How do we justify the normative standards to which we appeal in support of our moral progress judgments, given their historical and cultural contingency? To answer this question in a noncircular way, Elizabeth Anderson and Philip Kitcher appeal exclusively to formal features of the methodology by which a moral change was brought about; some moral methodologies are systematically less prone to bias than others and are therefore less vulnerable to error. However, we argue that the methodologies espoused by Anderson and (...) Kitcher implicitly appeal to the substantive principle of “moral universalism.” This sets up the positive project of the paper: an attempt to vindicate moral universalism with a pragmatic genealogy. Using resources from cultural evolutionary theory and the history of ideas we argue that the universalistic norms widely committed to in many societies today have the function of maintaining cooperation in large anonymous groups. Furthermore, while universalistic norms play this instrumental role, their functional benefits are best secured when people following such norms do so for intrinsic rather than instrumental reasons. Finally, having elaborated our pragmatic genealogy, we close by considering how this genealogy should affect our commitment to moral universalism and how it can complement the methods of Anderson and Kitcher. (shrink)

(2004). A vindication of the rights of brutes. Philosophy & Geography: Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 259-264.

What is the philosophical role of an historical account of how someone, or some people, came to believe or value as they do? I consider some proposals, due to Bernard Williams and David Wiggins, according to which such an account might either vindicate or subvert our believing or valuing as we do. I suggest some reasons for scepticism about those proposals, at least when construed as providing a fundamental means of assessing cases of believing or valuing. The main problem raised (...) for the proposals, when so construed, is that they conflate reasons that now support believing or valuing with reasons for coming in the first place to believe or value. (shrink)

Nearly two hundred years ago, Mary Wollstonecraft wrote what is considered to be the first major work of feminist political theory: A Vindication of the Rights of Women . Much has been written about this work, and about Wollstonecraft as the intellectual pioneer of feminism, but the actual substance and coherence of her political thought have been virtually ignored. Virginia Sapiro here provides the first full-length treatment of Wollstonecraft's political theory. Drawing on all of Wollstonecraft's works and treating them (...) thematically rather than sequentially, Sapiro shows that Wollstonecraft's ideas about women's rights, feminism, and gender are elements of a broad and fully developed philosophy, one with significant implications for contemporary democratic and liberal theory. The issues raised speak to many current debates in theory, including those surrounding interpretation of the history of feminism, the relationship between liberalism and republicanism in the development of political philosophy, and the debate over the canon. For political scientists, most of whom know little about Wollstonecraft's thought, Sapiro's book is an excellent, nuanced introduction which will cause a reconsideration of her work and her significance both for her time and for today's concerns. For feminist scholars, Sapiro's book offers a rounded and unconventional analysis of Wollstonecraft's thought. Written with considerable charm and verve, this book will be the starting point for understanding this important writer for years to come. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to argue for a revised and precisified version of the infamous Verifiability Criterion for the meaningfulness of declarative sentences. The argument is based on independently plausible premises concerning probabilistic confirmation and meaning as context-change potential, it is shown to be logically valid, and its ramifications for potential applications of the criterion are being discussed. Although the paper is not historical but systematic, the criterion thus vindicated will resemble the original one(s) in some important ways. (...) At the same time, it will also be more modest insofar as meaningfulness will turn out to be relativized linguistically and probabilistically, and different choices of the linguistic and probabilistic parameters may lead to different verdicts on meaningfulness. (shrink)

Psychologists and neuroscientists have recently been unearthing the unconscious processes that give rise to moral intuitions and emotions. According to skeptics like Joshua Greene, what has been found casts doubt on many of our moral beliefs. However, a new approach in moral psychology develops a learning-theoretic framework that has been successfully applied in a number of other domains. This framework suggests that model-based learning shapes intuitions and emotions. Model-based learning explains how moral thought and feeling are attuned to local material (...) and social conditions. Philosophers can draw on these explanations, in some cases, in order to vindicate episodes of moral change. Explanations can support justifications by showing that they are not mere rationalizations. In addition, philosophical justifications are a fertile source for empirical hypotheses about the rational learning mechanisms that shape moral intuitions and emotions. (shrink)

The proponents of the ‘vindication’ or ‘pragmatic justification’ of induction have attempted to show that induction will work if any method does. This in turn serves as grounds for their claim that we have everything to gain by using induction and nothing to lose. Hence, they conclude that it is rational to use induction. Their claim that induction will work if any mehtod does is based upon the following argument:If nature is uniform, induction will work. If nature is not (...) uniform and some other method works, the success of that method will then constitute a regularity to which induction can be successfully applied. In that case, induction will sanction the continued use of the successful method and hence will be successful as well. (shrink)

The works of Mary Wollstonecraft ranged from the early _Thoughts on the Education of Daughters_ to _The Female Reader_, a selection of texts for girls, and included two novels. But her reputation is founded on _A Vindication of the Rights of Woman_ of 1792. This treatise is the first great document of feminism—and is now accepted as a core text in western tradition. It is not widely known that the germ of Wollstonecraft’s great work came out of an earlier (...) and much shorter vindication—A Vindication of the Rights of Men, written in the context of the issues raised by the French Revolution. This edition, which follows the model of other Broadview Editions in including a range of materials that help the reader to see the work in the context of its era out of which it emerged, is arranged chronologically, opening with Wollstonecraft’s “other vindication.” It also includes a wide range of other documents in appendices, as well as a comprehensive and authoritative introduction, chronology, and full index. (shrink)

When Timothy Sprigge's The Vindication of Absolute Idealism appeared in 1983 it ran very much against the grain of the dominant linguistic and analytic traditions of philosophy in Britain. The very title of this work was a challenge to those who believed that Absolute Idealism fell with the critiques of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore at the beginning of the 20th century. Sprigge, however, saw himself as providing an underrepresented position in the philosophical spectrum rather than as advocating (...) an abandoned view. For him, idealism did not fall at any determinate point in the history of philosophy. The truth of any philosophical thesis cannot depend on what happens to be currently fashionable, but rather must stand on the soundness of philosophical argument. To this end, The Vindication of Absolute Idealism is a bold statement of his conclusions, a synthesis of panpsychism and absolute idealism, which he contends is the most satisfactory solution to the question of the nature of consciousness and the mind-body problem. Sprigge's view of consciousness remains a challenge to mainstream physicalism and a viable option that addresses pressing contemporary concerns not only in metaphysics and philosophy of mind but also in environmental ethics and animal rights. (shrink)

Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Woman was a ground-breaking work of literature which still resonates in feminism and human rights movements of today.

The works of Mary Wollstonecraft ranged from the early Thoughts on the Education of Daughters to The Female Reader, a selection of texts for girls, and included two novels. But her reputation is founded on A Vindication of the Rights of Woman of 1792. This treatise is the first great document of feminism—and is now accepted as a core text in western tradition. It is not widely known that the germ of Wollstonecraft's great work came out of an earlier (...) and much shorter vindication—A Vindication of the Rights of Men , written in the context of the issues raised by the French Revolution. This edition, which follows the model of other Broadview Editions in including a range of materials that help the reader to see the work in the context of its era out of which it emerged, is arranged chronologically, opening with Wollstonecraft's "other vindication." It also includes a wide range of other documents in appendices, as well as a comprehensive and authoritative introduction, chronology, and full index. (shrink)

. Vindicating Archer’s concepts of educational systems – centralized and decentralized – as exemplars of critical realist theorizing. Journal of Critical Realism: Vol. 18, Sustainability, Interdisciplinarity and Transformative change: A Critical Realist Response to the Crisis System, pp. 453-473.

I argue that the "why be rational?" challenge raised by John Broome and Niko Kolodny rests upon a mistake that is analogous to the mistake that H.A. Pritchard famously claimed beset the “why be moral?” challenge. The failure to locate an independent justification for obeying rational requirements should do nothing whatsoever to undermine our belief in the normativity of rationality. I suggest that we should conceive of the demand for a satisfactory vindicating explanation of the normativity of rationality instead in (...) terms of the demand for a philosophical characterisation of rationality that can do something to explain why rational requirements are the kinds of things that are, by their very nature, normative. I consider several accounts that have recently been offered – the distinctive-object account, the proper functioning account, and the subjective reasons account – and argue that none succeeds in meeting this challenge. I then sketch a new account, the “first-personal authority account”, which holds that rational requirements are what I call “standpoint-relative demands” concerning the attitudes we ought to have and form; and that complying with rational requirements is a matter of honouring our first-personal authority as agents. I suggest that the first-personal authority account does a better job of meeting the challenge. (shrink)

The proponents of the ‘vindication’ or ‘pragmatic justification’ of induction have attempted to show that induction will work if any method does. This in turn serves as grounds for their claim that we have everything to gain by using induction and nothing to lose. Hence, they conclude that it is rational to use induction. Their claim that induction will work if any mehtod does is based upon the following argument:If nature is uniform, induction will work. If nature is not (...) uniform and some other method works, the success of that method will then constitute a regularity to which induction can be successfully applied. In that case, induction will sanction the continued use of the successful method and hence will be successful as well. (shrink)

Excerpt from A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes (1792) Mary Wollstonecraft as a guest in Taylor's home had called his study the abode of peace. He was not in sympathy with her radical ideas or those of Paine; he was not an advocate of an egal itarian world, but if they insisted upon agitation for this, he could show them how much farther they must carry their theories. His Vindication of the Rights of Brutes (london, 1792; Boston, (...) Massachusetts, 1795) endeavors to demonstrate that who has said A must say B; and that B leads on to an unforeseen Z. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

This paper deals with the problem of vindicating a particular type of inductive rule, a rule to govern inferences from observed frequencies to limits of relative frequencies. Reichenbach's rule of induction is defended. By application of two conditions, normalizing conditions and a criterion of linguistic invariance, it is argued that alternative rules lead to contradiction. It is then argued that the rule of induction does not lead to contradiction when suitable restrictions are placed upon the predicates admitted. Goodman's grue-bleen paradox (...) is considered, and an attempt to resolve it is offered. Finally, Reichenbach's pragmatic argument, hinging on convergence properties, is applied. (shrink)

Fetzer famously claims that program verification is not even a theoretical possibility, and offers a certain argument for this far-reaching claim. Unfortunately for Fetzer, and like-minded thinkers, this position-argument pair, while based on a seminal insight that program verification, despite its Platonic proof-theoretic airs, is plagued by the inevitable unreliability of messy, real-world causation, is demonstrably self-refuting. As I soon show, Fetzer is like the person who claims: ‘My sole claim is that every claim expressed by an English sentence and (...) starting with the phrase “My sole claim” is false’. Or, more accurately, such thinkers are like the person who claims that modus tollens is invalid, and supports this claim by giving an argument that itself employs this rule of inference. (shrink)

In resultant moral luck, blame and punishment seem intuitively to depend on downstream effects of a person’s action that are beyond his or her control. Some skeptics argue that we should override our intuitions about moral luck and reform our practices. Other skeptics attempt to explain away apparent cases of moral luck as epistemic artifacts. I argue, to the contrary, that moral luck is real—that people are genuinely responsible for some things beyond their control. A partially consequentialist theory of responsibility (...) justifies moral luck. But this justification is no mere rationalization of the status quo. Recent experimental and evolutionary work on punishment and learning suggests that the very same reasons that justify moral luck have also shaped the evolution of our luck-sensitive moral practices. (shrink)

The works of Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) ranged from the early _Thoughts on the Education of Daughters_ to _The Female Reader_, a selection of texts for girls, and included two novels. But her reputation is founded on _A Vindication of the Rights of Woman_ of 1792. This treatise is the first great document of feminism—and is now accepted as a core text in western tradition. It is not widely known that the germ of Wollstonecraft’s great work came out of an (...) earlier and much shorter vindication—A Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790), written in the context of the issues raised by the French Revolution. This edition, which follows the model of other Broadview Editions in including a range of materials that help the reader to see the work in the context of its era out of which it emerged, is arranged chronologically, opening with Wollstonecraft’s “other vindication.” It also includes a wide range of other documents in appendices, as well as a comprehensive and authoritative introduction, chronology, and full index. (shrink)

Can we regard ourselves as having free will? What is the place of values in a world of facts? What grounds the authority of moral injunctions, and why should we care about them? Unless we provide satisfactory answers to these questions, ethics has no credible status and is likely to be subsumed by psychology, history, or rational decision theory. According to Ermanno Bencivenga, this outcome is both common and regrettable. Bencivenga points to Immanuel Kant for the solution. Kant's philosophy is (...) a sustained, bold, and successful effort aiming at offering us the answers we need. Ethics Vindicated is a clear and thorough account of this effort that builds on Bencivenga's previous interpretation of transcendental philosophy (as articulated in his Kant's Copernican Revolution) and draws on the entire Kantian corpus. (shrink)

Stephen Phillips has devoted his career to excavating some of the most valuable gems of Indian philosophy and bringing them into conversation with contemporary thought. This volume honors him and follows his lead by continuing his lifelong project: faithfully interpreting Sanskrit texts to think along with their authors about ideas that still perplex us today. -/- It features ten new essays focusing on epistemology, logic, and metaphysics from outstanding philosophers and scholars of Sanskrit philosophy, with contributions varying in methodology: both (...) historical and cross-cultural. Further, in addition to essays on Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta, it engages with Navya-Nyāya (“new Nyāya”), an important but understudied part of Indian philosophy. Through these investigations, in conversation with Phillips's groundbreaking work, the contributors show the value of cross-cultural engagement for philosophical progress. -/- The Vindication of the World will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in Indian philosophy, comparative philosophy, and, more generally, epistemology, logic, and metaphysics. (shrink)

This essay responds to the machine question in the affirmative, arguing that artifacts, like robots, AI, and other autonomous systems, can no longer be legitimately excluded from moral consideration. The demonstration of this thesis proceeds in four parts or movements. The first and second parts approach the subject by investigating the two constitutive components of the ethical relationship—moral agency and patiency. In the process, they each demonstrate failure. This occurs not because the machine is somehow unable to achieve what is (...) considered necessary and sufficient to be a moral agent or patient but because the characterization of agency and patiency already fail to accommodate others. The third and fourth parts respond to this problem by considering two recent alternatives—the all-encompassing ontocentric approach of Luciano Floridi’s information ethics and Emmanuel Levinas’s eccentric ethics of otherness. Both alternatives, despite considerable promise to reconfigure the scope of moral thinking by addressing previously excluded others, like the machine, also fail but for other reasons. Consequently, the essay concludes not by accommodating the alterity of the machine to the requirements of moral philosophy but by questioning the systemic limitations of moral reasoning, requiring not just an extension of rights to machines, but a thorough examination of the way moral standing has been configured in the first place. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Vindication Wim Klever Comparing Hume with Spinoza I am accused ofhaving misread both, at least in certain respects; I would have gone too far in considering Spinoza as an influential root of Hume's thought. On occasion of Dr. Leavitt's criticism I would like to stress the following points: 1. In spite ofWolfson'sendeavourtoreduceSpinozatoAristotelian, scholastic and Jewish sources ofthe Middle Ages, many texts—in fact all texts in which Aristotle (...) ismentioned—constitute aconvincingproof that Spinoza not only rejected,just like Hume, all sorts ofAristotelian and scholastic speculation, buteven showedmuch contemptfor them.1 In the same way there cannot be any doubt that he rejected Maimonides' Jewish Aristotelianism.2 In the TTP he defines his position in sharp contrast to Maimonides. 2.Nominalism means that names may be used for the indication of many items whereas ideas are essentially ideas of particulars. According to Spinoza everything is reflected in its own specific idea,3 whereas names like 'ens', 'aliquid', 'man', etc. may be the sign, sometimes ambiguously but often also without confusion, of more things, which are vaguely conceived. This confused idea, then, is nevertheless the properideaofaparticularblurredimageinthebrains. Some eminent scholars like Stuart Hampshire and Martial Gueroult (I confess: not all ofthem) pretend that Spinoza is a true nominalist. I think the texts (and the whole structure of the system) enforce us to confess that they are right. 3.In the case of common things, that is, (elementary) things common to all beings, the human body included, the ideas of these things are, though particular, common too.4 In spite ofand in line with Hume's agreement with Spinoza's nominalism he does not deny, as Leavitt pretends, the existence of common notions. In "Of the Passions," part 1, section 10, he writes that "according to common notions a man has no power, where very considerable motives Ue betwixt him and the satisfaction of his desires, and determine him to forbearwhathe wishes toperform."5Thispassageis notatallinconflict with Treatise 1.1.7 in which the real existence ofabstract ideas in our mind is refuted. The ideas of things we have in common with other natural beings, may not be called abstract for that reason. This section (T 17-25) is perfectly congruous with Spinoza's position. 4.I keep to my claim that there is a striking parallel between Spinoza's famous distinction between three kinds of knowledge Volume XVII Number 2 209 WIM KLEVER (2 Ethics 40s2) and some statements ofHume. Additional evidence for this claim (compared with what I gave already) is to find in Treatise 1.3.11, where Hume marks "several degrees of evidence,... distinguishing] human reason into three kinds, viz. that from knowledge, from proofs, and from probabilities" (T 124, first emphasis added); and in the Enquiry, where all objects of human reason are dividedinto three (!)kinds as well, namely"Relations ofIdeas... either intuitively or demonstratively certain" and "Matters ofFact."6 Put into a diagram the resemblance becomes even more apparent: Spinoza Ethics opinio/imaginatio ratio intuitio Hume TreatiseEnquiry probabilityMatters of Fact proofdemonstratively knowledgeintuitively Careful comparison ofthe texts shows that the functions attributed to the various kinds ofknowledge are exactly the same in Spinoza as in Hume, contrary to what is suggested by Leavitt. I only need to remind him ofthe 'Spinozistic' opening ofTreatise 1.3.3: "Tis a general maxim in philosophy, that whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence... Tis suppos'd to be founded on intuition,... All certainty arises from the comparison of ideas, and from the discovery of such relations as are unalterable" (T 78-79). Both philosophers locate the highest kind of knowledge in the evidence of mathematics and the common properties of nature, explained in physics. Let us not forget that both are fully naturalists, for whom the understanding of things "sub specie aeternitatis" (Spinoza's description of the third kind of knowledge) means in fact the intuition of the particular essence of things in a scientific way. 5.In the TractatusTheologico-Politicus itiscertainly not Spinoza's intention to show that the third kind of knowledge is identical with prophecy. On the contrary, in the first two chapters he clearly demonstrates, in his scientific hermeneutics, that prophecy is... (shrink)

Frege regarded Hume's Principle as insufficient for a logicist account of arithmetic, as it does not identify the numbers; it does not tell us which objects the numbers are. His solution, generally regarded as a failure, was to propose certain sets as the referents of numerical terms. I suggest instead that numbers are properties of pluralities, where these properties are treated as objects. Given this identification, the truth-conditions of the statements of arithmetic can be obtained from logical principles with the (...) help of definitions, just as the logicist thesis maintains. (shrink)

Natural law political theory grounds the authority of law in the law's capacity to advance the common good, but questions about what this common good is and how it relates to political life remain highly contested. The influential new natural law theory of John Finnis reduces political association to the operation of government and makes it a merely instrumental good that serves to secure and facilitate individual and social goods. Political community, on this account, does not realize any further human (...) good not already experienced in smaller human communities. In A Vindication of Politics, Matthew Wright challenges this account and argues that political community itself realizes an aspect of social life intrinsic to full human flourishing. Wright develops an account of the political common good that is both inclusivist and distinctive--that is to say, it includes within its orbit the diverse goods of individuals and other associations, and it recognizes the good of the political association itself. Drawing on the work of Edmund Burke and the example of Abraham Lincoln, Wright argues that political community has its own distinctive goods, including civic friendship and political culture, embodied in its history, institutions, practices, and ideals. Individuals do not have to run for office to be engaged in the political common good. Participation in the vibrant cultural life of one's political community is an intrinsic part of the common good. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

Some ways of updating belief have more epistemic merit than others. Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke have defended varieties of the view that the epistemic merit of certain ways of updating belief is explained by facts about the conditions of possessing certain concepts. In particular, they argue that if it is a condition of possessing a concept C that one must be disposed to update one’s beliefs in accord with a norm N, then beliefs updated in accord with N are (...) thereby epistemically warranted. Following Peacocke, this chapter calls such strategies of vindicating N by appeal to conditions of concept-possession “metasemantic.” Might a parallel metasemantic approach be made to work in vindicating practical norms, norms for updating intentions? After rejecting some blind alleys, it argues for a qualified “yes.” Working with the example of the concept OUGHT TO Φ and an enkratic norm for updating intentions, it argues that we can validly get from premises about the conditions of possessing OUGHT TO Φ to the conclusion that updating intentions enkratically is rationally permissible. The argument generalizes, so that updating intentions in accord with any concept-constituting norm is rationally permissible. (shrink)

This volume makes available for the first time critical editions of John Locke's A Vindication and A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity, in which Locke defends his interpretation of the New Testament and of the Christian Religion against charges of heterodoxy. These works contribute greatly to our understanding of Locke's Christian commitments, which it is now recognized played an important role in shaping his philosophical opinions; they also demonstrate his sophistication as a biblical scholar, and the (...) breadth of his theological learning. The texts are accompanied by a historical introduction explaining the origin of the works and setting them in context. In addition to a textual introduction and critical apparatus, editorial notes help to clarify the text. The volume also includes a French translation and abridgment by Pierre Coste, a Huguenot scholar, who was patronized by Locke and worked on his translations while residing in Locke's household. This definitive edition is an important contribution to an understanding of the development of modern enlightened Christian attitudes. (shrink)

Social scientists use many different methods, and there are often substantial disagreements about which method is appropriate for a given research question. In response to this uncertainty about the relative merits of different methods, W. E. B. Du Bois advocated for and applied “methodological triangulation”. This is to use multiple methods simultaneously in the belief that, where one is uncertain about the reliability of any given method, if multiple methods yield the same answer that answer is confirmed more strongly than (...) it could have been by any single method. Against this, methodological purists believe that one should choose a single appropriate method and stick with it. Using tools from voting theory, we show Du Boisian methodological triangulation to be more likely to yield the correct answer than purism, assuming the scientist is subject to some degree of diffidence about the relative merits of the various methods. This holds even when in fact only one of the methods is appropriate for the given research question. (shrink)

This article questions Balibar’s claim that Simondon’s concept of the transindividual does not fulfil all the requirements for a materialist ‘philosophical anthropology’. In fact, we demonstrate that Simondon’s philosophy of individuation, and notably his concept of the transindividual, can be, as it were, included in a genealogy of aleatory materialism. Simondon’s philosophy of individuation is indeed a philosophy of the transindividual insofar as it involves the constant revision of the different historical forms taken by social relations in the coevolution of (...) human beings and their techno-social and natural milieu. Simondon’s way of conceiving anthropogenesis as an open and ‘metastable’ field in which individuals and processes relate to each other maintaining their own knowledge in motion, marks, in our view, a materialist style of thinking. Against this background we analyse Simondon’s overcoming of the dichotomy between the individual and society through a ‘double rejection’, we sketch his theory of a ‘double source’ for social relations, and we explain in what sense, from his perspective, the transindividual ‘can be said in many ways’. (shrink)