- In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.details
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Subjective consciousness and self-representation.Robert Van Gulick - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):457-465.details
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Consciousness, type physicalism, and inference to the best explanation.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):266-304.details
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Kripke's proof is ad hominem not two-dimensional.David Papineau - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):475–494.details
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Taking referentialism seriously: A response to the modal argument.Brendan O'sullivan - 2010 - Theoria 76 (1):54-67.details
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Epistemology and possibility.Rebecca Hanrahan - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (4):627-652.details
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A Phenomenal Case for Sport.Jens E. Birch - 2009 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 3 (1):30-48.details
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Physicalism and sparse ontology.Kelly Trogdon - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):147-165.details
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Grounding: necessary or contingent?Kelly Trogdon - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):465-485.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.details
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In favor of (plain) phenomenology.Charles Siewert - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):201-220.details
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Content, character, and color.Sydney Shoemaker - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):253-78.details
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Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in all Worlds?Robert Schroer - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):561-577.details
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Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered.Robert Schroer - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):63-77.details
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Shoemaker's Analysis of Realization: A Review.David Pineda & Agustín Vicente - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):97-120.details
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Access Denied to Zombies.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):81-93.details
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Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues.Frederic Peters - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (4):441-461.details
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Randomness, Contingency, and Faith: Is there a Science of Subjectivity?Steven L. Peck - 2003 - Zygon 38 (1):5-23.details
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Absent Qualia and Categorical Properties.Brendan O’Sullivan - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):353-371.details
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Skepticism, Abductivism, and the Explanatory Gap.Ram Neta - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):296-325.details
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Skepticism, abductivism, and the explanatory gap.Ram Neta - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):296-325.details
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Supervenience Physicalism, Emergentism, and the Polluted Supervenience Base.Kevin Morris - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):351-365.details
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Guidelines for theorizing about realization.Kevin Morris - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (4):393-416.details
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Physicalism in an Infinitely Decomposable World.Barbara Montero - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (2):177-191.details
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A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to Block's harder problem.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):163-204.details
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Why “consciousness” means what it does.Neil C. Manson - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):98-117.details
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Mary Meets Molyneux: The Explanatory Gap and the Individuation of Phenomenal Concepts.Macdonald Cynthia - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):503-524.details
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The modal status of materialism.Joseph Levine & Kelly Trogdon - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):351 - 362.details
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Phenomenal experience: A cartesian theater revival.Joseph Levine - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):209-225.details
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Higher Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):69-98.details
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You Really Do Imagine It: Against Error Theories of Imagination.Peter Kung - 2014 - Noûs 50 (1):90-120.details
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Self-representationalism and phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.details
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Phenomenal epistemology: What is consciousness that we may know it so well?Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.details
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Naturalizing Subjective Character.Uriah Kriegel - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.details
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The vagueness constraint and the quality space for pain.Daniel Kostic - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):929-939.details
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Explanatory Perspectivalism: Limiting the Scope of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Daniel Kostić - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):119-125.details
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Against qualia theory.James John - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):323 - 346.details
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In Defense of the What-It-Is-Likeness of Experience.Greg Janzen - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):271-293.details
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The knowledge argument and objectivity.Robert J. Howell - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):145-177.details
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Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness.Robert J. Howell & Brad Thompson - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):103-127.details
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Explanation and two conceptions of the physical.Jakob Hohwy - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (1):71-89.details
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Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum.Sophie Gibb - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (3):363-384.details
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Is There a Simple Argument for Higher-Order Representation Theories of Awareness Consciousness?Mikkel Gerken - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (2):243-259.details
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Phenomenal character, phenomenal concepts, and externalism.Jonathan Ellis - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.details
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Content externalism and phenomenal character: A new worry about privileged access.Jonathan Ellis - 2007 - Synthese 159 (1):47 - 60.details
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Intentionalism and intransitivity.Max Deutsch - 2005 - Synthese 144 (1):1-22.details
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Quotational higher-order thought theory.Sam Coleman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.details
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Russellian Physicalism and its Dilemma.Lok-Chi Chan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178:2043-2062.details
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Why we should lower our expectations about the explanatory gap.Neil Campbell - 2009 - Theoria 75 (1):34-51.details
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