That Maurice Merleau-Ponty derived important inspirations from Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms for his theory of perception is obviously, yet is has so far hardly been studied systematically. This paper attempts to fill this gap, and develops the thesis that Merleau-Ponty's readings mistook in part the potential in Cassirer's theory of the subject and by no means exhausted it.

A fact ignored or underestimated by most of the specialist of the work and thought of Merleau-Ponty is the debt h is phenomenology of perception has to Ernst Cassirer’s own phenomenology. The articulation of an actual dialogue between the two thinkers is here anchored in Cassirer’s _concept of symbolic pregnance; which will have further development in Merleau’s Phenomenology of Perception, especially in the chapter he dedicated to the concept of expression. The elements of a possible discussion between the two concepts (...) are here presented as a fruitful basis to renew the reflection on the Lebenswelt problematic. (shrink)

This book presents the framework for a new, comprehensive approach to cognitive science. The proposed paradigm, enaction, offers an alternative to cognitive science's classical, first-generation Computational Theory of Mind. _Enaction_, first articulated by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in _The Embodied Mind_, breaks from CTM's formalisms of information processing and symbolic representations to view cognition as grounded in the sensorimotor dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment. A living organism enacts the world it lives in; its embodied (...) action in the world constitutes its perception and thereby grounds its cognition. _Enaction_ offers a range of perspectives on this exciting new approach to embodied cognitive science. Some chapters offer manifestos for the enaction paradigm; others address specific areas of research, including artificial intelligence, developmental psychology, neuroscience, language, phenomenology, and culture and cognition. Three themes emerge as testimony to the originality and specificity of enaction as a paradigm: the relation between first-person lived experience and third-person natural science; the ambition to provide an encompassing framework applicable at levels from the cell to society; and the difficulties of reflexivity. Taken together, the chapters offer nothing less than the framework for a far-reaching renewal of cognitive science. Contributors: Renaud Barbaras, Didier Bottineau, Giovanna Colombetti, Diego Cosmelli, Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo. Andreas K. Engel, Olivier Gapenne, Véronique Havelange, Edwin Hutchins, Michel Le Van Quyen, Rafael E. Núñez, Marieke Rohde, Benny Shanon, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Adam Sheya, Linda B. Smith, John Stewart, Evan Thompson. (shrink)

In this article, we first describe our general inhibitory-control theory and, then, we describe how we have tested its specific hypotheses on reasoning with brain imaging techniques in adults and children. The innovative part of this perspective lies in its attempt to come up with a brain-based synthesis of Jean Piaget’s theory on logical algorithms and Daniel Kahneman’s theory on intuitive heuristics.

High and low alexithymia scorers were confronted with a modified visual oddball task that allowed the study of categorical perception of emotional expressions on faces. Participants had to quickly detect a deviant (rare) morphed face that shared or did not share the same emotional expression as the frequent one. Expected categorical perception effects, which were also neurophysiologically indexed, showed that rare stimuli were detected faster if they depicted a different emotional expression compared to rare stimuli depicting the same emotional expression (...) than the frequent one. Even if no differences were observed at a behavioural level, high alexithymia scorers evidenced overall delayed neurophysiological responses in components related to the attentional processing of rare emotional faces. Moreover, the categorical perception effects for event-related components associated with the attentional processing were smaller in high alexithymia scorers and were even absent for anger. These results show that high alexithymia scorers present discrimination delays that are already observed at the attentional level. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that Newtonian forces are real, symmetrical and non-causal relations. First, I argue that Newtonian forces are real; second, that they are relations; third, that they are symmetrical relations; fourth, that they are not species of causation. The overall picture is anti-Humean to the extent that it defends the existence of forces as external relations irreducible to spatio-temporal ones, but is still compatible with Humean approaches to causation (and others) since it denies that forces are a (...) species of causation. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 2 Seiten: 762-765.

I challenge two points in Cohen Kadosh & Walsh's (CK & W) argument: First, the definition of abstraction is too restricted; second, the distinction between representations and operations is too clear-cut. For example, taking Jean Piaget's I propose that another way to avoid orthodoxy in the field of numerical cognition is to consider inhibition as an alternative idea of abstraction.

When Henri Poincaré reviewed the then competing theories of electrodynamics in the 1890s, he required their compatibility with two principles of mechanical origin—the reaction principle and the relativity principle. Historians of relativity theory have usually focused on the relativity principle and neglected or misinterpreted Poincaré’s concern with the reaction principle. In particular, most of them have interpreted his crucial article of 1900 on “Lorentz’s theory and the principle of reaction” as an attempt to save this principle by assuming an electromagnetic (...) momentum in addition to the momentum of matter. The purpose of this article is to dismiss this interpretation and show that Poincaré had the opposite intention as he spelled out the paradoxical consequences of Lorentz’s violation of the reaction principle. In doing so, he formally introduced a quantity that could later be interpreted as a genuine electromagnetic momentum, developed a fundamentally new understanding of Lorentz’s transformations in relation with the relativity principle and identified the paradoxes that Einstein would later solve by assuming the inertia of energy. (shrink)

What are economic exchanges? The received view has it that exchanges are mutual transfers of goods motivated by inverse valuations thereof. As a corollary, the standard approach treats exchanges of services as a subspecies of exchanges of goods. We raise two objections against this standard approach. First, it is incomplete, as it fails to take into account, among other things, the offers and acceptances that lie at the core of even the simplest cases of exchanges. Second, it ultimately fails to (...) generalize to exchanges of services, in which neither inverse preferences nor mutual transfers hold true. We propose an alternative definition of exchanges, which treats exchanges of goods as a special case of exchanges of services and which builds in offers and acceptances. According to this theory: (i) The valuations motivating exchanges are propositional and convergent rather than objectual and inverse; (ii) All exchanges of goods involve exchanges of services/actions, but not the reverse; (iii) Offers and acceptances, together with the contractual obligations and claims they bring about, lie at the heart of all cases of exchange. (shrink)

L’expression équilibre naturel est largement utilisée dans les médias et par les militants écologistes pour sensibiliser le grand public aux conséquences néfastes des activités humaines sur l’environnement. Pourtant, alors qu’elle était relativement plébiscitée par les scientifiques au xixe et au début du xxe siècle, la quasi-totalité des écologues n’emploie plus cette expression. Dans cet article, nous visons à montrer que cette expression n’a pas été abandonnée à cause d’une réfutation de l’idée qu’elle recouvrait mais à cause d’une tombée en désuétude. (...) Nous avançons deux causes possibles à cette tombée en désuétude et nous défendons que les termes actuels de stabilité et de résilience renvoient à la même idée qui persiste et se précise. (shrink)

There has been a massive advocacy movement over the last 15 years that has sought to advance the case of religion into view of decision-makers in the international development sector. This advocacy effort has been dispersed and not centrally organised, and is made up of the efforts of multiple development actors, religious institutions, researchers and others. This article shows how this advocacy approach has been highly successful in increasing acceptance of the fact that religion is relevant to development, and religious (...) communities and institutions make contributions to the development effort - and this acceptance can now be seen at the highest levels. However, the article highlights several challenges that have come with this advocacy approach. It therefore supports urgent reflection on the direction of this advocacy going forward and suggests that major and uncomfortable adaptations might now be required. (shrink)

The main purpose of the present chapter is to argue in favor of the claim that, contrary to what is usually and tacitly assumed, organization is not necessary for organicism. To this purpose, I first set up the stage by providing a working characterization of organicism that involves two free parameters, whose variations allow for covering the rich and diverse conceptual landscape of organicism, past and present. In particular, I contend that organization is usually construed as a “mean to an (...) end” notion, or as a tool put at the service of vindicating organicism’s twofold defining assumption, namely, that organisms are determinative entities in their own right, to the effect that (organismic) biology is epistemologically autonomous from physico-chemistry. After a short detour devoted to show that organicism generally collapses on a spectrum of variants of emergentism, I take inspiration from a recent account of emergence called “transformational emergence” to put forward a transformational version of organicism. For such a version meets organicism’s defining standards in a way that is free of any commitment to organization, arguing for its very conceptual soundness finally allows for legitimizing the claim that organicism doesn’t really need organization. (shrink)

Analogies between hearing and seeing already existed in ancient Greek theories of perception. The present paper follows the evolution of such analogies until the rise of 17th century optics, with due regard to the diversity of their origins and nature but with particular emphasis on their bearing on the physical concepts of light and sound. Whereas the old Greek analogies were only side effects of the unifying concepts of perception, the analogies of the 17th century played an important role in (...) constructing optical theories by imitation of acoustic theories, or vice versa. This transition depended on several factors including the changing relations between optics, music, mathematics, and physics, the diversity of early modern concepts of sound, and the rise of a new physics based on experimentation and mechanical explanation. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the proof of the following upward categoricity theorem: Let K be a tame abstract elementary class with amalgamation, arbitrarily large models, and countable Löwenheim-Skolem number. If K is categorical in ‮א‬₁ then K is categorical in every uncountable cardinal. More generally, we prove that if K is categorical in a successor cardinal λ⁺ then K is categorical everywhere above λ⁺.

This thesis vindicates the common-sense intuition that touch is more objective than the other senses. The reason why it is so, it is argued, is that touch is the only sense essential of the experience of physical effort, and that this experience constitutes our only acquaintance with the mind-independence of the physical world. The thesis is divided in tree parts. Part I argues that sensory modalities are individuated by they proper objects, realistically construed. Part II argues that the proper objects (...) of touch are pressures and tensions, defined as pairs of real and antagonist forces. Part III argues that experiences of pressures are an essential part of the experience of physical effort and that the experience of physical effort (which amounts to the experience of resistance to our will), constitutes our only immediate access to the mind-independence of the physical world. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous nous proposons de mettre en évidence deux stratégies émergentistes possibles qui constituent une médiation intéressante entre les extrêmes classiques que sont le physicalisme réductionniste et le dualisme des substances. En distinguant trois niveaux de tension possibles entre monisme et dualisme — le niveau des substances, le niveau des propriétés causales et celui des prédicats — nous sommes amené à formuler deux positions philosophiques associées à deux concepts d’émergence distincts : l’émergence représentationnelle et l’émergence causale. Ces deux (...) concepts s’avèrent fidèles aux intuitions des premiers émergentistes véhiculées au travers de l’étymologie même du concept d’émergence, et permettent une interprétation non triviale de la maxime classique : « Le tout est plus que la somme des parties. »I emphasize in this paper two possible emergentist strategies that constitute interesting middle grounds between classical views that are reductive physicalism and substance dualism. By distinguishing three levels of tension between monism and dualism — the levels of substance, causal properties and predicates — one is allowed to formulate two philosophical views that may be associated with two distinct concepts of emergence : representational emergence and causal emergence. Both concepts are faithful to the intuitions of early emergentists that are conveyed in the very etymology of the concept of emergence, and they allow a non-trivial reading of the classical maxim : “the whole is more than the sum of the parts”. (shrink)

Featuring more than one hundred of his photographs in every genre, this book celebrates Hervé's work as an artist, creating images that serve not simply as records but stand as works of a singular imagination.

In his ‘Theory of Light and Colours’, presented to the Royal Society in November 1801, Thomas Young defended a mechanical explanation of the coloured fringes observed outside of the shadow of an opaque object – the so-called ‘colours by inflection’ – that was based on the hypothesis of an ethereal density gradient surrounding all material bodies. However, two years later, he publicly rejected that hypothesis, without giving much detail of his reasons. Although Geoffrey Cantor has demonstrated the crucial role of (...) mechanical and astronomical arguments in explaining the withdrawal of this fundamental hypothesis long ago, the purpose of this article is to draw deeper attention to a set of experiments performed by David Brewster on the inflection of light, described in a letter he addressed to the Royal Society in January 1802, but was retained by William Herschel, and finally was neither read before the Society, nor published in its Philosophical Transactions. For the hypothesis that will be evaluated here is that these unpublished experiments of Brewster’s were eventually known to Young through the mediation of Herschel, and eventually played a significant role in Young’s rejection of his ether distribution hypothesis. (shrink)

A slight modification of Helmholtz’s metrical approach to the foundations of geometry leads to the locally Euclidian character of space without restriction of the curvature. A bolder generalization involving time measurement leads to the locally Minkowskian character of spacetime. Some philosophical consequences of these results are drawn.Keywords: Hermann Helmholtz; Space; Time; Spacetime.

Conscious awareness comprises two distinct states, autonoetic and noetic awareness. Schizophrenia impairs autonoetic, but not noetic, awareness. We investigated the strategic regulation of relevant and irrelevant contents of conscious awareness in schizophrenia using a directed forgetting paradigm. Twenty-one patients with schizophrenia and 21 normal controls were presented with words and told to learn some of them and forget others. In a subsequent test, they were asked to recognize all the words they had seen previously and give remember, know or guess (...) responses according to whether they recognized words on the basis of autonoetic awareness, noetic awareness, or guessing. Overall, patients showed the same degree of a directed forgetting effect as normal subjects. However, whereas the effect was observed both for remember and know responses in normal subjects, it was observed for know, but not for remember, responses in patients. These results indicate that patients with schizophrenia exhibit an impaired strategic regulation of contents of autonetic awareness for relevant and irrelevant information. (shrink)

La Semaine d'épigraphie créto-mycénienne a été organisée par l'École française d'Athènes du 24 au 28 mars 1998, dans le but de réunir, pour quelques séances de travail, des savants reconnus et de jeunes doctorants spécialisés dans l'étude des écritures linéaires A et B. Chacun des participants a présenté un état de ses recherches personnelles : M.-L. Bech Nosch, L'administration des textes en Crète centrale, hors des séries Lc/Le/Ln ; Chr. Boulotis, Les nouveaux documents en linéaire A d'Akrotiri (Théra) : remarques (...) préliminaires ; P. Carlier, wa-na-ka derechef. Nouvelles réflexions sur les royautés mycéniennes; P. Darcque, Archives réelles, archives virtuelles en linéaire B; H. Landenius Enegren, Some Problems of the Prosopography of Knossos; J. T. Killen, The Pylos Ta Tablets Revisited ; S. Lupack, The Role of the Religious Sector in Mycenaean Economics; J.-P. Olivier, Le syllabaire chyproclassique : un inventaire; M. Perna, Gli ideogrammi dei vasi in lineare A ; Fr. Rougemont, Quelques problèmes liés à l'étude des «collecteurs» dans les tablettes en linéaire B; M.-St. Speciale, Gli antroponimi in lineare B di Cnosso e la Creta del TM II-III; M. Tsipopoulou, The Hieroglyphic Archive at Petras, Siteia ; C. Varias Garcia, Antroponimia micénica en las tablillas de h sene B de Cnoso y en Micenas. (shrink)

Samuel Johnson claimed to have refuted Berkeley by kicking a stone. It is generally thought that Johnson misses the point of Berkeley's immaterialism for a rather obvious reason: Berkeley never denied that the stone feels solid, but only that the stone could exist independently of any mind. I argue that Johnson was on the right track. On my interpretation, Johnson’s idea is that because the stone feels to resist our effort, the stone seems to have causal powers. But if appearances (...) are to be taken at face value, as Berkeley insists, then the stone has causal powers. I argue that such causal powers threaten not only Berkeley’s view that only minds are active, but also, and more fundamentally, his central claim that sensible things depend on perception. (shrink)

To be optimistic, it is standardly assumed, is to have positive expectations. I here argue that this definition is correct but captures only one variety of optimism – here called factual optimism. It leaves out two other important varieties of optimism. The first – focal optimism – corresponds to the idea of seeing the glass half full. The second – axiological optimism – consists in the view that good is stronger than bad. Those three varieties of optimism are irreducible to (...) each other and do not belong to a common kind. I define each of these, characterize their respective correctness conditions, and contrast hope with optimism. (shrink)