Problems of and explanations for evil -- Neo-cartesianism -- Animal suffering and the fall -- Nobility, flourishing, and immortality : animal pain and animal well-being -- Natural evil, nomic regularity, and animal suffering -- Chaos, order, and evolution -- Combining CDs.

Florijn’s helpful discussion of the Heringa case illustrates the difficulties in drawing a boundary on eligibility conditions for EAS. In Heringa, the Dutch Supreme Court reaffirmed...

It has recently been suggested that the fact that punishment involves an intention to cause suffering undermines expressive justifications of punishment. I argue that while punishment must involve harsh treatment, harsh treatment need not involve an intention to cause suffering. Expressivists should adopt this conception of harsh treatment.

It is commonly understood that in its focus on rights and obligations law is centrally concerned with organising responsibility. In defining how obligations are created, in contract or property law, say, or imposed, as in tort, public, or criminal law, law and legal institutions are usually seen as society’s key mode of asserting and defining the content and scope of responsibilities. This book takes the converse view: legal institutions are centrally involved in organising irresponsibility. Particularly with respect to the production (...) of large-scale harms – including extensive human rights violations, forms of colonialism, or environmental or nuclear devastation – and in opposition to conventional understandings of responsibility in law, morality and politics, the book provides a detailed analysis of the ways in which legal institutions – their practices, concepts, and categories – themselves operate as much to deflect responsibility for harms suffered as they do to acknowledge them. Drawing on a series of case studies from local, national, and global concerns the book analyses how law facilitates dispersals and disavowals of responsibility, and it shows how it does so in consistent and patterned ways. In assessing how this ‘organised irresponsibility’ operates, and what its consequences are for both legal analysis and society generally, a thoroughgoing re-evaluation of law’s methods, operation, and consequences is required. At stake is nothing less than a fundamental re-assessment of the role of modern law in the production and legitimation of human suffering. This innovative and interdisciplinary book provides a sustained challenge to conventional thinking about law and legal institutions. It will be of major interest to those working in law, political and legal theory, sociology and moral philosophy. (shrink)

Believing in God requires not only a leap of faith but also an extension of people’s normal capacity to perceive the minds of others. Usually, people perceive minds of all kinds by trying to understand their conscious experience (what it is like to be them) and their agency (what they can do). Although humans are perceived to have both agency and experience, humans appear to see God as possessing agency, but not experience. God’s unique mind is due, the authors suggest, (...) to the uniquely moral role He occupies. In this article, the authors propose that God is seen as the ultimate moral agent, the entity people blame and praise when they receive anomalous harm and help. Support for this proposition comes from research on mind perception, morality, and moral typecasting. Interestingly, although people perceive God as the author of salvation, suffering seems to evoke even more attributions to the divine. (shrink)

A large part of the debate around the right to refuse life-prolonging treatment of anorexia nervosa sufferers centers on the issue of competence. Whether or not the anorexic should be allowed to refuse life-saving treatment does not depend solely or primarily on competence. It also depends on whether the anorexic’s suffering is bearable or tractable, and on the degree of involvement of the family in the therapeutic process. Anorexics could be competent to refuse lifesaving treatment (Giordano 2008). However, the (...) anorexic’s refusal of life-saving treatment should not be respected purely because it is a competent decision. In fact, anorexia has two characteristics that weaken the strength of the principle .. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate compassion and its place within mindfulness-based approaches. Compassion is an orientation of mind that recognizes pain and the universality of pain in human experience and the capacity to meet that pain with kindness, empathy, equanimity and patience. We outline how learning to meet pain with compassion is part of how people come to live with chronic conditions like recurrent depression. While most mindfulness-based approaches do not explicitly teach compassion, we describe how the structure of the (...) programme and teachers' embodiment enable participants to cultivate compassion in the landscape of suffering. We describe a case example of how this process unfolded for someone through mindfulness-based cognitive therapy. (shrink)

In his recent book Is a Good God Logically Possible? and article by the same name, James Sterba argued that the existence of significant and horrendous evils, both moral and natural, is incompatible with the existence of God. He advances the discussion by invoking three moral requirements and by creating an analogy with how the just state would address such evils, while protecting significant freedoms and rights to which all are entitled. I respond that his argument has important ambiguities and (...) that consistent application of his moral principles will require that God remove all moral and natural evils. This would deleteriously restrict not only human moral decision making, but also the knowledge necessary to make moral judgments. He replies to this critique by appealing to the possibility of limited divine intervention, to which I rejoin with reasons why his middle ground is not viable. (shrink)

Feeding difficulties in older patients who are suffering from dementia present problems with balancing conflicting ethical principles. They have been considered by several writers in recent years, and the views of nursing and care staff have been studied in different contexts. The present study used focus groups to explore the way in which nursing and care staff in a National Health Service trust deal with conflict between ethical principles in this area. Three focus groups were convened, one each from (...) the staff of three wards caring for patients with dementia. Case histories were discussed and transcripts analysed. It emerged that staff were aware of making fine judgements of utility concerning the spectrum of feeding methods available. Informants gave some weight to the principle of autonomy, but sought to balance that against their commitment to care. In explaining their perspectives, informants gave more weight to personal attitudes and trust culture than to professional ethics. (shrink)

Context: Despite the fact that pain and body awareness are by definition subjective experiences, most studies assessing these phenomena and the relationship between them have done so from a “third-person” perspective, meaning that they have used methods whose aim is to try to objectify the phenomena under study. Problem: This article assesses the question of what is the impact of a widespread chronic pain condition in the bodily experience of persons suffering from fibromyalgia. Method: I used an interview methodology (...) stemming from a phenomenological approach called the “elicitation interview.” Results: The results indicate that the intensification of fibromyalgia pain does in fact affect different aspects of body awareness: in particular, experienced body size, weight and localization, as well as the experience of owning one’s own body. In addition, these disruptions in patient’s body awareness have as a result, a modification of the experience of pain, leading to the apparently paradoxical experience of being in pain while not feeling it. Implications: The elicitation interview approach made it possible to gather and analyze descriptions of the bodily experience of persons suffering from fibromyalgia. This approach allowed the consideration of the hypothesis that the disruption of implicit knowledge of the topography of patients’ bodies prevents them from referring to the pain sensation in terms of its localization and intensity, transforming the sensation in a way that is experienced as paradoxical. Further studies should be conducted that focus on the interplay between attention, pain and body perception. Constructivist content: The study presented in this article is framed within the perspective that the study of conscious phenomena should consider a first-person perspective, which is in line with constructivist approaches. (shrink)

This study reviews the ethical dilemmas of nursing staff about using restraints on patients suffering from dementia in two types of health care settings in Israel: internal medicine wards of three general hospitals; and psychogeriatric wards of three nursing homes. The nurses’ level of knowledge about the Patient’s Rights Law, the Israeli Code of Ethics, and the guidelines on restraints was analysed. The purposes of restraints were defined as beneficial to: (1) the patient; (2) other patients; or (3) the (...) institution. The concept was evaluated in a realistic situation (expressing views of daily practice) and in an idealistic situation (expressing personal and professional beliefs and values). It was shown that nurses in internal medicine wards of general hospitals agreed more with the use of restraints than those in psychogeriatric wards in nursing homes. Differences were more pronounced when restraints were beneficial to the institution. In addition, nurses working in psychogeriatric wards of nursing homes had more knowledge about the guidelines on restraints and were less inclined than their counterparts to agree with the use of restraints for the benefit of other patients or the institution. (shrink)

David Benatar claims that everyone was seriously harmed by coming into existence. To spare future persons from this suffering, we should cease having children, Benatar argues, with the result that humanity would gradually go extinct. Benatar’s claim of universal serious harm is baseless. Each year, an estimated 94% of children born throughout the world do not have a serious birth defect. Furthermore, studies show that most people do not experience chronic pain. Although nearly everyone experiences acute pain and discomforts, (...) such as thirst, these experiences have instrumental value. For example, when a person picks up a hot object, in response to the pain, the person releases the object, thereby preventing serious harm. The standard that Benatar uses to evaluate the quality of our lives is arbitrary, as I will demonstrate. His proposal that we phase humanity out of existence by ceasing to have children is misguided and an overreaction to the problem of human suffering. The ‘threshold conception of harm’, which is a targeted approach for preventing future persons from suffering, is a more sensible approach. (shrink)

The existence and extent of animal suffering provides grounds for a serious evidential challenge to theism. In the wake of the Darwinian revolution, this strain of natural atheology has taken on substantially greater significance. In this essay we argue that there are at least four neo-Cartesian views on the nature of animal minds which would serve to deflect this evidential challenge.

Over the past years, various accounts of ethical consumption have been produced which identify certain concepts as central to mediating the ethical relationship between the consumer and the consumed. Scholars across disciplinary fields have explored how individuals construe their ethical consumption responsibilities and commitments through the notions of identity, taking care and doing good, proximity and distance, suggesting the centrality of these themes to consumer engagement in ethical practices. This paper contributes to the body of research concerned with unravelling consumers’ (...) conceptually mediated relationship to moral and ethical issues in the sphere of consumption by revealing a new set of ideas through which people interpret and relate to consumption ethics. Drawing upon findings from an empirical study on self-perceived ethical food consumers, I demonstrate that people’s perceptions and views of ethical problems around consumption are bound up with notions of vulnerability, suffering, and harm, and that these notions permeate and impact all aspects of ethical consumer behaviour. The paper concludes by arguing that we need to further explore the conceptual underpinnings of ethical consumer commitments and practices, and expand the conceptual toolkit of research on ethical consumption to account for a wider range of ideas and notions that shape individual as well as collective motivations, intentions, and actions throughout the process of becoming and being an ethical consumer. Finally, the paper suggests a specific analytical framework to facilitate such research. (shrink)

In this article I claim that service-learning experiences, wherein students work directly with individuals in need—individuals from whom studentscan learn what they cannot learn elsewhere—are invaluable, and perhaps necessary, for any curriculum with an aim toward the development of ethical understanding, personal moral character and commitment, and/or conscientious citizenship, both local and global. My argument rests on Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophical ethical theory that re-envisions the ethical relation as arising out of revelation from the unique and precious Other, rather than reason (...) and the rational determinations and conceptions of the ethical agent. (shrink)

Traditional Turkish love is identified with suffering. This study investigates how suffering in love is metaphorically conceptualized in Turkish via natural phenomena and disasters. Based on figura...

This paper examines one particular justification for the screening and termination of embryos/fetuses which possess genetic features known to cause disability. The particular case is that put forward in several places by John Harris. He argues that the obligation to prevent needless suffering justifies the prevention of the births of disabled neonates. The paper begins by rehearsing Harris's case. Then, drawing upon claims advanced in a recent paper in the Journal of Medical Ethics, it is subjected to critical scrutiny, (...) focusing on Harris's “suffering claim” .1 It is argued that the suffering claim must be false if understood as an empirical claim. And, even if understood as a conceptual truth, it mistakenly assimilates the concepts of harm and suffering. Finally, again focusing on Harris's recent work in this area, his characterisation of disability as a “harmed condition” is shown not to apply in the case of at least some moderate forms of intellectual disability. (shrink)

The chapter explores the sufferingSufferingassociated with MAIDMedical Assistance in Dying (MAID) giving special attention to assessmentAssessment and the psychological responses elicited in caregivers highlighting the need for all MAIDMedical Assistance in Dying (MAID) enquiries to activate a period of intense assessmentAssessment and the provision of detailed treatment alternatives. This chapter calls for a renewed commitment to compassionCompassion (‘sufferingSuffering together with’) as the communal dynamic to relieve and assuage such sufferingSuffering. Using the four domains of ‘total pain’ (Saunders in The management (...) of terminal malignant disease. Edward Arnold, London, UK, 1978), we summarize the evidence for the multiple opportunities available to ‘relieve often and comfort always.’ Finally, we review evidence on the impactImpactof MAIDMedical Assistance in Dying (MAID) suggesting that the overall burden of sufferingSuffering in Canada has increased since legalization. (shrink)

This paper explores the ways in which a fuller attention to suffering in the tradition of the early Frankfurt School might valuably inform international political thought. Recent poststructural writing argues that trauma is silenced to prevent it disrupting narratives of order and progress and instead advocates a continual ‘encircling’ of trauma that refuses incorporation into a broader historical narrative. This paper welcomes this challenge to mainstream international ethics: attention to particular suffering provides an important challenge to the abstraction, (...) instrumentalism and universalism of modernity. However, if we simply mark trauma and refuse to incorporate it into any kind of narrative, we cannot profit from the ways in which suffering can illuminate the structures and ways of thinking that create it. Drawing on Adorno's negative dialectics, the paper argues that a dialectical understanding of the relationship between universalising order and disrupting particularity can lead from individual suffering towards a political re-engagement with the universal. (shrink)

Ethics in caring is what we actually make explicit through our approach and how we invite the suffering patient into a caring relationship. This phenomenological study investigates suffering and health and how this presupposes a deeper reflection on ethics in caring. The aim was to try to discover, describe and understand how patients experience their life situation three years after undergoing surgery. The theoretical approach is based on central aspects of Eriksson’s caritative theory (i.e. the view of the (...) person as body, soul and spirit). The informants were four women and four men aged between 55 and 77 years. The empirical material revealed suffering that was connected with both illness and life. Suffering involves experiences of grief, loneliness and struggling. Health implies a yearning for something beyond the current life situation, a yearning to experience some meaning in life. This leads to an awareness of unplumbed possibilities. Understanding the experiences of individual patients demands of us, as both researchers and nurses, to act, seeking after the scientific truth (i.e. a deeper reflection of the ontological, epistemological and methodological questions). The idea of responsibility helps us to interpret and meet the innermost desires of suffering patients in their true presence. Caritative caring ethics means ‘being there’, confirming patients’ absolute dignity; it is a manifestation of the love that ‘just exists’. Compassion requires an inner disposition to go with others to the places where they are weak, vulnerable, lonely and broken. An ontology of caring provides both a starting point and a context for reflection about ethics and the ethical life. (shrink)

I present ideas about human suffering that are salient among the black peoples of sub-Saharan Africa, reconstruct them in order to make them relevant to an international audience with philosophical interests, and urge that audience to give them consideration as alternatives or correctives to some dominant Western approaches. I first recount views commonly held by sub-Saharans about the nature, causes and cures of suffering, and then draw on them to articulate an account of it qua enervation, which rivals (...) a neuro-physical perspective that friends of Western science would readily adopt. Then, I address the way one morally should respond to suffering, appealing to judgments about the value of community that are influential among Africans. I show that, upon theoretical refinement, an Afro-communitarianism entails an ethical analysis of suffering that seriously competes with those entailed by standard Western moral philosophies. This view instructs moral agents neither to make others suffer because they deserve it, as per Kantian retributivism, nor to do whatever will minimize suffering, à la utilitarianism. Instead, it roughly prescribes responding to suffering out of love, which can require increasing the amount of suffering in the world by taking it upon oneself, instead of leaving it to others to bear on their own. (shrink)

Taking John Paul II's teaching on the Christian meaning of suffering as my main source for a Catholic perspective on suffering, I show how seriously he takes the reality of suffering, and how seriously he takes the question as to the meaning of suffering. I proceed to explore his many-sided teaching on the way in which sin is and is not involved in the meaning of suffering, giving particular attention to his teaching on social dimensions (...) of sin and suffering that are little understood in the individualistic West today. The heart of his teaching on suffering lies in his explication of how it is that we have to be conformed in our suffering to the suffering of Christ so as to share in His resurrection. But it is not the suffering as such but the love that we are called to live when we suffer, that incorporates us into the risen Christ. (shrink)

Les études sur le corps du siècle des Lumières se sont longtemps appuyées sur les traités de médecine, reprenant ainsi les représentations médicales plutôt que celles des malades. Les écrits ordinaires, parmi lesquels on peut compter les consultations épistolaires, permettent toutefois d’appréhender les perceptions corporelles des femmes du xviiie siècle. Ces lettres, envoyées par les malades à leur médecin, forment de véritables biographies médicales et constituent des sources d’une grande richesse pour explorer les écritures féminines du corps. On peut ainsi (...) mettre en évidence des manières spécifiques d’écrire le corps au féminin tout en soulignant les points communs avec les écritures masculines. (shrink)

Uma tese fundamental para a tradição cristã é a de que _todas as coisas que acontecem no mundo acontecem sob a providência divina. _Assim, também o sofrimento dos seres humanos precisa ser compreendido à luz da noção de providência, e o sofrimento de um justo como Jó ou de uma comunidade humana inteira como os escravos no Brasil colonial parece especialmente desconcertante. Uma interpretação recente enfatiza a função terapêutica das adversidades. Contudo, uma visão cuidadosa de alguns textos de Tomás de (...) Aquino e de Antônio Vieira apontam para a limitação humana quanto à plena compreensão da providência divina bem como para a imprescindibilidade da fé na providência de Deus. (shrink)

For ages one phase of Indian thought has grappled with exactly this problem. To be in the world is to be subject to limitations--conditionings--of power, of knowledge, and of freedom. So man's suffering is a result of his being in the world--of his being a link in this chain of becomings. His suffering is tied up with temporality and illusion--with mäyä. Suffering is a cosmic necessity; it is one of the modes of reality, a law of worldly (...) existence. If so, what are the limits of the various forces that condition man--that bind and fetter him? If we know this, then man can be deconditioned, freed from suffering and temporality and taken into another mode of existence, where he enjoys spontaneity and freedom. Thus universality of suffering need not lead to a philosophy of pessimism, for realization of it is a necessary condition for emancipation. The quest for the beyond, for transcendence, will start only when this world and this mode of life are depreciated and rejected. The quest presupposes that there is something beyond becoming, temporality, and suffering; and that it is possible for man to decondition and free himself completely. The immemorial experience of the sages who have gone beyond and reached "the other shore," after discovering the ford and the ferry which will sail them across this ocean of suffering and becoming, testifies to the reality of transcendence and complete freedom. Such was the conclusion reached by one trend of Indian thought. (shrink)

This article investigates the hypothesis that greater human-livestock intimacy can deter cruelty and mitigate suffering in the industrial production of animals for human consumption. The history of industrial agriculture in North America is one of increasingly utilitarian, profit-based, and technologically mediated relationships between humans and the animals they raise and kill for food. Under what circumstances is the physical and emotional distance between producers, consumers, and consumed animals an impetus toward uncaring and irresponsible relationships? Do even intimate interspecies encounters (...) in livestock production involve cruelty and suffering? This article addresses these questions and evaluates reform options by attending to both the localized arrangements and systemic structures of industrial livestock production. Finally, it proposes a risk-mapping strategy to assess the plausibility of caring intimacies in livestock production. (shrink)

This paper develops an analysis of the relationship between politics and suffering in the writings of Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Both thinkers uphold the tragic idea of suffering as a crucible in which the uniquely human powers of self-creation - having reached, apparently, their lowest point - are revealed in all of their grand majesty. Yet they diverge dramatically when it comes to working out the political implications of this idea. Whereas Hölderlin deploys the tragic (...) revaluation of suffering on behalf of democracy, Nietzsche deploys this same revaluation against democracy. My argument suggests that the differences between Hölderlin and Nietzsche refer more to their different points in the development of the modern age than to any substantive difference in the structure of their thinking, and that unearthing Nietzsche's origins in Hölderlin enables us to retrieve the wider compass of the idea of suffering on which Nietzsche relies in developing his critique of modern democratic politics, and so also a wider compass for settling some of the debates that have arisen around his political thought. Key Words: democracy • Hölderlin • Nietzsche • suffering • tragedy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.1 (2003) 63-66 [Access article in PDF] The Pragmatics of Psychiatry and the Psychiatry of Cross-Cultural Suffering Jennifer Radden I AM IN SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT with many of the conclusions David Brendel draws in his thoughtful discussion. Misleading language aside, I particularly applaud his use of my plea for ontological descriptivism to support clinical practice, which respects, as he puts it, the subjectively "melancholic" person (...) living behind the objectively "depressed" clinical presentation.Brendel offers two main critiques of my discussion about the relationship between today's depression and melancholia of past eras. First, he asserts that I neglect the relevance of causal reasoning in my preference for a descriptivist over a causal ontology. Second, arguing that pragmatic considerations ought to be, as he says, front and center when philosophers and psychiatrists "grapple with the complexities of psychiatric explanation," (Brendel 2003, 54) he questions what he sees as my too ready dismissal of pragmatism in this discussion. Allegiance to pragmatism seems to me to sit strangely with support for a causal ontology, as I shall try to demonstrate. But first let me comment on these two sides of Brendel's commentary.The case of Van Gogh's alleged melancholia is particularly well chosen because there has been continuing debate about Van Gogh's condition, including scholarly work attributing it to an inherited metabolic disorder (Arnold 1992). Brendel's suggestion that a causal ontology might allow us to use historical evidence to throw light on the relation between depression and melancholia is an interesting and fruitful one that I had overlooked. Brendel also holds hope for drug cartography as a means of determining the causes of mental disorders. I admit to the initial plausibility of the approach to classification employed by drug cartography, of course. Diagnostic maps must be evaluated according to their effectiveness for the purposes they serve, and cannot—or should not—be seen as mere descriptions of natural phenomena. And maps based on psychopharmacological effects will serve one of the most important purposes we can have in relation to mental disorders: their successful treatment. Nonetheless, as I indicated in my essay, there are conceptual limitations to drug cartography. That several different syndromes respond to the same drug is suggestive, but it does not tell us anything definitive about structural similarities or differences between those different disorders. Nor, from the fact that a condition is alleviated by drugs, does it follow that a particular brain state was the initiating cause of that condition.My dismissal of a pragmatic approach in the foregoing discussion may have been overly hasty. [End Page 63] But in trying to make good this omission, I find myself struck by the complexity of the task. There appear to be at least five different places where a pragmatic response might be called for: (1) in deciding what to say about the relationship between depression and melancholia; (2) in determining the structure of any given psychiatric classification; (3) in choosing between what I have called descriptivist and causal ontologies; (4) in electing a course or method of treatment in the clinical context; and (5) in evaluating psychiatric explanations.With regard to (1), I have sketched in a note one pragmatic consideration in favor of equating melancholia and depression: by so doing, we might reinvest depressive states with some of the glamorous associations from the past and so diminish the stigma and provide some compensation and consolation for the suffering attaching to depression. Pragmatic reasoning may be perfectly appropriate here. I beg to point out that pragmatic considerations let me neglect it.With regard to (2), I recognize that psychiatric classifications are not so much identifications of natural kinds as responses to our various purposes; indeed, this point is offered as one drawback of adopting a causal analysis, because there is little reason to expect our purposes, which are a product of culture, to correspond to natural arrangements, which are not.With regard to (3), if there were overriding pragmatic considerations that favored accepting one or the other of these ontologies, then perhaps this would be... (shrink)

How does the clinical encounter work? To tackle this question, the present study centers on the paradigmatic clinical encounter, namely, psychoanalysis, paradigmatic in that it is structured by the encounter itself. Our question thus becomes: how does the clinical encounter work, when its only modality is speech? By reading Jacques Lacan and Emmanuel Levinas together, we better identify how speech sets up as subjects those who address one another and how this subjectivation touches the suffering body specifically. In this (...) framework, a definition of the encounter is put to work: The encounter of a sufferer and a listener, that is, the clinical encounter, is the opening of an inter-human space beyond suffering. This conception of the encounter permits a specifying of the violence it avoids—respecting the transcendence of the other irreducibly other—but also the violence that it mobilizes—through a presumption of subjectivity imposed upon the other, by which the subjectivation at work in the encounter is, by definition, a subjection to the other. This outlines, then, an ethics of the clinical encounter: a relationship of man to man commanded by one sensing body to another, i.e. a minimal and therefore radical ethics that is structured as a sensible ethics between speaking bodies. (shrink)

Purpose: To analyze how individual characteristics and the social context are associated with mental distress symptoms in the Brazilian population.Method: A multilevel cross-sectional study with data from the 2013 National Health Survey. There were two dependent variables: decreased vital energy and somatic symptoms, the presence of depressive thoughts. The independent variables were biological characteristics, education and income, habits and lifestyle, and context variables. Bivariate analysis was performed, and Prevalence Ratios calculated in a Poisson Regression. A multilevel Poisson Regression was performed (...) to verify the effect of individual and contextual variables.Results: Regarding depressive thoughts, young and middle-aged individuals, low education, women, absence of partner, smokers or former smokers, and absence of health insurance were the categories at highest risk; belonging to classes D-E and living in states with lower expected years of schooling proved to be protective factors. Similar results were found for the second outcome.Conclusions: Symptoms of mental distress were associated with the individual characteristics and contextual aspects of the federation unit. These findings indicate the importance of strengthening psychosocial care aimed at vulnerable groups. (shrink)

Philosophy of religion, approached from a comparative perspective, can be a valuable tool for advancing inter-religious dialogue. Unfortunately, “comparative religion” today is usually characterised by two extreme positions: 1) Comparing religions in order to come to the conclusion that one's own religion is superior 2) Arguing for a type of “religious pluralism” that relativises all religious truth claims. -/- The former approach reduces religion to a confrontational form of apologetics, theatrical “debates” and polemics, while the latter reduces religion to a (...) mere acceptance of pragmatically useful perspectivist narratives devoid of absolute reality or truth. -/- Inter-religious dialogue should follow a middle path between these two extremes by engaging with underlying philosophical themes that are common to all religious traditions instead of emphasising the comparison of theological and soteriological arguments that may depend on justifications that are exclusive to a particular religious practice. The philosophical theme explored here is that of dissatisfaction and existential suffering in an imperfect world, a theme found in all “world religions”. Indeed, the diagnosis of this existential predicament and the hope that religious practice may allow one to overcome it appears to be universal, while its causes and the prescribed remedies differ considerably among religious traditions. Nevertheless, inter-religious dialogue beginning from a conviction that all religious practitioners strive for truth and salvation in response to a common existential experience may lead to a more compassionate and productive dialogue between religious communities. This type of inter-religious dialogue avoids accusations of falling into religious syncretism or relativism while encouraging diverse religious communities to address contemporary issues from areas of philosophical common ground. This allows for a more fruitful type of inter-religious dialogue and comparative study of religion that can be pursued while maintaining one's own distinct religious identities and particular religious truths. (shrink)