El artículo se centra en el filósofo argentino Eugenio Pucciarelli (1907-1995) y su recepción de la fenomenología, a la que confiere un sesgo humanista. Se procederá a una introducción a su contribución a la fenomenología en América Latina y se abordarán los siguientes temas: 1) la misión de la filosofía, las diversas vías de acceso a su esencia, en particular aquellas de Scheler, Dilthey y Husserl, 2) su recepción de Husserl en cuanto concierne a los ideales de ciencia y de (...) razón, 3) la crisis de la razón y de la evidencia, 4) su concepción pluralista de la razón, del tiempo y de la cultura, 5) humanismo y libertad. La tesis sostiene que su concepción de la filosofía, que enfatiza la dimensión personal y el compromiso social de la práctica filosófica, revela un profundo humanismo pluralista que no descuida su función militante y crítica, evidenciado así la actualidad de su mensaje. (shrink)

This paper concerns both Aristotle's notion of right feelings and Husserl's account of intentional feelings and emotions as developed in their ethical writings and it discusses these approaches in relation to each other. It addresses the question of motivation and justification or evidence for moral feelings and actions. In particular, it focuses on the emotional states of Philia and love as well as the inherent relationship between affectivity and reason. The paper concludes with some reflections on the requirements for the (...) constitution of a moral self. (shrink)

This paper enquires into a paradigmatic change concerning the concept of motion: from a phenomenological conception of motion understood as a continuous and finite process of translation, to a physical conception of motion as rectilinear, uniform and continuous, that is, as an inertial state that if unhindered, can extend infinitely – the former held by Aristotle, the latter by Koyré, a shift that is evidenced by their contrasting treatment of Zeno’s paradoxes. I argue that both ontologies of motion can be (...) understood in phenomenological terms: Motion is accomplished by the real itself. However, while Aristotle’s continuous motion as actualization of the form of a given body involves its formal determination and constitution of sense, Koyré’s conceives of motion and rest as kinds of being and motion itself as exemplifcation of the mathematization of nature that Husserl described in the Crisis. Taken together, these changes presuppose a transformation of metaphysical and epistemic frameworks. (shrink)

The interweavement of philosophy and literature allows to gain a new sense from the own, lived experiences and to express them through narrations, as the paradigmatic works of Nietzsche, Deleuze and Borges show. They all deal with the inexorability of time and the fact of being at the mercy of the unwanted aspects of Being-in-the-world, the detailed reading of which allows us to assert that the event of the emergence of a new sense lies in the experience of the creative (...) power of the instant, wherein the difference is introduced as the first principle through a Copernican turn and where the eternity expresses itself. In fact, the instant in its repetition results from a strike of chance, an assumption which leads to a new understanding not only of time as a network of destinies, but of eternity as extensive, intensive or ecstatic eternity. Being involved in this experience means to undergo an existential experience of time which produces an irrevocable change of the self. (shrink)

La confrontación entre Heidegger y Husserl que ha dominado hasta fecha reciente la interpretación filosófica debe ser revisada a la luz de las indagaciones de Husserl sobre la protofacticidad: Ella concierne a una ontología del mundo de la vida que es afín a la mundaneidad heideggeriana: Los protohechos constituyen un horizonte de sentido ya instaurado, que el yo debe reconfigurar en su praxis. Esta protofacticidad inmodalizable alberga un núcleo de protocontingencia que da cuenta no sólo de la contingencia fáctica de (...) las categorías experienciales, sino también la del mundo, del ego y de los entes finitos: En tanto procesos o sujetos a cambios cualitativos en sus características esenciales su modo de ser se caracteriza por una permanente apertura esencial. Ambos pensadores sostienen la contingencia esencial del mundo, de la que sólo puede dar cuenta la experiencia fáctica hic et nunc de un ego encarnado y mundano.The confrontation between Heidegger and Husserl, ever present in philosophical debates, should be reviewed in the light of Hus-serl’s late inquiries into protofacticity. Concerning the ontology of the lifeworld, it addresses some of the issues of Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein as being-in-the-world: Protofacts constitute an already given sense-horizon, which the ego must re-configurate in its praxis. This unmodalizable primal facts host a core of protocontingency that accounts for the factual contingency not only of the categories of experience, but of the world, the ego and of finite beings: Understood as processes or subjected to qualitative changes in their essential structures, their mode of being is characterized by an essential openness. Both thinkers sustain the contingency of the world, for which only the hic et nunc factual experience of a mundane, incarnated ego can account. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The current article deals with the correlation between virtual and physical reality as they concern the body. The thesis of this article is that the lived body transposed into virtual reality becomes a body without organs in Deleuze’s terms, i.e. the lived body, a sensitive field of sensorial events immersed in a lived space, becomes a virtual body made up of intensities, of pure forces or magnitudes within a vector space, thereby losing its affective qualities. Furthermore, lived and virtual (...) bodies build up a correlation bridged not by intentionality, as phenomenology would maintain, but by sensation. Virtuality is thus characterised by both the loss of corporeality and the simulation of the lifeworld. But how can the split between the real and the virtual body be bridged? On the one hand, in Deleuze’s conception of sensation, real and virtual collapse into one another so that the real world ‘resonates’ with its virtual double. On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of form relates both realities in terms of a correlation of signification between the physical and the existential realms. With recourse to the notion of structure or form, I will argue that the phenomenal and the virtual do not represent different modes of being, but are bound by a correlation ruled by sensation as a system of intensive forces. (shrink)

Die Phänomenologie Husserls ist nicht nur als ein metaphysikkritisches Unternehmen, sondern als eine kritische Wiederaufnahme aristotelischer Themen aufzufassen. Denn die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins führt Husserl anfänglich dazu, eine transzendentale Phänomenologie als eidetische Wissenschaft zu entwerfen, welche die aristotelische Ontologie auf formale und materiale Regionen erweitert. Später aber führt sie Husserl nicht nur zu einer Revision der Beziehungen zwischen Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, sondern zu einer Erweiterung des phänomenologischen Bereiches auf Fragen der letzten absolut gegebenen Urtatsachen, die eine phänomenologische (...) Metaphysik ausmachen. Dabei unternimmt Husserl eine kritische Rehabilitierung der aristotelischen Ontologie, indem er die materiale Ontologie sowohl mit einem ‚Unterbau‘ als auch mit einer ‚Krönung‘ versieht: Sie gründet auf einer apodiktischen Urfaktizität, die eine affektive Lebendigkeit aufweist, und gipfelt in einer Gottesauffassung, welche die erste Philosophie Aristoteles in einer praktischen Wende wieder aufnimmt. Die anfängliche Trennung beider Disziplinen wird somit in Richtung einer Phänomenologie überwunden, die eine phänomenologische Metaphysik miteinschließt und dadurch ihre Spannbreite neu definiert. (shrink)

In den folgenden Überlegungen wird der Frage nachgegangen, welchen Status die Unterscheidung zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Begriff in der Philosophie Husserls hat und inwiefern sie für die Herausarbeitung eines ästhetischen Wissens fruchtbar gemacht werden kann. Husserl formuliert in den Ideen I das „Prinzip aller Prinzipien“ für die Philosophie, „daß jede originär gebende Anschauung eine Rechtsquelle der Erkenntnis sei, daß alles, was sich uns in der ‚Intuition’ originär (sozusagen in seiner leibhaften Wirklichkeit) darbietet, einfach hinzunehmen sei, als was es sich gibt, aber (...) auch nur in den Schranken, in denen es sich da gibt[...].“1 Eine Anschauung ist also die subjektive Erscheinungsweise eines Gegenstandes: Etwas erscheint mir „als“ etwas, d.h. das Selbstsein der Sache ist nicht ein ‚ansich’ Sein, sondern eine „subjektive[], situationsgebundene[] Gegebenheitsweise.“2 Es gibt eine Korrespondenz zwischen der Gegebenheitsweise – dem ‚Wie’ des Erscheinens – und dem Gegenstandsart bzw. dem Gegenstandssinn – dem ‚als Was’ der Gegenstand vermeint ist. Sinnliche und kategoriale Anschauungen konstituieren die Form der Gegenständlichkeit: die sinnliche aus den „Auffassungsstoffen“, die kategoriale aus den „Auffassungsformen“. Sie sind nicht getrennte Bereiche in der husserlschen Phänomenologie, sondern sind durch ein Fundierungsverhältnis3 aufeinander bezogen: Laut den Logischen Untersuchungen ist eine kategoriale Anschauung4 ein durch eine sinnliche Wahrnehmung fundierter intentionaler Akt;in der kategorialen Anschauung erfüllen sich die „kategorial geformten Bedeutungen“.5 Im Unterschied zur sinnlichen Anschauung ist die kategoriale Anschauung durch einen „Überschuss in der Bedeutung“ charakterisiert, denn „nur die in []einem ‚Begriff‘ vereinten Merkmalbedeutungen terminieren in der Wahrnehmung“.6 In seinen späteren Überlegungen erkennt Husserl aber, dass das Kategoriale auf das Nichtkategoriale, auf das Vorprädikative bzw. die passive Synthesis hinweist. Im Folgenden wird daher die These vertreten, dass diese Anerkennung einer passiven, vorkategorialen, ursprünglichen Sinnstiftung und die darauf aufbauende sich stets fortbildende Sinnbildung des identischen Gegenstandes im kontinuierlichen Wahrnehmungsverlauf dem Gegenstand einen sinnlichen Überschuss aufprägt, den die kategoriale Wahrnehmung nicht einzulösen vermag. Diesem Überschuss liegen spezifische Wissensformen zugrunde, die nicht mehr ganz im Sinne Husserl, sondern in Anknüpfung an Platons Politeia als eikasía (Vermutung: den Bildern, eikones, entsprechend) und pístis (Hinnahme, Überzeugung) bestimmt werden können. Im letzten Teil des Vortrages wird schließlich ein auf dem Boden der Lebenswelt aufbauendes Fundierungsverhältnis zwischen ästhetischem und wissenschaftlichem Wissen vorgeschlagen. (shrink)

This paper deals with the problem of the origin of sense and meaning. For Husserl, the determination of the ideal identity of something new can only take place retroactively in the totality of the preceding series by stepping back towards the original foundation of sense. In this regard, J. Derrida questions the ideality of the same as presence and the possibility of retrieving any arché of sense in his writings Speech and Phenomena and Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry. Phenomenology is (...) not oblivious to these difficulties, as results from a closer reading of the correlation between idealities and sensory experience: It will show that there are at least four interrelated gaps in the Husserlian phenomenology which testify the difficulty in grasping a retraceable arché of sense. First, the gap between the ideality of sense and its representation. Second, the gap between sensory and categorial intuitions, whereby both exceed one another. Third, the gap between the ideality of sense and the sense which exceeds our expectations. Fourth, the gap between the experience of the new that overcomes us and its apprehension by consciousness. Hence, there is a fundamental gap between the conceptual idealities and the essential indeterminacy of our phenomenological sensory experience, which is correlative to an excess of one in respect to the other. In this sense, Derrida’s concepts of « différance » and “invention” allow us to conceive of this self-givenness of sense as the expression of its constant self-renewal. This expression takes the form of a trace, which, neither present nor absent, suspends meaning and full presence, leaving the narrative “open” for the reinvention of sense. (shrink)

In her article “Die Irrealität des Kunstwerkes,” first published in 1938, Hedwig Conrad-Martius delves into the question of the artistic representation of the real reality of the world, which basically concerns the classical distinction between art and nature. It is in this context that Conrad-Martius rejects idealism and the concomitant assumption that an artwork imitates the “living reality” of Nature. She clearly distinguishes between the task of phenomenology and that of art: while phenomenology should surpass the sphere of mere sensuous (...) appearances and inquire into the “real reality” (wirkliche Wirklichkeit) of the world, phenomenological aesthetics should conversely deal with the expressive character of appearances and assume their inherent “irreality” (Irrealität), such that phenomenological ontology and aesthetics involve distinctive ontological realms that vary according to the subject-matter. However, while she clearly distances herself from Husserl’s phenomenology in her search for the consciousness-independent facticity of the world, she concurs with him in her eidetic enquiries and in the assertion of the creative potential of art, which lies in the creation of a new, even “irreal,” world. For this purpose, I will explore confluences and divergences between their respective conceptions. (shrink)

In dem Beitrag wird der Frage nachgegangen, wie der Widerstreit zwischen mimesis und methexis eine – so die These – ›atopische Differenz‹ hervorbringt, die den Sinn des Gegenstandes zu einer fortwährenden Bildung zwingt, einen Sinn, der sich weder vollständig erhellen noch in bestehenden Begrifflichkeiten erfassen lässt, sondern sich eher in sinnlichen Erfahrung ausdrückt. Der Begriff der Atopie bedeutet nach Franco Rella , außerhalb unseres Platzes bzw. der Grenzen unserer wahrnehmungsmäßigen und kognitiven Gewohnheiten zu sein. Die hier vorgeschlagene atopische Differenz – (...) eine Differenz, die sich in keinem eigenen Ort bzw. topos idios im Sinne Aristoteles verankern lässt – wandert zwischen dem Abbild und dem Trugbild und entzieht sich unseren Gewohnheiten und übernommenen Begriffen. Um die Voraussetzungen der Repräsentation, wie sie von Platon benannt werden, aufzudecken, soll in einem ersten Schritt das Verhältnis zwischen Urbild und Abbild im Denken Platons vorgestellt werden. Anschließend wird auf Gilles Deleuze’ Schriften Differenz und Wiederholung und Logik des Sinns eingegangen, die die Grundbausteine für eine moderne Aufwertung der mimetischen Praktiken liefern. Der französische Philosoph hebt die Produktion von Trugbildern als eine »Umkehrung des Platonismus« hervor, denn diese reproduzieren nicht mehr das Urbild. In einem dritten Schritt werden die Eigenschaften der Trugbilder anhand der Gemälde des englischen Malers Francis Bacon näher bestimmt. Zum Schluss wird die ›atopische Differenz‹ in ihrer Entstehungsmöglichkeit und ihrer Tragweite näher beleuchtet. Es wird sich herausstellen, dass die Umkehrung des Platonismus nicht nur eine Produktion des Trugbildes ist, sondern auch einen sinnlichen Überschuss verursacht, der sich jeder wesentlichen Bestimmung widersetzt, unlokalisierbar bleibt und die Betrachter affiziert. (shrink)

This article inquires firstly into the descriptive and affective function of images as examples and exemplars in both Cassirer’s and Husserl’s conceptions of perception and aesthetics in order to disclose their respective relationship to reality, that is, mimesis. In view of the correlation between symbolic comportment and symbolic forms at Cassirer, it will secondly show that the ensuing hermeneutical circle can be overcome by taking recourse on Husserl’s genetic analyses on passive sense constitution. It will thus set the basis for (...) a “hermeneutics of expression” that should, thirdly, shed light on the possibility of establishing an aesthetical knowledge. For this purpose, it will disclose an excess of sensuous expression that is determined by a pre-categorial limit-concept within the process of sense-formation. This inquiry shows that, while images as examples are characterized by their ideal arbitrariness, aesthetic images as singular and categorially determined exemplars can be understood as the affective expression of reality. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the Argentine philosopher Eugenio Pucciarelli (1907–1995) and his critical reception of phenomenology. It introduces to his contribution to phenomenology in the context of its early reception in Argentina and addresses the following issues: 1) the mission of philosophy, the various ways of accessing its essence, in particular those of Scheler, Dilthey and Husserl, 2) his reception of Husserl as far as the ideals of science and reason are concerned, 3) the crisis of reason 4) his pluralistic (...) conception of reason and time, and finally, to 5) his humanistic stance. I argue that his conception of philosophy, which emphasizes the personal dimension and the social commitment of philosophical practice as well as the relentless search for unshakeable foundations of knowledge as carried out by Husserl, is underpinned by a pluralistic conception of reason, time and culture that confers Pucciarelli’s philosophizing a humanistic bias. Phenomenology as conceived by Pucciarelli becomes thus an active force by embracing multiple perspectives, such that its methodology can be applied to varying contexts and circumstances. Pucciarelli’s commitment to social justice and Latin American culture responds to the attempt to rescue the virtues and freedom of the individual, which ground human dignity. In short, Pucciarelli’s stance reveals a profound pluralistic humanism that does not neglect its militant and critical function, thus evidencing its relevance to the current sociopolitical situation in Latin America. (shrink)

In his book Welt und Unendlichkeit, László Tengelyi has enquired into the possibility of a phenomenological metaphysics. Among the many issues addressed in his book, he thematized a real necessity of a non-apriori kind at Aristotle and Husserl, a necessity which he called „a necessity of the fact“. His research settled the basis for the present enquiry, which will examine the relationship between the absolute and the conditional necessity of a fact as well as the contingent or accidental features involved (...) therein at Aristotle and Husserl, insofar as facticity is concerned. I intend to show that although both authors share the view that worldly beings are characterized by their contingency, they differ as to their necessity: Aristotle attributes a contingent necessity to the factual being i.e. to reality, a necessity characterized by its being temporarily conditioned by actuality and which can therefore be defined as the ,conditional necessity of a fact‘. As to Husserl, transcendental phenomenology must, upon the basis of the eidetic method, determine the possibilities out of which the ego constitutes the factual world. He states the necessity of the fact as an eidetic necessity, which has to be grounded on eidetic laws. Later on, enquiries into a „metaphysics in new sense“ lead to a revision of the meaning of „fact“ and to an inversion of the order of foundation as well: the original givenness of the world, the primal I, intersubjectivity and historicity as primal and absolute facts carry the eidetic necessities. Accidental causes, on the other hand, account not only for the contingency of the real but, at Husserl, for the ego‘s ,essential openness‘ and its core of primal contingency. In this context, I shall argue that facticity paired with the accidental allows for the irruption of something new that overwhelms us – an event as Ereignis. (shrink)

Summary This paper deals with the development of Husserl’s and Merleau-Pontys analyses of the affective lived experience of body and space. Both the concept of „flesh“ (Merleau-Ponty) and „Hyle“ (Husserl) stand for a sensuous principle that underlies the original givenness and solidarity of body and world and I claim that this interaction and the concomitant intertwining of body and place make up the existential dimension of architecture, i.e. the, being-here-in-a-place’. In this connection, I argue that the fact that bodily affective (...) experience endows the world with sense has led to a double break: On the one hand with representation and on the other with perspectivity and compossibility of the realms of being in Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s respective approaches. Finally, I will exemplify this break and the development of genetic insights – from an anthropocentric, organic and harmonious space conception to a topologic space made up of incompossibilities expressing an ambiguous sense – with paradigmatic works of architecture, so as to make evident the explanatory potential of phenomenology for architecture. (shrink)

Acts of violence develop in relation to place and involve the violation of its very limits. Every significant place is a scene of history, its limits embrace presence and sense. As such, it is the life-worldly home of memory. In this article, I will retrieve the bodily affective dimension of the phenomenon of place memory in instances of public commemoration. Drawing on different philosophical horizons like those of mainly Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Adorno, Ricoeur and Bataille, I’ll contrast their different (...) perspectives on the question of the intertwining of violence, place and memory and refer them to the narrative work of memorials. Insofar violence has been traditionally represented and thereby obliterated by architecture, we may ask how should genocide, as the unspeakable and ungraspable be expressed? I’ll suggest that it can only be attained by the suspension of meaning and presence: A narrative of bodily affections, of pathos, suffering and excess that accounts for what in itself remains beyond expression. (shrink)

Der Beitrag widmet sich der Entwicklung der Untersuchungen Husserls und Merleau-Pontys in Bezug auf die Wechselverhältnisse zwischen Welt, Raum und Leib. Die These besagt, dass die ›genetische‹ Einsicht, die leiblich aff ektive Erfahrung verleihe der Welt einen subjekt-relativen Sinn, anfänglich zu einer Umkehrung des Fundierungsverhältnisses und schließlich zur Ausarbeitung der Urhyle als sinnliches Prinzip bei Husserl geführt hat, während sie Merleau-Ponty dazu verleitet hat, die Unterscheidung ›Bewusstsein-Objekt‹ zu revidieren und eine Ontologie des Fleisches zu entwickeln. Aus dieser Initialthese wird sich (...) zeigen, dass die durch pathische Empfindungen, Gefühle und Stimmungen hervorgebrachte Verschränkung von Leib und Ort die existenzielle Dimension der Raumerfahrung, das ›Hier-in-einem-Ort-zu-sein‹, ausmacht. Der Begriff der Atmosphäre verbindet diese Einsichten mit der Architekturerfahrung: Insofern eine Atmosphäre alle unsere Sinne durch optische und haptische Empfindungen simultan ergreift, gleicht sie einer intensiven Gefühlskraft und stellt die Dauer und die affektive Dimension eines Seins-in-Situation hervor. Sie veranschaulicht somit das Erklärungspotential der genetischen Phänomenologie für die Architektur. (shrink)

The Sublime in a phenomenological sense: The Affective Bodily Experience of Space The aim of the following paper is to redefine the sublime in phenomenological terms, a task long overdue. Departing from Kant, it claims that the phenomenological sublime is an emotion aroused neither by the power of our reason transcending the inadequacy of imagination as it concerns nature, nor by the overwhelming powers of imagination as it concerns an artwork, but by the excess of sensuousness over conceptuality, which is (...) bodily felt. This shift into bodily apprehensions, though advanced by empirical psychologists, took place in the twentieth century resulting from Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's reformulation of the affective sphere of the body and of its concomitant experience of space. Their criticism of compossibility and harmony lead to a disruption of the bodily metaphoric order inherent to artistic representation. This becomes evident in the conception of present architecture, as the works of Tschumi and Eisenman show. The phenomenological emotion of sublimity expresses thus the affective bodily experience of space. (shrink)

La tesis principal sostiene que Descartes, mucho antes que Nietzsche, sentó las bases para la aserción de la fenomenalidad del mundo interno, el cual posee los atributos de certeza e indubitalidad de las que carecen los fenómenos externos de la percepción. Después de un primer analisis del alcance del cógito de las Meditaciones, de la crítica al mismo de Nietzsche y finalmente de la crítica de Heidegger a ambos, se analizan los problemas inherentes a sus respectivos planteos. Mientras que el (...) cógito de las Meditaciones sólo prueba la existencia del ser sustancial inmaterial, el Tratado de las pasiones y ciertas cartas de Descartes permiten la postulación de un �yo� sustrato del compuesto alma-cuerpo que no sólo es sede de las pasiones y acciones, sino que alberga emociones ciertas e indudables que permiten la constitutición de un sujeto de la experiencia afectiva. El análisis de la subjetividad en Nietzsche revelará que, aunque el sujeto es sólo una ficción útil, comparte ciertos rasgos con la subjetividad afectiva postulada: las emociones remiten al mundo exterior en cuanto éste es sentido y, en cuanto le advienen al alma y la afectan irremisiblemente, no pueden ser puestas en duda. (shrink)

Written by two of the leading figures in the field, this is a lucid and systematic introduction to semantics as applied to transformational grammars of the ...

Die Subjektivitat ist das ureigene Grundthema der Phanomenologie. Allerdings kann die Phanomenologie die Subjektivitat nicht zum Thema machen, ohne die Frage nach der Intersubjektivitat zu stellen. Beide Problemfelder sind derart aufeinander bezogen, dass sie nicht unabhangig voneinander behandelt werden konnen. Die Phanomenologie aber eignet sich besonders gut dazu, die Art und Weise der Zusammengehorigkeit von Subjektivitat und Intersubjektivitat zu erforschen, weil sie nicht von vornherein eine ubergreifende Vernunft oder einen allumfassenden Geist zugrunde legt. Vielmehr macht sie gerade die Singularitat des (...) einzelnen Subjekts und sein einmaliges Verhaltnis zu den ebenso singularen Mitsubjekten zum Problem. Diese Einsicht liegt den funfzehn Beitragen des vorliegenden Sammelbandes zugrunde. Dirk Fonfara, Michela Summa, Irene Breuer, Walter Schweidler, Michael Wallner, Alice Pugliese, Meike Siegfried, Anna Orlikowski, Thiemo Breyer, Antonio Cimino, Jesus Guillermo Ferrer Ortega, Christian Rossner, Daniel Biro, Inga Romer und Klaus Held gehen in ihren Beitragen der Frage nach der Subjektivitat und ihrer Bezogenheit auf die Intersubjektivitat aus verschiedenen Perspektiven nach. Dabei kommt immer wieder eine Spannung zwischen den beiden Grundbegriffen zum Vorschein, deren Bedeutung und Reichweite ausgelotet wird. (shrink)

This Agenda 2050 piece is a call to action for management scholars to follow the lead of business associations, foundations, and businesses in studying and understanding the transformative change needed to bring about a more equitable and flourishing world for all living beings—including humans and other‐than‐humans. These entities advocate for a significant paradigm shift in how business is practiced as a way of responding to ‘polycrisis’—the interrelated set of civilization‐threatening crises that includes climate change, social inequality, and biodiversity loss. Yet (...) management scholars lag behind business discourse with issues of sustainability and ecological flourishing, adapting to the type of leadership needed for the future, and understanding the need for system change. We provide four keystone pathways to help scholars shape future discourse in business scholarship, practice, and curricula: 1) structural changes to management education, 2) piloting social impact, 3) development of regenerative business models, and 4) moral, legal, and financial cases for action. (shrink)

This article reconstructs the reception of Fichte’s philosophy in the works of the physician and philosopher A.K.A. Eschenmayer between 1796 and 1801. In 1796/97, Eschenmayer was working on his project of a metaphysics of nature which would be capable of constituting a middle term between the empirical sciences and the transcendental philosophy. In doing so, he explicitly engaged with Kant, on the one hand, and with scientists of the time, on the other hand, while the influence of Fichte is comparatively (...) slight and less easily discerned. In 1798, however, he introduced into his studies of magnetism an explicit recognition of Fichte and a reference to the third principle of the Wissenschaftslehre. In 1799, Eschenmayer adopted a higher standpoint from which it was possible to conceive the genesis of the concepts which up to that point had been merely analysed. This change of viewpoint coincided with a deeper engagement with the works of Fichte. The analysis of the Dedukzion and of Eschenmayer’s explicit references to Fichte that is attempted in the present study leads to the conclusion that Eschenmayer not only adopted some terminology typical of Fichtean philosophy but also integrated into his deduction several theoretical elements developed by Fichte. The reconstruction of the influences that Fichte exercised on Eschenmayer’s thought is fundamental to an understanding of the theoretical position of Eschenmayer and the point of view from which in 1801 he formulated his criticism of Schelling’s idea of nature as autarchic and as its own legislator.Der Beitrag rekonstruiert die Rezeption der Philosophie Fichtes in den Werken des Arztes und Philosophen A.K.A Eschenmayer aus den Jahren 1796 bis 1801. 1796/97 verfolgt Eschenmayer das Ziel, eine Naturmetaphysik zu entwickeln, die als Mittelglied zwischen den empirischen Wissenschaften und der Transzendentalphilosophie fungieren soll. Dabei setzt er sich einerseits mit Kant und andererseits mit den Wissenschaftlern seiner Zeit auseinander. Der Einfluss von Fichte auf Eschenmayer ist hingegen vergleichsweise gering und nicht leicht festzustellen. Dennoch erkennt Eschenmayer bereits in seiner Studie zum Magnetismus aus dem Jahr 1798 das Verdienst Fichtes an und verweist auf den dritten Grundsatz der Wissenschaftslehre. Im Jahr 1799 erhebt sich Eschenmayer insofern zu einem höheren Standpunkt, als er nun die Genese der Begriffe entfaltet, die er vorher bloß analysiert hatte. Diese Änderung des Standpunktes führt Eschenmayer zu einer tieferen Auseinandersetzung mit den Werken Fichtes. Die in diesem Beitrag durchgeführte Untersuchung der Passagen aus Eschenmayers Dedukzion, in denen sich explizite Verweise auf Fichte finden, hat zu dem Schluss geführt, dass Eschenmayer sich nicht nur Fichtes Terminologie zu eigen macht, sondern auch mehrere von Fichte aufgestellte Theorien in seine eigene Deduktion integriert. Die Rekonstruktion der Einflüsse Fichtes auf Eschenmayer ist nicht nur für ein besseres Verständnis der Philosophie Eschenmayers unentbehrlich, sondern trägt auch zum Verständnis des Standpunktes bei, von dem aus Eschenmayer im Jahre 1801 Kritik an Schellings Idee der Natur als ihrer eigenen Gesetzgeberin übt. (shrink)

For cognitivist accounts of aesthetic appreciation, appreciation requires an agent (1) to perceptually respond to the relevant aesthetic features of an object o on good evidential grounds, (2) to have an autonomous grasp of the reasons that make the claim about the aesthetic features of o true by pointing out the connection between non-aesthetic features and the aesthetic features of o, (3) to be able to provide an explanation of why those features contribute to the overall aesthetic value of o. (...) In this framework, aesthetic emotions have traditionally been confined to the level of aesthetic perception (1) and dismissed from the process of reason-giving (2, 3). I argue that this dismissal is due, firstly, to a questionable perceptual reading of the connection between emotional experience and value, and, secondly, to a narrow focus on the basic emotions. My argument will reveal that the non-standard or ‘intellectual’ emotions, the emotions which are in fact most important to appreciation, can play a significant epistemic role in our appreciative practices. They can do this because they (a) help us to deliberately focus our attention and (b) place the appreciator in a state of second-order awareness of their mental states. I conclude the paper by showing how these two epistemic tools (a, b) can help the appreciator to meet the explanatory/justificatory conditions (2) and (3). (shrink)

La identificación de Granada con el icono del fruto del granado en los atlas náuticos de al-Šarafī alimenta una imagen evocadora del reino nazarí, a la vez que solidaria con los exiliados moriscos en el contexto de la defensa turco-otomana del Islam en el Mediterráneo. Tanto la imagen de Granada como de la Sierra de Segura en la cartografía náutica mediterránea plantea interesantes cuestiones de tipo conceptual y estilístico pero, sobre todo, documenta la interacción entre las tradiciones magrebí-andalusí y mallorquina. (...) La carta de al-Mursī se presenta aquí como testimonio de ello. (shrink)

The commentaries on the Ethica nova and the Ethica vetus written by some masters of the arts – presumably operating in the Paris faculty – in the first half of the thirteenth century expound in an original way the doctrine of the virtutes consuetudinales which Aristotle, at the end of the first book of his Ethica (I 13), distinguishes into the two main classes of the “moral virtues” and the “intellectual virtues”. The present paper aims at highlighting the particularly important (...) task which is assigned to the intellectual virtues in these early commentaries: joining man to God directly, through a contemplation which becomes love. The masters of the arts maintain that the moral virtues, in spite of the definition given by Aristotle (habitus a quo quis bonus est et opus eius bene reddit), are not sufficient alone to bring man to perfection, but that other more perfect virtues, namely the intellectual ones, are needed in order to make him know and love the supreme good. Having no knowledge of the sixth book of the Ethica, in which Aristotle deals in particular with the intellectual virtues, our masters know only their general description and are concerned with clarifying their relationships with the moral virtues, compared to which they appear to be sometimes really distinct and sometimes united to them in sharing the recta ratio, so much that they may constitute a double virtue. Although the masters of the arts seem to be well-informed about the teaching of the theologians – which they often cite without opposing to it, albeit stressing their own philosophical point of view –, it is significant that no reference whatsoever is made by them to the theological virtues and that they have recourse to the themes of Avicennian mysticism such as the doctrine of the two faces of the soul. Besides presenting the commentaries on the Ethica vetus from a general point of view, I will focus on the Paris commentary in Ethicam veterem (Paris BN lat. 3804A, ff. 152ra-159vb, 241ra-247vb; Paris BN lat. 3572, ff. 226ra-235ra), of which I am preparing a critical edition. The Paris commentary contains in fact a special and original discussion of the doctrine of the virtutes intellectuales. (shrink)

Arts, Real-Time Video and Interactivity for Sustainability is an ongoing collaborative research project investigating how real-time video, DIY surveillance technologies and sensor data can be used as a tool for environmental awareness, activism and artistic explorations. The project consists of a series of digital contexts for aesthetic contemplation of nature and civic engagement, aiming to foster awareness and empowerment of local populations through DIY surveillance. At the core of the ARTIVIS efforts are a series of interactive installations, that make use (...) of surveillance technologies and real-time video as raw material to promote environmental awareness through the emotion generated by real-time connections with nature. Throughout the project development, the surveillance concept has been shifting from the use of surveillance technology in a centralized platform, to the idea of veillance with distributed peer-to-peer networks that can be used for science and environmental monitoring. In this paper we present the history of the ARTiVIS project, related and inspiring work, describe ongoing research work and explore the present and future challenges of appropriating surveillance technology for artistic, educational and civic engagement purposes. (shrink)

Jenefer Robinson believes that feelings can play an important role in the critical evaluation of artworks. In this paper, I want to put some pressure on two important notions in her theory: emotional understanding and affective empathy. I will do this by focusing on the nature of self-conscious emotions. My strategy will be, firstly, to demonstrate the difficulty that Robinson’s two step theory of emotions has in accommodating higher cognitive emotional responses to art. Secondly, I will discuss how the tight (...) connection to the ‘self’ involved in self-conscious emotions makes it difficult to take the emotional perspective of another person as empathy requires. From here, I suggest that Peter Goldie’s feeling-towards and his critique of perspective-shifting may give a better understanding of the role of emotions in the appreciation of art, particularly in the case of reflective emotions. This issue will be explored through a discussion of the expression of autobiographical nostalgia in the work of the avant-garde filmmaker Jonas Mekas. (shrink)

Thanks to Chenu’s and Gregory’s studies, twelfth-century discovery of Nature is became a major topic in philosophical historiography. During the last four decades, many quality publications were devoted to Nature and philosophy of Nature in the twelfth century. Recent scholarship paid much attention to medicine, astrology, translators and translations, Aristotelian philosophy. Finally, the picture is very complex and rich. The article gives an overview of the different philosophical and scientific traditions and outlines some new directions for future research.

This chapter compares the institutional setting and integrations processes in Switzerland and the EU. The major findings are that EU integration is trying to achieve more political integration and accommodation of a much higher degree of diversity in much less time than has ever been the case in Switzerland. Integration and expansion processes that were slower and non-linear in Switzerland and that happened in separate phases (e.g. religious diversification, linguistic diversification, territorial expansion, etc.) are all going on at the same (...) time in the EU. Especially integration and accession with enormous shocks of diversification are engineered at the same time in the EU. From this point of view, the EU has already tried to go beyond many stages that took centuries to be completed in Switzerland. The institutional design of the European Union seems to echo quite well the federal state formation process in Switzerland. The following precisions are however necessary in the comparative perspective. First, the momentary stage of European Integration, characterized by intergovernmental crisis management, resembles the (dysfunctional) intergovernmental centralism of the Swiss cantons during the decades before the formation of the federal-state in 1848. Second, due to the greater diversity of the European Union, this quasi-federal system has derived in extreme asymmetries between the member states. Since EU identity is not well entrenched among European citizens (and politicians), it has been hard to design institutions and policies of common territorial protection and redistribution and there is mistrust towards centralistic EU institutions (specially in the countries more affected by the economic crisis). Most European citizens do not feel that their interests are taken into account by the European Union. Third, it is important to note that in Swiss federalism the municipalities play an important role, they are much more than just administrative districts. This city-centred and bottom up construct of citizenship is guaranteed by the Swiss federal constitution. Citizens feel that their most immediate and local identity is not jeopardized but rooted in and guaranteed by the Swiss federal constitution. Compared to sub-national Swiss federalism, EU federalism is entirely focused on the nation-state and the EU institutions. Serious consideration ought to be given to the idea that European citizenship is not only about bringing citizenship to a higher European level but also about bringing it more to the root-level of citizenship: the city. Direct democracy has acted as a federator in the Swiss context. Switzerland made direct democracy and direct democracy made Switzerland. There has been a slow and iterative process of adaptation of structurally similar institutions of direct democracy at all levels (communal, cantonal, federal) of all units (all communes, all cantons, confederation roughly between 1830-1891. To the contrary, the EU is only incipiently in a process of introducing direct democracy (in some member-states and ECI), and so far direct democracy is mainly practiced as national plebiscitary democracy. Under this guise it is seen as a threat to EU integration and probably not without good reason. While in Switzerland the coherent introduction of direct democracy at all levels of the polity in the long run served as an important unifier, direct democracy has even not been considered as integrative part of all levels of political integration in the EU. It is of great interest that the one element in which the European Union has based the construction of EU citizenship and identity – mobility of residence – has been implicitly discouraged in Switzerland. The institutional design as incorporated in Swiss multicultural identity (which aims fundamentally at the protection of cantonal autonomy, culture and language) has facilitated that Switzerland is called today a successful multicultural society. Most citizens identify with Switzerland as a country and they like it as it is, but they do not want to take advantage of their formal right to move to other parts of the country, especially not across language borders. The same institutional design that has made of Switzerland a successful case of multiculturalism and democracy poses important barriers that make it difficult for the Swiss to move their residence across their country. Considering that one of the main features of European citizenship is the freedom of movement and residence, this poses a main concern. The Swiss compromise between the formal right and economic necessity of mobility on the one hand and the protection of political and cultural sub-identities on the other hand, is commuting. Due to the vast size, this is of limited applicability in the EU. However, in a Europe of cities and trans-border regions, commuting is an important option provided that every European citizen lives reasonably close to an important economic centre. In short, the Europe of commuters deserves attention in the context of EU citizenship. (shrink)