Dans sa réflexion herméneutique, Thomas d’Aquin énonce la théorie des quatre sens mais il ne lui accorde pas un rôle majeur. Il utilise plutôt l’opposition augustinienne entre res et voces et envisage la lettre dans toutes ses dimensions, y intégrant l’analyse théologique. Dans sa pratique exégétique, l’allégorie est très peu présente, voire totalement absente de certains commentaires.

Parmi les versets du Pentateuque qui régissent la conduite à l’égard des étrangers, on étudie les commentaires médiévaux d’Ex 22, 21 et 23, 9, Lv 19, 33-34 et 25, 23, Dt 10, 19. Les lexiques (Papias, Huguccio de Pise, Jean de Gênes) permettent de préciser le sens des mots qui désignent l’étranger dans la Vulgate, advena et peregrinus. Les commentateurs (de Raban Maur à Dominique Grima) développent les raisons de cette exigence d’hospitalité : la compassion, l’amour du prochain, le fait (...) que les Hébreux aient été eux-mêmes étrangers en Égypte, la terre appartient au Seigneur. L’exégèse spirituelle assimile les étrangers aux pécheurs qui se repentent. (shrink)

Résumé Dans cet hommage à la Commission Léonine, l’auteur souligne la qualité très remarquable des introductions aux éditions des commentaires bibliques de saint Thomas (Job et Isaïe) et montre en quoi elles peuvent nous aider à connaître le texte courant de la Vulgate au xiii e siècle (dit « texte parisien »). Est posée la question de l’utilisation par Thomas du correctoire de Hugues de Saint-Cher et de la Bible de Saint-Jacques.

Deux lignes caractérisent l’exégèse médiévale de la Bible : elle s’inscrit dans une tradition de réception de la Parole divine, elle considère sa lecture comme un progrès infini. Les Pères représentent le fondement de cette tradition exégétique. Peut-être plus, même : ayant aussi bénéficié de l’inspiration, ils font partie eux-mêmes d’une Écriture sacrée, qui dépasse le canon des textes bibliques. On étudie donc ici, notamment à travers un texte d’Henri de Gand, cette notion des Pères comme sacra Scriptura. Puis on (...) note que certains ouvrages ont joué un rôle déterminant – aux Pères s’ajoutent des auteurs du haut Moyen Âge et même du xii e siècle. L’une des manifestations les plus claires de cette présence est le commentaire anthologique, qui fleurit dans le haut Moyen Âge, mais se poursuit au moins jusqu’à la Catena aurea de Thomas d’Aquin. L’utilisation des Pères est multiple : on ne craint pas d’opposer leurs vues, notamment dans la questio, on recherche aussi dans leurs œuvres des traces des traductions anté-hiéronymiennes. (shrink)

Les correctoires sont des recueils de notes critiques sur le texte (latin) de la Vulgate. Est donné comme exemple le correctoire Sorbonne II (ms. BnF lat. 15554, seconde partie) sur Osée. On y perçoit la richesse des sources (texte massorétique, vieilles latines et manuscrits de la Vulgate, Pères de l’Église, autres correctoires) et on a un exemple de la méthode : les auteurs comparent les textes de leurs bibles au texte massorétique pour déterminer les interpolations, les omissions et les modifications (...) ; ils sont attentifs aux questions de ponctuation. (shrink)

Cet article a pour objet l’étude des commentaires médiévaux de l’épître à Philémon. Après avoir examiné la place de l’épître dans les bibles médiévales, avec ses prologues et ses divisions, puis la traduction latine de la Vulgate et l’histoire du texte, à travers surtout les notes critiques des correctoires, on envisage les prologues des commentaires puis les techniques d’exégèse : divisio textus, étude sémantique, analyse rhétorique, distinctiones et quaestiones. L’étude thématique se limite aux éléments historiques et au traitement du problème (...) de l’esclavage. En annexe, on trouvera la liste des commentaires utilisés, les textes des correctoires sur Philémon et les textes des prologues. (shrink)

Les exégètes médiévaux ont-ils une attitude particulière à l’égard des récits de la Bible que nous faisons aujourd’hui entrer dans la catégorie du « mythe »? On voudrait répondre à cette question à partir de l’étude des généalogies des chapitres 4 et 5 de la Genèse dans les commentaires composés entre le xii e et le xiv e siècles en Occident. Celles du chapitre 4 (v. 17-22) sont considérées comme un mythe sur les origines de la culture – la vie (...) pastorale, le travail des métaux, la musique, le tissage –, celles du chapitre 5 posent des problèmes divers, notamment du fait de la longueur de la vie des personnages nommés. Il semble que les commentateurs du Moyen Âge soient moins sensibles à la dimension « historique » de ces textes qu’aux enseignements que nous pouvons en tirer sur les fondements de la conduite humaine. L’analyse qu’ils font des structures de ces textes (utilisant notamment la valeur symbolique attachée aux nombres et mettant en relief les différences d’agencement) et les applications tropologiques qu’ils en tirent, puisznt dans l’Écriture sainte les enseignements d’une Parole adressée en permanence à l’homme, permettent de constater que les procédures qu’ils mettent en œuvre sont proches de celles d’une certaine analyse des mythes aujourd’hui. (shrink)

This is a new release of the original 1949 edition.

The everyday concept of a social group is approached by examining the concept of going for a walk together, an example of doing something together, or "shared action". Two analyses requiring shared personal goals are rejected, since they fail to explain how people walking together have obligations and rights to appropriate behavior, and corresponding rights of rebuke. An alternative account is proposed: those who walk together must constitute the "plural subject" of a goal. The nature of plural subjecthood, the thesis (...) that social groups are plural subjects, and the relation of these ideas to Rousseau's and Hobbes 's, are briefly explored. (shrink)

This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention ? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people (...) share an intention when and only when they are jointly committed to intend as a body to do such-and-such in the future. This account is compared and contrasted with the common approach that treats shared intention as a matter of personal intentions, with particular reference to the work of Michael Bratman. (shrink)

In this important new collection, Gilbert Harman presents a selection of fifteen interconnected essays on fundamental issues at the center of analytic philosophy. The book opens with a group of four essays discussing basic principles of reasoning and rationality. The next three essays argue against the once popular idea that certain claims are true and knowable by virtue of meaning. In the third group of essays Harman presents his own view of meaning and the possibility of thinking in language (...) The final three essays investigate the nature of mind, developing further the themes already set out. Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind offers an integrated presentation of this rich and influential body of work. which Harman has developed over thirty years. (shrink)

The author develops and elaborates on her account of collective belief, something standardly referred to, in her view, when we speak of what we believe. This paper focuses on a special response hearers may experience in the context of expressions of belief, a response that may issue in offended rebukes to the speaker. It is argued that this response would be appropriate if both speakers and hearers were parties to what the authors calls a joint commitment to believe a certain (...) proposition as a body. This joint commitment puts speakers under an obligation to refrain from speaking in certain ways, and gives hearers a correlative right to such refraining, and hence a basis for offended rebukes. (shrink)

Collective action is interpreted as a matter of people doing something together, and it is assumed that this involves their having a collective intention to do that thing together. The account of collective intention for which the author has argued elsewhere is presented. In terms that are explained, the parties are jointly committed to intend as a body that such-and-such. Collective action problems in the sense of rational choice theory—problems such as the various forms of coordination problem and the prisoner’s (...) dilemma—are then considered. An explanation is given of how, when such a problem is interpreted in terms of the parties’ inclinations, a suitable collective intention resolves the problem for agents who are rational in a broad sense other than the technical sense of game theory. Key Words: rationality • collective action • collective intention • joint commitment. (shrink)

I begin by summarizing the first two chapters of (Harman 1986). The first chapter stresses the importance of not confusing inference with implication and of not confusing reasoning with the sort of argument studied in deductive logic. Inference and reasoning are psychological events or processes that can be done more or less well. The sort of implication and argument studied in deductive logic have to do with relations among propositions and with structures of propositions distinguished into premises, intermediate steps, and (...) conclusion. Deductive logic is not a particular psychological subject and is not a particularly normative subject, although one might attempt to develop a logic of belief or a deontic logic, for example. (shrink)

Essays analyze the nature of the human mind, thought, and imagination and explore the connection of thought to teaching.

The strength of democracy lies in its ability to self-correct, to solve problems and adapt to new challenges. However, increased volatility, resulting from multiple crises on multiple fronts – humanitarian, financial, and environmental – is testing this ability. By offering a new framework for democratic education, Teaching Democracy in an Age of Uncertainty begins a dialogue with education professionals towards the reconstruction of education and by extension our social, cultural and political institutions. -/- This book is the first monograph on (...) philosophy with children to focus on democratic education. The book examines the ways in which education can either perpetuate or disrupt harmful social and political practices and narratives at the classroom level. It is a rethinking of civics and citizenship education as place-responsive learning aimed at understanding and improving human-environment relations to not only face an uncertain world, but also to face the inevitable challenges of democratic disagreement beyond merely promoting pluralism, tolerance and agreement. -/- When viewed as a way of life democracy becomes both a goal and a teaching method for developing civic literacy to enable students to articulate and apprehend more than just the predominant political narrative, but to reshape it. This book will be of interest to scholars of philosophy, political science, education, democratic theory, civics and citizenship studies, and peace education research. (shrink)

I argue that obligations of an important type inhere in what I call 'joint commitments'. I propose a joint commitment account of everyday agreements. This could explain why some philosophers believe that we know of the obligating nature of agreements a priori. I compare and contrast obligations of joint commitment with obligations in the relatively narrow sense recommended by H. L. A. Hart, a recommendation that has been influential. Some central contexts in which Hart takes there to be obligations in (...) his sense are contexts in which there are obligations of joint commitment. Nonetheless, different senses of 'obligation' appear to be at issue. (shrink)

The problem of induction is sometimes motivated via a comparison between rules of induction and rules of deduction. Valid deductive rules are necessarily truth preserving, while inductive rules are not.

In this paper I examine what I will call "the standard account" of intrinsic value as it appears in recent textbooks written by John Hospers, William Frankena, and Richard B. Brandt. I argue: (a) it is not clear whether a theory of intrinsic value can be developed along the lines of the standard account; (b) if one is to develop such a theory, one will need to introduce a notion of "basic intrinsic value" in addition to the notion of "intrinsic (...) value"; and (c) several different theories of intrinsic value may account for the same judgments concerning desirability, and it will be arbitrary to choose one of these theories over another. (shrink)

May social unity - the unity of a society or social group - be a matter of sharing values? Political philosophers disagree on this topic. Kymlicka answers: No. Devlin and Rawls answer: Yes. It is argued that given one common 'summative' account of sharing values a negative answer is correct. A positive answer is correct, however, given the plural subject account of sharing values. Given this account, those who share values are unified in a substantial way by their participation in (...) a joint commitment. Some consequences of such sharing of values for the liberty of the people involved are noted. (shrink)

This is a review essay of Christopher Kutz's Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, and Jonathan Bass's Stay The Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals. Topics addressed include the nature of collective intentions and actions, the possibility of collective guilt, the moral responsibility of individuals in the context of collective actions.

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 1, Page 25-41, January 2022.

Matthew Lipman claims that the community of inquiry is an exemplar of democracy in action. To many proponents the community of inquiry is considered invaluable for achieving desirable social and political ends through education for democracy. But what sort of democracy should we be educating for? In this paper I outline three models of democracy: the liberal model, which emphasises rights and duties, and draws upon pre-political assumptions about freedom; communitarianism, which focuses on identity and participation in the creation of (...) political ends; and deliberative self-governance, whereby citizens deliberatively shape their collective lives in public forums—at various levels of government and in different political and social arenas. I argue that some kind of deliberative democracy is defensible as a preliminary justification for how citizens might shape their lives, and therefore compatible with other forms of democracy, insofar as they can result from democratic deliberations. Acceptance of such a view raises further questions about the purpose or aims of education consistent with this conception of democracy. I contend that it requires an educational model that is committed to aligning curriculum, pedagogy, assessment and school governance to produce a transformational environment that will inform our structures—a commitment to democratic education and not merely education for democracy. Lipman goes part of the way to achieving these ends, but learning how to be proficient at democratic decision-making is like all tasks children and adolescents learn to perform. It involves action, understanding, and awareness of what counts as doing the task adequately. (shrink)

The notion of a community of inquiry has been treated by many of its proponents as being an exemplar of democracy in action. We argue that the assumptions underlying this view present some practical and theoretical difficulties, particularly in relation to distribution of power among the members of a community of inquiry. We identify two presuppositions in relation to distribution of power that require attention in developing an educational model that is committed to deliberative democracy: (1) openness to inquiry and (...) readiness to reason, and (2) mutual respect of students and teachers towards one another. Our contention is that these presuppositions, presented as preconditions necessary to the creation of a community of inquiry, are not without ideological commitments and dependent upon the ability of participants to share power. Using group dynamic theories and the ideas of Hannah Arendt, we argue that behaviours commonly interpreted as obstacles to dialogue or reflective inquiry could provide opportunities for growth. (shrink)

We falter and stammer when trying to describe our own mental acts. Many mental acts, including thinking, are what the author calls ‘chain-undertakings’, that is, courses of action with some over-arching purpose governing the moment-by-moment sub-acts of which we are introspectively aware. Hence the intermittency and sporadicness of the passage of mental activity which constitutes thinking about something.

In this paper I discuss the role played by the 'categorical imperative' in the thought of Jean-Luc Nancy. I argue that, while this is a theme of major importance in Nancy's work, its overall significance is not immediately evident: on the surface, Nancy appears to be affirming the abstract exigency of the imperative while at the same time depriving it of any possible concrete force. I maintain, however, that a close reading of this theme in terms of other crucial themes (...) in Nancy's writing (namely: 'interruption' and the Heideggerian notion of 'Being-with' [Mitsein, être-avec]) reveals that Nancy's imperative does have concrete implications; indeed, it demands that we rethink the relation between responsibility and the concrete as such. Key Words: communication • community • Jacques Derrida • Martin Heidegger • imperative • Jean-Luc Nancy • responsibility. (shrink)

What is it to do something with another person? In the author's book On Social Facts and elsewhere, she has conjectured that a special type of commitment - joint commitment - lies at the root of acting together and many other central social phenomena. Here she surveys some data pertinent to this conjecture, including the assumption of those who act together that they have associated rights against and obligations towards each other. She explains what joint commitment is, how it relates (...) to the data noted, and argues that an appeal to joint commitment does not involve a pernicious form of holism. (shrink)

I argue that philosophical inquiry as underpinning educational practice can reduce the fragmentation in the school curriculum, and therefore, create an educational environment that is in accord with the Adelaide Declaration on the National Goals for Schooling in the Twenty-First Century, and in Queensland, the 2010 Initiative. It can also promote democratic practice itself as opposed to students merely practising the processes of democracy while at school in preparation to function effectively as future democratic citizens.

There is a widespread view that philosophical thinking has no application to matters pertaining to the ‘real world’. It follows from such reasoning that if the purpose of education is to prepare students for the real world, then philosophy has no place in schools or university courses, and by implication in everyday life. One of the aims of this paper is to illustrate that the reasoning behind this view is mistaken. The ability to think critically and creatively through philosophical inquiry (...) provides an intellectual context for study and discussion of issues related to all areas of study. But the introduction of philosophy into the classroom is not without its critics. This paper, therefore, explores a major accusation aimed at philosophy, i.e., that it is necessarily adversarial. The final section of the paper argues that Matthew Lipman’s approach to philosophical inquiry offers much to remedy the more adversarial and limiting elements of the Western philosophical tradition. It is clear that we should not simply aim to reproduce traditional methods of doing philosophy in the classroom. The community of inquiry is an illustration of a positive direction in respect to participation, relatedness and relevance to those involved. (shrink)