This book argues that the question posed by virtue theories, namely, “what kind of person should I be?” provides a more promising approach to moral questions than do either deontological or consequentialist moral theories where the concern is with what actions are morally required or permissible. It does so both by arguing that there are firmer theoretical foundations for virtue theories, and by persuasively suggesting the superiority of virtue theories over deontological and consquentialist theories on the question of explaining morally (...) bad behavior. Virtue theories can give a richer account by appealing to the kinds of dispositions that make certain bad choices appear attractive. This richer account also exposes a further advantage of virtue theories: they provide the best kinds of motivations for agents to become better persons. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the standard epistemological requirements of impartiality on the part of the knower, and passivity on the part of the thing under investigation, exclude from the purview of epistemology a very important kind of knowledge, namely: knowledge of persons. Feminist philosophers have focused on problems in explaining knowledge of other persons, but the same considerations require a reorientation in the way we think of knowledge of oneself. Because of the subjectivity of the knower and reflexive nature of (...) the investigation involving self-knowledge, one's inquiry is affected in a way that challenges the accuracy of what is learned. The chapter's response is to treat the procedural methods used to obtain knowledge of oneself as continuous with the methods of acquiring knowledge of other persons via knowing their moral and cognitive characters. It highlights the intersection between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. (shrink)

In this paper I examine John Greco’s agent reliabilism, in particular, his requirement of subjective justification. I argue that his requirement is too weak as it stands to disqualify as knowledge claims some true beliefs arrived at by reliable processes and that it is vulnerable to the “value problem” objection. I develop a more robust account of subjective justification that both avoids the objection that agents require beliefs about their dispositions in order to be subjectively justified and explains why knowledge (...) is more valuable than true belief. (shrink)

L'hypocrisie implique un souci de la réputation morale qui conduit à des contradictions entre les actions et les raisons d'agir qui sont ouvertement déclarées,ou entre les raisons d'agir réelles et celles qui sont ouvertement déclarées. On opposera ici les actions hypocrites aux actions velléitaires, et les personnes hypocrites aux personnes velléitaires. Les rapports entre l'intégrité et l'hypocrisie seront esquissés : ce qui distingue la personne intègre et l'hypocrite, ce sont leurs attitudes respectives à l'endroit de leurs raisons d'agir; cela ouvre (...) une voie pour la compréhension de ce qu'il y a de mauvais dans l'hypocrisie. Les supercheries de l'hypocrite font obstacle à sa tentative de se construire pour lui-même une personnalité dans le cadre de laquelle ses identifications autoconstitutives puissent lui fournir des raisons d'agir. II compromet ainsi son propre bien. Et il sape, au surplus, la fin collective de la moralité en faussant les données sur lesquelles les autres basent leurs jugements moraux. (shrink)

L'hypocrisie implique un souci de la réputation morale qui conduit à des contradictions entre les actions et les raisons d'agir qui sont ouvertement déclarées,ou entre les raisons d'agir réelles et celles qui sont ouvertement déclarées. On opposera ici les actions hypocrites aux actions velléitaires, et les personnes hypocrites aux personnes velléitaires. Les rapports entre l'intégrité et l'hypocrisie seront esquissés : ce qui distingue la personne intègre et l'hypocrite, ce sont leurs attitudes respectives à l'endroit de leurs raisons d'agir; cela ouvre (...) une voie pour la compréhension de ce qu'il y a de mauvais dans l'hypocrisie. Les supercheries de l'hypocrite font obstacle à sa tentative de se construire pour lui-même une personnalité dans le cadre de laquelle ses identifications autoconstitutives puissent lui fournir des raisons d'agir. II compromet ainsi son propre bien. Et il sape, au surplus, la fin collective de la moralité en faussant les données sur lesquelles les autres basent leurs jugements moraux. (shrink)

Agents can be insincere in many different ways. They can utter claims they take to be false, or they can utter true claims with an intention to deceive their audiences. While both liars and virtual liars are committed truth-seekers, they are poor truth-sharers. Agents can also deceive about their reasons for holding the true beliefs that they hold: cheaters and plagiarists deceive about the justifications of their true beliefs, and they intentionally exploit our normative practices of evaluating cognitive agents. Agents (...) can also be insincere about their commitment to truth-seeking enterprises. They may pose as serious truth-seekers and earnest truth-sharers, but they are what Frankfurt identifies as bullshitters: they do not care whether what they say is true. In this paper, I examine these different ways of deceiving others, and I assess Frankfurt’s charge that bullshit is worse than lies. (shrink)

This anthology contains several of Thomas E. Hill’s essays on the contributions various basic Kantian themes can be seen to make to the topics of human welfare and moral worth. The essays have been written over the last decade, and all but two have been previously published in academic journals and anthologies. This volume complements one published in 2000 entitled, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian Perspectives, and it is part of Hill’s “ongoing project to develop a moral theory in the (...) Kantian tradition that is as plausible as possible”. The essays reveal Hill’s Kantian sympathies and sensibilities, without being apologies for Kantian ethics: what Hill takes to be untenable Kantian claims are identified and explicitly rejected. What Hill takes to be unreasonable interpretations of Kantian points suffer a similar fate. The anthology has a very useful introduction by Hill, which provides a brief synopsis of each essay as well as the organizing principles behind the selections and their ordering. Those readers who do not think of themselves as Kant scholars will not be out of their depths. (shrink)

This anthology contains several of Thomas E. Hill’s essays on the contributions various basic Kantian themes can be seen to make to the topics of human welfare and moral worth. The essays have been written over the last decade, and all but two have been previously published in academic journals and anthologies. This volume complements one published in 2000 entitled, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian Perspectives, and it is part of Hill’s “ongoing project to develop a moral theory in the (...) Kantian tradition that is as plausible as possible”. The essays reveal Hill’s Kantian sympathies and sensibilities, without being apologies for Kantian ethics: what Hill takes to be untenable Kantian claims are identified and explicitly rejected. What Hill takes to be unreasonable interpretations of Kantian points suffer a similar fate. The anthology has a very useful introduction by Hill, which provides a brief synopsis of each essay as well as the organizing principles behind the selections and their ordering. Those readers who do not think of themselves as Kant scholars will not be out of their depths. (shrink)

Dans son ouvrage, McKinnon a pour but de démontrer que l’éthique de la vertu est une alternative valable et plus prometteuse que ses pendants traditionnels que sont l’éthique du devoir et les différents types d’utilitarismes. Elle reconnaît toutefois que l’éthique de la vertu à cette étape de son développement a besoin d’être peaufinée. Premièrement, il semblerait que la connexion entre ce qui est bon pour les humains et ce que c’est que d’être un bon être humain soit manquante et (...) que donc, au point de vue théorique, le fondement soit manquant. Deuxièmement, il semblerait que les différentes versions proposées de l’éthique de la vertu ne définissent pas assez clairement ce que sont la vertu et le vice et ne posent pas de façon distincte les liens existants entre ceux-ci et le caractère. McKinnon réussira dans son ouvrage à pallier ces deux manques. (shrink)

v. 1. Kierkegaard; in translation.--v. 2. Fundamental polyglot konkordans til Kierkegaards samlede værker.--v. 3. Index verborum til Kierkegaards samlede værker.--v. 4. Computational analysis of Kierkegaard's samlade værker.

After discussing de Sousa's view of emotion in akrasia, I suggest that emotions be viewed as nonconceptual perceptions of value (see Tappolet 2000). It follows that they can render intelligible actions which are contrary to one's better judgment. An emotion can make one's action intelligible even when that action is opposed by one's all-things-considered judgment. Moreover, an akratic action prompted by an emotion may be more rational than following one's better judgement, for it may be the judgement and not the (...) perception which is in error. By contrast, "cool" akrasia is genuinely puzzling; it is not clear whether it exists. (shrink)

This book provides a collection of some 400 passages on music from early Christian literature - New Testament to c. 450 AD - newly translated from the original Greek, Latin, and Syriac. As there are no musical sources of the period, music historians must rely upon remarks about music in literary sources to gain some knowledge of early Christian liturgical music. This volume makes a large and representative collection of the material conveniently available. The passages are arranged chronologically and regionally (...) in eleven chapters with brief commentary. An introduction sets out the major subjects and themes of the original source material. (shrink)

Content skepticism about practical reason is doubt about the bearing of rational considerations on the activities of deliberation and choice. Motivational skepticism is doubt about the scope of reason as a motive. Some people think that motivational considerations alone provide grounds for skepticism about the project of founding ethics on practical reason. I will argue, against this view, that motivational skepticism must always be based on content skepticism. I will not address the question of whether or not content skepticism is (...) justified. I want only to establish the fact that motivational skepticism has no independent force. (shrink)

In spite of strengthened financial regulation, ethical concern continues about the promotion and distribution of financial services in Britain, including savings and investment products. Greater ethical attention needs to be paid to products, price, promotion and distribution. The authors are all faculty members of the School of Management and Finance, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK. Correspondence should be addressed to Dr Ennew. Alison McGregor gratefully acknowledges funding provided by the Association of British Insurers.

In this 2002 book, Anna Elisabetta Galeotti examines the most intractable problems which toleration encounters and argues that what is really at stake is not religious or moral disagreement but the unequal status of different social groups. Liberal theories of toleration fail to grasp this and consequently come up with normative solutions that are inadequate when confronted with controversial cases. Galeotti proposes, as an alternative, toleration as recognition, which addresses the problem of according equal respect to groups as well as (...) equal liberty to individuals. She offers an interpretation that is both a revision and an expansion of liberal theory, in which toleration constitutes an important component not only of a theory of justice, but also of the politics of identity. Her study will appeal to a wide range of readers in political philosophy, political theory, and law. (shrink)

"First Published in 1998, Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.".

There's been a great deal of interest in epistemology regarding what it takes for a hearer to come to know on the basis of a speaker's say-so. That is, there's been much work on the epistemology of testimony. However, what about when hearers don't believe speakers when they should? In other words, what are we to make of when testimony goes wrong? A recent topic of interest in epistemology and feminist philosophy is how we sometimes fail to believe speakers due (...) to inappropriate prejudices – implicit or explicit. This is known as epistemic injustice. In this article, I discuss Miranda Fricker's groundbreaking work on epistemic injustice, as well as more recent developments that both offer critique and expansion on the nature and extent of epistemic injustice. (shrink)

Aristotle believes that an agent lacks virtue unless she enjoys the performance of virtuous actions, while Kant claims that the person who does her duty despite contrary inclinations exhibits a moral worth that the person who acts from inclination lacks. Despite these differences, this chapter argues that Aristotle and Kant share a distinctive view of the object of human choice and locus of moral value: that what we choose, and what has moral value, are not mere acts, but actions: acts (...) done for the sake of ends. Morally good actions embody a kind of intrinsic value that inspires us to do them from duty (in Kant) or for the sake of the noble (in Aristotle). The chapter traces the difference in their attitudes about doing one's duty with pleasure to a difference in their attitudes towards pleasure itself: Aristotle sees it as a perception of the good, while Kant thinks of it as mere feeling. (shrink)

Feminism and Ecological Communities presents a bold and passionate rethinking of teh ecofeminist movement. It is one of the first books to acknowledge the importance of postmodern feminist arguments against ecofeminism whilst persuasively preseenting a strong new case for econolocal feminism. Chris J.Cuomo first traces the emergence of ecofeminism from the ecological and feminist movements before clearly discussing the weaknesses of some ecofeminist positions. Exploring the dualisms of nature/culture and masculing/feminine that are the bulwark of many contemporary ecofeminist positions and (...) questioning traditional traditional feminist analyses of gender and caring, Feminism and Ecological Communities asks whether women are essentially closer to nature than men and how we ought to link the oppression of women, people of colour, and other subjugated groups to the degradation of nature. Chris J.Cuomo addresses these key issues by drawing on recent work in feminist ethics as well as teh work of diverse figures such as Aristotle, John Dewey, Donna Haraway adn Maria Lugones. A fascinating feature of the book is the use of the metaphor of the cyborg to highlight the fluidity of the nature/culture distinction and how this can enrich econfeminist ethics and politics. An outstanding new argument for an ecological feminism that links both theory and practice, Feminism and Ecological Communities bravely redraws the ecofeminist map. It will be essential reading for all those interested in gender studies, environmental studies and philosophy. (shrink)

This book brings together a group of international scholars, many of whom have already contributed to the debate on toleration, and who are offering fresh thoughts and approaches to it. The essays of this collection are written from a variety of perspectives: historical, analytical, normative, and legal. Yet, all authors share a concern with the sharpening of our understanding of the reasons for toleration as well as with making them relevant to the way in which we live with others in (...) our modern and diverse societies. (shrink)

This book is about the norms of the speech act of assertion. This is a topic of lively contemporary debate primarily carried out in epistemology and philosophy of language. Suppose that you ask me what time an upcoming meeting starts, and I say, “4 p.m.” I’ve just asserted that the meeting starts at 4 p.m. Whenever we make claims like this, we’re asserting. The central question here is whether we need to know what we say, and, relatedly, whether what we (...) assert must be true. If the meeting is really at 3:30 p.m., you’ll be late, and probably rather upset that I told you the wrong time. In some sense, it seems like I’m on the hook for having said something false. This sense that I’ve done something wrong suggests that there are certain standards of evaluating assertions: a way of distinguishing between good and bad, appropriate and inappropriate. We call these standards norms. And so the debate about what, if any, norms govern the linguistic practice of assertion is known as the norms of assertion debate. When one’s assertion satisfies the norm, we say that the assertion is warranted. -/- Various philosophers have typically focused their views of the norms of assertion on articulating the level of epistemic support required for properly asserting. Some argue, for example, that one must know what one asserts. Others argue that one merely needs to justifiably believe what one asserts–an epistemic standing weaker than knowledge. The purpose of this book is to defend what I propose as the central norm governing our practice of assertion, which I call the Supportive Reasons Norm. Here’s what it looks like: -/- One may assert that p only if: One has supportive reasons for p, The relevant conventional and pragmatic elements of the context are present, and One asserts that p at least in part because the assertion that p satisfies and. -/- In rough outline, the standards for warrantedly asserting shift with changes in context, although knowledge is never required for warrantedly asserting. In fact, in some special contexts, speakers may warrantedly lie. This latter feature particularly sets apart my view from others in the debate. This also means that truth, knowledge, and even belief aren’t necessary conditions for warrantedly asserting. (shrink)

A major collection of innovative new work by emerging and established scholars on the critical topic of ethics for climate governance, offering a wholly original proposal for reform to climate governance.