The Jewish Philosophy Reader is the first comprehensive anthology of classic writings on Jewish philosophy from the Bible to postmodernism. The Reader is clearly divided into four separate parts: Foundations and First Principles, Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Philosophy, Modern Jewish Thought, and Contemporary Jewish Philosophy. Each part is clearly introduced by the editors. The readings featured are representative writings of each era listed above and are from the following major thinkers: Abrabanel, Baeck, Bergman, Borowitz, Buber, Cohen, Crescas, Fackenheim, Geiger, Gersonides, (...) Goodman, Graetz, Halevi, Hartman, Heschel, Hess, Hirsch, Ibn Ezra, Ibn Gabirol, Ibn Paquda, Kellner, Kook, Krochmal, Leibowitz, Levinas, Maimonides, Maybaum, Mendelssohn, Novak, Philo, Plaskow, Rosenzweig, Saadia, Scholem, Seeskin, Soloveitchik, Spinoza, Strauss, Wolf, Zunz. (shrink)

For over three decades, clinical ethicists in the United States have recorded their consulting activities to supplement documentation in the medical record, often using locally developed instrument...

This book treats practical and political reasoning as an active engagement with the world and other people; it cannot be understood as exclusively cognitive and this is seen as a virtue rather than a deficiency. Informal, emotional, characterological, aesthetic and interactional aspects of thought can be constituents of reasonable arguing. The work examines key capacities connected with argumentation, in a variety of fields from professional and medical ethics to work organization and the practice of art.

A recursive enumerator for a function h is an algorithm f which enumerates for an input x finitely many elements including h(x), f is a k(n)-enumerator if for every input x of length n, h(x) is among the first k(n) elements enumerated by f. If there is a k(n)-enumerator for h then h is called k(n)-enumerable. We also consider enumerators which are only A-recursive for some oracle A. We determine exactly how hard it is to enumerate the Kolmogorov function, which (...) assigns to each string x its Kolmogorov complexity: • For every underlying universal machine U, there is a constant a such that C is k(n)-enumerable only if k(n) ≥ n/a for almost all n. • For any given constant k, the Kolmogorov function is k-enumerable relative to an oracle A if and only if A is at least as hard as the halting problem. • There exists an r.e., Turing-incomplete set A such for every non-decreasing and unbounded recursive function k, the Kolmogorov function is k(n)-enumerable relative to A. The last result is obtained by using a relativizable construction for a nonrecursive set A relative to which the prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity differs only by a constant from the unrelativized prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity. Although every 2-enumerator for C is Turing hard for K, we show that reductions must depend on the specific choice of the 2-enumerator and there is no bound on the quantity of their queries. We show our negative results even for strong 2-enumerators as an oracle where the querying machine for any x gets directly an explicit list of all hypotheses of the enumerator for this input. The limitations are very general and we show them for any recursively bounded function g: • For every Turing reduction M and every non-recursive set B, there is a strong 2-enumerator f for g such that M does not Turing reduce B to f. • For every non-recursive set B, there is a strong 2-enumerator f for g such that B is not wtt-reducible to f. Furthermore, we deal with the resource-bounded case and give characterizations for the class ${\rm S}_{2}^{{\rm P}}$ introduced by Canetti and independently Russell and Sundaram and the classes PSPACE, EXP. • ${\rm S}_{2}^{{\rm P}}$ is the class of all sets A for which there is a polynomially bounded function g such that there is a polynomial time tt-reduction which reduces A to every strong 2-enumerator for g. • PSPACE is the class of all sets A for which there is a polynomially bounded function g such that there is a polynomial time Turing reduction which reduces A to every strong 2-enumerator for g. Interestingly, g can be taken to be the Kolmogorov function for the conditional space bounded Kolmogorov complexity. • EXP is the class of all sets A for which there is a polynomially bounded function g and a machine M which witnesses A ∈ PSPACEf for all strong 2-enumerators f for g. Finally, we show that any strong O(log n)-enumerator for the conditional space bounded Kolmogorov function must be PSPACE-hard if P = NP. (shrink)

Toward a New Socialism offers a critical analysis of capitalism's failings and the imminent need for socialism as an alternative form of government. Dr. Richard Schmitt joins with Dr. Anatole Anton to compile a volume of essays exploring the benefits and consequences of a socialist system as an avenue of increased human solidarity and ethical principle.

A collection of anecdotes that articulate the inspirations behind the development of the Frank/Suzuki Performance Aesthetics, an actor training system.

During the intense philosophical and theological renaissance of the Russian Silver Age, the German Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) received a unique appraisal in the work of Semyon Liudwigovich Frank (1877–1950), hailed by some as ‘the greatest Russian philosopher’. This paper will show that five of Frank's central philosophical arguments can be traced directly to Cusa's writings. Once these key arguments are taken together with Frank's own comments about Cusa, it can be concluded that Frank saw (...) himself as Cusa's modern successor, presenting his ideas in a different intellectual context. In this sense, we can speak of Frank as the ‘Russian Cusanus’. The arguments in question include Cusa's docta ignorantia, our knowledge of being, the recognition of absolute being as ‘non‐other’, the identity of possibility and actuality in the absolute, and finally the coincidentia oppositorum. (shrink)

English summary: Is radical self-determination relevant to the theory of freedom? In other words, is it a constitutive moment of freedom? And is radical self-determination possible or indeed real? Frank Dettinger understands radical self-determination as being the faculty of an acting subject - in whose personal and characteristic nature decisions and actions are established - to self-determine in an independent act. The author provides impetus not only for the analytical-philosophical, but also the theological freedom debates. In the first instance, (...) his work is intended as a contribution to the understanding of the freedom debate about itself. Secondly, its objective seeks to demonstrate the potential of an inter-disciplinary approach. The author reconstructs Luther's understanding of freedom by the precise application of analytical-philosophical freedom systematics and in this way makes it accessible to argumentative examination. German description: Ist radikale Selbstbestimmung freiheitstheoretisch relevant, d.h. ein konstitutives Moment von Freiheit? Und ist radikale Selbstbestimmung moglich oder gar wirklich? Unter radikaler Selbstbestimmung versteht Frank Dettinger dabei das Vermogen eines Handlungssubjekts, dessen personliche und charakterliche Beschaffenheit, in der seine Entscheidungen und Handlungen grunden, in einem unabhangigen Akt selbst zu bestimmen.Dettinger gibt Impulse sowohl fur die analytisch-philosophische als auch fur die theologische Freiheitsdebatte. In der ersten Hinsicht versteht sich seine Arbeit insbesondere als Beitrag zur Verstandigung der Freiheitsdebatte uber sich selbst. In der zweiten Hinsicht liegt das Proprium im Aufweis des Potentials eines interdisziplinaren Vorgehens. Er rekonstruiert Luthers Freiheitsverstandnis in Anwendung analytisch-philosophischer Freiheitssystematik prazise und macht es auf diese Weise einer argumentativen Prufung zuganglich. (shrink)

This study argues that the early philosophy of Semyon Liudvigovich Frank (1877–1950) exhibits significant intellectual correlations with nineteenth century German Idealist philosophy. The idealists in question are Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1796–1879), G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831) and F.W.J. Schelling (1775–1854). It will be suggested that the critical tension of Frank’s early philosophy is precisely a tension between his Hegelian and Schellingian tendencies. The paper will first introduce Frank’s theory of a “personal absolute”, exploring its surprising parallels with the religious (...) philosophy of I. H. Fichte. The analysis then addresses the self-dispersal of Hegel’s absolute, before finally turning to Schelling’s immediate intuition of subject-object identity. (shrink)

In this paper we respond to three objections raised by Joshua Harris to our article, “Against a Postmodern Pentecostal Epistemology,” in which we express misgivings about the conjunction of Pentecostalism with James K. A. Smith’s postmodern, story-based epistemolo- gy. According to Harris, our critique: 1) problematically assumes a correspondence theory of truth, 2) invalidly concludes that “Derrida’s Axiom” conflicts with “Peter’s Axiom,” and 3) fails to consider an alternative account of the universality of Christian truth claims. We argue that Harris’s (...) objections either demonstrate a deficient interpretation of the relevant biblical pas- sages or are not directed at us at all. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 20 (2000) 239-240 [Access article in PDF] News and Views Korean Temple Burnings and Vandalism: The Response of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies Harry L. WellsHumboldt State UniversityOver the course of the last decade a fairly large number of Buddhist temples in South Korea have been destroyed or damaged by fire by misguided Christian fundamentalists. More recently, Buddhist statues have been identified as idols, and attacked (...) and decapitated in the name of Jesus. Arrests are hard to effect, as the arsonists and vandals work by stealth of night. In 1998, the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies announced its support for our Buddhist brothers and sisters and our disgust at such violent misuse of the name of Jesus. At the 1998 Board meeting, an ad hoc committee was set up to explore and develop strategies which would further address the situation. Below are some actions which have occurred during 1999. A Letter from Our President: The following letter of protest was sent on the Society's behalf on January 25, 1999 to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea and other governmental officials plus Korean church leaders and organizations. A second letter was sent to the U.S. State Department and the headquarters of various church bodies in the U.S. as well as the National Council of Churches. The Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies wishes to register its deepest sadness and most profound protest regarding the numerous acts of arson and malicious destruction done to Buddhist temples by misinformed and intolerant fundamentalist Christian groups throughout the Republic of South Korea. Professor Frank Tedesco of Sejong University first drew the attention of the Society to these incidents in an article he published in 1997 in Buddhist-Christian Studies, the journal of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies. More recently, two more Buddhist temples have been burned by fundamentalist Christians, seven hundred Buddhist images have been decapitated, and the Roman Catholic Cathedral was also burned because it contained images. All members of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies, both Christian and Buddhist, are embarrassed that such acts have been done in the name of [End Page 239] Jesus Christ, a name that demands that all persons should live in justice and peace, not sectarian stupidity and religious fanaticism. The small, but vocal, number of fundamentalist Christians in Korea who defend such actions as blows against pagan idolatry are simply wrong. Their actions are contrary to the core of Christian teaching and practice, which is that all persons are to be treated with love, justice, and respect. There is no excuse for intra-religious violence in Buddhist or Christian teaching and practice. Accordingly, the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies not only deplores fundamentalist Christian attacks against Korean Buddhist temples, images, and persons, we ask that the government of Korea actively seek out all groups and persons engaged in violent actions against our Buddhist brothers and sisters and bring them to justice according to the laws of the Republic of Korea. May the peace at the heart of the Christian tradition and the heart of the Buddha's Dharma heal the minds of the violent so that all human beings may one day live as brothers and sisters in accord and dialogue. Paul O. Ingram, President A Section on the International Association for Religious Freedom Website Robert Traer, General Secretary of the International Association for Religious Freedom, graciously agreed to allow the Society to post a section on their website about the Buddhist-Christian tensions in Korea. His hope reflects the hope of our Society, that incidents of vandalism will cease and dialogue efforts increase. This page presently includes the summary account written by a SBCS member, Dr. Frank Tedesco, photos, and an introductory statement by our Society. Visit the site! A Call for Monetary Contributions The Society initiated a contributions drive to collect funds to send to Korea as a symbolic gesture of support of our Buddhist brothers and sisters whose temples and images have been attacked by extremist Christian vandals... (shrink)

Errol Harris talks about a crypto-dialectic method that lies behind the geometrical disguise of Spinoza'sEthics.Spinoza's method, he argues, is not the linear formal deduction of traditional logic but a crypto-dialectical development of the structural implications of a systematic whole. Substance differentiates itself into infinite attributes and infinite modes. Each attribute is self-differentiated into a hierarchy of modes ranging from the most complex to the simplest. Harris calls this a dialectical scale or a crypto-dialectical development of the structural implications of a (...) systematic whole. The self-specification of the whole into attributes and modes provides the framework for a dialectical system. Spinoza's hypotheses are implications dialectically derived from his concept of substance, a concept of a whole which differentiates itself into infinite attributes and modes. Substance is not a hypothesis but is a postulate which s i absolutely certain. Everything follows from substance with dialectical necessity. Substance is the origin of all things and ideas. (shrink)

This paper is a response to an article in Philosophia Christi by W. Paul Franks and Richard B. Davis entitled “Against a Postmodern Epistemology.” In this article, the authors offer a critique of James K. A. Smith. I respond to three of their particular criticisms in the following manner: by explaining the motivations behind rejecting a modern “correspondence theory of truth”; revealing what I take to be an invalid inference on the topic of scripture and interpretation; and offering an alternative (...) account of the “universality” of the gospel. (shrink)

It is common in the history of science to try to extend an idea first demonstrated in one domain into others. Sometimes the extension is literal, and sometimes it is frankly metaphorical. Sometimes, however, when an extension is claimed to be literal, it is far from easy to see that it is. If an extension does not make use of entities and mechanisms involved in the original domain, and introduces novel entities and mechanisms, then it is not unreasonable to doubt (...) the claim of its authors that it is a literal extension of a well-established theory. IT is, therefore, not surprising that many who accept that the cultural transmission of information is unique to out species nevertheless balk at Dawkins's and Dennett's contention that there are units of cultural evolution, called 'memes', which can be used to explain the development and diversity of human culture, and whose survival is explicable in terms of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. Our aim in this paper is to argue that scepticism about Dawkins's and Dennett's proposal is indeed justified; though it of course does not follow that there is not another way of explaining human culture in evolutionary terms. (shrink)

In this paper a plea is made for an unprincipled approach to biomedical ethics, unprincipled of course just in the sense that the four principles are neither the start nor the end of the process of ethical reflection. While the four principles constitute a useful “checklist” approach to bioethics for those new to the field, and possibly for ethics committees without substantial ethical expertise approaching new problems, it is an approach which if followed by the bioethics community as a whole (...) would, the author believes, lead to sterility and uniformity of approach of a quite mindbogglingly boring kind. Moreover, much of bioethics is not concerned with identifying the principles or values appropriate to a particular issue, but rather involves analysing the arguments that are so often already in play and which present themselves as offering solutions in one direction or another. Here, as I try to show in discussion of these four scenarios, the principles allow massive scope in interpretation and are, frankly, not wonderful as a means of detecting errors and inconsistencies in argument. (shrink)

In this powerful volume, 15 leading American philosophers examine and critically reassess Douglass's significance for contemporary social and political thought. Philosophically, Douglass's work sought to establish better ways of thinking, especially in the light of his convictions about our humanity and democratic legitimacy - convictions that were culturally and historically shaped by his experience of, and struggle against, the institution of American slavery. Contributors include Bernard R. Boxill, Angela Y. Davis, Lewis R. Gordon, Leonard Harris, Tommy L. Lott, Howard McGary, (...) and John P. Pittman. (shrink)

With Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed and Gersonides’s Wars of the Lord, Hasdai Crescas’s Light of the Lord deserves a place on any shortlist of medieval Jewish philosophical classics. Apart from partial translations by Warren Harvey and Harry Wolfson, the English-speaking student of medieval Jewish philosophy has had limited access to the text. Thanks to Roslyn Weiss’s felicitous new translation, this is no longer the case.Light of the Lord [=Light] has of course its own internal philosophical dynamic, but it (...) is helpful to remember the broader historical context in which it was written. In 1391, the life of Spanish Jewry was upended. Thousands of Jews in Barcelona and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IntroductionSchelling and the EnvironmentChelsea C. Harry (bio)Scientists overwhelmingly agree that climate change is anthropogenic, caused by our greenhouse gas emissions.1 Given the evidence that exists, we should be able to convince ourselves to change the everyday behaviors resulting in these emissions. If we hope to save ourselves, other animals, plants, and the environment from a devastating future, then why would we continue to use fossil fuels?The answer here (...) is not an easy one. And yet, the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle, provides us with a possible cause. In his most famous work on ethics,2 Aristotle argued that being weak-willed, suffering from what he called, “akrasia,” is the reason we do things that we know we shouldn’t do. It is a condition that results when desire wins over reason. For example, I eat a chocolate bar when I know I should eat a salad because my desire for chocolate wins over what I have reasoned to be best for my health. Simply put, reason might be what distinguishes us from other animals and plants, but it is not always our most powerful faculty. It stands both to experience and to reason, then, that rational decision might not be what is going to get us out of this climate crisis. Then, what is?In this special issue, we hear from five contemporary scholars of the 18th–19th century German philosopher, F.W.J. Schelling, an oft-called “protean thinker” whose prolific, sometimes creative, and diverse works spanned over seventy years. A onetime roommate of Hegel and Hölderlin, Schelling’s works are lesser-known outside specialist circles, and yet one finds that his prescient insights continue to have much to offer. This is especially true vis-à-vis the climate crisis, as Schelling was the first post-Kantian philosopher to take nature seriously. He eschewed the modern, Kantian, and post-Kantian trend to focus on [End Page 1] ipseity, the self, and on what we as humans can rationally know. Instead, he returned to metaphysics and argued for a wholistic conception and experience of life—all life. For Schelling, humans are rational as an expression of nature, rather than as an exception to nature. As John Sallis put it so well as he argued for the Platonic influence in Schelling: “For what Schelling rewrites within the text of modern philosophy is a discourse on nature.”3 Sallis then reminds us that in Schelling’s 1809 text, Philosophical Investigations of the Essence of Human Freedom (“Die Freiheitschrift”), he openly criticizes post-Cartesian philosophy generally for its exclusion of nature; “All modern European philosophy since it began with Descartes has this common defect, that nature does not exist for it and that it lacks a living ground.”4 Schelling’s intention was to resolve the defect, and because of his efforts in this regard, his work has something to say to us about our relationship to the environment.The idea to think about what Schelling can offer us in our current climate crisis is hardly new. In 2014, the North American Schelling Society (NASS), hosted by Bruce Matthews and Bard College, thematized its third international conference on “Schelling in the Anthropocene,” asking scholars to think beyond modern philosophy’s legacy of the human/nature divide and to discuss Schelling’s contribution to the anthropogenic environmental crisis we currently face. Since then, published work on this topic includes: Bruce Matthews’s, “Schelling in the Anthropocene,”5 Christopher Lauer’s, “Confronting the Anthropocene,” 6 and Vincent Lee’s, “Schelling and the Sixth Extinction.”7 Other journals have published special issues on related topics, including McGrath et al. Schelling After Theory special issue of Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy, McGrath et al. The Many Faces of F.W.J. Schelling special issue of Analecta Hermeneutica, Tritten et al. Nature, Speculation, and the Return to Schelling special issue of Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, and Bahoh, et al. Philosophies of Nature special issue of Comparative and Continental Philosophy. While this is by no means an exhaustive list, other contemporary thinkers who have been part of this conversation include: Kyla Bruff, Charlotte Alderwick, Manfred Frank, Markus Gabriel, Iain Grant,8 Lore... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:700 jOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER t995 131--35). As we should expect, Dummett's treatment of these and related matters is masterful. Chapters on Husserl and Frege on perception, and on something Dummett calls "Proto-Thoughts," exercise Dummett's peculiar gifts on new ground. The closing chapters bring us round to more familiar Dummettian themes: Since we must conceive of meaning as inextricably a feature of language, the fundamental (...) task will be to describe the character of a theory of meaning for a language. Davidson's work in this direction is subjected to new and interesting criticisms, but for those who see holism as central to the Quine/Davidson outlook, some (but not all) of these criticisms may seem misplaced. Dummett declares that if what someone means is determined by the theory of meaning which implicitly informs their utterances, then "we need to be told by what means I can recognize the other speaker as having the same theory of meaning as I do," and charges Davidson with a commitment to privacy (147ff.). But if"Davidson's holism be emphasized, there is no corroboration of a theory of meaning except rather vaguely in terms of how well it facilitates communication. It is this latter notion which wears the pants ontologically; hence meaning can only misleadingly be said to be a possession of individual speakers, something which a theory of meaning literally describes. A similar objection can be brought against the discussion of Wittgenstein which closes the book: Dummett asserts that Wittgenstein's admonition to chart statement-types rather than try to peer directly at the phenomenon "rests upon a quite definite conception of what meaning consists in" (t64); it is arguable that for Wittgenstein there is no univocally characterizable phenomenon called 'meaning' which that method is meant to capture-no single picture to substitute for the Frege-Russell picture. But on the whole this tightly conceived book is immensely stimulating, and it breaks new ground. As usual, Frege scholars will find much to argue with, direct reference theorists will be provoked, and no one whose ideas are said to be "celebrated" will imagine they are being complimented. Appended to the book is an interview in which Dummett describes the evolution of his philosophical interests. GARY KEMP University of Waikato Alan M. Olson, editor. Heidegger and Jaspers. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994. Pp. viii + 177. Cloth, $44.95. Paper, $19.95. Richard Wisser and Leonard H. Ehrlich, editors. Karl Jaspers: Philosopher among Philosophers/Philosoph unter Philosophen. Wiirzburg: K6nigshausen & Neumann, 1993. Pp. vii + 37o. Paper, $44.oo. Though one of the most pivotal philosophers of the twentieth century, Karl Jaspers is known primarily for the influence he had on other intellectuals of that period, especially Heidegger, as well for challenging his contemporaries to develop a sense of social responsibility in the post-war world. The collection of essays which Alan Olson has assembled not only underscores the originality of Jaspers's thought, but also shows the political context within which Jaspers criticized Heidegger for refusing to recant his BOOK REVIEWS 7Ol allegiance to National Socialism. In this regard, the reader cannot help but notice that there is a political thematic if not an agenda to the organization of the essays. Papers devoted to "Heidegger's Philosophy of Being from the Perspective of His Rectorate" (Leonard Ehrlich), "Shame, Guilt, Responsibility" (Karsten Harries), "The Psychological Dimension in Jaspers's Relationship with Heidegger" (Harold Oliver), "On the Responsibility of Intellectuals" (Joseph Margolis), and "Philosophy and Politics" (Tom Rockmore) serve as much to reveal the inadequacy of Heidegger's political vision as to demonstrate the viability of Jaspers's alternative of combining a post-Enlightenment rationality with an existential philosophy of limits. But despite certain polemical overtones, the volume as a whole is tightly organized, and most of the articles (including the others which I will briefly mention) are of remarkably high quality and thoughtprovoking in their own right. The editor selects a previously unpublished 1954 lecture of Paul Tillich's, "Heidegger and Jaspers," as the inaugural essay in the volume. Tillich points to the uneasy balance between the "existentialist" thrust of Heidegger's early philosophy, and the more "mystical" posture... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:700 jOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER t995 131--35). As we should expect, Dummett's treatment of these and related matters is masterful. Chapters on Husserl and Frege on perception, and on something Dummett calls "Proto-Thoughts," exercise Dummett's peculiar gifts on new ground. The closing chapters bring us round to more familiar Dummettian themes: Since we must conceive of meaning as inextricably a feature of language, the fundamental (...) task will be to describe the character of a theory of meaning for a language. Davidson's work in this direction is subjected to new and interesting criticisms, but for those who see holism as central to the Quine/Davidson outlook, some (but not all) of these criticisms may seem misplaced. Dummett declares that if what someone means is determined by the theory of meaning which implicitly informs their utterances, then "we need to be told by what means I can recognize the other speaker as having the same theory of meaning as I do," and charges Davidson with a commitment to privacy (147ff.). But if"Davidson's holism be emphasized, there is no corroboration of a theory of meaning except rather vaguely in terms of how well it facilitates communication. It is this latter notion which wears the pants ontologically; hence meaning can only misleadingly be said to be a possession of individual speakers, something which a theory of meaning literally describes. A similar objection can be brought against the discussion of Wittgenstein which closes the book: Dummett asserts that Wittgenstein's admonition to chart statement-types rather than try to peer directly at the phenomenon "rests upon a quite definite conception of what meaning consists in" (t64); it is arguable that for Wittgenstein there is no univocally characterizable phenomenon called 'meaning' which that method is meant to capture-no single picture to substitute for the Frege-Russell picture. But on the whole this tightly conceived book is immensely stimulating, and it breaks new ground. As usual, Frege scholars will find much to argue with, direct reference theorists will be provoked, and no one whose ideas are said to be "celebrated" will imagine they are being complimented. Appended to the book is an interview in which Dummett describes the evolution of his philosophical interests. GARY KEMP University of Waikato Alan M. Olson, editor. Heidegger and Jaspers. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994. Pp. viii + 177. Cloth, $44.95. Paper, $19.95. Richard Wisser and Leonard H. Ehrlich, editors. Karl Jaspers: Philosopher among Philosophers/Philosoph unter Philosophen. Wiirzburg: K6nigshausen & Neumann, 1993. Pp. vii + 37o. Paper, $44.oo. Though one of the most pivotal philosophers of the twentieth century, Karl Jaspers is known primarily for the influence he had on other intellectuals of that period, especially Heidegger, as well for challenging his contemporaries to develop a sense of social responsibility in the post-war world. The collection of essays which Alan Olson has assembled not only underscores the originality of Jaspers's thought, but also shows the political context within which Jaspers criticized Heidegger for refusing to recant his BOOK REVIEWS 7Ol allegiance to National Socialism. In this regard, the reader cannot help but notice that there is a political thematic if not an agenda to the organization of the essays. Papers devoted to "Heidegger's Philosophy of Being from the Perspective of His Rectorate" (Leonard Ehrlich), "Shame, Guilt, Responsibility" (Karsten Harries), "The Psychological Dimension in Jaspers's Relationship with Heidegger" (Harold Oliver), "On the Responsibility of Intellectuals" (Joseph Margolis), and "Philosophy and Politics" (Tom Rockmore) serve as much to reveal the inadequacy of Heidegger's political vision as to demonstrate the viability of Jaspers's alternative of combining a post-Enlightenment rationality with an existential philosophy of limits. But despite certain polemical overtones, the volume as a whole is tightly organized, and most of the articles (including the others which I will briefly mention) are of remarkably high quality and thoughtprovoking in their own right. The editor selects a previously unpublished 1954 lecture of Paul Tillich's, "Heidegger and Jaspers," as the inaugural essay in the volume. Tillich points to the uneasy balance between the "existentialist" thrust of Heidegger's early philosophy, and the more "mystical" posture... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Search for Unity in Diversity: The "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" in the Philosophy of John DeweyFrank X. RyanJames A. Good A Search for Unity in Diversity: The "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" in the Philosophy of John Dewey Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006. xxx + 288 pp.Among the revelations of Dewey's rare moments of autobiographical reflection, none has generated more curiosity and investigative zeal than his 1930 claim to have (...) "drifted" from Hegel in the decade following his move from Michigan to Chicago in 1894. Beginning with Morton White's Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism (1943), biographers have divided on the question of whether Dewey's later philosophy was more strongly influenced by William James's experimental psychology or F. J. E. Woodbridge's Aristotelian naturalism. Despite their differences, both approaches are essentially empirical and realistic, and thus the majority of sympathetic commentators have agreed that Dewey was a realist, albeit of a decidedly unorthodox stripe. For them the notion that Dewey retained any significant commitment to idealism, given its virtual eradication at the beginning of the twentieth century, would damage his influence and legacy.It has been something of a puzzle, accordingly, that in the same autobiographical essay Dewey alludes to a "permanent Hegelian deposit." For years Richard Rorty has claimed this differentiates a "good" Dewey committed to "social flourishing" from a "bad" Dewey prone to metaphysical dalliance. But the first systematic inquiry into Dewey's enduring Hegelianism is John R. Shook's Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality (2000). Shook argues convincingly that Dewey never abandoned idealism, but rather transformed it into an experimental naturalism by doing away with both "mind-stuff" and equally noxious "things-in-themselves." In many ways James Good's A Search for Unity in Diversity is a bookend to Shook's project, though Good further differentiates Anglo-American Neo-Hegelianism from Hegel himself. According to Good, Dewey endorsed a Humanistic/Historicist interpretation of Hegel rooted in the reciprocal engagement of individuals and societies, rather than the supernatural and architectonic absolute championed by Neo-Hegelians such as T. H. Green, and F. H. Bradley. With [End Page 216] top-notch scholarship and scrupulous attention to detail, A Search for Unity in Diversity is both an excellent intellectual biography and a penetrating plea for a radical reinterpretation of Dewey's contribution to philosophy. I'll briefly sketch the historical account before addressing the more controversial claims about the "permanent Hegelian deposit."Even readers familiar with the half-dozen book-length treatments of Dewey's development will find this account refreshing and informative. Good's professional credentials as a historian shine as he recreates the rough and bustling Burlington of Dewey's youth. In the 1870s, German idealism was considered the epitome of political liberalism and progressive education, and Dewey's journey toward the "inclusive philosophical idea" of the social began in an environment swirling with the crosscurrents of Kant, Hegel, and Schelling. At the White Street Congregational Church, Lewis Barstow preached a liberal orthodoxy that was essentially "man-building" (102), and Good presents a convincing case for the likelihood that even in boyhood Dewey never viewed God as an aloof law-giver or cosmic architect, but as a process unifying the individual and the social within a natural world of unlimited potential. At the University of Vermont Dewey encountered a struggling rural college transformed into the first bastion of American transcendentalism by James Marsh, who inspired a "Burlington philosophy" that rejected atomistic empiricism for a holistic integrity of knowing and doing, facts and values, and pure and practical reasons (57–59).In noting the influence of the "St. Louis Hegelians" upon Dewey, most biographers have focused on W. T. Harris, the prominent founder of The Journal of Speculative Philosophy who published Dewey's earliest submissions and offered encouragement that led to his pursuit of graduate work at Johns Hopkins. Good augments this familiar tale with fascinating depictions of equally influential yet lesser-known Hegelians such as H. C. Brokmeyer, Denton Snider, and Thomas Davidson. At a time when European Hegelianism was polarized between, on the one hand, reactionary apologists for traditional Christianity and Prussian militarism and, on the other, radical... (shrink)

This collection of original essays on the topics of causation and explanation offers readers a state-of-the-art view of current work in these areas. The book is notable for its interdisciplinary character, and the essays, by distinguished authors and important rising scholars, will be of interest to a wide readership, including philosophers, computer scientists, and economists. Students and scholars alike will find the book valuable for its wide-ranging treatment of two difficult philosophical topics.The volume focuses first on the development of theories (...) of causation and explanation, and then on the application of those theories. Theoretical discussions include Patrick Suppes's investigation of the causal issues surrounding intentional activities such as computation and decision making, and Clark Glymour and Frank Wimberly's analysis of technical issues encountered in formulating an account of actual causation. The essays exploring applications include Nancy Cartwright's examination of the application of counterfactuals to economics and Alfred Mele's criticism of the work of Benjamin Libet on the applicability of experimental results in psychology to philosophical analyses of free will and self-control.Causation and Explanation offers a remarkably wide-ranging set of essays on two topics that present difficult philosophical issues. (shrink)

This fascinating study in the sociology of science explores the way scientists conduct, and draw conclusions from, their experiments. The book is organized around three case studies: replication of the TEA-laser, detecting gravitational rotation, and some experiments in the paranormal. "In his superb book, Collins shows why the quest for certainty is disappointed. He shows that standards of replication are, of course, social, and that there is consequently no outside standard, no Archimedean point beyond society from which we can lever (...) the intellects of our fellows. "- -Donald M. McCloskey, Journal of Economic Psychology "Collins is one of the genuine innovators of the sociology of scientific knowledge.... Changing Order is a rich and entertaining book. "- - Isis "The book gives a vivid sense of the contingent nature of research and is generally a good read. "- -Augustine Brannigan, Nature "This provocative book is a review of [Collins's] work, and an attempt to explain how scientists fit experimental results into pictures of the world.... A promising start for new explorations of our image of science, too often presented as infallibly authoritative. "- -Jon Turney, New Scientist. (shrink)

Presents a theory of bullshit, how it differs from lying, how those who engage in it change the rules of conversation, and how indulgence in bullshit can alter a person's ability to tell the truth.

This study builds on the work of contemporary civic republicans, supplying a detailed analysis of the concept of domination absent in the familiar accounts of political freedom as non-domination.

In this book Harry Heft examines the historical and theoretical foundations of James J. Gibson's ecological psychology in 20th century thought, and in turn, integrates ecological psychology and analyses of sociocultural processes. A thesis of the book is that knowing is rooted in the direct experience of meaningful environmental objects and events present in individual-environment processes and at the level of collective, social settings. Ecological Psychology in Context: *traces the primary lineage of Gibson's ecological approach to William James's philosophy (...) of radical empiricism; *illuminates how the work of James's student and Gibson's mentor, E.B. Holt, served as a catalyst for the development of Gibson's framework and as a bridge to James's work; *reveals how ecological psychology reciprocally can advance Jamesian studies by resolving some of the theoretical difficulties that kept James from fully realizing a realist philosophy; *broadens the scope of Gibson's framework by proposing a synthesis between it and the ecological program of Roger Barker, who discovered complex systems operating at the level of collective, social processes; *demonstrates ways in which the psychological domain can be extended to properties of the environment rendering its features meaningful, publicly accessible, and distributed across person-environment processes; and *shows how Gibson's work points the way toward overcoming the gap between experimental psychology and the humanities. Intended for scholars and students in the areas of ecological and environmental psychology, theoretical and historical psychology, cognitive science, developmental psychology, anthropology, and philosophy. (shrink)

Professor Harris of Witwatersrand is an unabashed Absolute Idealist, whose constructive philosophy may not, perhaps, be readily acceptable to many others but who manifestly exercises an invaluable role as a trenchant critic of the prevailing Anglo-Saxon fashions of Empiricism. This school of thought possibly demands closer definition of its common nature than he affords, but his analysis of the detail of its historical development and its retention of the obsolete logic and epistemology of its Renaissance origin is devastatingly frank, (...) if emotionally polemical when it reaches Logical Positivism. His account-sheet of historic errors comes opportunely at a time when British philosophers are uneasily conscious of their dogmatic presuppositions and open to criticism. Professor Harris takes full advantage of this condition, as his bold programme announces. (shrink)

Harry G. Frankfurt begins his inquiry by asking, “What is it about human beings that makes it possible for us to take ourselves seriously?” Based on The Tanner Lectures in Moral Philosophy, Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right delves into this provocative and original question. The author maintains that taking ourselves seriously presupposes an inward-directed, reflexive oversight that enables us to focus our attention directly upon ourselves, and “[it] means that we are not prepared to accept ourselves just (...) as we come. We want our thoughts, our feelings, our choices, and our behavior to make sense. We are not satisfied to think that our ideas are formed haphazardly, or that our actions are driven by transient and opaque impulses or by mindless decisions. We need to direct ourselves—or at any rate to believe that we are directing ourselves—in thoughtful conformity to stable and appropriate norms. We want to get things right.” The essays delineate two features that have a critical role to play in this: our rationality, and our ability to love. Frankfurt incisively explores the roles of reason and of love in our active lives, and considers the relation between these two motivating forces of our actions. The argument is that the authority of practical reason is less fundamental than the authority of love. Love, as the author defines it, is a volitional matter, that is, it consists in what we are actually committed to caring about. Frankfurt adds that “The object of love can be almost anything—a life, a quality of experience, a person, a group, a moral ideal, a nonmoral ideal, a tradition, whatever.” However, these objects and ideals are difficult to comprehend and often in conflict with each other. Moral principles play an important supporting role in this process as they help us develop and elucidate a vision that inspires our love. The first section of the book consists of the two lectures, which are entitled “Taking Ourselves Seriously” and “Getting It Right.” The second section consists of comments in response by Christine M. Korsgaard, Michael E. Bratman, and Meir Dan-Cohen. The book includes a preface by Debra Satz. (shrink)

In his ecological approach to perception, James Gibson introduced the concept of affordance to refer to the perceived meaning of environmental objects and events. this paper examines the relational and causal character of affordances, as well as the grounds for extending affordances beyond environmental features with transcultural meaning to include those features with culturally-specific meaning. such an extension is seen as warranted once affordances are grounded in an intentional analysis of perception. toward this end, aspects of merleau-ponty's treatment of perception (...) are explored. finally, a resolution of the apparent tension between the relational and perceiver-independent nature of affordances is presented. (shrink)

_Formal Ethics_ is the study of formal ethical principles. The most important of these, perhaps even the most important principle of life, is the golden rule: "Treat others as you want to be treated". Although the golden rule enjoys support amongst different cultures and religions in the world, philosophers tend to neglect it. _Formal Ethics_ gives the rule the attention it deserves. Modelled on formal logic, _Formal Ethics_ was inspired by the ethical theories of Kant and Hare. It shows that (...) the basic formal principles of ethics, like the golden rule, are very similar to principles of logic, and gives a firm basis for our ethical thinking. As an introduction to moral rationality, _Formal Ethics_ also considers non-formal elements, and is applied to areas of practical concern such as racism and moral education. (shrink)

Written nearly fifty years ago, at a time when the world was still wrestling with the concepts of Marx and Lenin, 'The Illusion of the Epoch' is the perfect resource for understanding the roots of Marxism-Leninism and its implications for philosophy, modern political thought, economics, and history. As Professor Tim Fuller has written, this "is not an intemperate book, but rather an effort at a sustained, scholarly argument against Marxian views." Far from demonising his subject, Acton scrupulously notes where Marx's (...) account of historical and economic events and processes is essentially accurate. However, Acton also points out that Marx is generally right about things that were already widely known and accepted in his own time and indeed had been long understood in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, Acton shows that in many cases Marx either is simply wrong or has stated his views so as to render his theories immune to disproof. Acton also explains why the embodiment of Marxist-Leninist theory in an actual social order would require coercive support if it were not, sooner or later, to collapse of its own contradictions. (shrink)