Normative Ethics

Ethical theories are explanatory. But do ethical theories themselves include explanatory content? The direct model holds that they do. The indirect model denies this, maintaining instead that, if true, ethical theories can be employed to provide explanations of the phenomena they concern. The distinction between these models is left implicit in much of ethics. The choice between them, however, has significant methodological and other consequences. I provide two arguments for the direct model and suggest that ethical theories do contain explanatory (...) content. I then respond to three objections, connecting this neglected issue to others concerning property-identity and the nature of explanation and theory confirmation in ethics. (shrink)

The article concerns the philosophical presuppositions of education as paideia.

In recent years, research on modeling the human mind has been progressing rapidly in Japan, which has provided a framework for programming the mind in the current development of artificial intelligence. Despite the skepticism about this subject, it is possible to model the mind according to the same pattern as long as people feel the same way when placed in the same situations and if they can understand the feelings of others when placed in specific situations. In addition, as people (...) tend to understand other’s emotions by applying some model of the mind, the existence of such a model for understanding people’s emotions is not surprising. Therefore, this book introduces the main ideas of the model of the mind, indicating that the human mind is inevitably equipped with various emotions. In other words, this model yields several qualitatively different impulses defined as human emotions. Currently, the field of research that analyzes this model of the mind is called the “economics of emotions,” which is expected to become a unified theory applied across the humanities and social sciences. There is no human mind left that cannot be modeled by the economics of emotions as this concept focuses on the human mind as a whole. In this regard, this book (published in 2022 in Japan) touches on the key points discussed in the economics of emotions. While this book aims to present an overall picture to readers intending to study the economics of emotions, it will also help them organize the overall contents, whose English translation will be published in 2024. (shrink)

According to the hybrid account of harm, an agent suffers harm if the agent has negative wellbeing or is worse off than before. However, Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, and Olle Risberg have criticized the hybrid account, arguing that it finds harm where there is none in cases of temporary benefits and that it fails to find harm in the case of death. In this note, I defend the hybrid account against both criticisms.

Prioritarianism is a family of views comparing distributions of well-being. What unites prioritarians is the thought that when deciding whether a distribution is overall better than another, the worse off have priority. There are different ways of making this idea more precise. However, some of these views have extreme aggregative implications and others have extreme anti-aggregative implications. This raises the question: can prioritarians accommodate partial aggregation (aggregating in some but not all cases) and avoid both extremes? In this paper, I (...) explore and focus on a neglected anti-aggregation condition. I identify a family of views I call ‘bounded prioritarianism’ that meet this condition by placing an upper bound on the moral significance of benefits. I argue that anyone sympathetic to partial aggregation ought to opt for a version of bounded prioritarianism. (shrink)

In this paper, we report the results from an experimental reproductive ethics study exploring questions about reproduction and parenthood. The main finding in our study is that, while we may assume that everyone understands these concepts and their relationship in the same way, this assumption may be unwarranted. For example, we may assume that if ‘x is y’s father’, it follows that ‘y is x’s child’. However, the participants in our study did not necessarily agree that it does follow. This (...) means, at the very least, that we need to make sure all parties in a debate have the same relationships in mind when talking about reproduction and parenthood. Moreover, it gives us reason to explore more carefully the conditions which support or undermine the connections between these concepts. This cannot come from purely theoretical reasoning, nor from empirical research alone, but from the alliance between the two. (shrink)

The Digital Ethics handbook (Nomos Handbuch series) provides an overview of the challenges and specifics of ethics in the context of digitality. Renowned experts contribute chapters on I) Philosophical perspectives and theoretical approaches to digital ethics, II) Values of digital ethics, III) Discourses of digital ethics on related phenomena, IV) Systems and technologies of digital ethics, V) Fields of practice of digital ethics. With contributions by: Regina Ammicht Quinn | Ben Bachmair | Klaus Beck | Kathi Beier | Dieter Birnbacher (...) | Dagmar Borchers | Stefan Brink | Peter Bröckerhoff | Rafael Capurro | Hans-Henrik Dassow | Jan Doria | Nicola Döring | Alexander Filipović | Christian Fuchs | Rüdiger Funiok | Maike Gossen | Petra Grimm | Armin Grunwald | Björn Haferkamp | Martin Hähnel | Jessica Heesen | Martin Hennig | Clarissa Henning | Michel Hohendanner | Dietmar Kammerer | Matthias Karmasin | Antonia Kempkens | Nina Köberer | Vanessa Kokoschka | Hans Krah | Larissa Krainer | Susanne Kuhnert | Jan Mehlich | Catrin Misselhorn | Julia Maria Mönig | Regina Müller | Sebastian Müller | Horst Niesyto | Claudia Paganini | Matthias Pfeffer | Marlis Prinzing | Lars Rademacher | Tilman Santarius | Christian Schicha | Marcel Schlegel | Stefan Selke | Ingrid Stapf | Kai Erik Trost | Nicole van Geel | Frederike van Oorschot | Eduardo Villanueva-Mansilla | Eva Weber-Guskar | Verena Weigand | Micha H. Werner | Klaus Wiegerling | Christiane Woopen | Oliver Zöllner. (shrink)

This paper studies the relationship between promoting people's welfare and respecting their autonomy of choice under risk. I highlight a conflict between these two aims. Given compelling assumptions, welfarists end up disregarding people's unanimous preference, even when everyone involved is entirely rational and only concerned with maximizing their own welfare. Non-welfarist theories of social choice are then considered. They are shown to face difficulties, too: either they fail to respect the value of welfare in at least one important sense, or (...) they end up prioritizing different people's welfare differently in non-risky choices, on the basis of their attitudes to risk, which are intuitively irrelevant in this context. (shrink)

Few views have seen a more precipitous fall from grace than hedonism, which once occupied a central position in the history of ethics. Recently, there have been efforts to revive interest in the view, including well-motivated pleas for contemporary ethicists to at least take the view seriously. In this article, I argue for the seriousness of hedonism on metaethical grounds. Taking J.S. Mill’s argument for hedonism as a test case, I show that historically, classic hedonism was grounded metaethically via a (...) commitment to two positions: empiricist epistemology and the view that pleasure occurs in sensation. Together, these two positions provided principled grounds for various iterations of classic hedonism. Moreover, these two positions are still serious options in both contemporary epistemology and the contemporary literature on the nature of pleasure. Insofar as a contemporary ethicist takes those two views seriously, they ought to take classic hedonism seriously as well. (shrink)

A virtue often neglected in character education is humor. Sometimes it is deprioritized to focus on virtues deemed more important. Occasionally, it is forgotten altogether. Other times, humor’s formation is regarded as incidental to the process of character formation, with the expectation that, as learners proceed through moral education, they are likely to come away decently well-positioned in their humor, too. This article explores how humor ought to be regarded in character education. It assesses humor’s status as a virtue, its (...) moral and civic value, and potential liabilities. It defends the claim that, without a curricular emphasis on humor, students do not cease to laugh but laugh at the wrong things, and this is an obstacle to the overall success of character education. This article provides a preliminary account of how to educate humor, as part of a general sequence of character development. (shrink)

Can agents be duty-bound towards ends that are infeasible? Some scholars have endorsed a “feasibility constraint” on justice and answered that we cannot be duty-bound to bring about the infeasible. In this paper, I question whether the feasibility constraint on justice should still be endorsed and whether we are duty-bound to pursue some aims regardless of this constraint. I ask: Can an ethical agent be duty-bound to work towards bringing about a state of affairs that is desirable but infeasible? I (...) consider the climate crisis: climate justice may require us to work towards ends that may be infeasible, such as maintaining global climate warming below 1.5°C or mitigating climate change in a way that treats all people affected fairly. I argue that we may be duty-bound or obliged to work towards some desirable goals when faced with the infeasible and conclude that we should reject feasibility constraints on climate justice. (shrink)

In this article, I defend Frances Kamm’s inviolability account against a powerful objection referred to as the saveability objection. The inviolability account aims to justify deontological constraints (that prohibit us from harming innocent people even to minimise instances of the same type of harm overall) by referring to the idea that constraints hold us to be more inviolable and hence more important beings than we would otherwise be. The saveability objection says that we would seem to be at least equally (...) important if it was permissible to harm innocent people to save us in greater numbers. We would be less inviolable but more saveable. I argue that, despite looking initially forceful, the saveability objection fails to establish that we would have greater saveability without constraints because there is a sense in which the absence of constraints would not only make us less inviolable but also less saveable. (shrink)

According to some pessimists, trusting moral testimony is an action in which the agent does not think about moral questions by herself, and thus it is unacceptable. I argue for optimism by giving some reasons to display moral agents are still depending upon their own in many cases of moral testimony. Specifically, I argue that testimony is a form of social cooperation: the division of epistemic labor. My strategy is as follows: First, I give a principle to show when an (...) agent could reasonably trust moral testimony. Specifically, an agent could reasonably accept the testimony, when she can reasonably expect she would make the same or similar judgment with the testifier. Second, I show how moral testimony could work as a form of social cooperation. Given the principle of the same judgment, it is reasonable for the agent to form a moral belief and act with moral testimony. And it provides us higher efficiency in moral knowledge and shows respect for each moral agent. After that, I provide explanations for the problem of moral disagreement and moral understanding with such a principle for moral testimony. Finally, I respond to some possible objections and give some clarifications of my argument. (shrink)

Pathologies of agency affect both groups and individuals. I present a case study of agential pathology in a group, in which supposedly rogue members of a group act in light of what they take the group’s interests and attitudes to be, but in a way that goes against the group’s explicitly stated agential point of view. I consider several practical concerns brought out by rogue member action in the context of a group agent, focusing in particular on how it undermines (...) the agency of the group and whether or not the group agent itself may be responsible for it. (shrink)

People often fail to comply with the demands of morality. Partial compliance theory takes this noncompliance or its possibility into account in the formulation of moral requirements for people to comply with, or in the evaluation of people’s actions against those requirements. This chapter critically engages with recent work on partial compliance theory. It examines the relationship between noncompliance and injustice, assesses different ways of doing partial compliance theory, sketches the relationship between partial compliance theory and other central methodological debates (...) in moral and political philosophy, and considers whether it is reasonable to issue moral requirements without examining what would happen if everyone did their part. (shrink)

In Sect. 2, I will introduce what religious robots are and present examples of such robots. Then, in Sect. 3, I will discuss my project with a NAO robot at the Katholikentag. In Sect. 4, I will discuss anthropological and ethical questions related to religious robots. Thus, I will outline the direction in which research on religious robots can go, where the challenges lie, and highlight two key advantages. Finally, in Sect. 5, I conclude with an outlook for future research (...) on religious robots. - Puzio, Anna: A NAO Robot Performing Religious Practices. In: ET-Studies 15/1 (2024), pp. 129-140. DOI: 10.2143/ETS.15.1.3293070. (shrink)

Some normative theories are self-defeating. They tell us to respond to our situations in ways that bring about outcomes that are bad, given the aims of the theories, and which could have been avoided. Across a wide range of debates in ethics, decision theory, political philosophy, and formal epistemology, many philosophers treat the fact that a normative theory is self-defeating as sufficient grounds for rejecting it. I argue that this widespread and consequential assumption is false. In particular, I argue that (...) a theory can be self-defeating and still internally consistent, action-guiding, and suitable as a standard for criticism. (shrink)

This paper is a discussion of value of self-knowledge and the role that reflection plays in its acquisition. It employs the title character in Jane Austen’s Emma as an illustration of the importance of reflection in understanding ourselves and developing self-trust. I argues that appropriate self-trust is a virtue in Aristotle’s sense. The person with the virtue of self-trust employs self-doubt effectively, avoiding both insufficient and excessive confidence in her own judgment. I show how Emma uses reflection as a way (...) of correcting her own tendency toward overconfidence, enabling her to have greater self-trust and improved self-knowledge. (shrink)

I argue that the consumption of illegally shared pornography is often morally problematic. My argument is not based on any general condemnation of pornography or even illegal content sharing as such. Instead, my argument emphasizes that commercial pornography that is illegally shared risks violating the consent and thus the dignity of its performers. In this way, illegally shared pornography is akin to ‘revenge porn’, involving the non-consensual distribution and consumption of sexually intimate images or videos. The idea is that if (...) viewing sexually explicit content shared without the permission of the people featured within it is unethical, then the same is often true of the consumption of commercial pornographic content that has been shared illegally. My primary focus is on the commercial pornography produced and distributed by the performers themselves, but I also consider the moral status of more traditional forms of pornographic content. (shrink)

This book offer a sustained and vigorous defence of free expression and objective enquiry situated in the context of the current culture wars. In the spirit of J. S. Mill, it investigates objections to free expression and enquiry in relation to harm and offence, reaching classically liberal conclusions and with particular reference to recent controversies on university campuses. While accepting that the concept of harm is broader than than merely physical harm, the book implicitly offers a critique of objections to (...) free speech and enquiry that are based on certain current understandings of power and privilege. In exploring and rejecting arguments against the possibility of obtaining objective truth, the book navigates hotly contested fields of contemporary debate, including feminism and identity politics. It challenges the dogma of social constructionism and examines current notions of identity, arguing that a case for fairness can be made without appealing to them. Offering a qualified endorsement of friendship between ideological opponents, the book highlights common obstacles to civil and rational discussion, concluding with a rational, moral and broadly spiritual solution to the cultural combat that monopolises present-day society. (shrink)

This article explains and defends reverence as a cardinal ethical value in the Western philosophical tradition, which was considered an underpinning value in ancient society, and it then gradually declined over time. Many contemporary Western philosophers embark on respect rather than reverence. Reverence and respect are not the same. Reverence is all-inclusive, while respect is limited. Reverence values the genuine person, while respect may flatter a powerful arrogant person. Reverence is a cardinal moral and political value necessary for decent politics, (...) education, law, economics, and religion. Reverence is not only essential for becoming a perfect human person but also for instituting a good society. To expound the notion of reverence in the Western tradition, I select four significant Western intellectuals: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Bertrand Russell, Albert Schweitzer, and Paul Woodruff. Goethe posits a tripartite account of reverence: reverence for God, Earth, and human beings. Russell argues for reverence in politics and education. Schweitzer not only developed his account of reverence but also lived his life according to it. Schweitzer declares that his life is his argument, which is reverence for life, life in all its forms. Woodruff intends to revive the notion of reverence in global politics and ethics. So, the article examines the accounts of reverence posited by Goethe, Russell, Schweitzer, and Woodruff and defends its role as a cardinal moral and political value vital for politics, education, and religion for acquiring the common good in the world. (shrink)

This article examines the implications of utilitarianism for social justice, considering different cases of the trolley problems. Utilitarianism comprises a cluster of ethical theses, which have political and legal implications. In general, utilitarianism is assumed to augment the common good, such as pleasure, happiness, satisfaction, and utility, or to reduce pain, suffering, dissatisfaction, and disutility. The article investigates a key problem whether utilitarianism brings about social justice as a moral theory. In recent literature, many moral philosophers have developed several thought (...) experiments, known as trolley problems, that help understand the utilitarian applications to social justice. Philippa Foot and others formulated several thought experiments to help explain the utilitarian difference between the maximum good and the minimum loss. Considering different cases of the trolley problem, I argue that utilitarianism does not do egalitarian justice to all people because it does not eliminate unjust inequalities in society. I hold that utilitarianism is an ethical theory without an egalitarian morality. John Rawls posited a landmark theory of social justice in contrast to the utilitarian notion of social justice. Utilitarianism does not provide social justice to the few, the minority, or the weak in the social world. So, utilitarianism is an inadequate moral theory for acquiring social justice. In qualitative research methodology, I adopt a method of an empirically informed philosophical analysis to examine documentary resources, including journal papers, academic books, and conferences and congresses. (shrink)

This article posits and defends an argument that a cosmopolitan common mind approach is essential for resolving global challenges that cannot be resolved by individuals working independently from one another, such as achieving global peace, cleaning the environment, and improving public health. A ‘cosmopolitan common mind’ refers to an intersubjective recognition across states, cultures, or continents. This argument of the cosmopolitan common mind is centred on Philip Pettit’s theory of the common mind and ethical cosmopolitanism. Pettit argues that a common (...) mind is a shared mind. The standard account of cosmopolitanism claims all human beings are members of the human community. This account is based on three key ideals: individualism, egalitarianism, and universalism. Cosmopolitanism considers individuals rather than nations or states, giving them equal moral status across the world without any discrimination. A cosmopolitan common mind can direct collective action across cultures or continents to resolve global problems. Terrorism and climate change are global problems that are not the products of individual actions but collective actions. For instance, pollution is created by many people working together. If people all together create pollution, they all together can stop it. The problems of establishing global peace and clean ecology are similar to preventing pollution because they are beyond the ability of any lone individual to solve. If it is not impossible, there is a need to develop a cosmopolitan common mind to acquire the common good. The research concludes that the cosmopolitan common mind approach can be a promising framework for resolving contemporary challenges. In qualitative research methodology, I use empirically informed philosophical analysis to critically evaluate documentary resources, including journal papers, academic books, and the proceedings of conferences and congresses. (shrink)

This article explains and examines the ethical implications of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy for human development and global peace. The article addresses the problem of whether Kant’s philosophy advances human development and global peace. I argue that Kant’s philosophy promotes human development and global peace. The argument is based on the following premises: Kant’s moral philosophy supports reverence for humanity. Reverence for humanity promotes the cultivation of human potential, such as rationality. Kant considers rationality a property par excellence in human persons, (...) making them superior to other animals; so, rationality is a guiding principle that makes human persons worthy of reverence. Rationality helps resolve conflicts among people in a society. Moreover, Kant’s political philosophy promotes cooperation among states, eventually leading to global peace. Peace and human development depend on each other: human development develops positive peace, and negative peace augments human development. Kant’s ethics of reverence for humanity promotes positive peace, while his politics of cosmopolitan rights creates negative peace among states. Negative peace is the absence of violence, while positive peace refers to activities affirming life. In general, Kant’s moral and political philosophy is characteristically rational and cosmopolitan, which strives to cultivate natural capacities among human persons across the states, which enhances human development and global peace. In the arena of qualitative research, this article uses the method of empirically informed philosophical analysis to examine journal papers, scholarly books, proceedings of conferences, and congresses. (shrink)

This article investigates whether the politics of nationalism fosters human development and global peace. Nationalism is a political ideology that primarily gives birth to nation-states based on particular shared identities, such as religion, race, culture, or language. Empirical evidence shows that nationalism causes conflicts, which leads to violence, terrorism or war. On the one hand, nationalism gives birth to nation-states; on the other hand, it creates hostility in the world. However, Lahouari Addi argues that giving birth to nations and their (...) nation-building are two different social phenomena. Addi contends that the public sphere and civil peace are the essential conditions for nation- building. Addi’s argument for nation-building is promising. In line with this argument, this paper asserts that the politics of nationalism should make human development and peace in their respective nation-states. To explain malign and benign aspects, the paper differentiates between two kinds of nationalism: negative and productive. Negative nationalism, based on the politics of exclusion, discriminates, humiliates, exploits, and coerces the people of other nations, which causes conflicts and, eventually violence. This strand of nationalism is inconsistent with human development and global peace. Instead, productive nationalism, based on the politics of inclusion, fosters a sense of reverence for humanity which supports self-respect, dignity, freedom, equality, and fraternity in the world. Productive nationalism helps develop human potential, which leads to positive peace through creative accomplishments, such as performing arts, literature, and sports. Thus, the research implies that the politics of productive nationalism creates positive moral values to promote cooperation among people within and across the nations, which fosters human development and peace in the world. In the domain of qualitative research, this paper adopts the methodology of empirically informed philosophical analysis to evaluate the documentary resources. (shrink)

This paper aims to debunk the spectre of terrorism through social capital. At the advent of the twenty-first century, the menace of terrorism becomes a global phenomenon. Undeniably, terrorism is an evil. The central thesis of social capital theory holds that social relationships matter. There are three central elements of terrorism: politics, terror and ideology. Terrorists plan political strategies using certain kind of ideology to create terror. To deal with all these three elements of terrorism, social capital can be an (...) effective weapon. For explicating the core contours of social capital theory, I draw on Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam. To deal with political, violent and ideological foundations of terrorism, I assert that social capital can be useful for countering all of these foundations. Putnam’s binding and bonding strands of social capital can potentially empower people to develop a social network between people, institutions and states to debunk political, violent and ideological roles of terrorism. Thus, a social capital of intellectuals can repudiate the ideological foundations of terrorism for bringing about global peace. (shrink)

This article presents a critique of the contemporary realist political theory developed as an anti–thesis to the Rawlsian normative political philosophy. John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) fosters a colossal influence on the current Anglo–American political thought which defends that political philosophy ought to be an applied moral philosophy. It offers a normative standpoint. Political realists, on the other hand, argue that political philosophy should be independent of moral philosophy. It offers a realist standpoint. The core contention between these (...) two standpoints is that whether political philosophy is (in)dependent to moral philosophy. The normative standpoint places ethics at the centre of politics while the realist standpoint places sociology and history at the centre of politics. In this paper, I examine the central contours of political realism to understand whether it can be consistent with political moralism. I conclude that reverence as a moral and political ideal could be a common foundation for political realism and moralism. (shrink)

This study explores the historical background of the time value of money theory developed within the Austrian School, focusing on the contributions of its Scholastic antecedents. Although the Scholastics had a different starting point from the Austrians in analysing the nature of the time value of money, they ultimately reached a similar understanding. We present a new interpretation of Martín de Azpilcueta's theory, demonstrating that while he cannot be considered the sole originator of the time value of money theory, the (...) role of Scholastic thinkers in its development should not be ignored. (shrink)