El presente trabajo busca indagar la teoría del conocimiento spinoziana a partir de una hipótesis de lectura que vincula la univocidad de lo real con la ciencia intuitiva. El objetivo es demostrar que el acceso cognoscitivo que brinda el tercer género de conocimiento es el único que permite conocer la totalidad de la Naturaleza. En ese sentido, se mostrará: por un lado, que tanto la imaginación como la razón nos brindan conocimientos incompletos y sesgados de lo real; por el otro, (...) que, aún en su insuficiencia, ambas perspectivas cognoscitivas son auténticas y verdaderas, y se hallan presentes en el conocimiento de tercer género. Por último, se mostrará la coherencia del sistema spinoziano que postula la ciencia intuitiva, en tanto conocimiento de la unidad que subyace bajo todas las perspectivas, como destino ético humano. (shrink)

El presente trabajo busca defender que las nociones spinozianas de eternidad y duración no pueden entenderse, como ha sostenido la historia de la recepción de Spinoza, como ontológicas, sino como gnoseológicas. Para esto, analiza los tres géneros de conocimiento humanos -imaginación, razón, ciencia intuitiva- para mostrar que Spinoza presenta su accionar como aquel que da lugar a las perspectivas de la eternidad y la duración. Estos movimientos permiten, por un lado, entender que la dualidad, al ser gnoseológica, no representa una (...) objeción a la univocidad ontológica; por el otro, indagar en mayor profundidad el proyecto filosófico spinoziano y el lugar que el conocimiento ocupa en él. (shrink)

El presente trabajo es un intento por repensar el modo en que ha sido interpretada la primera parte de la Ética de Baruch Spinoza por la tradición. Fundamentalmente, busca alejarse de las interpretaciones que llamamos “ontológicas” -que sostienen que las distinciones conceptuales allí postuladas refieren a diferentes ámbitos de lo real-, para defender una lectura que tenga al factor gnoseológico como principio explicativo de tales distinciones. Se intentará mostrar que mediante esta hipótesis de lectura se accede a aquello que nos (...) parece ser el más auténtico espíritu spinozista: aquel donde la multiplicidad de las perspectivas del conocimiento humano se vuelve coherente con la más absoluta univocidad de lo real. (shrink)

The following paper addresses the problem of dualism in Spinoza’sontology. It aims to briefly reconstruct the story of the discussion around this problem in orderto analyze howthe philosophical traditionhas interpreted the dualities of essence-existence, eternity-duration,infinite-finite, substance-modes. The goal is to shed light on the inaccuraciesthat arise from understanding these as ontological distinctionsas well as from ignoring them entirely. Our proposal is to expose aninterpretation that allows us to claim Spinoza’s duality, in a way thatpresents it as a gnoseological duality instead (...) of an ontological one, thatis, to show how the duplicity refers to perspectives or ways in whichhumans conceive reality. We believe that, in this way, duality does notonly become compatible with the univocity of being but also provides adeeper comprehension of the authentic Spinozistic spirit. (shrink)

Raimo Tuomela, late Professor Emeritus at the Centre for Philosophy of Social Sciences (TINT), University of Helsinki, is widely regarded as one of the most important philosophers of our time. He published extensively on various topics within social philosophy; particularly, on social action, cooperation, group belief, group responsibility, group reasoning, social practices, and institutions. To celebrate his legacy, this volume engages with and delves deeply into his philosophy of sociality. By gathering original essays from a world-class line-up of social ontologists, (...) social action theorists, and social philosophers, this collection provides the first comprehensive and critical treatment of Tuomela's outstanding contribution to social ontology and collective intentionality. (shrink)

Neste artigo são examinados os aspectos do Assédio Moral que foram fundamentais para a emergência da Psicologia Organizacional, destacando os Movimentos Sociais e a Construção de Novas Concepções em Psicologia.

The general concept of a trope – that of a non-shareable character-grounder – admits of a distinction between modifier tropes and module tropes. Roughly, a module trope is self-exemplifying whereas a modifier trope is not. This distinction has wide-ranging implications. Modifier tropes are uniquely eligible to be powers and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes are uniquely eligible to play a direct role in perception and causation. Moreover, each type of trope theory faces unique challenges concerning character- grounding. Modifier trope theory (...) faces challenges concerning the inscrutability of predication and the incompatibility with bundle theory, whereas module trope theory faces challenges concerning character overdetermination and a collapse into austere nominalism. These differences indicate that the modifier/module distinction divides the advantages of general trope theory and thus presents the trope theorist with a pivotal choice. (shrink)

In this paper I explore Michael Loux’s important distinction between “tropes” and “tropers”. First, I argue that the distinction throws into relief an ambiguity and discrepancy in the literature, revealing two fundamentally different versions of trope theory. Second, I argue that the distinction brings into focus unique challenges facing each of the resulting trope theories, thus calling into question an alleged advantage of trope theory—that by uniquely occupying the middle ground between its rivals, trope theory is able to recover and (...) preserve the insights of these views. Ultimately, the distinction suggests that trope theory is a divided house. (shrink)

Hacemos una lectura del “Tratado sobre los principios de la teología” de Guillermo de Occam, y echamos un vistazo a la Escolástica tardía que esta obra representa tan bien, revisando diferentes referencias bibliográficas, que me han permitido conocer y analizar diferentes conceptos y enfoques acerca de este singular tema. De hecho, se trata de una obra mayor, de gran calibre, pero de autor incierto, generalmente atribuida a Occam, aunque la autoría real está en disputa. Lo cierto es que se trata (...) de un momento culminante de una época de la historia del pensamiento occidental; una en la que su autor, con briosa arquitectura, levanta un edificio que perenniza el pensar occamista, comentándolo, glosándolo y dándole forma enciclopédica, minuciosa, como la que uno esperaría encontrar en un diccionario o un manual del Nominalismo naciente. (shrink)

Defends a version of the Davidsonian Demonstrative Theory of quotation against proponents of the Fregean Identity Theory.

New technologies could facilitate new ways of cheating. This emerging scenario places academic integrity policy in higher education institutions as critical. Academic integrity scholars have designed conceptual frameworks to analyze academic integrity policy. The body of the literature on academic integrity policy analysis includes studies developed in North America, Europe, and Australia. However, insight into several regions of the world is lacking. This pioneering study in the Chilean context analyzes documents addressing academic integrity at forty-three accredited universities. Using a qualitative (...) research design, we framed this policy analysis in the five core elements of exemplary academic integrity policy: access, approach, responsibility, detail, and support. The findings revealed challenges with accessing documents online, a strong presence of legal language that might not be understandable to all students, and a scarcity of information about review cycles. The punitive approach was prevalent, with a significant focus on students’ conduct. Signs of collaboration and mechanisms for promoting academic integrity cultures were nearly absent. The documents primarily targeted students and the roles of other stakeholders concentrated on the enforcement of sanctions and misconduct investigations. The analysis also showed the use of general definitions to describe academic integrity breaches, inconsistency across the system in defining plagiarism and a lack of guidance to address contract cheating and unauthorized use of generative artificial intelligence. The findings also highlighted the unavailability of institutional support to teach, learn, and research with integrity or references to research-based practices. We propose twelve practical recommendations for policymakers and academic integrity advocates. (shrink)

This paper defends a version of Davidson’s demonstrative theory of quotation and against against the Fregean identity theory (IT henceforth) as articulated and defended by Corey Washington (1992). On the Fregean view, when an expression is referred to by means of quotation the quoted material itself is a linguistic referring expression. Quotation-marks are not needed; when they are used, they serve to make clearer the shift in syntactic and semantic properties effected on the quoted material by its occupying that linguistic (...) context: whatever its usual syntactic function, the quoted material functions as a singular term; whatever its usual semantic function, in that linguistic environment the quoted material refers to itself. On DT, in contrast, quotation-marks themselves are the linguistic bearers of reference, functioning like a demonstrative; the quoted material merely plays the role of a demonstratum. In the version I argue for the referent is obtained through some contextually suggested relation; in the default case the relation will be: … instantiates the linguistic type __, but there are other possibilities. In this way, the view can deal with the fact that we do not merely refer with quotations to expression-types, but also to other entities related in some way to the relevant token we use: features exhibited by the token distinct from those constituting its linguistic type, features exhibited by other tokens of the same type but not by the one actually used (as when, by using a graphic token, we refer to its phonetic type), or even other related tokens. (shrink)

There is a long-standing discussion concerning the nature of moral discourse. Multiple views range from realism—according to which moral discourse is closer to scientific discourse than to fictional discourse—to anti-realism—according to which moral discourse is rather closer to fictional discourse. In this paper, I want to motivate a novel anti-realist account. On this view, there are no moral properties or truths, neither mind-independent nor mind-dependent ones (i.e., anti-realism). However, moral cognition results from the use of higher order cognitive abilities with (...) enough resources to grant moral discourse with all the features of a realist talk (i.e., cognitive quasi-realism). I defend this view based on empirical evidence on human moral development and by showing that the resulting account can meet the demands of robust moral realism. The paper concludes by placing the proposed view within the metaethical landscape by comparing it against other forms of anti-realism, most significantly against expressivism. (shrink)

The paper discusses the criticism of externalist theories of content which, on the basis of "Twin Earth" considerations, claims that such theories cannot make intentional properties supervenient on basic, intrinsic properties of the organism -- while supervenience is a necessary condition for the causal efficacy of any macro-property. The paper accepts the supervenience requirement, understood as arising from a requirement that macro- properties should be explained by micro- properties. It points out, however, that as a consequence of this, the modality (...) in the concept of supervenience should be understood as "nomic", not conceptual. Then the paper attempts to show that the usual thought- experiments do not establish that such variety of supervenience does not hold for psychological properties -- at least with regard to a particular, teleo- functional way of interpreting them. (shrink)

Proxy agency is the capacity of individuals and groups to act for other individuals or groups in specific social transactions. For example, a legal team acts as a proxy for a client in a courtroom, or the Prime Minister acts as a proxy for the UK Government when attending international meetings, etc. Although a very common social phenomenon, it has not yet received enough philosophical treatment. Currently, the most developed account of this capacity is Ludwig’s proxy agency in collective action. (...) Yet, his account relies on a deflationary, we-content approach to collective intentionality (á la Bratman). In this chapter, I argue that this approach is far too weak to explain proxy agency in institutional contexts—where the individuals and groups formally authorised to perform rule-guided group activities for the principal hold a strong, non-conditional we-commitment. In order to elucidate this feature, I provide an account of proxy agency based on a more robust, we-mode approach to collective intentionality (á la Tuomela). I suggest with this that, for institutional proxy agency to operate as expected, there must be appropriate conditions of sociality in place—which ultimately coheres with the larger project developed by Tuomela on social ontology. (shrink)

Since the publication of Hartry Field’s influential paper “Tarski’s Theory of Truth” there has been an ongoing discussion about the philosophical import of Tarski’s definition. Most of the arguments have aimed to play down that import, starting with that of Field himself. He interpreted Tarski as trying to provide a physicalistic reduction of semantic concepts like truth, and concluded that Tarski had partially failed. Robert Stalnaker and Scott Soames claimed then that Field should have obtained a stronger conclusion, namely that (...) Tarski’s failure in his allegedly intended physicalistic reduction was total. From another front, Hilary Putnam argued for an even more sweeping thesis: “[a]s a philosophical account of truth, Tarski’s theory fails as badly as it is possible for an account to fail.” Scott Soames followed suit also on this count, endorsing Putnam’s argument in section iii of the aforementioned paper; and John Etchemendy used a very similar argument to contend that “a Tarskian definition of truth [...] cannot possibly illuminate the semantic properties of the object language.” The paper argues that these contentions are based on several misunderstandings about the nature of a definition like Tarski’s. Regarding the Putnam-Soames-Etchemendy argument, we must apply a distinction Frege found natural to draw—and is natural to draw anyway—between what he called “constructive” definitions, definitions properly so called, which are mere stipulations, and what he described as “analytic” definitions, definitions which aim to make explicit the meaning of a term already in use. Regarding the Field-Soames-Stalnaker criticism, the paper contends that the true aims of a Tarskian truth definition are perfectly well fulfilled without Field’s amendments. (shrink)

The technical possibilities of biomedicine open up the opportunity to intervene in ageing itself with the aim of mitigating, reducing or eliminating it. However, before undertaking these changes or rejecting them outright, it is necessary to ask ourselves if what would be lost by doing so really has much value. This article will analyse the desirability of ageing from an individual point of view, without circumscribing this question to the desirability or undesirability of death. First, we will present the three (...) most widely used arguments to reject biomedical interventions against ageing. We will argue that only the last of these arguments provides a consistent answer to the question of the desirability of ageing. Second, we will show that the third argument falls prey to a conceptual confusion that we will call the paradox of ageing: although ageing entails negative health effects, it leads to a life stage with valuable goods. Both valuations, one positive and the other negative, refer to two different dimensions of ageing: the chronological and the biological. We will defend that, by not adequately distinguishing these two types of ageing, it does not become apparent that all the valuable goods exclusive to ageing derive only from its chronological dimension. Third, we will argue that, if we just conceive ageing biologically, it is undesirable. We will elaborate on the two kinds of undesirable effects biological ageing has: direct and indirect. Finally, we will respond to potential objections by adducing that these are insufficient to weaken our argument. (shrink)

For the philosopher of Rotterdam, religious coercion has two essential sources of illegitimacy: the linking of religious and ecclesiastical belief and the use of politics for religious purposes. Bayle responds to it, with his doctrine of freedom of conscience, on one hand and by means of the essential distinction between voluntary religious affiliation and political obligation, on the other hand. From my perspective, his doctrine of tolerance does not involve an atheist state, nor does it mean the rejection of the (...) presence of religion in the public space or its displacement to the intimate sphere of the conscience. This paper proposes a reading of Baylean tolerance as a political doctrine that allows the articulation between freedom of conscience, minority confessions, and official religion. Thus, the Baylean theoretical model could be considered a proposal to provide a normative form to the practice of toleration present in the seventeenth -century Netherlands. (shrink)

Resumo: O texto tem como objetivo apontar alguns elementos para uma reflexão crítica sobre a mudança curricular, no sentido da emergência de um currículo nacional. Em tempos de reorganização das forças conservadoras, a quem e a que serve a reformulação curricular levada a efeito sob a égide da necessidade da melhoria qualitativa da escola? Palavras-chave: educação; mudança curricular; currículo nacional.

Dennett (1988) provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar and Searle. My goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett's argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, the argument rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information‐processing consciousness; and against Loar and Searle, it defends the claim that qualia are constitu‐tively representational in an externalist understanding of this. (...) The core of the argument is contained in section 3. In the first part, I contrast a minimal conception of qualia, relative to which their existence is not under dispute, with the sort of view to which I will object. In the second part I set the stage by presenting the facts about (minimal) qualia on which a Dennett‐like argument can be based. (shrink)

Dennett provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar and Searle. My goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett's argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, the argument rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information-processing consciousness; and against Loar and Searle, it defends the claim that qualia are constitutively representational in an externalist understanding of this. The (...) core of the argument is contained in section 3. In the first part, I contrast a minimal conception of qualia, relative to which their existence is not under dispute, with the sort of view to which I will object. In the second part I set the stage by presenting the facts about qualia on which a Dennett-like argument can be based. (shrink)

Cosmopolitan critics attack the scope-limitation of justice of egalitarian liberal theorists to states. They treat justice as the production of a given set of outcomes for people regardless of location or relationship. However, in doing so they either ignore the relevant agent towards whom principles of justice are addressed or see the question of agency as a practical, derivative question, of a secondary character. This paper argues that a principle of justice without a clearly justified agent is not a genuine (...) principle at all. This is what writers like Rawls mean by the "subject" of justice (analogous to the grammatical subject of a sentence, i.e.,the agent). We should reflect on agents and why they would or would not justifiably carry certain burdens for others and what kind of benefits or goods they are able to secure. The answers to those questions explain why the idea of cosmopolitan global justice is incomplete, either requiring a global basic structural agency or not applying because no relevant agent is present that can create cooperative arrangements between individual persons across the globe. Other moral principles will still apply globally, but they will be distinct from those that apply to basic-structural agencies. This account is not a practice dependence account, as it bases the distinctness of moral and political principles on purely moral and value-based considerations. (shrink)

The paper examines an alleged distinction claimed to exist by Van Gelder between two different, but equally acceptable ways of accounting for the systematicity of cognitive output (two varieties of compositionality): concatenative compositionality vs. functional compositionality. The second is supposed to provide an explanation alternative to the Language of Thought Hypothesis. I contend that, if the definition of concatenative compositionality is taken in a different way from the official one given by Van Gelder (but one suggested by some of his (...) formulations) then there is indeed a different sort of compositionality; however, the second variety is not an alternative to the language of thought in that case. On the other hand, if the concept of concatenative compositionality is taken in a different way, along the lines of Van Gelder's explicit definition, then there is no reason to think that there is an alternative way of explaining systematicity. (shrink)

The paper examines an alleged distinction claimed to exist by Van Gelder between two different, but equally acceptable ways of accounting for the systematicity of cognitive output (two “varieties of compositionality”): “concatenative compositionality” vs. “functional compositionality.” The second is supposed to provide an explanation alternative to the Language of Thought Hypothesis. I contend that, if the definition of “concatenative compositionality” is taken in a different way from the official one given by Van Gelder (but one suggested by some of his (...) formulations) then there is indeed a different sort of compositionality; however, the second variety is not an alternative to the language of thought in that case. On the other hand, if the concept of concatenative compositionality is taken in a different way, along the lines of Van Gelder's explicit definition, then there is no reason to think that there is an alternative way of explaining systematicity. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone determinar un criterio con que interpretar de modo global el desarrollo del pensamiento de Giovanni Gentile. Su caracterización como pensador neohegeliano no da razón del sentido global de su filosofía ni de sus efectivos puntos de partida ni de los pensadores con los que directamente se midió. El trabajo hace ver que, con Donato Jaja, su maestro universitario, la tradición idealista iniciada por Bertrando Spaventa se separa definitivamente de la interpretación de Hegel y se constituye (...) como tradición autónoma. En ese sentido, buscamos precisar los rasgos característicos de la personalidad filosófica de Gentile dentro de dicha tradición y concluimos que Vico ocupó un papel nuclear en ella. (shrink)

I argue racial injustice undermines the reliability of news source reports in the information domain of racial injustice. I argue that this in turn undermines subjects’ doxastic justification in inferences they base on these news sources in the racial injustice information domain. I explain that racial injustice does this undermining through the effect of racial prejudice on news organizations’ members and the effect of society's racially unjust structure on non-dominant racial group-controlled news sources.

A "modernidade" desempenhou processos de barbárie e incultura a regiões externas à Europa, em seculares relações entre sociedades do Ocidente e não ocidentais. O potencial da imprensa e do letramento produziu "atitude textual" na Europa, utilizada na invenção do Oriente pelo Ocidente. Portadora da hegemonia ocidental, a escrita letrada, entre racismos e exclusões anularam alteridade de outros povos, como entre povos negros e nativos. Povos tradicionais de África e Américas, socializados em tradições orais, na aceleração da modernidade Ocidental, acumulam tensões (...) culturais, acirradas na ampliação de mercados, extração de minerais e desequilíbrios da natureza, onde o meio ambiente vivido é anterior a expansão do Ocidente. Como vivem no entre-lugar povos da diáspora no Nordeste e Yanomami no Norte do Brasil. (shrink)

"Epistola a Memeceo, Maximas capitales, Sentencias vaticanas, fragmentos y testimonios; texto griego y traduccion": p. [87]-161.

Either a person's claim to subsistence goods is held against institutions equipped to distribute social benefits and burdens fairly or it is made regardless of such a social scheme. If the former, then one's claim is not best understood as based on principles setting out a subsistence goods entitlement, but rather on principles of equitable social distribution — a fair share. If, however, the claim is not against a given social scheme, no plausible principle exists defining what counts as a (...) reasonable burden for any of the available agents to secure subsistence. No justifiable principle exists implying generalised perfect duties any agent could clearly follow or clearly breach that secure subsistence conditions for others. At best we can justify rescue duties under very specific conditions, or general but imperfect duties to improve arrangements. Neither of these obviously correlates with human rights standards. Attempts in the literature to overcome the dilemma by claiming basic rights can correlate with imperfect duties or can generate duties to work towards institutions that ‘perfect’ our imperfect duties, are faulty. I then show how the dilemma can be avoided by accounts of human rights focusing on minimum respectful treatment rather than goods or interests. (shrink)

I argue racial injustice undermines the reliability of news source reports in the information domain of racial injustice. I argue that this in turn undermines subjects’ doxastic justification in inferences they base on these news sources in the racial injustice information domain. I explain that racial injustice does this undermining through the effect of racial prejudice on news organizations’ members and the effect of society's racially unjust structure on non-dominant racial group-controlled news sources.

(1995). Responsibility Versus Defensiveness: Inclusion of Ethnicity in the Conceptualization of Theory. Ethics & Behavior: Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 373-375.

Sue James recommends an 'enforcement account' of rights, where a right is to be understood simply as an enforceable claim. I show that adopting this analysis of rights implies giving up non-rhetorical, important, uses of the word 'right' which are possible on the best alternative theory of rights to James's position: the ability to deny a moral right's existence, even where claims are effectively enforced; the notion of a right's violation; and the idea that rights imply entitlement to make a (...) demand, and not just enforcement of demands. Thus, adopting James's position implies giving up much more than mere rhetoric about rights. (shrink)

This paper argues that Susan James' definition of rights as 'enforceable claims' suffers from key faults based in its descriptive approach to a normative and evaluative concept (rights). James cannot explain key and valuable functions of the concept of rights as action-guiding and reason-giving, and some upshots of the view are inconsistent with the reasons one would appeal to rights as a distinctive concept. On her view it is difficult to explain how a right can be violated, given that violation (...) appears to imply lack of effective enforcement. (shrink)

Sue James recommends an 'enforcement account' of rights, where a right is to be understood simply as an enforceable claim. I show that adopting this analysis of rights implies giving up non-rhetorical, important, uses of the word 'right' which are possible on the best alternative theory of rights to James's position: the ability to deny a moral right's existence, even where claims are effectively enforced; the notion of a right's violation; and the idea that rights imply entitlement to make a (...) demand, and not just enforcement of demands. Thus, adopting James's position implies giving up much more than mere rhetoric about rights. (shrink)