We are glad to acknowledge the wide spectrum of topics posited by our commentators and at the same time the recognition of the thematic issue of our project: that the mentally ill is still a person, and that this humane dimension of his existence must be brought to the fore in psychopathological studies and kept always in the fore in the therapeutic process.We are also glad to have encountered appreciation for the fact that long gone is the time when the (...) clinician could have afforded to be the plenipotentiary in the therapeutic relationship, and that a more equal geometry of relations with the patient is not only useful but probably necessary for therapeutic success, intended as a "success [that] also involves... (shrink)

In this paper, I return to the well-known apparent inconsistencies in Hume’s treatment of personal identity in the three books of A Treatise of Human Nature, and try to defend a Humean narrative interpretation of the self. I argue that in Book 1 of the Treatise Hume is answering (to use Marya Schechtman’s expressions in The Constitution of Selves) a “reidentification” question concerning personal identity, which is different from the “characterization” question of Books 2 and 3. That is, I maintain (...) that whereas in Book 1 Hume is using his philosophical empiricism to provide his own version of the problem of how to recognize persons as the same at different times, in Books 2 and 3 he is presenting selves from a different, both sentimental and ethical standpoint, as the focus of people’s concerns. I start by discussing Hume’s notion of personal identity as presented in Book 1 and in the “Appendix.” I then specify the narrative conception of the self Hume relies on when dealing with passions and morality as the self-consciousness persons develop as bearers of characters of or about which they can be morally proud or humble. I finally conclude by distinguishing Hume’s narrative self from the idea of “the unity of human life” that Alasdair MacIntyre puts forward in After Virtue. (shrink)

Custom is a complex phenomenon, and one that is hardly given a satisfying account, especially if it is assumed, as many legal positivists do, that law is only produced through acts of will. After examining five main reasons for the complexity of custom, I will consider Uberto Scarpelli’s thesis that customary law can be given an account within legal positivism through a reinterpretation of norm-generating facts as the manifestations of a will. But what kind of will is implied here, and (...) how can the underlying norm be inferred? I will first briefly examine Gaetano Carcaterra’s analysis of abduction as a method to infer norms from behaviors, and then distinguish six different forms of will possibly implied in a behavior which is relevant for the formation of a customary norm. I will finally focus on norm-oriented, or nomotropic will, and especially on nomotrophic will, that is, the will –implied and expressed in the reaction to the violation of a norm– that the infringed norm be valid. (shrink)

Qu’est-ce qu’une norme? Y a-t-il des relations logiques entre les normes? Sur quoi repose la validité d’un système normatif? Qu’est-ce que la validité déontique? Les verbes performatifs peuvent-ils agir sur le monde? Quelles sont les différentes façons d’agir en fonction d’une règle? Que sont les règles constitutives? Et qu’est-ce que la vérité? Ce sont là quelques-unes des questions que posent les essais d’Amedeo Giovanni Conte rassemblés dans cette anthologie. Ces essais offrent quelques-unes des contributions les plus originales et les plus (...) significatives de la philosophie du langage normatif. Amedeo Giovanni Conte (Pavie, 1934-Cava Manara, 2019), professeur émérite de l’Université de Pavie, membre de l’Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, fut l’un des philosophes les plus originaux du droit italien. Parmi ses œuvres : Saggio sulla completezza degli ordinamenti giuridici (1962), les trois volumes de Filosofia del linguaggio normativo (1989-2001), Filosofia dell’ordinamento normativo (1997), Sociologia filosofica del diritto (2011) et Adelaster : Il nome del vero (2016). (shrink)

David Hume is famous for developing a ‘science of man’ based on a thorough investigation of passions and sentiments. What is most surprising is that, in his sentimental geography, shame appears to play a rather marginal role. In this essay, I shall maintain that it is nonetheless possible to find room for shame in Hume, and that the most promising way to do so is to consider it in the light of a different passion on which Hume dwells at length, (...) the passion of humility. I shall thus examine where Hume explicitly refers to shame and how it relates to humility. By comparing Hume’s reflections with those of some more recent philosophers such as Gabriele Taylor, Bernard Williams, and Richard Wollheim, I shall argue that, as in the case of humility, so with shame Hume considers it to be a negative and vicious passion. That is because, like humility, shame as well produces a distorted and repressed conception of the self, with the consequence of leading to an oppressive and suffocating ethical perspective that is ultimately immoral. On the contrary, ‘a due degree of pride’ is the passion that, for Hume, allows us to give stability to our practical self, enabling us to establish ourselves as proper moral agents. (shrink)

The framework presented by Bayefsky and Berkman is based on having clear and accurate genetic information to offer parents, for them to either decide to prepare for birth or to terminate the...

In this essay, I examine the role played by sympathy in preserving the practical dimension of Hume’s ethics. I reconstruct how sympathy works for Hume by differentiating it from the contemporary understanding of empathy, and I counter some of the objections that have been moved against Humean sympathy. I argue that Humean sympathy is instrumental in bringing about a common point of view of morality, and capable of vindicating both how we form moral judgments, and how we are moved by (...) them. I maintain that this is due to the fact that the process of the determination of the point of view of morality via sympathy is reflective in a way that makes it overlap with the perspective of the agent who acts morally. This bears consequences for the Humean notion of ethical objectivity. I conclude by indicating that such an understanding of sympathy in Hume favors an internalist reading regarding the normative status he recognizes moral reasons as having. (shrink)

In this essay, I offer a vindication of pride. I start by presenting the Christian condemnation of pride as the cardinal sin. I subsequently examine Mandeville’s line of argument whereby pride is beneficial to society, although remaining a vice for the individual. Finally, I focus on, and endorse, the analysis of pride formulated by Hume, for whom pride qualifies instead as a virtue. This is because pride not only contributes to making society flourish but also stabilizes the virtuous agent by (...) creating a virtuous circle between our desire for self-appraisal and our aspiration to act morally. I conclude by underscoring the (virtuous) connection between pride and modesty, concomitantly arguing that humility should be discarded as vicious. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Eugenio Lecaldano’s way of tackling the issue of the meaning of life. I highlight the dependence of his individualistic approach on the specific character of the person who inquires into the meaning of life. I also sketch a weaker way of understanding the meaning of life as an attempt to provide reasons which are valid from the standpoint of the present, and which will make us continue living.

This paper will critically assess Popper’s evolutionary philosophy. There exists a rich literature on the topic with which we have many reservations. We believe that Popper’s evolutionary philosophy should be assessed in light of the intriguing theoretical insights offered, during the last 10 years or so, by the philosophy of biology, evolutionary biology and molecular biology. We will argue that, when analysed in this manner, Popper’s ideas concerning the nature of selection, Lamarckism and the theoretical limits of neo-Darwinism can be (...) appreciated in their full biological and philosophical value. (shrink)

In this paper, I present some reasons in favour of an interpretation of Hume’s moral philosophy as a brand new form of "virtue ethics." By discussing some specific issues within the secondary literature in favour and against this kind of reading, I argue that Hume offers better philosophical tools to redefine the basic notion of virtue ethics than the neo-Aristotelian alternative. In particular, I maintain that the strength of Hume’s proposal lies in its pointing toward the unity of character instead (...) of the unity of the virtues. This allows Hume to develop a nonfinalistic, secular and pluralistic morality in which the individuality of people is seen as a central value to be promoted. (shrink)

In this essay, I discuss David Hume’s reasoning on free will as he presents it in A Treatise of Human Nature and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. I proceed by showing how Hume’s compatibilist solution acquires meaning in the light of his sentimentally based science of human nature, which conceives human beings as reasonable, social, and active creatures. Within Hume’s empiricist, naturalistic, and sceptical approach, we deal only with perceptions and never with things themselves, and human experience is structured in (...) a causal order which allows us to organise both the way we experience the world and our existence in relation to that of others. In such a scenario, the question of free will depends on human practices, such as the attribution of responsibility, which follow a causal order and are not affected by metaphysical doubts about the loss of responsibility if determinism were true. I argue that Hume traces responsibility back to the expression of feelings for or against particular characters; people become the object of judgements of responsibility in so far as, through their actions, they show that they possess characters of a certain kind which reflect a whole series of dispositions and traits, empirically verifiable and causally explainable, acquired over time. I conclude by highlighting how free will may represent a problem on a practical level once moral or religious issues come into play and why this is not so for Hume. (shrink)

David Hume is famous for developing a ‘science of man’ based on a thorough investigation of passions and sentiments. What is most surprising is that, in his sentimental geography, shame appears to play a rather marginal role. In this essay, I shall maintain that it is nonetheless possible to find room for shame in Hume, and that the most promising way to do so is to consider it in the light of a different passion on which Hume dwells at length, (...) the passion of humility. I shall thus examine where Hume explicitly refers to shame and how it relates to humility. By comparing Hume’s reflections with those of some more recent philosophers such as Gabriele Taylor, Bernard Williams, and Richard Wollheim, I shall argue that, as in the case of humility, so with shame Hume considers it to be a negative and vicious passion. That is because, like humility, shame as well produces a distorted and repressed conception of the self, with the consequence of leading to an oppressive and suffocating ethical perspective that is ultimately immoral. On the contrary, ‘a due degree of pride’ is the passion that, for Hume, allows us to give stability to our practical self, enabling us to establish ourselves as proper moral agents. (shrink)

This essay deals with a set of distinctive themes in the thought of Bernard Williams, and focuses on two aspects they all have in common. These are, on the one hand, the idea that the philosophical enterprise is intrinsically reflective in nature, and, on the other, a preoccupation with human beings singly regarded as individuals. By bringing these two constants to the fore, individually and in their interrelations, the essay formulates the general lines of an alternative reading of Williams, revealing (...) a more unitary understanding of his philosophy than has hitherto been allowed. (shrink)

This essay deals with a set of distinctive themes in the thought of Bernard Williams, and focuses on two aspects they all have in common. These are, on the one hand, the idea that the philosophical enterprise is intrinsically reflective in nature, and, on the other, a preoccupation with human beings singly regarded as individuals. By bringing these two constants to the fore, individually and in their interrelations, the essay formulates the general lines of an alternative reading of Williams, revealing (...) a more unitary understanding of his philosophy than has hitherto been allowed. (shrink)

Schrödinger’s equation says that the Hamiltonian is the generator of time translations. This seems to imply that any reasonable definition of time operator must be conjugate to the Hamiltonian. Then both time and energy must have the same spectrum since conjugate operators are unitarily equivalent. Clearly this is not always true: normal Hamiltonians have lower bounded spectrum and often only have discrete eigenvalues, whereas we typically desire that time can take any real value. Pauli concluded that constructing a general a (...) time operator is impossible. Here we show how the Pauli argument fails when one uses an external system to track time, so that time arises as correlations between the system and the clock. In this case, the time operator is conjugate to the clock Hamiltonian and not to the system Hamiltonian, but its eigenvalues still satisfy the Schrödinger equation for arbitrary system Hamiltonians. (shrink)

Actualmente son necesarias propuestas educativas que promuevan la sostenibilidad mediante activismo digital. El objetivo de este estudio fue evaluar la movilización de competencias digitales docentes a través de la creación de storytellings sobre la Fast Fashion. Su análisis mostró cómo estas experiencias pueden propiciar el desarrollo de capacidades de comunicación y colaboración, como son la participación para la creación de contenidos, la participación ciudadana en línea o la capacidad para compartir contenidos. Los vídeos creados relacionan las acciones cotidianas con las (...) consecuencias socioambientales y llaman a la transición hacia formas de consumo conscientes, mostrando su potencial creativo e inspirador. (shrink)

The comparative study between Kant and Thomas Aquinas regarding the limitations of metaphysical knowledge, yields notable coincidences, despite the clear differences between the systematic approach of each thinker. This makes it possible to appreciate in a better way the core of the question, and perhaps provides some help in the clarification of matters concerning the value of metaphysical knowledge. Despite appearances, our approach is not primarily historical, but systematic-philosophical. The cited authors will be used to the study a philosophical problem, (...) and not as authority arguments. For that reason, we will confine ourselves to primary sources, without resorting to historical studies save for dispelling exegetical doubts or confirming the author’s assertions. (shrink)

We introduce the new notion of additive “multibox” for linear logic proof-nets. Thanks to this notion, we define a cut-elimination procedure which associates with every proof-net of multiplicative and additive linear logic a unique cut-free one.

Voces técnicas mínimas que forman el lenguaje filosófico, extraídas de los libros de Filosofía de Bachillerato, Ética y textos de COU.