A. Tarski [22] proposed the study of infinitary consequence operations as the central topic of mathematical logic. He considered monotonicity to be a property of all such operations. In this paper, we weaken the monotonicity requirement and consider more general operations, inference operations. These operations describe the nonmonotonic logics both humans and machines seem to be using when infering defeasible information from incomplete knowledge. We single out a number of interesting families of inference operations. This study of infinitary inference operations (...) is inspired by the results of [12] on nonmonotonic inference relations, and relies on some of the definitions found there. (shrink)

A. Tarski [22] proposed the study of infinitary consequence operations as the central topic of mathematical logic. He considered monotonicity to be a property of all such operations. In this paper, we weaken the monotonicity requirement and consider more general operations, inference operations. These operations describe the nonmonotonic logics both humans and machines seem to be using when infering defeasible information from incomplete knowledge. We single out a number of interesting families of inference operations. This study of infinitary inference operations (...) is inspired by the results of [12] on nonmonotonic inference relations, and relies on some of the definitions found there. (shrink)

When a proposition is cumulatively entailed by a finite setA of premisses, there exists, trivially, a finite subsetB ofA such thatB B entails for all finite subsetsB that are entailed byA. This property is no longer valid whenA is taken to be an arbitrary infinite set, even when the considered inference operation is supposed to be compact. This leads to a refinement of the classical definition of compactness. We call supracompact the inference operations that satisfy the non-finitary analogue of the (...) above property. We show that for any arbitrary cumulative operationC, there exists a supracompact cumulative operationK(C) that is smaller thenC and agrees withC on finite sets. Moreover,K(C) inherits most of the properties thatC may enjoy, like monotonicity, distributivity or disjunctive rationality. The main part of the paper concerns distributive supracompact operations. These operations satisfy a simple functional equation, and there exists a representation theorem that provides a semantic characterization for this family of operations. We examine finally the case of rational operations and show that they can be represented by a specific kind of model particularly easy to handle. (shrink)

A. Tarski [21] proposed the study of infinitary consequence operations as the central topic of mathematical logic. He considered monotonicity to be a property of all such operations. In this paper, we weaken the monotonicity requirement and consider more general operations, inference operations. These operations describe the nonmonotonic logics both humans and machines seem to be using when infering dofeasible information from incomplete knowledge. We single out a number of interesting families of inference operations. This study of infinitary inference operations (...) is inspired by the results of [11] on finitary nonmonotonic operations, but this paper is self-contained. (shrink)

We show how to construct partial nontrivial base revision operators that satisfy the analogues of the AGM postulates and depends on no extra‐logical consideration. These operators, closely related to the full meet revision process, are defined on stratified bases, in which the information can be ranked in logical sequences. Stratified bases, which can be viewed as sets of graded sheaves, are exactly the knowledge bases for which the full meet revision operator satisfies the rationality postulate K*8. As the revision of (...) a stratified base is again a stratified base, it is possible to perform iterated revisions, and the resulting output is particularly easy to determine. (shrink)

We investigate the family of concepts that an agent comes to know through a set of defining features, and examine the role played by these features in the process of categorization. In a qualitative framework, categorial membership is evaluated through an order relation among the objects at hand, which translates the fact that an object may fall more than another under a given concept. For concepts defined by their features, this global membership order depends on the degree with which each (...) feature applies to the objects of the universe. The passage from these individual membership degrees to a global membership order poses a problem analogous to vote aggregation in social choice theory. This similarity leads to an original solution that is particularly well-adapted to the framework of cognitive psychology. The resulting membership order extends to compound concepts, and provides a good description of the guppy paradox and the conjunction effect. (shrink)

Michael Freund (1902-1972) war der erste Professor für «Wissenschaft und Geschichte der Politik» an der Universität Kiel und gehörte damit zur einflussreichen Gründervätergeneration der westdeutschen Politikwissenschaft nach 1945. Sowohl Freunds universitäres und wissenschaftliches Wirken als Politikwissenschaftler und Historiker als auch sein politisches Engagement und seine umfangreiche journalistische Tätigkeit stehen im Fokus dieser Studie. Somit stellt die Arbeit nicht nur die erste Biographie Freunds dar, sondern bietet zugleich einen Einblick in eine stark historisch orientierte Richtung der frühen westdeutschen Politikwissenschaft. (...) Darüber hinaus leistet sie einen Beitrag zur Verständigung über Wissenschafts- und Universitätsgeschichte nach 1945. (shrink)

Michael Rathjen and the present author have shown that ‐bar induction is equivalent to (a suitable formalization of) the statement that every normal function has a derivative, provably in. In this note we show that the base theory can be weakened to. Our argument makes crucial use of a normal function f with and. We shall also exhibit a normal function g with and.

Von allen Briefwechseln, die Bernard Bolzano (1781?1848) führte, war der mit seinem Schüler und Freund Michael Josef Fesl (1788?1864) bei weitem der umfangreichste. Insgesamt tauschten die beiden etwa 730 Briefe aus. Da wegen der grossen Zahl der Briefe in der Bernard-Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe ab dem Jahr 1831 nur noch die Briefe des Lehrers an seinen Schüler veröffentlicht werden, erscheinen die Briefe Fesls an Bolzano in den Beiträgen zur Bolzano-Forschung. 0Der vorliegende Band enthält Fesls Briefe der Jahre 1831?1836. Ihr Hauptthema sind (...) Bolzanos Publikationsprojekte, darunter die Religionsbekenntnisse zweier Vernunftfreunde (1835), die Lebensbeschreibung (1836) und die Wissenschaftslehre (1837). Dazu kommt ein Austausch über die Zensur, über politische Ereignisse, über Cholera und andere Epidemien jener Zeit sowie über Heilmittel wie Homöopathie oder Kaltwasserkuren. Philosophische Fragen im eigentlichen Sinne spielen eine kleinere, aber nicht zu vernachlässigende Rolle. (shrink)

Specifies an axiomatization of the system S13 of modal logic. Referenced in Cocchiarella & Freund "Modal Logic: an Introduction to its Syntax and Semantics", Oxford University Press, 2008.

Das Buch stellt eine Alternative zur gängigen Sicht der Entstehungsgeschichte des Deutschen Idealismus vor, indem eine spezielle Rezeption des Platonismus, wie sie in Tübingen am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts möglich war, als Ausgangspunkt der prinzipiellen Überlegungen der Tübinger Freunde nachgewiesen wird. Im Gegensatz zu den bewußtseins- und wissenschaftstheoretischen Rekonstruktionen der System-Sukzessionen (von Kant über Reinhold und Fichte zu Schelling und Hegel) wird hier der philosophische Ansatz der drei Tübinger aus dem Versuch erklärt, die platonische Prinzipienlehre (in ihrer neuplatonisch überarbeiteten Form) (...) unter den Bedingungen der transzendentalen Wende Kants zu reformulieren. (shrink)

Anlässlich des 65. Geburtstages von Ingeborg Schüßler haben ihre Kollegen, Freunde und ehemaligen Schüler beschlossen, ihr eine Festschrift zu widmen. Das Buch umfasst 25 Beiträge in Deutsch und Französisch. Der Titel des Bandes, Genealogie des neuzeitlichen Denkens bezeichnet die leitende Perspektive der Beiträge: unter verschiedenen Beleuchtungen geht es jedesmal darum, wie das Denken der Moderne und der Gegenwart die philosophischen Erbschaften, von denen es herkommt, aufnimmt und neu bearbeitet. A l'occasion du soixante-cinquième anniversaire de Madame Ingeborg Schüßler, ses collègues, aims (...) et anciens élèves ont décidé de lui offrir un volume d'hommages, rassemblant vingt-cinq contributions en français et en allemand. Le titre du volume, Généalogie de la pensée moderne, indique l'optique commune aux études réunies : sous diverses perspectives, il s'agit à chaque fois de se demander comment la pensée de la modernité reprend et retravaille les héritages philosophiques dont elle est tributaire. Contributions de / Beiträge von Emil Angehrn, Rudolf Bernet, Raphae͏̈l Célis, Pascal David, Felix Duque, Michael Esfeld, Jean Ferrari, Karen Gloy, Gérard Guest, Michel Herren, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Helmuth Holzhey, Wolfgang Janke, Emmanuel Mejia, Ada Neschke, Thérèse Pentzopoulos-Valalas, Mario Ruggenini, John Sallis, Alexandre Schild, Gerhard Seel, Tiziana Suarez-Nani, Rainer Thurnher, Jean-Marc Tétaz, Ivan Urbancic, Franco Volpi. (shrink)

Die Verantwortung fur das Leben und die Hochachtung vor dem Mitmenschen lebt Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schleissheimer in seinem Philosophieren. Aus der Begegnung mit ihm versuchen Freunde, Kollegen und Schuler diesen Anspruch fur ihr Fachgebiet aufzugreifen.".

We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? To defend materialism, philosophical materialists have formulated what is sometimes called "the phenomenal-concept strategy," which holds that we possess a range of special concepts for classifying the subjective aspects of our experiences. In Consciousness Revisited, the philosopher Michael Tye, until now a proponent of the the phenomenal-concept strategy, argues that the (...) strategy is mistaken. A rejection of phenomenal concepts leaves the materialist with the task of finding some other strategy for defending materialism. Tye points to four major puzzles of consciousness that arise: How is it possible for Mary, in the famous thought experiment, to make a discovery when she leaves her black-and-white room? In what does the explanatory gap consist and how can it be bridged? How can the hard problem of consciousness be solved? How are zombies possible? Tye presents solutions to these puzzles -- solutions that relieve the pressure on the materialist created by the failure of the phenomenal-concept strategy. In doing so, he discusses and makes new proposals on a wide range of issues, including the nature of perceptual content, the conditions necessary for consciousness of a given object, the proper understanding of change blindness, the nature of phenomenal character and our awareness of it, whether we have privileged access to our own experiences, and, if we do, in what such access consists. (shrink)

Michael S. Brady offers a new account of the role of emotions in our lives. He argues that emotional experiences do not give us information in the same way that perceptual experiences do. Instead, they serve our epistemic needs by capturing our attention and facilitating a reappraisal of the evaluative information that emotions themselves provide.

In this book, Michael Arbib, a researcher in artificial intelligence and brain theory, joins forces with Mary Hesse, a philosopher of science, to present an integrated account of how humans 'construct' reality through interaction with the social and physical world around them. The book is a major expansion of the Gifford Lectures delivered by the authors at the University of Edinburgh in the autumn of 1983. The authors reconcile a theory of the individual's construction of reality as a network (...) of schemas 'in the head' with an account of the social construction of language, science, ideology and religion to provide an integrated schema-theoretic view of human knowledge. The authors still find scope for lively debate, particularly in their discussion of free will and of the reality of God. The book integrates an accessible exposition of background information with a cumulative marshalling of evidence to address fundamental questions concerning human action in the world and the nature of ultimate reality. (shrink)

Inspired by the work of Wilfrid Sellars, Michael Williams launches an all-out attack on what he calls "phenomenalism," the idea that our knowledge of the world rests on a perceptual or experiential foundation.

Gnothi sauton - Erkenne dich selbst! Das Streben nach Erkenntnis und Selbsterkenntnis, das nach antiker Auffassung der Gott selbst in dieser Aufforderung dem Menschen ans Herz legt, bildet ein zentrales Moment von Arbogast Schmitts jahrzehntelanger Beschaftigung mit antiker Literatur und Philosophie, die zugleich immer auch eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit modernen Konzepten und Positionen darstellt. Die vorliegende Festschrift vereint zwolf neue Beitrage zur antiken Philosophie, Literatur und Literaturtheorie, in denen Schuler, Freunde und Weggefahrten Arbogast Schmitts dieses Erkenntnisstreben beantworten und fortsetzen. Mit (...) Beitragen von: Wolfgang Bernard, Stefan Buttner, Sabine Follinger, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Andreas Kablitz, Michael Krewet, Joachim Latacz, Thomas Leinkauf, Christian Pietsch, Ernst-Richard Schwinge, Rainer Thiel und Gregor Vogt-Spira. (shrink)

The two dominant theories of consciousness argue it appeared in living beings either suddenly, or gradually. Both theories face problems. The solution is the realization that a foundational consciousness was always here, yet varying conscious states were not, and appeared gradually. Michael Tye explores this idea and the key questions it raises.

In _Reconstructing the Cognitive World_, Michael Wheeler argues that we should turn away from the generically Cartesian philosophical foundations of much contemporary cognitive science research and proposes instead a Heideggerian approach. Wheeler begins with an interpretation of Descartes. He defines Cartesian psychology as a conceptual framework of explanatory principles and shows how each of these principles is part of the deep assumptions of orthodox cognitive science. Wheeler then turns to Heidegger's radically non-Cartesian account of everyday cognition, which, he argues, (...) can be used to articulate the philosophical foundations of a genuinely non-Cartesian cognitive science. Finding that Heidegger's critique of Cartesian thinking falls short, even when supported by Hubert Dreyfus's influential critique of orthodox artificial intelligence, Wheeler suggests a new Heideggerian approach. He points to recent research in "embodied-embedded" cognitive science and proposes a Heideggerian framework to identify, amplify, and clarify the underlying philosophical foundations of this new work. He focuses much of his investigation on recent work in artificial intelligence-oriented robotics, discussing, among other topics, the nature and status of representational explanation, and whether cognition is computation rather than a noncomputational phenomenon best described in the language of dynamical systems theory. Wheeler's argument draws on analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, and empirical work to "reconstruct" the philosophical foundations of cognitive science in a time of a fundamental shift away from a generically Cartesian approach. His analysis demonstrates that Heideggerian continental philosophy and naturalistic cognitive science need not be mutually exclusive and shows further that a Heideggerian framework can act as the "conceptual glue" for new work in cognitive science. (shrink)

In Unnatural Doubts, Michael Williams constructs a masterly polemic against the very idea of epistemology, as traditionally conceived.

Sustainability challenges typically occur across sectoral boundaries, calling the state, market, and civil society to action. Although consensus exists on the merits of cross-sector collaboration, our understanding of whether and how it can create value for various, collaborating stakeholders is still limited. This special issue focuses on how new combined knowledge on cross-sector collaboration and business models for sustainability can inform the academic and practitioner debates about sustainability challenges and solutions. We discuss how cross-sector collaboration can play an important role (...) for the transition to new and potentially sustainability-driven business models given that value creation, delivery, and capture of organizations are intimately related to the collaborative ties with their stakeholders. Sustainable alternatives to conventional business models tend to adopt a more holistic perspective of business by broadening the spectrum of solutions and stakeholders and, when aligned with cross-sector collaboration, can contribute new ways of addressing the wicked sustainability problems humanity faces. (shrink)

This is a collection of published and unpublished essays by distinguished philosopher Michael E. Bratman of Stanford University. They revolve around his influential theory, know as the "planning theory of intention and agency." Bratman's primary concern is with what he calls "strong" forms of human agency--including forms of human agency that are the target of our talk about self-determination, self-government, and autonomy. These essays are unified and cohesive in theme, and will be of interest to philosophers in ethics and (...) metaphysics. (shrink)

Was leistete der Gedanke der selbstandigen Auswahl (Eklektik) in der Geschichte der Philosophie von Aristoteles bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, wo liegen die Anwendungsgebiete, wo seine Grenzen und warum kam der Begriff der Eklektik schon im 18. Jahrhundert zur Bezeichnung unselbstandiger Vermischung herunter? Der Schwerpunkt der umfangreichen Arbeit liegt in der Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft des 17. Jahrhunderts; sie reicht aber bis zur eklektischen Psychotherapie der Gegenwart.

A consideration of some of the most common questions about animal minds.Do birds have feelings? Can fish feel pain? Could a honeybee be anxious? For centuries, the question of whether or not animals are conscious like humans has prompted debates among philosophers and scientists. While most people gladly accept that complex mammals - such as dogs - share emotions and experiences with us, the matter of simpler creatures is much less clear. Meanwhile, the advent of the digital age and artificial (...) intelligence has created an added dimension to questions about non-human consciousness. In Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs, Michael Tye offers answers to some of today's most pressing questions about nonhuman consciousness. Blending the latest research about animal sensation with theories about the nature of consciousness, Tye develops a methodology for addressing the mysteries of the animal mind. Without endorsing any specific theory on the nature of consciousness, Tye tackles issues such as the animal experience of pain and fear, and the role of brain anatomy in determining consciousness. He then turns his attention to the artificial realm, considering whether complex robots could ever be considered conscious. Tye concludes with a discussion of how, if we consider animals conscious, this might impact our ethical obligations to them. From insects to crabs, fish to birds, Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs offers an insightful exploration of the ways in which animals relate to the world. Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs will appeal to students and scholars of philosophy and neuroscience, as well as general readers with an interest in animal and environmental ethics. (shrink)

Michael Devitt is a distinguished philosopher of language. In this book he takes up one of the most important difficulties that must be faced by philosophical semantics: namely, the threat posed by holism. Three important questions lie at the core of this book: what are the main objectives of semantics; why are they worthwhile; how should we accomplish them? Devitt answers these 'methodological' questions naturalistically and explores what semantic programme arises from the answers. The approach is anti-Cartesian, rejecting the (...) idea that linguistic or conceptual competence yields any privileged access to meanings. This new methodology is used first against holism. Devitt argues for a truth-referential localism, and in the process rejects direct-reference, two-factor, and verificationist theories. The book concludes by arguing against revisionism, eliminativism, and the idea that we should ascribe narrow meanings to explain behaviour. (shrink)

The Chomskian revolution in linguistics gave rise to a new orthodoxy about mind and language. Michael Devitt throws down a provocative challenge to that orthodoxy. What is linguistics about? What role should linguistic intuitions play in constructing grammars? What is innate about language? Is there a 'language faculty'? These questions are crucial to our developing understanding of ourselves; Michael Devitt offers refreshingly original answers. He argues that linguistics is about linguistic reality and is not part of psychology; that (...) linguistic rules are not represented in the mind; that speakers are largely ignorant of their language; that speakers' intuitions do not reflect information supplied by the language faculty and are not the main evidence for grammars; that the rules of 'Universal Grammar' are largely, if not entirely, innate structure rules of thought; indeed, that there is little or nothing to the language faculty. Devitt's controversial theses will prove highly stimulating to anyone working on language and the mind. (shrink)

_Paradoxes from A to Z, Third edition_ is the essential guide to paradoxes, and takes the reader on a lively tour of puzzles that have taxed thinkers from Zeno to Galileo, and Lewis Carroll to Bertrand Russell. Michael Clark uncovers an array of conundrums, such as Achilles and the Tortoise, Theseus’ Ship, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, taking in subjects as diverse as knowledge, science, art and politics. Clark discusses each paradox in non-technical terms, considering its significance and looking at (...) likely solutions. This third edition is revised throughout, and adds nine new paradoxes that have important bearings in areas such as law, logic, ethics and probability. Paradoxes from A to Z, Third edition is an ideal starting point for those interested not just in philosophical puzzles and conundrums, but anyone seeking to hone their thinking skills. (shrink)

Published very shortly before his death in February 1976, Meaning is the culmination of Michael Polanyi's philosophic endeavors.

Michael T. Ferejohn presents a new analysis of Aristotle's theory of explanation and scientific knowledge, in the context of its Socratic roots. Ferejohn shows how Aristotle resolves the tension between his commitment to the formal-case model of explanation and his recognition of the role of efficient causes in explaining natural phenomena.

Michael Davis, a leading figure in the study of professional ethics, offers here both a compelling exploration of engineering ethics and a philosophical analysis of engineering as a profession. After putting engineering in historical perspective, Davis turns to the Challenger space shuttle disaster to consider the complex relationship between engineering ideals and contemporary engineering practice. Here, Davis examines how social organization and technical requirements define how engineers should (and presumably do) think. Later chapters test his analysis of engineering judgement (...) and autonomy empirically, engaging a range of social science research including a study of how engineers and managers work together in ten different companies. (shrink)

Three leading philosopher-logicians present a clear and concise overview of formal theories of truth, explaining key logical techniques. Truth is as central topic in philosophy: formal theories study the connections between truth and logic, including the intriguing challenges presented by paradoxes like the Liar.

Michael Wedin argues against the prevailing notion that Aristotle's views on the nature of reality are fundamentally inconsistent. According to Wedin's new interpretation, the difference between the early theory of the Categories and the later theory of the Metaphysics reflects the fact that Aristotle is engaged in quite different projects in the two works--the earlier focusing on ontology, and the later on explanation.