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  1. Glen O. Allen (1970). From the "Naturalistic Fallacy" to the Ideal Observer Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (4):533-549.
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  2. James C. Anderson (1974). A Note on Searle's Naturalistic Fallacy Fallacy. Analysis 34 (4):139 - 141.
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  3. Erik Angner, Did Hayek Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy?
    In promoting spontaneous orders – orders that evolve in a process of cultural evolution – as “efficient,” “beneficial,” and “advantageous,” Friedrich A. Hayek (1899-1992) has often been attributed the belief that there is something desirable about them. For this reason, he has been accused of committing the naturalistic fallacy, that is, of trying to derive an “ought” from an “is.” It appears that Hayek was..
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  4. G. P. Baker & P. M. Hacker (1966). Rules, Definitions, And The Naturalistic Fallacy. American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (October):299-305.
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  5. Jonathan Barrett (1991). Really Taking Darwin and the Naturalistic Fallacy Seriously: An Objection to Rottschaefer and Martinsen. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 6 (4):433-437.
    Out of a concern to respect the naturalistic fallacy, Ruse (1986) argues for the possibility of causal, but not justificatory, explanations of morality in terms of evolutionary processes. In a discussion of Ruse's work, Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1990) claim that he erroneously limits the explanatory scope of evolutionary concepts, because he fails to see that one can have objective moral properties without committing either of two forms of the naturalistic fallacy, if one holds that moral properties supervene on non-moral properties. (...)
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  6. Bernard H. Baumrin (1968). Is There a Naturalistic Fallacy? American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (2):79 - 89.
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  7. Hasna Begum (1979). Moore on Goodness and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):251-265.
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  8. Hasna Begum (1979). Moore on Goodness and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):251 – 265.
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  9. David Brax, Hedonic Naturalism.
    Published (in Swedish) in the journal Filosofisk tidskrift as "Hedonistisk naturalism", 2011/3.
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  10. Adriano Naves de Brito (2010). Falácia naturalista e naturalismo moral: do é ao deve mediante o quero. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 51 (121):215-226.
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  11. Karla Chediak (2006). O problema da falácia naturalista para o projeto de uma ética evolucionista. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 47 (113):147-157.
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  12. Oliver Curry, Who's Afraid of the Naturalistic Fallacy?
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  13. Julian Dodd & Suzanne Stern-Gillet (1995). The Is/Ought Gap, the Fact/Value Distinction and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Dialogue 34 (04):727-.
  14. Elmer H. Duncan (1970). Has Anyone Committed the Naturalistic Fallacy? Southern Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):49-55.
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  15. Antoine C. Dussault, Ecocentrism and Appeals to Nature's Goodness: Must They Be Fallacious?
  16. Antoine C. Dussault (2013). L’écocentrisme et ses appels normatifs à la nature : sont-ils nécessairement fallacieux ? In É Litalien (ed.), Peut-on tirer une éthique de l'étude de la nature ? Les Cahiers d'Ithaque. 43-76.
  17. Antoine C. Dussault (2010). Le rôle de la science dans l'écocentrisme humien de Callicott. Revue Phares 10:103-123.
  18. Federico L. G. Faroldi (2012). Fallacia Deontica. From "Ought" to "Is". Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia Del Diritto 89 (3):413–418.
  19. Gregor Flock, Solving the Is-Ought Problem.
    One of the most prolific and well-known debates in ethics and especially metaethics concerns the question of whether or not (and if so how) moral ought-beliefs can be derived from descriptive is-beliefs. In this paper I will propose the following two respective theses: That there is no unbridgable ontological, logical or semantical ʻgap’ between Is and Ought since moral cognitivism is true (thesis I) and that Ought consequently can be and routinely is derived from Is (thesis II). In order to (...)
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  20. W. K. Frankena (1939). The Naturalistic Fallacy. Mind 48 (192):464-477.
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  21. David P. Gauthier (1967). Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy. American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (4):315 - 320.
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  22. George R. Geiger (1949). A Note on the Naturalistic Fallacy. Philosophy of Science 16 (4):336-342.
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  23. James M. Giarelli (1976). Lawrence Kohlberg and G. E. Moore on the Naturalistic Fallacy. Educational Theory 26 (4):348-354.
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  24. Kenneth E. Goodpaster (1985). Business Ethics, Ideology, and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Journal of Business Ethics 4 (4):227 - 232.
    This paper addresses the relationship between theoretical and applied ethics. It directs philosophical attention toward the concept of ideology, conceived as a bridge between high-level principles and decision-making practice. How are we to understand this bridge and how can we avoid the naturalistic fallacy while taking ideology seriously?It is then suggested that the challenge posed by ideology in the arena of organizational ethics is in many ways similar to the challenge posed by developmentalist accounts of moral stages in the arena (...)
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  25. Oren Harman (2012). Is the Naturalistic Fallacy Dead (and If So, Ought It Be?). Journal of the History of Biology 45 (3):557 - 572.
    Much of modern moral philosophy argued that there are is's in this world, and there are oughts, but that the two are entirely independent of one another. What this meant was that morality had nothing to do with man's biological nature, and could not be derived from it. Any such attempt was considered to be a categorical mistake, and plain foolish. Most philosophers still believe this, but a growing group of neonaturalist thinkers are now challenging their assumptions. Here I consider (...)
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  26. Meena Kelkar (1983). Naturalistic Fallacy : Does Spinoza Commit This Fallacy? Indian Philosophical Quarterly 10 (3):303.
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  27. Andrew J. Kerr (2000). The Possibility of Metaphysics: Environmental Ethics and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Environmental Ethics 22 (1):85-99.
    One of the most distinguishing features of environmental ethics has been the effort to develop a nonanthropocentric intrinsic value theory, that is, a definition of the good which is not dependent upon some quality particular to humanity, a definition of the good whereby properties found in the terrestrial, nonhuman world are constitutive of that definition. In this paper, I argue that major nonanthropocentric theories suffer from arbitrariness. I argue through the use of representative thinkers that much nonathropocentric theory has committed (...)
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  28. Aurel Kolnai (1980). The Ghost of the Naturalistic Fallacy. Philosophy 55 (211):5 - 16.
    In 1952, having for the first time to give a lecture in Madrid, I said somewhat dejectedly to the able and witty young man entrusted with the tedious task of revising the Spanish of my text that I found my lecture didn't amount to much: it was but a long paraphrase of one single idea. Perhaps I hoped for an enthusiastic protest on his part. But he only offered as solace the terse remark: ‘Well, I have heard many a lecture (...)
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  29. John F. Lange (1965). The Logic of Derivationist Versions of the Naturalistic Fallacy. Ratio 7 (2):190.
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  30. John Lemos (2000). Darwinian Natural Right and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Biology and Philosophy 15 (1):119-132.
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  31. Hallvard Lillehammer (forthcoming). An Assumption of Extreme Significance: Moore, Ross and Spencer on Ethics and Evolution. In Uri Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
    In recent years there has been a growing interest among mainstream Anglophone moral philosophers in the empirical study of human morality, including its evolution and historical development. This chapter compares these developments with an earlier point of contact between moral philosophy and the moral sciences in the early decades of the Twentieth century, as manifested in some of the less frequently discussed arguments of G. E. Moore and W. D. Ross. It is argued that a critical appreciation of Moore and (...)
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  32. Joseph W. Long (2001). The Logical Mistake of Racism. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8 (1):47-51.
    In this paper, I will explore and attempt to define one very important type of egregious discrimination of persons, racism. I will argue that racism involves a kind of logical mistake; specifically. I hope to show that racists commit the naturalistic fallacy. Finally, I will defend my account of racism against two challenges, the most important of which argues that if racism is merely a logical error then racists are not morally culpable.
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  33. Nr Luebke (1970). Frankena on Naturalistic Fallacy. Journal of Thought 5 (4):262-273.
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  34. Piotr T. Makowski (2011). Gilotyna Hume'a. Przegląd Filozoficzny 4 (80):317-334.
    The paper is devoted to the interpretation of one of the most important passages in modern Anglophon philosophy: III.1.3 of Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume. The author considers the problem of its meaning at an angle of the standard interpretation, which can be summed up in a dictum: ‘no ought from is’ (so called “Hume’s Guillotine”). The author outlines four possible approaches to this putative meaning of the Treatise passage and weighs arguments for them. The investigation, based mainly (...)
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  35. Philip Mulloch (1971). The Naturalistic Fallacy and Anderson's Systems OM. Philosophical Studies 22 (4):60 - 61.
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  36. Kai Nielsen (1974). Covert and Overt Synonymity: Brandt and Moore and the 'Naturalistic Fallacy'. Philosophical Studies 25 (1):51 - 56.
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  37. Susana Nuccetelli, Is There a Naturalistic Fallacy?
    More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously offered his own version of nonnaturalism in opposition to what are, in effect, analytic versions of reductive naturalism in ethics. Although Moore himself did not clearly distinguish the analysis of predicates from that of properties, he plainly denied that the evaluative predicate, good , could be analyzed in terms of any purely descriptive predicate, and took this to show that the property of goodness could not be identical to any natural property (...)
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  38. Susana Nuccetelli (2010). Two Puzzles in Metaethics. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Ethics 1 (1):15-16.
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  39. Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay, Semantic Naturalism and the New Naturalistic Fallacy.
    More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously offered an extended inference to reject what are in effect two substantially different types of ethical naturalism. Although some naturalistic doctrines targeted by that inference make semantic claims that, if true, would entail certain metaphysical claims, it is also possible that those semantic doctrines could be false and the metaphysical ones true at the same time. For if semantic naturalism is true, then moral terms and sentences are reducible, by an analysis (...)
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  40. Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay, The Semantic Naturalist Fallacy.
    More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously attempted to refute all versions of moral naturalism by offering the open question argument (OQA) followed by the “naturalistic fallacy” charge (NF).1 Although there is consensus that this extended inference fails to undermine all varieties of moral naturalism, OQA is often vindicated as an argument against analytical moral naturalism. By contrast, NF usually finds no takers at all. ln this paper we argue that analytical naturalism of the sort recently proposed by (...)
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  41. Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (2011). Does Semantic Naturalism Rest on a Mistake? In Nuccetelli & Seay Susana & Gary (ed.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates. Cambridge University Press.
    More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously attempted to refute ethical naturalism by offering the so-called open question argument (OQA), also charging that all varieties of ethical naturalism commit the naturalistic fallacy. Although there is consensus that OQA and the naturalistic-fallacy charge both fail, OQA is sometimes vindicated, but only as an argument against naturalistic semantic analyses. The naturalistic-fallacy charge, by contrast, usually finds no takers at all. This paper provides new grounds for an OQA thus restricted. But (...)
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  42. Charles Pigden (forthcoming). Hume On Is and Ought: Logic, Promises and the Duke of Wellington. In Paul Russell (ed.), Oxford Handbook on David Hume. Oxford University Press.
    Hume seems to contend that you can’t get an ought from an is. Searle professed to prove otherwise, deriving a conclusion about obligations from a premise about promises. Since (as Schurz and I have shown) you can’t derive a substantive ought from an is by logic alone, Searle is best construed as claiming that there are analytic bridge principles linking premises about promises to conclusions about obligations. But we can no more derive a moral obligation to pay up from the (...)
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  43. Charles Pigden (2007). Desiring to Desire: Russell, Lewis and G.E.Moore. In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes from G.E.Moore. Oxford University Press. 244-260.
    I have two aims in this paper. In §§2-4 I contend that Moore has two arguments (not one) for the view that that ‘good’ denotes a non-natural property not to be identified with the naturalistic properties of science and common sense (or, for that matter, the more exotic properties posited by metaphysicians and theologians). The first argument, the Barren Tautology Argument (or the BTA), is derived, via Sidgwick, from a long tradition of anti-naturalist polemic. But the second argument, the Open (...)
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  44. Charles Pigden (2004). Review of G.E.Moore’s Ethical Theory by Brian Hutchinson. [REVIEW] International Philosophical Quarterly:543-547.
    The history of philosophy can be seen either as a contribution to history or a contribution to philosophy or perhaps as a bit of both. Hutchinson fail on both counts. The book is bad: bad in itself (since it quite definitely ought not to be) and bad as a companion to Principia (since it sets students a bad example of slapdash, lazy and pretentious philosophizing and would tend to put them off reading Moore). As a conscientious reviewer I ploughed through (...)
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  45. Charles Pigden (1991). Naturalism. In Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics. Blackwell. 421-431.
    Survey article on Naturalism dealing with Hume's NOFI (including Prior's objections), Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy and the Barren Tautology Argument. Naturalism, as I understand it, is a form of moral realism which rejects fundamental moral facts or properties. Thus it is opposed to both non-cognitivism, and and the error theory but also to non-naturalism. General conclusion: as of 1991: naturalism as a program has not been refuted though none of the extant versions look particularly promising.
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  46. Charles R. Pigden (2012). Identifying Goodness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):93 - 109.
    The paper reconstructs Moore's Open Question Argument (OQA) and discusses its rise and fall. There are three basic objections to the OQA: Geach's point, that Moore presupposes that ?good? is a predicative adjective (whereas it is in fact attributive); Lewy's point, that it leads straight to the Paradox of Analysis; and Durrant's point that even if 'good' is not synonymous with any naturalistic predicate, goodness might be synthetically identical with a naturalistic property. As against Geach, I argue that 'good' has (...)
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  47. Massimo Pigliucci (2005). The Naturalistic Fallacy. Free Inquiry 25.
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  48. Burton frederick Porter (1968). Deity and Morality, with Regard to the Naturalistic Fallacy. London, Allen & Unwin.
    ChapterI THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY AZ THE NATURE OF THE FALLACY The criticism which has since been labelled the naturalistic fallacy was first described by the eighteenth-century empircist David Hume, in a small but celebrated ...
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  49. Burton Frederick Porter (1968). Deity and Morality. New York, Humanities Press.
  50. Gabriel Ricci (2012). Norm and Nature: The Naturalistic Fallacy Revisited. Existentia 22 (3-4):279-300.
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