les manières dont (...) la domination et la normativité sont intrinsèques à la constitution corporelle. Je soutiens que le « corps anonyme » peut être lu d’une manière productive pour la compréhension des manières dont le corps vécu est fondamentalement constitué par des relations concrètes de pouvoir. Plus particulièrement, je reprends deux lectures de l’anonymat, l’une comme temporalité vécue – un passé sédimenté – et l’autre comme intériorité corporelle. Prises ensemble, ces lectures montrent que l’anonymat soutient le champ intersubjectif, qui joue un rôle clé dans la description de la constitution corporelle de Merleau-Ponty. Je reprends ensuite cette description pour lire la théorie du schéma corporel de Frantz Fanon et les histoires autobiographiques de l’écrivaine et activiste yankton Zitkála-Šá, le tout afin de montrer que le déni de l’anonymat, qui dérange le champ intersubjectif, a pour résultat une violence et des maux considérables. Le tout servira à montrer que la description du corps anonyme par Merleau-Ponty fournit d’importantes ressources pour une politique émancipatrice et une critique philosophique radicale. (shrink)

What does it mean to say that “I am always on the same side of my body” if the body is understood as flesh? This question of sidedness, and specifically of perspectival unilaterality, in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology leads to a careful sorting of the various relational metaphors that he deploys across his oeuvre, including reversibility, intertwining, possession, encroachment, incorporation, promiscuity, and many others. Curiously, each of these notions implicates a different image of sidedness, from sides that are impermeable in themselves but (...) nonetheless interwoven with those of other bodies, to sides that are porous, interpenetrated, incorporable, and yielding. Ultimately, it is suggested with reference to Merleau-Ponty’s ontologically anticipatory concept of le schèma corporel that unilaterality is not a necessary feature of incarnate subjectivity after all, but is instead one of the last specters of modern metaphysics, haunting Merleau-Ponty’s thinking still. Insofar as perspectival individuation is a function of the dynamic operations of actual body schemas rather than a logical, topological, or ontological given, subjectivity will be essentially promiscuous rather than merely reversible, moving in and out of bodies, overflowing its own body, taking in the bodies of others, leaking into and absorbing the flesh of the world, at times to the point of indivision.Quel est le sens de cet énoncé : « Je suis toujours du même côté de mon corps » lorsque le corps est compris comme chair? Cette question de l’unilatéralité, en particulier celle de l’unilatéralité perspectivale, dans l’ontologie de Merleau-Ponty, conduit à une utilisation précise d’un ensemble de métaphores variées qu’il déploie dans son oeuvre, telles que la réversibilité, l’entrelacement, la possession, l’empiètement, l’incorporation, la promiscuité et bien d’autres encore. Curieusement, chaque notion implique une image d’unilatéralité différente, depuis les côtés qui sont imperméables en eux-mêmes mais néanmoins entrelacés avec ceux des autres corps, jusqu’aux côtés qui sont poreux, interpénétrés, incorporables, malléables. En définitive, il semble que la référence anticipée au concept de schéma corporel montre que l’unilatéralité n’est pas, après tout, un élément nécessaire de la subjectivité incarnée, mais plutôt un des derniers spectres de la métaphysique moderne qui hante le style de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty. Dans la mesure où l’individuation perspectivale est une fonction des opérations dynamiques des schémas corporels actuels et non un donné logique, topologique ou ontologique, la subjectivité sera essentiellement promiscuité plutôt que simplement réversible, entrant et sortant des corps, débordant son propre corps, prenant le corps des autres, laissant filtrer la chair du monde et l’absorbant, parfois jusqu’au point de l’indivision.Che cosa significa dire che “io mi trovo sempre dallo stesso lato del mio corpo” se il corpo è compreso come carne? Questa questione della lateralità e in particolare di una unilateralità nell’ontologia di Merleau-Ponty ci porta a discernere attentamente le diverse metafore relazionali che il filosofo impiega nel corso della sua opera, tra cui reversibilità, intreccio, sconfinamento, incorporazione, promiscuità, per citarne solo alcune. È interessante notare che ciascuna di queste nozioni implica una differente immagine della lateralità, da lati che sono impermeabili in se stessi e ciononostante intrecciati con quelli di altri corpi, fino a lati che sono invece porosi, interpenetrati gli uni con gli altri, incorporabili e cedevoli. In definitiva, la nozione merleau-pontiana – ontologicamente anticipatrice – di schema corporeo suggerisce che l’unilateralità non è un carattere necessario della soggettività incarnata, ma invece uno degli spettri residuali della metafisica moderna, che ancora incombono sul pensiero di Merleau-Ponty. Nella misura in cui l’individuazione prospettica è una funzione delle operazioni dinamiche di schemi corporei piuttosto che un dato logico, topologico o ontologico, la soggettività sarà essenzialmente promiscua e non semplicemente reversibile, muovendo verso l’interno e l’esterno dei corpi, sconfinando i limiti del corpo, lasciando entrare i corpi altrui, concedendo l’ingresso e assorbendo la carne del mondo, talvolta fino a raggiungere l’indiscernibilità. (shrink)

La préparation du premier cours de Merleau-Ponty au Collège de France, "Le monde sensible et le monde de l'expression", est un document remarquable dont la publication était attendue depuis longtemps. A mi-chemin de son oeuvre, le philosophe entame une critique de ses premiers travaux ainsi qu'une réélaboration qui engage plusieurs directions fondamentales de sa recherche à venir. Que ce soit dans l'analyse de la vision en profondeur, de la perception du mouvement, ou encore de l'éveil du schéma corporel (...) dans l'action et la relation avec autrui, Merleau-Ponty revisite sa phénoménologie pour dégager les dimensions expressives de la vie perceptive, dans une réforme radicale de la notion de conscience. La publication de ce cours inédit ouvre donc des perspectives d'interprétation nouvelles sur l'évolution d'une pensée dont l'actualité n'est plus à démontrer. Elle offre aussi une illustration majeure des relations si fécondes que cette philosophie a su entretenir avec la neurologie, la psychologie de la forme, la psychanalyse, ou encore les arts visuels. (shrink)

"L’organisation d’une pénalité d’enfermement n’est pas simplement récente, elle est énigmatique. Qu’est-ce qui pénètre dans la prison? En tout cas, pas la loi. Que fabrique-t-elle? Une communauté d’ennemis intérieurs". C’est en ces termes que Michel Foucault dénonce, dans ce cours prononcé en 1973, et que viendra compléter, en 1975, son ouvrage Surveiller et punir, le "cercle carcéral". La Société punitive étudie ainsi comment les sociétés traitent les individus ou les groupes dont elles souhaitent se débarrasser, c’est-à-dire les tactiques punitives, mais (...) aussi la prise de pouvoir sur le corps et sur le temps et l’instauration du couple pénalité-délinquance. Michel Foucault retrace l'histoire des "tactiques fines de la sanction" dont il distingue quatre modalités : exiler ; imposer un rachat ; marquer ; enfermer. C'est dans la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle que se développe une "science des prisons" à fonction corrective et que se construit un discours sur le criminel et son traitement possible, donnant naissance à un schéma de société qui vise à l’absolu du contrôle et de la surveillance. L’ajustement entre le système judiciaire et le mécanisme de surveillance (l’organisation d’une police), entre l’émergence de la richesse et la pratique des illégalismes, entre la force corporelle de l’ouvrier et l’appareil de production s’accomplit ensuite au tournant du XIXe siècle. Foucault démontre donc que ce sont les instances de contrôle para-pénal du XVIIe et du XVIIIe siècle qui ont abouti, in fine, au fonctionnement de la prison, visant à l’élimination du désordre, au contrôle de la distribution spatiale des individus, de leur emplacement par rapport à l’appareil productif. La Société punitive finit par poser la question, cruciale aux yeux du philosophe, de la validité intrinsèque de la loi pénale. A-t-elle vocation universelle ou se limite-t-elle à la douteuse applicabilité d’une somme de décrets? (shrink)

This chapter presents an account of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the body schema as an operative intentionality that is not only opposed to, but also complexly intermingled with, the representation-like grasp of the world and one’s own body, or the body image. The chapter reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s position primarily based on his preparatory notes for his 1953 lecture ‘The Sensible World and the World of Expression’. Here, Merleau-Ponty elaborates his earlier efforts to show that the body schema is a perceptual ground against (...) which the perceived world stands out as a complex of perceptual figures. The chapter clarifies how Merleau-Ponty’s renewed interpretation of the figure-ground structure makes it possible for him to describe the relationship between body schema and perceptual (body) image as a strictly systematic phenomenon. Subsequently, the chapter shows how Merleau-Ponty understands apraxia, sleep, and perceptual orientation as examples of dedifferentiation and subtler differentiation of the body-schematic system. The last section clarifies how such body-schematic differentiating processes give rise to relatively independent superstructures of vision and symbolic cognition which constitute our body image. It, moreover, explains how, according to Merleau-Ponty, the cognitive superstructures always need to be supported by praxic operative intentionality to maintain their full sense, even though, in some cases, they have the power to compensate for praxic deficiencies. (shrink)

Cultural schemas are a central cognitive mechanism through which culture affects action. In this article, we develop a theoretical model of cultural schemas that is better able to support empirical work, including inferential, sensitizing, and operational uses. We propose a multilevel framework centered on a high-level definition of cultural schemas that is sufficiently broad to capture its major sociological applications but still sufficiently narrow to identify a set of cognitive phenomena with key functional properties in common: cultural schemas are socially (...) shared representations deployable in automatic cognition. We use this conception to elaborate the main theoretical properties of cultural schemas, and to provide clear criteria that distinguish them from other cultural or cognitive elements. We then propose a series of concrete tests empirical scholarship can use to determine if these properties apply. We also demonstrate how this approach can identify potentially faulty theoretical inferences present in existing work. Moving to a lower level of analysis, we elaborate how cultural schemas can be algorithmically conceptualized in terms of their building blocks. This leads us to recommend improvements to methods for measuring cultural schemas. We conclude by outlining questions for a broader research program. (shrink)

Most research on image schema examined the meaning configuration of words connotation. However, previous studies of adjectives are meaningful in cognitive linguistics because they provide insight into how those adjectives are involved with psychological movement. In this sense, from the perspective of cognitive linguistics, one’s conceptualization and cognition are closely associated with their bodily experience and surroundings; adjectives are no exception. The varieties of transformations of image schemas lay the foundation for the conception and perception. Accordingly, this study is an (...) investigation into the perception of adjectives and psychological activities associated with image schema. Data in this study come from adjectives in the novel The Great Gatsby, which were tagged and calculated with the help of software Python and the NLTK package. The results demonstrate that a significant amount of adjectives were used in the novel. Moreover, Nick’s psychological activities changed significantly from the SOURCE to the DESTINATION schematic stage, which is uncovered by his expression of adjectives. Finally, the results further suggest that transformations of image schema as BALANCE, CONTAINER, and PATH work together to motivate one’s linguistic expression of adjectives. The present findings have several implications for research on lexicons and literacy interpretation from cognitive linguistics. (shrink)

A body schema is an agent's model of its own body that enables it to act on affordances in the environment. This paper presents a body schema system for the Learning Intelligent Decision Agent (LIDA) cognitive architecture. LIDA is a conceptual and computational implementation of Global Workspace Theory, also integrating other theories from neuroscience and psychology. This paper contends that the ‘body schema' should be split into three separate functions based on the functional role of consciousness in Global Workspace Theory. (...) There is (1) an online model of the agent's effectors and effector variables (Current Body Schema), (2) a long-term, recognitional storage of embodied capacities for action and affordances (Habitual Body Schema), and (3) "dorsal" stream information feeding directly from early perception to sensorimotor processes (Online Body Schema). This paper then discusses how the LIDA model of the body schema explains several experiments in psychology and ethology. (shrink)

-/- A schema (plural: schemata, or schemas), also known as a scheme (plural: schemes), is a linguistic template or pattern together with a rule for using it to specify a potentially infinite multitude of phrases, sentences, or arguments, which are called instances of the schema. Schemas are used in logic to specify rules of inference, in mathematics to describe theories with infinitely many axioms, and in semantics to give adequacy conditions for definitions of truth. -/- 1. What is a Schema? (...) 2. Uses of Schemas 3. The Ontological Status of Schemas 4. Schemas in the History of Logic Bibliography. (shrink)

There seems to be no dimension of bodily awareness that cannot be disrupted. To account for such variety, there is a growing consensus that there are at least two distinct types of body representation that can be impaired, the body schema and the body image. However, the definition of these notions is often unclear. The notion of body image has attracted most controversy because of its lack of unifying positive definition. The notion of body schema, onto which there seems to (...) be a more widespread agreement, also covers a variety of sensorimotor representations. Here, I provide a conceptual analysis of the body schema contrasting it with the body image as well as assess whether the body schema can be specifically impaired, while other types of body representation are preserved; and the body schema obeys principles that are different from those that apply to other types of body representation. (shrink)

The way in which a schema represents something is precisely by abstracting from some of its features; in a schema, representation and abstraction are thus not opposed to each other but rather internally related. The first part of this paper investigates this internal relation by delineating Kant’s concept of schema as the term mediating concept and intuition. Due to its pivotal position, however, the schema tends to collapse either into the conceptual or into the intuitive. The second part of the (...) paper turns to Heidegger who tries to overcome this difficulty: he does not conceive the schema as a supplementary representation that connects already determinate concepts and intuitions, but rather locates schematization immanently in the very articulation of concept and intuition themselves. The third part of the paper proposes that the schematicity of our representations can be reflected in three pictorial strategies that are important for contemporary art: reduction, serialization, and reconstruction. These strategies are exemplified in certain images which put us in a position to see through our own representational form, as it were, and observe the procedures of figuration involved in that very form. (shrink)

Thirty years ago, I elaborated on a position that could be seen as a compromise between an "extreme," symbol-based AI, and a "neurochemical reductionism" in AI. The present article recalls aspects of the espoused framework of schema theory that, it suggested, could provide a better bridge from human psychology to brain theory than that offered by the symbol systems of A. Newell and H. A. Simon.

In this paper we present a schema for describing dualities between physical theories, and illustrate it in detail with the example of bosonization: a boson-fermion duality in two-dimensional quantum field theory. The schema develops proposals in De Haro : these proposals include construals of notions related to duality, like representation, model, symmetry and interpretation. The aim of the schema is to give a more precise criterion for duality than has so far been considered. The bosonization example, or boson-fermion duality, has (...) the feature of being simple, yet rich enough, to illustrate the most relevant aspects of our schema, which also apply to more sophisticated dualities. The richness of the example consists, mainly, in its concern with two non-trivial quantum field theories: including massive Thirring-sine-Gordon duality, and non-abelian bosonization. This prompts two comparisons with the recent philosophical literature on dualities:--- Unlike the standard cases of duality in quantum field theory and string theory, where only specific simplifying limits of the theories are explicitly known, the boson-fermion duality is known to hold {\it exactly}. This exactness can be exhibited explicitly. The bosonization example illustrates both the cases of isomorphic and {\it non-isomorphic} models: which we believe the literature on dualities has not so far discussed. (shrink)

Prior knowledge structures (or schemas) confer multiple behavioral benefits. First, when we encounter information that fits with prior knowledge structures, this information is generally better learned and remembered. Second, prior knowledge can support prospective planning. In humans, memory enhancements related to prior knowledge have been suggested to be supported, in part, by computations in prefrontal and medial temporal lobe cortex. Moreover, animal studies further implicate a role for the hippocampus in schema-based facilitation and in the emergence of prospective planning signals (...) following new learning. To date, convergence across the schema-enhanced learning and memory literature may be constrained by the predominant use of hippocampally dependent spatial navigation paradigms in rodents, and non-spatial list-based learning paradigms in humans. Here, we targeted this missing link by examining the effects of prior knowledge on human navigational learning in a hippocampally dependent virtual navigation paradigm that closely relates to foundational studies in rodents. Outside the scanner, participants overlearned Old Paired Associates (OPA – item-location associations) in multiple spatial environments, and they subsequently learned New Paired Associates (NPA – new item-location associations) in the environments while undergoing fMRI. We hypothesized that greater OPA knowledge precision would positively affect NPA learning, and that the hippocampus would be instrumental in translating this new learning into prospective planning of navigational paths to NPA locations. Behavioral results revealed that OPA knowledge predicted one-shot learning of NPA locations, and neural results indicated that one-shot learning was predicted by the rapid emergence of performance-predictive prospective planning signals in hippocampus. Prospective memory relationships were not significant in parahippocampal cortex and were marginally dissociable from the primary hippocampal effect. Collectively, these results extend understanding of how schemas impact learning and performance, showing that the precision of prior spatial knowledge is important for future learning in humans, and that the hippocampus is involved in translating this knowledge into new goal-directed behaviors. (shrink)

This study investigates the relationship between moral schemas and corruption in public procurement. It adopts a moral schema framework to examine procurement-induced corruption from Uganda. Experiences, attitudes, and values of respondents are used to construct future behavior of public procurement staff. The schema framework was built around the premise that procurement-related corruption is a function of the social framework and human nature paradox, constructing logical justification for the acts of corruption. The study uses data from 474 public procurement staff to (...) demonstrate that social identity, ethical egoistic, legislative, amoral, and religious moral schemas account for 78.51% of the variance in moral schema of respondents. All these schemas were found to be significant predictors, accounting for 73.3% of public procurement corruption. The paper urges managers of procuring and disposing entities to utilize moral scripts in reducing corruption. Managers are encouraged to engage in morally responsible behaviors to promote ethics and value-for-money transactions. The paper provides an alternative framework for examining corruption in sub-Saharan Africa where explicit elaboration of insights on corruption is still lacking. (shrink)

If we want to retain classical logic and standard syntax in light of the liar, we are forced to restrict the T-schema. The traditional philosophical justification for this is sentential – liar sentences somehow malfunction. But the standard formal way of implementing this is conditional, our T-sentences tell us that if “p” does not malfunction, then “p” is true if and only if p. Recently Bacon and others have pointed out that conditional T-restrictions like this flirt with incoherence. If we (...) want to keep the “malfunction” motivation, our only other option is to non-conditionally restrict the T-schema, but Field and others have given powerful philosophical and technical arguments against this kind of approach. Here I argue that if we really take the philosophical motivation for restricting T-sentences seriously, we can explain why conditional restrictions fail, answer Field's argument, and reason in a coherent way about truth using a non-conditional restriction strategy. This cracks the door open for a fully classical response to the liar and related paradoxes. In closing, I argue that, when properly understood, this kind of “restriction” is not really a restriction at all. If this is right, then the holy grail of liar studies (classical logic, naïve truth, and standard syntax) may yet be attainable. (Note for readers: when this paper was first put online, the typesetters had changed some instances of corners to brackets, leading to confusion. The paper has now been corrected online by PPR, so please make sure you have the corrected version before reading or citing.). (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning redirects the investigation of deduction conceptually and methodologically because the premises and the conclusion of the inferences are assumed to be uncertain. A probabilistic counterpart of the concept of logical validity and a method to assess whether individuals comply with it must be defined. Conceptually, we used de Finetti's coherence as a normative framework to assess individuals' performance. Methodologically, we presented inference schemas whose premises had various levels of probability that contained non-numerical (...) expressions and, as a control, sure levels. Depending on the inference schemas, from 60% to 80% of the participants produced coherent conclusions when the premises were uncertain. The data also show that except for schemas involving conjunction, performance was consistently lower with certain than uncertain premises, the rate of conjunction fallacy was consistently low (not exceeding 20%,.. (shrink)

This article explores the ethics of migrant marketers in Guangzhou. Data were collected from 357 migrant marketers who lived in Guangzhou. A model of Ethical Action has been developed to test the antecedents and outcomes of the ethical decision-making process. It measured moral intention using four ethical scenarios. The results show that the egoistic schema had a positive effect on their intention to act unethically, while the legislative schema exerted a negative effect. The results confirm that moral intention was a (...) strong predictor of an individual's subsequent actual behavior, and it fully mediated the influence of the legislative schema on actual behavior. This study adds to ethics literature by incorporating the construct of social identity and found a moderating effect between the legislative schema and moral intention. The relationships were stronger for individuals who were lower rather than higher in social identity. Analysis of these results lead to a discussion of the implications for marketing ethics in China. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that rather than exclusively focusing on trying to determine if an idealized model fits a particular account of scientific explanation, philosophers of science should also work on directly analyzing various explanatory schemas that reveal the steps and justification involved in scientists’ use of highly idealized models to formulate explanations. We develop our alternative methodology by analyzing historically important cases of idealized statistical modeling that use a three-step explanatory schema involving idealization, mathematical operation, and explanatory interpretation.

A review of the literature on the subject and a discussion involving philosophical analysis, philosophy of science and phenomenology in the style of Merleau-Ponty. The study has practical interest in addition to scientific and philosophical relevance: the way a person conceptualizes his body is important to the way he behaves and the quality of his social interactions. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

The Tarski T-Schema has a propositional version. If we use ϕ as a metavariable for formulas and use terms of the form that-ϕ to denote propositions, then the propositional version of the T-Schema is: that-ϕ is true if and only if ϕ. For example, that Cameron is Prime Minister is true if and only if Cameron is Prime Minister. If that-ϕ is represented formally as [λ ϕ], then the T-Schema can be represented as the 0-place case of λ-Conversion. If we (...) interpret [λ…] as a truth-functional context, then using traditional logical techniques, one can prove that the propositional version of the T-Schema is a tautology, literally. Given how well-accepted these logical techniques are, we conclude that the T-Schema, in at least one of its forms, is a not just a logical truth but a tautology at that. (shrink)

A tight connection between competence and performance is a central tenet of the usage-based model. Methodologically, however, corpus frequency is a poor predictor of acceptability – a phenomenon known as the “frequency/acceptability mismatch”. This article argues that the mismatch arises from a “methodological mismatch”, when simple frequency measures are mapped onto complex grammatical units. To illustrate, we discuss the results of acceptability judgments of go/come-v. The construction is subject to a formal constraint (Go see the doctor! vs. *He goes sees (...) the doctor), which results from its mandative semantics (directives, commissives). While a formal model makes no prediction with regard to gradient acceptability of bare (“grammatical”) go/come-v, the usage-based view assumes that acceptability is a function of compatibility with an abstract schema. The experimental ratings are compared with a number of corpus-derived measures: while acceptability is largely independent of (raw) frequency, it is not independent of frequency-related usage distribution. The results add to recent suggestions that the frequency/acceptability mismatch is substantially reduced if the syntactic complexity of a unit is appropriately captured in usage data. (shrink)

Ce texte entend interroger une expression majeure qu’on trouve dans les Carnets de captivité et qui en articule bien des développements, « signification corporelle du temps ». Elle préfigure l’inversion de l’intentionnalité pratiquée dans Totalité et Infini et désintrique le lien temps-monde-corps, hérité de Husserl, en le renouant autour d’Eros. Ce texte questionne cette « centralité du sexe », si saisissante dans les Carnets, et engage une réflexion sur l’équivoque temporelle qui règle non seulement l’érotique de Levinas mais sans doute (...) aussi son éthique, en tant que l’une et l’autre sont temporellement structurées autour de l’unicité de l’autre et de l’unicité du soi devant l’autre. (shrink)

We propose that people typically reason about realistic situations using neither content-free syntactic inference rules nor representations of specific experiences. Rather, people reason using knowledge structures that we term pragmatic reasoning schemas, which are generalized sets of rules defined in relation to classes of goals. Three experiments examined the impact of a “permission schema” on deductive reasoning. Experiment 1 demonstrated that by evoking the permission schema it is possible to facilitate performance in Wason's selection paradigm for subjects who have had (...) no experience with the specific content of the problems. Experiment 2 showed that a selection problem worded in terms of an abstract permission elicited better performance than one worded in terms of a concrete but arbitrary situation, providing evidence for an abstract permission schema that is free of domain-specific content. Experiment 3 provided evidence that evocation of a permission schema affects not only tasks requiring procedural knowledge, but also a linguistic rephrasing task requiring declarative knowledge. In particular, statements in the form if p then q were rephrased into the form p only if q with greater frequency for permission than for arbitrary statements, and rephrasings of permission statements produced a pattern of introduction of modals totally unlike that observed for arbitrary conditional statements. Other pragmatic schemas, such as “causal” and “evidence” schemas can account for both linguistic and reasoning phenomena that alternative hypotheses fail to explain. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyze the effect of the speed on the task of random number generation. Each subjectgenerates the sequences of ``random'' numbers under various speed conditions. In addition to the 16 indiceswhich have been used in the past studies, we introduce and calculate the new indices called the ``frequency ofschema''. From the statistical analysis, we find that there is an obvious change, along with the speed, in theproperties of sequences, indicating the transition of the underling information processing. It (...) is shown that thefrequencies of schemas are effective indices for describing the properties of sequences produced under high-speed conditions. (shrink)

This schema gives an overview of the main branches and key members of the school of the German philosopher Franz Brentano (1838–1917).

The syllogistic figures and moods can be taken to be argument schemata as can the rules of the Stoic propositional logic. Sentence schemata have been used in axiomatizations of logic only since the landmark 1927 von Neumann paper [31]. Modern philosophers know the role of schemata in explications of the semantic conception of truth through Tarski’s 1933 Convention T [42]. Mathematical logicians recognize the role of schemata in first-order number theory where Peano’s second-order Induction Axiom is approximated by Herbrand’s Induction-Axiom (...) Schema [23]. Similarly, in first-order set theory, Zermelo’s second-order Separation Axiom is approximated by Fraenkel’s first-order Separation Schema [17]. In some of several closely related senses, a schema is a complex system having multiple components one of which is a template-text or scheme-template, a syntactic string composed of one or more “blanks” and also possibly significant words and/or symbols. In accordance with a side condition the template-text of a schema is used as a “template” to specify a multitude, often infinite, of linguistic expressions such as phrases, sentences, or argument-texts, called instances of the schema. The side condition is a second component. The collection of instances may but need not be regarded as a third component. The instances are almost always considered to come from a previously identified language (whether formal or natural), which is often considered to be another component. This article reviews the often-conflicting uses of the expressions ‘schema’ and ‘scheme’ in the literature of logic. It discusses the different definitions presupposed by those uses. And it examines the ontological and epistemic presuppositions circumvented or mooted by the use of schemata, as well as the ontological and epistemic presuppositions engendered by their use. In short, this paper is an introduction to the history and philosophy of schemata. (shrink)

I define T-schema deflationism as the thesis that a theory of truth for our language can simply take the form of certain instances of Tarski's schema (T). I show that any effective enumeration of these instances will yield as a dividend an effective enumeration of all truths of our language. But that contradicts Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem. So the instances of (T) constituting the T-Schema deflationist's theory of truth are not effectively enumerable, which casts doubt on the idea that the (...) T-schema deflationist in any sense has a theory of truth. (The argument in section 2 of "Semantics for Deflationists" supercedes this paper.). (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a populational schema of modeling that consists of: a linear AFSV schema, and a higher-level schema employing the genetic algorithm. The basic ideas of the proposed solution are as follows: whole populations of models are considered at subsequent stages of the modeling process, successive populations are subjected to the activity of genetic operators and undergo selection procedures, the basis for selection is the evaluation function of the genetic algorithm. The schema can be applied to automate (...) the modeling of the mind/brain by means of artificial neural networks: the structure of each network is modified by genetic operators, modified networks undergo a learning cycle, and successive populations of networks are verified during the selection procedure. The whole process can be automated only partially, because it is the researcher who defines the evaluation function of the genetic algorithm. (shrink)

In his 1953 lectures at the College de France, Merleau-Ponty dedicated much effort to further developing his idea of embodied subject and interpreted fresh sources that he did not use in Phenomenology of Perception. Notably, he studied more in depth the neurological notion of "body schema". According to Merleau-Ponty, the body schema is a practical diagram of our relationships to the world, an action-based norm with reference to which things make sense. Merleau-Ponty more precisely tried to describe the fundamentally dynamic (...) unity of the body, i.e. the fact there are various possibilities how the practical "diagram" of body schema could be de-differentiated (in pathology) or further refined (via cognitive and cultural superstructures, symbolic systems). This chapter summarises Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of the notion, while contrasting it to the more traditional understanding of the body in phenomenology and recent philosophical texts dealing with body schema. (shrink)

Body image and body schema are two phenomenological concepts which generated a revival of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical heritage. In the present text I intend to inquire on the relation between these two concepts and that of Logos of life, another challenging point in the Merleau-Pontyan thought.In order to delineate the correlation between body schema, body image and my understanding of a logic of life, I will first explore how what I term “schematism of the body” is connected to an inherent (...) model of life and living and how this schematism is reflected in the body image. I will turn further to the relation between body and world and highlight how the life of the body defines itself as meaningful in the context of both the surrounding world and the lifeworld. In a third part of my analysis I shall point out how the relation between body schematism and motile intentionality redefines corporeal inten-tionality. I shall conclude by noting the role of the Logos of life, through which corporeity, in its position of meaning project, is instituted as body schematism.Los conceptos fenomenológicos de imagen corporal y esquema corporal han dado lugar a un resurgimiento del legado filosófico de Maurice Merleau-Ponty. En este texto pretendo investigar la relación entre estos dos conceptos y el de Logos de la vida, otro elemento estimulante del pensamiento Merleau-Pontiano.Con el fin de trazar la correlación entre es-quema corporal, imagen corporal y mi interpretación de la lógica de la vida, exploraré en pri-mer lugar cómo el término “esquematismo del cuerpo” está conectado con un modelo inheren-te de vida y de vivir, y cómo este esquematis-mo se refleja en la imagen corporal. Consideraré después la relación entre cuerpo y mundo y remarcaré cómo la vida del cuerpo se define como significativa en el contexto tanto del mundo circundante como del mundo de la vida. En la tercera parte de mi análisis señalaré cómo la relación entre esquematismo corporal e intencionalidad moto-ra redefine la intencionalidad corporal. Concluiré destacando el papel del Logos de la vida, a través del cual la corporeidad, en su posición de proyecto significativo, se instituye como esquematismo corpora. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant’s “Schema” and J. G. Fichte’s “Bild” are parallel figures of activity that serve as bridges. For both Kant and Fichte, it is not the image/schema taken as product that is primary, but the act of imaging. I show how Fichte leans on the Kantian argumentation of the schematism in order to attempt bridging the gulf critical philosophy leaves between theoretical and practical philosophy. My broader purpose is to indicate how two German Idealists emphasize activity as a way of (...) solving philosophical problems. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant’s “Schema” and J. G. Fichte’s “Bild” are parallel figures of activity that serve as bridges. For both Kant and Fichte, it is not the image/schema taken as product that is primary, but the act of imaging. I show how Fichte leans on the Kantian argumentation of the schematism in order to attempt bridging the gulf critical philosophy leaves between theoretical and practical philosophy. My broader purpose is to indicate how two German Idealists emphasize activity as a way of (...) solving philosophical problems. (shrink)

This volume expands the concept and role of the schema, with three goals in mind: 1) to outline the continuing issues in the schema concept as the legacy of Kant's concept and analysis, 2) to show that Kant's challenges resulted in successful but truncated views of the schema and its functions, 3) to reconstruct Otto Selz's schema concept by proposing an alternative. The basis and scope of Selz's schema were intended to yield a more complete follow-up to Kant's challenges. These (...) had emerged out of his unresolved view of the schema as knowledge, on one hand, and thought, on the other. Sel'z concepts-'anticipatory schema,' 'coordinate relations,' and 'knowledge complex'-are more inclusive and psychologically dynamic than those of the influential but reductionist theorists: Piaget, Bartlett, and Craik. Harwood Fisher explores Sel'z ideas in past, present, and future temporal contexts. His predecessors' and his contemporaries' ideas influenced him. Present-day needs and future prospects round out a Selzian conception of the schema that would enrich a psychology of thought and knowledge. Harwood Fisher is Professor Emeritus, City College, City University of New York, USA. (shrink)

Barresi & Moore's “intentional schema” will not do the work of “theory of mind.” Their model will account neither for fundamental facts of social competence, such as the social attributions of the 10-month-old infant, nor the possibility that, though having a theory of mind, the chimpanzee's theory is “weaker” than the human's.

Proponents of the predictive processing (PP) framework often claim that one of the framework’s significant virtues is its unificatory power. What is supposedly unified are predictive processes in the mind, and these are explained in virtue of a common prediction error-minimisation (PEM) schema. In this paper, I argue against the claim that PP currently converges towards a unified explanation of cognitive processes. Although the notion of PEM systematically relates a set of posits such as ‘efficiency’ and ‘hierarchical coding’ into a (...) unified conceptual schema, neither the frameworks’ algorithmic specifications nor its hypotheses about their implementations in the brain are clearly unified. I propose a novel way to understand the fruitfulness of the research program in light of a set of research heuristics that are partly shared with those common to Bayesian reverse engineering. An interesting consequence of this proposal is that pluralism is at least as important as unification to promote the positive development of the predictive mind. (shrink)