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- Robert Adams, Well-Being and Excellence.
- Anna Alexandrova (2012). Well-Being as an Object of Science. Philosophy of Science 79 (5):678-689.
- Erik Angner, Subjective Well-Being.
- Erik Angner (2012). Fred Feldman, What is This Thing Called Happiness? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), Pp. Xv + 286-ERRATUM. Utilitas 24 (01):150-.
- Erik Angner (2011). Are Subjective Measures of Well-Being 'Direct'? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):115-130.
- Erik Angner (2011). Fred Feldman, What is This Thing Called Happiness? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), Pp. Xv + 286. Utilitas 23 (04):458-461.
- Richard Arneson (2006). Desire Formation and Human Good. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 81 (59):9-.
- Richard J. Arneson (2004). Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care:Welfare and Rational Care. Ethics 114 (4):815-819.
- John R. Atherton, Elaine L. Graham & Ian Steedman (eds.) (2010). The Practices of Happiness: Political Economy, Religion and Wellbeing. Routledge.
- Neera Badhwar (2009). Review of Daniel M. Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (10).
- Kathy Behrendt (2011). Reasons to Live Versus Reasons Not to Die. Think 10 (28):67-76.
- Mark Bernstein (2001). L. W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics:Welfare, Happiness and Ethics. Ethics 111 (2):441-443.
- Paul Bloomfield (ed.) (2008). Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford University Press.
- Greg Bognar (2010). Authentic Happiness. Utilitas 22 (3):272-284.
- E. J. Bond (1988). `Good' and `Good For': A Reply to Hurka. Mind 97 (386):279-280.
- Lisa Bortolotti (ed.) (2009). Philosophy and Happiness. Palgrave MacMillan.
- Ben Bradley (2009). Well-Being and Death. Oxford University Press.
- Bruce Brower (1998). Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics. Philosophical Review 107 (2):309-312.
- Stephen M. Campbell (forthcoming). An Analysis of Prudential Value. Utilitas.
- Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.) (1997). Morality and the Good Life. Oxford University Press.
- Ruth Chang (2004). All Things Considered. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):1–22.
- K. J. Clark (2010). Well-Being and Death * by Ben Bradley. Analysis 70 (3):592-593.
- Samuel Clark (2012). Pleasure as Self-Discovery. Ratio 25 (3):260-276.
- David Collard (2006). Research on Well-Being: Some Advice From Jeremy Bentham. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (3):330-354.
- Christian Coons (forthcoming). "The Best Expression of Welfarism". In Mark C. Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (Vol. 2). Oxford University Press.
- S. Darwall (2006). Précis of Welfare and Rational Care. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):579 - 584.
- Stephen Darwall (2006). Reply to Griffin, Raz, and Wolf. Utilitas 18 (4):434-444.
- Stephen Darwall (1998). Empathy, Sympathy, Care. Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3):261–282.
- Stephen L. Darwall (2002). Welfare and Rational Care. Princeton University Press.
- Dale Dorsey (2010). Preferences, Welfare, and the Status-Quo Bias. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):535-554.
- Daniel Doviak (2009). Virtue, Satisfaction and Welfare Enhancement. Utilitas 21 (1):59-71.
- Ronald Dworkin (1981). What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare. Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (3):185-246.
- Jon Elster & John E. Roemer (eds.) (1991). Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being. Cambridge University Press.
- Fred Feldman, What is the Rational Care Theory of Welfare? A Comment on Stephen Darwall's Welfare and Rational Care.
- Fred Feldman (2010). What is This Thing Called Happiness? Oxford University Press.
- Fred Feldman (2006). What is the Rational Care Theory of Welfare? Philosophical Studies 130 (3).
- Fred Feldman (1992). Confrontations with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of Death. Oxford University Press.
- Simon D. Feldman & Allan Hazlett, In Defense of Ambivalence.
- Simon D. Feldman & Allan Hazlett (2013). What's Bad About Bad Faith? European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):50-73.
- Stephen Finlay (2004). The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgement. Journal of Ethics 8 (3):205-223.
- John Martin Fischer (2009). Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. Oxford University Press.
- Guy Fletcher (2012). Resisting Buck-Passing Accounts of Prudential Value. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):77-91.
- Guy Fletcher (2012). The Locative Analysis of Good For Formulated and Defended. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (JESP) 6 (1).
- Guy Fletcher (2009). Rejecting Well-Being Invariabilism. Philosophical Papers 38 (1):21-34.
- Gandhi (1950). The Good Life. New Delhi, Indian Printing Works.
- Gerald F. Gaus (2005). Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), Pp. XXII + 544. Utilitas 17 (2):233-236.
- Jyl Gentzler (2004). Winner of The Philosophical Quarterly Essay Prize 2003: The Attractions and Delights of Goodness. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):353 - 367.
- Allan Gibbard (2008). Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics. Oxford University Press.
- James Grant (2012). The Value of Imaginativeness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):275-289.
- James Griffin (2006). Darwall on Welfare as Rational Care. Utilitas 18 (4):427-433.
- James Griffin (2000). Welfare Rights. Journal of Ethics 4 (1-2):27-43.
- James Griffin, Roger Crisp & Brad Hooker (eds.) (2000). Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. Oxford University Press.
- Bjørn Grinde (2005). Darwinian Happiness: Can the Evolutionary Perspective on Well-Being Help Us Improve Society? World Futures 61 (4):317 – 329.
- Daniel Groll (2012). Paternalism, Respect, and the Will. Ethics 122 (4):692-720.
- Sven Ove Hansson (2004). Welfare, Justice, and Pareto Efficiency. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (4):361 - 380.
- Gerald K. Harrison & Julia Tanner (2011). Better Not to Have Children. Think, 10(27), 113-121.
- Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson (2009). Preference Satisfaction and Welfare Economics. Economics and Philosophy 25 (1):1-25.
- Jennifer S. Hawkins (2008). Well-Being, Autonomy, and the Horizon Problem. Utilitas 20 (2):143-168.
- Dan Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness: Well-Being and the Limits of Personal Authority.
- Dan Haybron, Life Satisfaction, Ethical Reflection, and the Science of Happiness.
- Dan Haybron, Philosophy and the Science of Subjective Well-Being.
- Daniel M. Haybron (2008). The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being. OUP Oxford.
- Chris Heathwood (2010). Welfare. In John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics. Routledge.
- Chris Heathwood (2007). Review of Roger Crisp, Reasons and the Good. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (7).
- Ori J. Herstein (2013). Why 'Nonexistent People' Do Not Have Zero Wellbeing but No Wellbeing at All. Journal of Applied Philosophy 30 (2):136-145.
- Thomas E. Hill (2002). Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
- Thomas E. Hill (1999). Happiness and Human Flourishing in Kant's Ethics. Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (01):143-.
- Nils Holtug (2003). Welfarism – The Very Idea. Utilitas 15 (02):151-.
- Brad Hooker (1991). Theories of Welfare, Theories of Good Reasons for Action, and Ontological Naturalism. Philosophical Papers 20 (1):25-36.
- Thomas Hurka (2006). A Kantian Theory of Welfare? Philosophical Studies 130 (3).
- Thomas Hurka (1987). `Good' and `Good For'. Mind 96 (381):71-73.
- E. Jordan (1949). The Good Life. [Chicago]University Press.
- Guy Kahane & Julian Savulescu (2012). The Concept of Harm and the Significance of Normality. Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (3):n/a-n/a.
- Antti Kauppinen (2012). Meaningfulness and Time. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):345-377.
- Lansana Keita (1999). Welfare Economics and Positive Neoclassical Economics. Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (3):335-351.
- Frank H. Knight (1951). Economics and Welfare:Theories of Welfare Economics. Hla Myint. Ethics 61 (3):219-.
- Richard Kraut (2007). What is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being. Harvard University Press.
- Richard Kraut (1972). The Rationality of Prudence. Philosophical Review 81 (3):351-359.
- Ivar Labukt (2012). Hedonic Tone and the Heterogeneity of Pleasure. Utilitas 24 (02):172-199.
- William Lauinger (forthcoming). The Missing-Desires Objection to Hybrid Theories of Well-Being. Southern Journal of Philosophy.
- William Lauinger (2012). Well-Being and Theism: Linking Ethics to God. Continuum.
- David Lefkowitz (2008). On the Concept of a Morally Relevant Harm. Utilitas 20 (4):409-423.
- Noah Lemos (2004). Rational Desire and the Good. Business Ethics Quarterly 14 (2):329-336.
- Christian List, Multidimensional Welfare Aggregation.
- Timothy Macklem & John Gardner (2006). Value, Interest, and Well-Being. Utilitas 18 (4):362-382.
- Elinor Mason (2007). The Nature of Pleasure: A Critique of Feldman. Utilitas 19 (3):379-387.
- Michelle Mason & Valerie Tiberius (2009). Eudaimonia. In Shane J. Lopez (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Patrick Maynard (2000). "What Will Surprise You Most": Self-Regulating Systems and Problems of Correct Use in Plato's Republic. Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (1):1-26.
- Thaddeus Metz (forthcoming). Ubuntu: The Good Life. In Alex Michalos (ed.), Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-being Research. Springer.
- Thaddeus Metz (2011). Are Lives Worth Creating? Philosophical Papers 40 (2):233-255.
- D. Molyneux (2007). "And How is Life Going for You?" an Account of Subjective Welfare in Medicine. Journal of Medical Ethics 33 (10):568-582.
- Tim Mulgan (2004). Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker (Eds.), Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), Pp. X + 316. Utilitas 16 (3):326-331.
- Hichem Naar (2011). Review: The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Daniel Haybron. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):307 - 310.
- Thomas Nagel (1979/2012). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.
- Jan Narveson (2004). Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics. International Studies in Philosophy 36 (1):316-318.
- Gert Olthuis & Wim Dekkers (2005). Quality of Life Considered as Well-Being: Views From Philosophy and Palliative Care Practice. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (4):307-337.
- Mark Piper (2011). The Prudential Value of Education for Autonomy. Journal of Philosophy of Education 45 (1):19-35.
- F. Pollock (1877). Happiness or Welfare. Mind 2 (6):269-272.
- Douglas W. Portmore, Welfare and Posthumous Harm.
- A. N. Prior (1958). The Good Life. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):1 – 13.
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