Peter Lipton has attempted to flesh out a model of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) by clarifying explanation in terms of a causal model. But Lipton's account of explanation makes an adequate explanation depend on a principle which is virtually identical to Mill's Method of Difference. This has the result of collapsing IBE on Lipton's account of it into causal inference as conceived by the Causal-Inference model of induction. According to this model, many of our inductions are inferences from (...) effects to their probable causes, and Mill's Methods are canons to guide such inferences. Thus, Lipton's account of IBE fails to represent an advance over the already familiar Causal-Inference Model of induction. (shrink)

As we look beyond our terrestrial boundary to a multi-planetary future for humankind, it becomes paramount to anticipate the challenges of various human factors on the most likely scenario for this future: permanent human settlement of Mars. Even if technical hurdles are circumvented to provide adequate resources for basic physiological and psychological needs, Homo sapiens will not survive on an alien planet if a dysfunctional psyche prohibits the utilization of these resources. No matter how far we soar into the stars, (...) our psychologies for future generations will be forever tethered to the totality of our surroundings. By shaping our environment toward survival and welfare during the voyage to Mars and in a Martian colony, we indirectly shape our psyches and prepare them for a mission of unprecedented alienation and duration. Once on Mars, human factors such as leadership structure, social organization and code of conduct, group size, gender balance, developmental cycle, mobility, length of stay and the ecological settings and type and manner of subsistence, will create a novel Martian culture. The degree that settlers are severed from the Earth will affect how radically foreign this culture will be when compared with cultures on Earth. (shrink)

Alexander Rosenberg has played a large role in creating the philosophy of economics as a distinct area of philosophy. But since the publication of Microeconomic Laws in 1976, Professor Rosenberg's thinking about economics has been casting the subject in an increasingly uncomplimentary light. This development is reflected in Rosenberg's new book Economics–Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns? In this stimulating work Rosenberg endorses the view that economics does not constitute scientific empirical knowledge. He says.

In investigating their models, economists do not appear to engage much in the activities many philosophers take to be essential to scientific understanding of the world, activities such as testing hypotheses and establishing laws. How, then, can economic models explain anything about the real world? Borrowing from William Dray, an explanation of what something really is, as opposed to an explanation of why something happens, is the subsumption of the explanandum under a suitable concept. One way economic models explain real-world (...) phenomena is by providing explanations-what of such phenomena. In this way, economic models can afford explanations of the world without necessarily involving the activities philosophers take to be integral to scientific understanding of the world, for explanations-what do not necessarily involve the activities in question. (shrink)

In a previous paper "A Mistake About Foundationalism" [_The Southern Journal of Philosophy (1992) Vol. 30:111-125] I try to show that the conception of foundationalism used by critics like Sellars and Lehrer distort the foundationalist's idea of a basic belief. Foundationalists view basic beliefs as ones that do not depend on other beliefs. The Sellars-Lehrer conception misrepresents the way the foundationalist's basic beliefs are independent of other beliefs. In a reply to my paper, Yalcin criticizes my line or argument, trying (...) to show that my own conception of foundationalism is inadequate. I show that Yalcin's criticism fails to establish this conclusion. (shrink)

Empirical foundationalism affirms that some empirical beliefs a person holds have a degree of justification or warrant that does not derive from their being inferable from other empirical beliefs the person holds. Such beliefs are basic for the person. In his recent book Laurence Bonjour claims that foundationalism faces the following problem:The basic problem confronting empirical foundationalism … is how the basic or foundational empirical beliefs to which it appeals are themselves justified or warranted or in some way given positive (...) epistemic standing, while still preserving their status as basic. This problem amounts to a dilemma: if there is no justification, basic beliefs are rendered epistemically arbitrary, thereby fatally impugning the very claim of foundationalism to constitute a theory of epistemic justification; while a justification which appeals to further premises of some sort threatens to begin anew the regress of justification which it is the whole point of foundationalism to avoid. (shrink)

Alexander Rosenberg has played a large role in creating the philosophy of economics as a distinct area of philosophy. But since the publication of Microeconomic Laws in 1976, Professor Rosenberg's thinking about economics has been casting the subject in an increasingly uncomplimentary light. This development is reflected in Rosenberg's new book Economics–Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns? In this stimulating work Rosenberg endorses the view that economics does not constitute scientific empirical knowledge. He says.

Some charge W.V. Quine with being a behaviorist. Others attempt to clear him of the charge. In replying to Harman in Words and Objections, Quine himself says he is as behavioristic as anyone in his right mind could be, but nowhere does he give us a satisfactory account of how behavioristic that is. It is worthwhile trying to clear up this confusing situation. Two kinds of behaviorism are often distinguished, logical behaviorism and the thesis about the science of psychology known (...) as methodological behaviorism. A careful definition of logical behaviorism, together with a description of relevant aspects of Quine's philosophy, enable us to conclude that Quine is no logical behaviorist. Rather, various moves Quine makes justify ascribing to him a doctrine we call "methodological behaviorism in linguistics." Our definition of this doctrine is based on an extended analysis of methodological behaviorism in psychology. (shrink)

In a previous article appearing in _Philosophia, I claimed that metaphysical relativism (the world does not come presorted but rather symbol users impose taxonomies on it) does not entail truth relativism (statements are true only relative to a framework). Michael Lynch has said that the _argument I gave for this claim is defective. My argument uses the premise that truth relativism is inconsistent with the deflationary theory of truth. Lynch argues that this premise is false. However, I show that Lynch's (...) argument misconstrues the deflationary theory. As a result, my premise remains unrefuted. (shrink)

In a previous article in _Philosophia, I claim that one can be a metaphysical relativist without being a truth relativist. One premise my argument for this claim relies on is (R2) truth relativism is inconsistent with the deflationary theory of truth. Peter Davson-Galle criticizes my argument for (R2), and also argues directly for the falsity of (R2). I try to show that Davson-Galle's effort to undermine (R2) founders due to his blurring the distinction between a taxonomy or classification system on (...) the one hand, and on the other, a conceptual framework in the sense use by truth relativists. (shrink)

What Daniel Hausman has called 'the simple criticism of economic theory' affirms that neoclassical microeconomic models include false statements, and therefore economists cannot rationally accept such models. Hausman considers, but rejects, the modal view of economic models as a defense of neoclassical theory against the simple criticism. I attempt to show that, on the contrary, the modal view can be used to defend neoclassical micro theory. The modal view distinguishes theoretical from applied economic models. Theoretical models afford true descriptions of (...) hypothetical economic agents, whereas applied models contain true or false statements about some real world situation. Relying on the modal view, I argue that the simple criticism is not well-founded, whether it concerns theoretical or applied models. (shrink)

What Daniel Hausman has called “the simple criticism of economic theory”1 is succinctly conveyed by the following passage: “We know full well not only that commodities are not infinitely divisible (which is only intended as a simplification), but businessmen do not always attempt to maximize profits and that the preferences of consumers are not always transitive. ‘Businessmen maximize profits’ and ‘a consumer’s preferences are transitive’ are fundamental economic ‘laws’. How can economists rationally accept a theory which is so full of (...) falsehoods?” (1981a, p. 382). In a recent paper Hausman considers several defenses of neoclassical microeconomics against the simple criticism. One of them is the modal view which Hausman initially characterizes in the, following admittedly vague and ambiguous manner: “Microeconomic general statements are modal (counter-factual) claims. (shrink)

The goal of this pilot study is to investigate expressions of the collective disquiet of people in the first months of Covid-19 pandemic, and to try to understand how they manage covert risk, especially with religion and magic. Four co-authors living in early hot spots of the pandemic speculate on the roles of science, religion, and magic, in the latest global catastrophe. They delve into the consolidation that should be occurring worldwide because of a common, viral enemy, but find little (...) evidence for it. They draw parallels to biblical works, finding evidence of a connection between plague and “social strife.” They explore changes in the purviews of science, religion, and magic, and how and why they have changed, as three systems of covert risk management. They speculate on the coming wave of grief when the world populations finally decide that too many people have died, and they envision cultural changes on the other side of the pandemic, to lifestyles, travel, reverse urbanization, and living and working in smaller communities. Using an unusual approach named “crowd-sourced ethnography”, they conduct un-traditional ethnography and speculate on management of covert risk in their native countries. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Questions of Evidence: An Anonymous Tract Attributed to John TolandRhoda RappaportIn 1695 there was published in London a tract with the unprepossessing title, Two Essays sent in a Letter from Oxford, to a Nobleman in London, by “L. P. Master of Arts.” Because the larger part of this work attacks John Woodward’s theory of the earth, published earlier that year, historians of geology have long been familiar with the (...) Two Essays, even if none has managed to identify L. P. In 1975 Giancarlo Carabelli offered evidence for a conjectural attribution of the Two Essays to John Toland (1670–1722), the famous deist who established his notoriety the next year with his Christianity Not Mysterious (1696). 1 Carabelli’s cautious attribution would require no comment, were it not for the fact that what began as conjecture has evolved into a strong probability and even into an established fact—all this without any notable addition to Carabelli’s evidence. It is surely time to look more closely at that evidence.Carabelli first presents the main points of the Two Essays: a rejection of Woodward’s supernaturalism, a preference for natural causes to explain even the origins of the earth, and a reduction of the Bible to the level of ancient myth and legend. We have here a pronounced free-thinker and materialist, and Toland’s later writings make him a plausible candidate as author. (Whether this interpretation of the Two Essays is accurate will be discussed later in this study.) Carabelli then provides three pieces of evidence, without discussion or evaluation. The next paragraphs rehearse that evidence, with commentary. [End Page 339]The Rumor in OxfordAccording to Edward Lhwyd (or Lhuyd), Keeper of the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford rumor had it that Toland was L. P. Lhwyd denied the rumor, chiefly because L. P. seemed to have had the aid of “some good naturalist”—this did not fit Lhwyd’s notion of Toland’s temperament. 2 In truth, although Lhwyd did not yet know it, L. P. did indeed get such aid from Tancred Robinson, F.R.S., but Robinson declined to identify L. P. 3 Thus far Carabelli.A rumor is no secure basis for attribution, especially when it is contradicted by someone who knew Toland reasonably well. In the small community of Oxford, Lhwyd quickly knew about Toland even before meeting him, because the two had common antiquarian interests. Toland had gone to Oxford with the intention of compiling an Irish dictionary, and fragmentary evidence shows that the two then met to discuss their Celtic researches. 4 A distinguished naturalist, Lhwyd also was consulted by Toland on matters of natural history—at least, the surviving text on this issue shows Toland asking one question of a trivial sort. Lhwyd then comments that Toland is “not conversant in these studies” but yet has ideas about them. 5 As the latter phrase indicates, Lhwyd learned much about the temper and opinions of Toland. He knew that Toland was “railing in coffee houses” about matters religious and political, but he did not associate religious radicalism with the Two Essays. Instead, Lhwyd assessed Toland’s fitness to deal with Woodward entirely in terms of temperament and personality: Toland was a man “of excellent parts, but as litle [sic] a share as may be of modesty or conscience; and one of the best scolds I ever met with.” In the same letter Lhwyd assessed Woodward as Toland’s presumed equal in stubbornness and egotism. 6In saying that L. P. must have had the advice of “some good naturalist,” Lhwyd seems to imply that Toland was too ignorant (of natural history) and too intemperate to profit from or perhaps even to seek advice. [End Page 340] Despite these doubts, is it not possible that Toland could have acquired sufficient knowledge of natural history, in a period of about four months (between the publication of Woodward’s book and that of the Two Essays), to display the expertise shown by L. P.? Any British virtuoso could surely have done so, and the Two Essays actually include a good little bibliography of suitable publications that would provide a working knowledge of the latest ideas... (shrink)

The authors present an evolutionary model for the biological emergence of religious capacity as an advanced neurocognitive trait. Using their model for the stages leading to the evolutionary emergence of religious capacity in Homo sapiens, they analyze the mechanisms that can fail, leading to unbelief (atheism or agnosticism). The analysis identifies some, but not all types of atheists and agnostics, so they turn their question around and, using the same evolutionary model, ask what keeps religion going. Why does its development (...) not fail in one social group after another, worldwide? Their final analysis searches for reasons in important evolutionary changes in the senses of hearing, vision, and general sensitivity on the hominin line, which together interact with both intellectual and emotional brain networks to achieve, often in human groups, variously altered states of consciousness, especially a numinous state enabled in part by a brain organ, the precuneus. An inability to experience the numinous, consider it important, or believe in its supernatural nature, may cleave the human population into those with belief and those with unbelief. (shrink)

Drawing upon research in philosophical logic, linguistics and cognitive science, this study explores how our ability to use and understand language depends upon our capacity to keep track of complex features of the contexts in which we converse.

Steven Crowell has been for many years a leading voice in debates on twentieth-century European philosophy. This volume presents thirteen recent essays that together provide a systematic account of the relation between meaningful experience and responsiveness to norms. They argue for a new understanding of the philosophical importance of phenomenology, taking the work of Husserl and Heidegger as exemplary, and introducing a conception of phenomenology broad enough to encompass the practices of both philosophers. Crowell discusses Husserl's analyses of first-person (...) authority, the semantics of conscious experience, the structure of perceptual content, and the embodied subject, and shows how Heidegger's interpretation of the self addresses problems in Husserl's approach to the normative structure of meaning. His volume will be valuable for upper-level students and scholars interested in phenomenological approaches to philosophical questions in both the European and the analytic traditions. (shrink)

Plato Plato (427-347 BC) is surely the most famous of all philosophers. Little is known of his early life, except that he was born into a noble Athenian ...

Ce livre presente une investigation critique de la science generale de l'etre, instituee par Aristote au titre de la science de l'etant en tant qu'etant. L'auteur met en lumiere ce qu'est l'etre pour Aristote, ce que signifie precisement le type d'unite de ses significations multiples, et quelles sont les structures, principes et concepts epistemologiques par lesquels le reel peut etre explique dans son ensemble. L'originalite aristotelicienne qui se revele dans son apprehension horizontale du reel, est a la fois responsable de (...) son naufrage historique dans l'ocean dominant des pensees hierarchisantes, et de son renouveau axtremement stimulant pour la pensee actuelle. (shrink)

What are the inherent claims that lie at the core of religion? Which of them are defensible by reason, and which are not? Potential answers to these questions and more, from influential philosophers past and present, may be found in this short book edited by Steven M. Cahn. Featuring fifty-two classic and contemporary readings, Exploring Philosophy of Religion: Text and Readings is a topically-organized anthology that presents broad coverage of seven major areas in the philosophy of religion - the (...) concept of God, the existence of God, religious language, miracles and mysticism, belief in God, resurrection and immortality, and religious pluralism - in a clear and accessible format. With guiding introductory material from Professor Cahn, each of the readings has been carefully selected and edited for maximum clarity and comprehensiveness; only the most essential material is included. To further foster understanding, the text also features an appendix consisting of Professor Cahn's monograph, God, Reason, and Religion, which provides a synthesis and interpretation of the crucial issues raised throughout the readings. (shrink)

A study both of the aims of education and the appropriate means of achieving those aims. It is suitable for courses in philosophy of education, foundations of education and the history of ideas.

Explores the basic forms of responsibility that we willingly assume and the collaborative fulfillment that we find in each.

This is the first detailed study to explore the little-understood notions of "knowing who someone is," "knowing a person's identity," and related locutions. It locates these notions within the context of a general theory of believing and a semantical theory of belief- and knowledge-ascriptions.The books's main contention is that what one knows, when one knows who someone is, is not normally an identity in the numerical sense of "a = b," but rather a certain sort of predication to know who (...) someone is is just to know that that person is F, where "F" is a predicate that is "important," in a technical sense defined by the authors, for the purposes determined by context. Their book offers a rigorous formal semantics for ascriptions of knowing and of knowing-who in particular, solving such well-known problems and paradoxes as Kripke's Puzzle, and Quines difficulties with de re belief, along the way.The authors apply their analysis to each of several important issues in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and ethical theory in which the previously unexamined notion of "knowing who" has loomed large-the mechanics of linguistic referring, the foundations of epistemic logic, problems of self-knowledge and self-regarding belief, universalizability and "Golden Rule" arguments in ethics, and moral "personalism" versus "impartialism."Stephen Boër is Professor of Philosophy at the Ohio State University. William Lycan is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina and author of Logical Form in Natural Language. A Bradford Book. (shrink)

An introduction to and critique of the latest trends in critical theory.

Winner of 2002 Edward Goodwin Ballard Prize In a penetrating and lucid discussion of the enigmatic relationship between the work of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, Steven Galt Crowell proposes that the distinguishing feature of twentieth-century philosophy is not so much its emphasis on language as its concern with meaning. Arguing that transcendental phenomenology is indispensable to the philosophical explanation of the space of meaning, Crowell shows how a proper understanding of both Husserl and Heidegger reveals the distinctive contributions (...) of each to that ongoing phenomenological project. (shrink)

Prospective memory (PM) is the accurate execution of an intention in the future. PM may be negatively impacted by negative affect, but the underlying mechanisms remain unclear. Rumination may increase the frequency of task-irrelevant thoughts, which deplete attentional capacity and reduce performance. To date, no studies have examined state and trait rumination on an online measure of PM. The present study examined the effects of state and trait rumination on an event-based, focal PM task embedded within a one-back task over (...) multiple sessions. 95 non-depressed adults (18–53 years) completed measures of state/trait rumination, mood, and PM on at least two occasions. Using multi-level modelling, we found that a derived measure of trait rumination, but not an established trait rumination survey, nor negative mood, predicted poorer PM accuracy. These novel findings demonstrate that trait rumination may partially underlie the association between negative affect & PM in a non-clinical sample, and highlight the potential of online methods to study PM. (shrink)

Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) was one of the most important philosophers of all time; he was also arguably the most radical and controversial. This was the first complete biography of Spinoza in any language and is based on detailed archival research. More than simply recounting the story of Spinoza's life, the book takes the reader right into the heart of Jewish Amsterdam in the seventeenth century and, with Spinoza's exile from Judaism, right into the midst of the tumultuous political, social, intellectual (...) and religious world of the young Dutch Republic. Though the book will be an invaluable resource for philosophers, historians, and scholars of Jewish thought, it has been written for any member of the general reading public with a serious interest in philosophy, Jewish history, seventeenth-century European history, and the culture of the Dutch Golden Age. Spinoza: A Life has recently been awarded the Koret Jewish Book Award. (shrink)

The last decade has witnessed the mass distribution and adoption of smart home systems and devices powered by artificial intelligence systems ranging from household appliances like fridges and toasters to more background systems such as air and water quality controllers. The pervasiveness of these sociotechnical systems makes analyzing their ethical implications necessary during the design phases of these devices to ensure not only sociotechnical resilience, but to design them for human values in mind and thus preserve meaningful human control over (...) them. This paper engages in a conceptual investigations of how meaningful human control over smart home devices can be attained through design. The value sensitive design (VSD) approach is proposed as a way of attaining this level of control. In the proposed framework, values are identified and defined, stakeholder groups are investigated and brought into the design process and the technical constraints of the technologies in question are considered. The paper concludes with some initial examples that illustrate a more adoptable way forward for both ethicists and engineers of smart home devices. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to explore and examine what hermeneutic methods can and should be summoned in order to interpret critically an intriguing yet endlessly puzzling sentence in the “Genjōkōan” (現成公案) fascicle of Sōtō sect founder Dōgen’s (道元, 1200–1253) Shōbōgenzō (正法眼蔵). The source material deals with the way perspectives shift dramatically “when riding a boat out to sea, where mountains can no longer be seen (yamanaki kaichū 山なき海中)”? The analogy of sailing past the horizon, so that any trace (...) of land is not visible, and one feels temporarily encircled by the ocean with no other frame of reference available, raises key phenomenological issues regarding the innate partiality or insufficiency of human perception in connection to the Zen goal of awakening to a holistic standpoint that is devoid of divisibility but incorporates an array of standpoints. This passage has been interpreted in diverse ways since the time of early medieval commentaries by Senne and Kyōgō and by Edo-period Sōtō scholiasts, as well as in modern times by various Japanese philosophers and researchers of Dōgen’s texts. (shrink)