This book enables the reader to recognize public expressions of an ideology, thereby avoiding gullibility and the consequences of ignorance. A Marxist-Freudian orientation is adopted. This book also discusses the possibility of escaping ideology and how it differs from science.

Escaping Alienation is a work of philosophical anthropology providing a theory of alienation and its opposite, dealienation.

The subject of discussion this evening is “ The Problem of Colour in Relation to the Idea of Equality,” and though the last seven words would seem to indicate some special limitation, it is in fact difficult to divide this question into watertight compartments. For the basis of all philosophical study is accuracy of definition, and we must therefore begin by forming a precise conception of what the phrase “ Colour problem ” connotes before we proceed to discuss its bearing (...) from a physiological, political, or sociological “ equality ” point of view. Thus at the outset we find ourselves in the very heart of a controversy, for it is difficult to find two people who will agree as to the definition of the Colour problem. Physiologically there is no line of demarcation, for of the inhabitants of North Central Asia many are as light—and indeed lighter—in the colour of their skin, their hair and their eyes than the Southern races of Europe, and the same may be true of Creoles, Quadroons, and Octaroons. (shrink)

Quality health care relies upon communication in a patient's preferred language. Language access in health care occurs when individuals are: Welcomed by providers regardless of language ability; and Offered quality language services as part of their care. Federal law generally requires access to health care and quality language services for deaf and Limited English Proficient patients in health care settings, but these patients still find it hard to access health care and quality language services.Meanwhile, several states are implementing Medicaid Accountable (...) Care Organization initiatives to reduce health care costs and improve health care quality. Alternative payment methods used in these initiatives can give Accountable Care Organizations more flexibility to design linguistically accessible care, but they can also put ACOs at increased financial risk for the cost of care. If these new payment methods do not account for differences in patient language needs, ACO initiatives could have the unintended consequence of rewarding ACOs who do not reach out to deaf and LEP communities or offer quality language services.We reviewed public documents related to Medicaid ACO initiatives in six states. Some of these documents address language access. More could be done, however, to pay for language access efforts. This article describes Medicaid ACO initiatives and explores how different payment tools could be leveraged to reward ACOs for increased access to care and quality language services. We find that a combination of payment tools might be helpful to encourage both access and quality. (shrink)

Three new books concerning the philosophy of Hegel are scheduled to appear before the end of this year. Holt, Rinehart & Winston will publish New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy, a collection of 15 essays by Hegel scholars throughout the world, edited by Warren Steinkraus of the State University of New York at Oswego. Professor Steinkraus reports that all but two of the essays will be in print for the first time. The two exceptions are translations of articles made especially (...) for the volume. * * * The proceedings of the Wofford Symposium will be published by Martinus Nijhoff under the title Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion. The volume is edited by Darrel E. Christensen of Wofford College. * * * Presently in the press also at Martinus Nijhoff is Hegel's Critique of Aristotle's Philosophy of Mind, by Frederick G. Weiss of the Florida State University. The book includes an extensive introductory essay by G.R.G. Mure. (shrink)

The Executive Council pro tem of the HSA, organized during a business session of the Wofford Symposium at Spartanburg, S. C. last November, met et Vanderbilt University the following March and drafted a constitution for the Society. The members of this Council were Darrel E. Christensen of Wofford College, Robert L. Perkins of the University of South Alabama, Frederick G. Weiss, George L. Kline, Warren E. Steinkraus, Donald P. Verene, and Otho M. Adkins. Shortly thereafter the constitution was (...) adopted and an election was held. Professors Christensen, Steinkraus, Perkins, and Verene were elected President, Vice-President, Secretary, and Treasurer of the Society. * * * PURPOSE * * * The purpose of the HSA, as specified by Article II of the constitution, is "to promote the study of the philosophy of Hegel, its place within the history of thought, its relation to social, political, and cultural movements since his time, and its relevance to contemporary issues and fields of knowledge. In addition to the study of the thought and significance of Hegel, the Society has as its purpose the furtherance of original philosophical thought which has its basis in the philosophy of Hegel or which treats issues in the style, manner, or method of Hegel.". (shrink)

This book is an appealing, worthwhile, even illustrated study of the life and thought of an idealistic philosopher who has not been given the attention his originality deserves. John Elof Boodin belongs to what we may call the second generation of American idealists. Most of them studied under thinkers who represented the first real surge of idealistic thought on this continent. That group includes: G. S. Morris, B.P. Bowne, G. H. Howison, Josiah Royce, J. E. Creighton, and Mary W. (...) Calkins. Boodin’s generation includes J. A. Leighton, W. E. Hocking, Elijah Jordan, E. S. Brightman and Brand Blanshard. Only Jordan and Leighton are less well-know than Boodin. (shrink)

This book is an appealing, worthwhile, even illustrated study of the life and thought of an idealistic philosopher who has not been given the attention his originality deserves. John Elof Boodin belongs to what we may call the second generation of American idealists. Most of them studied under thinkers who represented the first real surge of idealistic thought on this continent. That group includes: G. S. Morris, B.P. Bowne, G. H. Howison, Josiah Royce, J. E. Creighton, and Mary W. (...) Calkins. Boodin’s generation includes J. A. Leighton, W. E. Hocking, Elijah Jordan, E. S. Brightman and Brand Blanshard. Only Jordan and Leighton are less well-know than Boodin. (shrink)

In a career that spans 60 years so far, W.W. Tait has made many highly influential contributions to logic, the philosophy of mathematics, and their history. The present collection of new essays - contributed by former students, colleagues, and friends - is a Festschrift, i.e., a celebration of his life and work. The essays address a variety of themes prominent in his work or related to it. The collection starts with an introduction in which Tait's contributions are sketched and put (...) into context. The eleven essays that follow are arranged in three parts: Part I. Proof Theory and its History; Part II. Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics; and Part III. History of Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics. Each of the essays contributes substantially to one or several of these areas. The authors included are: Steve Awodey, Solomon Feferman, Michael Friedman, Warren Goldfarb, Geoffrey Hellman, William Howard, Stephen Menn, Rebecca Morris, Charles Parsons, Erich Reck, Thomas Ricketts, and Wilfried Sieg. The editor, Erich H. Reck is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Riverside. (shrink)

Did the Devil Make Darwin Do It? Modern Perspectives on the Creation-Evolution Controversy. David B. Wilson, Warren D. Dolphin, Science and Creationism. Ashley Montagu. Is God a Creationist? The Religious Case against Creation-Science. Roland Mushat Frye. A History of Modern Creationism. Henry M. Morris.

This is a study of "three metaphysical naturalists" who, although minor figures in their own right, nonetheless substantially influenced the direction and cast of American naturalism. The theme that unites them, according to Delaney, is their reaction to the bifurcation of mind and corporeal nature bequeathed to modern philosophy by Descartes and Locke. Morris R. Cohen, as a logician and philosopher of science, saw such a bifurcation as engendering conventionalism and a type of nominalism in science, and he reacted (...) against these with his own "logical realism." Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, working out of the Aristotelian and Spinozistic traditions, saw it as entailing subjectivism and attempted to counteract this by reasserting an "experiential realism." Roy Wood Sellars, himself an evolutionist, viewed the duality of mind and nature as a stimulus for the imaginative projection of idealism and the quietistic escapism of spiritualism, and countered these with a thorough-going "materialistic humanism." Delaney elaborates his thesis with clarity and cogency, using it as a vehicle to reconstruct the metaphysical views of the three men under study. He concludes with a critical comparison of the resulting "naturalistic reintegrations" of the mind-nature bifurcation: Cohen's through a more adequate philosophy of science, Woodbridge's by a realistic theory of experience, and Sellars' by an emergent theory of evolution. Delaney's critique focuses on the fundamental notions of existence, nature, and man, using these to expose essential differences between the "metaphysics" of the New York naturalists and that of Sellars. Woodbridge emerges from Delaney's analysis as the most substantial philosopher of the group. This is not a ponderous tome--it can be read practically at one sitting--but it succeeds in throwing new light on American naturalism in terms of its positive contributions to both the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of mind.--W. A. W. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:EDWARD W. STRONG, 1901--1990 Edward W. Strong, one.of the founders and leaders of the Journal of the HistoryofPhilosophy,passed away on January 13, 199o, after a long struggle with cancer. Born in Dallas, Oregon in 19~ 1, he was eighty-eight years old when he died. He did his undergraduate studies at Stanford, receiving his B.A. in 1925. Then he went on to graduate studies at Columbia, where he received a (...) master's degree in 1927 and a Ph.D. in 1937. He taught at City College in New York from 1927 to 1932, and then began his long career at the University of California, Berkeley, where he remained for the rest of his academic life. During World War II, he became laboratory manager of the university's Radiation Laboratory (now called the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory), which was part of the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb. After the war, Strong became a full professor in 1947, chairman of the Sociology Department from 1946 to 1952, Associate Dean of the College of Letters and Sciences from 1947 to 1955, a leader of the Academic Senate and its Educational Policy Committee, and Chancellor of the Berkeley campus from 1961 to 1965.This was a period of very rapid growth for the campus as well as its most troubled time. When the student rebellion--the Free Speech Movement--broke out, Strong tried valiantly but unsuccessfully to preserve those academic values he felt most challenged. As the conflict wore on, he ceased to have the full support of his superiors, the President of the Universityand the Board of Regents, who negotiated a resolution with the students, the effects of which are still being felt at Berkeley and elsewhere in the United States. Some feel that Strong's position in the struggle that transformed American universities has not been properly understood, and that his role has been portrayed unfairly to enhance that of his superiors. In any event, he resigned as Chancellor and became Professor Emeritus in 1967. Strong developed his interest in the history of philosophy, history of science, and history of ideas at Columbia during its heyday as a center for such concerns, under the leadership of John Dewey and Frederick Woodbridge. He told me that he was also very much influenced by the historical interests of Morris Raphael Cohen, his senior colleague at City College. His dissertation, Proceduresand Methods,was, and still is, a basic study of the origin and development of modern science. (It was mentioned approvingly in an article by Ernst [9] 10 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:1 JANUARY 1991 Cassirer, in 194o). In contrast to E. A. Burtt, whose MetaphysicalFoundationsof ModernPhysicalSciencestressed the philosophical and theological concerns of the early scientists, Strong emphasized the practical engineering concerns that were involved at the time. This led him to studies of Kepler, Galileo, and Newton, as well as to the scientific views of medieval thinkers, and modern views in the philosophy of science. Philosophically he was a naturalist, continuing the Columbia tradition. He was also very interested in Bergson's views, especially as they related to modern scientific ideas. He was the inspirer and founder of the History of Science discussion group at Berkeley, which became an important forum for creative research in this area. Strong was President of the American Philosophical Association in 1959. Because of the limited attention and concern given to the history of philosophy in most of the then-existing philosophicaljournals in America, the American Philosophical Association in 1957 approved in principle the establishment of a journal devoted to the history of philosophy, and appointed a committee of six members--Paul Kristeller, Gregory Vlastos, Richard McKeon, Julius Weinberg, John Goheen, and Edward Strong--to explore "ways and means to this end." Since all American philosophical journals at that time were published in the East and Midwest, Strong and Goheen were encouraged to try to establish the journal in the West. Strong has detailed the efforts to do this in his article, "The Founding of theJournal oftheHistoryofPhilosophy,"Journalof theHistoryofPhilosophy~5 (1987): 179-83. I first met Ed Strong at Trinity College, Dublin, in the summer of 1953, when I was a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Global Empires and The Roman ImperiumBrent D. ShawP. Fibiger Bang, C. A. Bayly, and W. Scheidel, eds. The Oxford World History of Empire. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021; xxviii + 552 pp.; xxxiv + 1,318 pp.The volumes under review are an impressive if unequal diptych. The first, the slimmer of the two, entitled "The Imperial Experience," comprises a series of analytical studies on the creation, management, and (...) ideologies of empires, and forms of resistance to them. The second, "The History of Empires," is a forbidding tome of forty-four specific studies of individual empires and imperial ventures, from Ur III and Middle Kingdom Egypt to the Mongols and the British, ending, naturally, with America's "global imperium." In the analytics, the usual suspects, including Michael Doyle, Frederick Cooper and Jane Burbank, are on display; and the conceptual approaches of Michael Mann and Ernest Gellner are favorite points d'appui. For premodern empires, the ideas of the Maghribi thinker Ibn Khaldūn provide a different focus, so it is heartening to see Bang and others applying them more consistently (e.g., 1:13, 40, 326–9; 2:162, 246–8, 253). Especially for premodern empires, these volumes can be seen as an extension of earlier handbooks devoted to the state, one devoted to the ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean state and another on ancient empires.1 As an aspect of world history, the endeavor is the culmination of a decades-long project on the history of empires fronted by Peter Bang.2 He has usefully produced detailed historical introductions not only to both volumes, but also to the subsections in each of them. Perhaps not surprisingly, empire turns out to be a virile enterprise. As Ian Morris notes, "the story of empire... is so strongly gendered that it [End Page 505] seems reasonable to call rulers and commanders 'he' throughout" (1:162 n. 14). The muscular subject is mirrored by its principal actors and by its students. All the editors are men. Reflecting the same balance, out of the forty-five authors of individual studies in the large history of empires volume, there are five (lonely) female voices. In both volumes, women as subjects of empire are, for all intents and purposes, absent.3From the perspective of an historian who has actually worked on the history of an empire, it must be plainly stated that almost all of the theories, adequately reviewed by Bang (1:20–48), are worth about as much as the paper or pixilated screens on which they have been written. Obvious and serious exceptions to every one of the definitions and hypotheticals abound. In fact, a fair number of the exemplary histories in the second volume do not obey the strictures of most of the theories advanced in the first. So it is with a sense of relief that one turns from theory to the hard quantities offered by Walter Scheidel (1:chap. 2). To a considerable degree, his analysis depends on the well-known measurements made by Rein Taagepera. Rather alarmingly, Taagepera counted as an empire "any large sovereign political entity whose components are not sovereign," say, like the well-known empires of Algeria, Finland, or Canada.4 What an analysis of these global entities confirms is that size or orders of magnitude mattered, and that the first entities to count as empires emerged in the 7th to 5th centuries bce in southwestern Asia (1:53; 2:161, 245). The neo-Assyrian empire was the first super-large territorial state and its successor, the Achaemenid empire, was the first "hyper-power without rival" (1:172; 2:83, 111, 161). Subsequent premodern empires were able to reach higher levels of millions of square kilometers of territory and larger populations of dozens of millions of subjects nominally under their aegis. The magnitudes reached by a given generation of super-states set base-lines above which a successor might be able to reach greater sophistication of rule, numbers of subjects, and extent of territory. In some cases, being able to piggy-back on existing empires, they were able to skip early developmental stages and to advance quickly to imperial status, as a succession... (shrink)

The late Joseph Grange is perhaps the most sharply focused and elegantly lucid of the group of North American philosophers to build new aesthetic metaphysical visions from the legacies of process philosophy and pragmatism. His peers include, among others, George Allan,1 Roger Ames,2 Chung-ying Cheng,3 Robert Corrington,4 Frederick Ferre,5 Warren Frisina,6 David L. Hall,7 Judith Jones,8 Elizabeth Kraus,9 Hugh P. McDonald,10 Steve Odin,11 Sandra Rosenthal,12 Robert Smid,13 David Weissman,14 and myself, along with our many students and colleagues. This (...) group has widely variant systems, yet what unites us is an emphasis on the aesthetic and a lack of the fear to enter deeply into metaphysics when relevant.. (shrink)

The new methods, the tone, and new taste are clearly discernible first in the early articles and books of John Crowe Ransom, Allen Tate, R. P. Blackmur, Kenneth Burke, and Yvor Winters, and somewhat later in Cleanth Brooks, Robert Penn Warren, and William K. Wimsatt. . . . Still, something tells us that there is some sense in grouping these critics together. Most obviously they are held together by their reaction against the preceding or contemporary critical schools and views (...) mentioned before. They all reject the kind of metaphorical, evocative criticism practiced by the impressionists. Tate, Blackmur, Burke, and Winters contributed to a symposium highly critical of the neo-Humanists, and others voiced their rejection elsewhere. They all had no use for Mencken and Van Wyck Brooks, particularly after Brooks became a violent enemy of all modernism. Furthermore, they were almost unanimous in their rejection of Marxism, with the single exception of Kenneth Burke, who in the thirties passed through a Marxist phase and, anyhow, after his first book moved away from his neo-critical beginnings. What, however, in the American situation mattered most was that they were united in their opposition to the prevailing methods, doctrines, and views of academic English literary scholarship. There, in a way the younger generation may find it difficult to realize, a purely philological and historical scholarship dominated all instruction, publication, and promotion. I remember that when I first came to study English literature in the Princeton graduate school in 1927, fifty years ago, no course in American literature, none in modern literature, and none in criticism was offered. Of all my learned teachers only Morris W. Croll had any interest in aesthetics or even ideas. Most of the New Critics were college teachers and had to make their way in an environment hostile to any and all criticism. Only Kenneth Burke was and remained a freelance man of letters, though he taught in later years occasionally at Bennington College and briefly at the University of Chicago. But he very early deserted the New Criticism. It took Blackmur, Tate, and Winters years to get academic recognition, often against stiff opposition, and even Ransom, R. P. Warren, and Cleanth Brooks, established in quieter places, had their troubles. Ransom's paper "Criticism, Inc." pleaded for the academic establishment of criticism, and thanks to him and others criticism is now taught in most American colleges and universities. But it was an uphill fight. I still remember vividly the acrimony of the conflict between criticism and literary history at the University of Iowa, where I was a member of the English Department from 1939 to 1946. René Wellek, Sterling Professor Emeritus of comparative literature at Yale University, is the author of Theory of Literature and of A History of Modern Criticism, 1750-1950. He has contributed "Notes and Exchanges Between René Wellek and Wayne C. Booth" and "A Rejoinder to Gerald Graff" to Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

One of the very few accounts in English of German idealism, this ambitious work advances and revises our understanding of both the history and the thought of the classical period of German philosophy. As he traces the structure and evolution of idealism as a doctrine, Frederick Beiser exposes a strong objective, or realist, strain running from Kant to Hegel and identifies the crucial role of the early romantics—Hölderlin, Schlegel, and Novalis—as the founders of absolute idealism.

This "festschrift" brings together authors from various countries who are specialists in different disciplines within the humanities and who share a common vision of human life. These essays in philosophical speculation, political theory, literary criticism, and historical analysis are rooted in the western cultural heritage and Christian religious tradition. Major figures examined include Aristotle, Aquinas, Thomas More, John of the Cross, Donoso Cortes, and the Spanish Carlists. The interdisciplinary and cosmopolitan nature of this "festschrift" reflects the approach and style of (...) the man honored, Dr. Frederick D. Wilhelmsen. A special feature of the volume is a selection of critical studies of Professor Wilhelmsen's own work. (shrink)

The question naturally arises: Is public art inherently violent, or is it a provocation to violence? Is violence built into the monument in its very conception? Or is violence simply an accident that befalls some monuments, a matter of the fortunes of history? The historical record suggests that if violence is simply an accident that happens to public art, it is one that is always waiting to happen. The principal media and materials of public art are stone and metal sculpture (...) not so much by choice as by necessity. “A public sculpture,” says Lawrence Alloway, “should be invulnerable or inaccessible. It should have the material strength to resist attack or be easily cleanable, but it also needs a formal structure that is not wrecked by alterations.”12 The violence that surrounds public art is more, however, than simply the ever-present possibility of an accident—the natural disaster or random act of vandalism. Much of the world’s public art—memorials, monuments, triumphal arches, obelisks, columns, and statues—has a rather direct reference to violence in the form of war or conquest. From Ozymandias to Caesar to Napoleon to Hitler, public art has served as a kind of monumentalizing of violence, and never more powerfully than when it presents the conqueror as a man of peace, imposing a Napoleonic code or a pax Romana on the world. Public sculpture that is too frank or explicit about this monumentalizing of violence, whether the Assyrian palace reliefs of the ninth century b.c., or Morris’s bomb sculpture proposal of 1981, is likely to offend the sensibilities of a public committed to the repression of its own complicity in violence.13 The very notion of public art as we receive it is inseparable from what Jürgen Habermas has called “the liberal model of the public sphere,” a dimension distinct from the economic, the private, and the political. This ideal realm provides the space in which disinterested citizens may contemplate a transparent emblem of their own inclusiveness and solidarity, and deliberate on the general good, free of coercion, violence, or private interests.14 12. Lawrence Alloway, “The Public Sculpture Problem,” Studio International 184 : 124.13. See Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, “The Forms of Violence,” October, no. 8 : 17-29, for an important critique of the “narrativization” of violence in Western art and an examination of the alternative suggested by the Assyrian palace reliefs.14. Habermas first introduced this concept in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence . First published in 1962, it has since become the focus of an extensive literature. See also Habermas’s short encyclopedia article, “The Public Sphere,” trans. Sara Lennox and Frank Lennox, New German Critique 1 : 49-55, and the introduction to it by Peter Hohendahl in the same issue, pp. 45-48. I owe much to the guidance of Miriam Hansen and Lauren Berlant on this complex and crucial topic. W. J. T. Mitchell, editor of Critical Inquiry, is Gaylord Donnelly Distinguished Service Professor of English and art at the University of Chicago. His recent book is Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology. (shrink)

In Stability and Justification in Hume’s Treatise, Louis Loeb ascribes to Hume a naturalistic account of justified belief, one on which Hume is fundamentally concerned with the question whether stable belief can be achieved. Loeb’s interpretation is systematic, richly explanatory, and powerfully argued. He makes a compelling case that stability plays a central role in Hume’s epistemology. Loeb’s case is so compelling indeed that anyone who wants to defend an alternative interpretation will now have to assimilate or deflect the massive (...) textual evidence in favor of the stability interpretation. I will argue here that, for some passages Loeb cites in favor of the stability interpretation, a veritistic interpretation explains the text at least as well as the stability interpretation does. (shrink)