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  1. Robert Adams, Well-Being and Excellence.
    We have noted some fundamental distinctions between types of goodness or value. There is usefulness, or merely instrumental goodness, the value that something may have as a means to something else that is good or that is valued. Usefulness has an obvious importance, and connects with significant philosophical issues about instrumentality and probability; but more fundamental issues for ethical theory are posed by the goods or ends that the useful is to serve. Within the realm of what is good for (...)
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  2. Anna Alexandrova (2012). Well-Being as an Object of Science. Philosophy of Science 79 (5):678-689.
    The burgeoning science of well-being makes no secret of being value laden: improvement of well-being is its explicit goal. But in order to achieve this goal its concepts and claims need to be value adequate; that is, they need, among other things, to adequately capture well-being. In this article I consider two ways of securing this adequacy—first, by relying on philosophical theory of prudential value and, second, by the psychometric approach. I argue that neither is fully adequate and explore an (...)
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  3. Jami L. Anderson (2014). A Life Not Worth Living. In David P. Pierson (ed.), Breaking Bad: Critical Essays on the Contexts, Politics, Style, and Reception of the Television Series. Lexington Press. 103-118.
    What is so striking about Breaking Bad is how centrally impairment and disability feature in the lives of the characters of this series. It is unusual for a television series to cast characters with visible or invisible impairments. On the rare occasions that television shows do have characters with impairments, these characters serve no purpose other than to contribute to their ‘Otherness.’ Breaking Bad not only centralizes impairment, but impairment drives and sustains the story lines. I use three interrelated themes (...)
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  4. Erik Angner, Subjective Well-Being.
    This paper examines the notion of “subjective well-being” as it is used in literature on subjective measures of well-being. I argue that those who employ the notion differ at least superficially on at least two points: first, about the relationship between subjective well-being and well-being simpliciter, and second, about the constituents of subjective well-being. In an effort to reconcile the differences, I propose an interpretation according to which subjective measures presuppose preference hedonism: an account according to which well-being is a (...)
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  5. Erik Angner (2012). Fred Feldman, What is This Thing Called Happiness? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), Pp. Xv + 286. Utilitas 23 (04):458-461.
  6. Erik Angner (2011). Are Subjective Measures of Well-Being 'Direct'? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):115 - 130.
    Subjective measures of well-being?measures based on answers to questions such as ?Taking things all together, how would you say things are these days?would you say you're very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy these days???are often presented as superior to more traditional economic welfare measures, e.g., for public policy purposes. This paper aims to spell out and assess what I will call the argument from directness: the notion that subjective measures of well-being better represent well-being than economic measures do (...)
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  7. Richard Arneson (2006). Desire Formation and Human Good. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81 (59):9-.
    In Wuthering Heights a man and a woman fall in love and their passion for each other wreaks havoc on several lives, theirs included.1 Long after his beloved is dead, Heathcliff’s life revolves entirely around his love for her. Frustrated by events, his grand romantic passion expresses itself in destructive spasms of antisocial behavior. Catherine, the object of this passion, marries another man on a whim, but describes her feelings for him as like superficial foliage, whereas “her love for Heathcliff (...)
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  8. Richard J. Arneson (2004). Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care:Welfare and Rational Care. Ethics 114 (4):815-819.
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  9. Richard J. Arneson (2002). The End of Welfare As We Know It? Scanlon Versus Welfarist Consequentialism. Social Theory and Practice 28 (2):315-336.
    A notable achievement of T.M. Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other is its sustained critique of welfarist consequentialism. Consequentialism is the doctrine that one morally ought always to do an act, of the alternatives, that brings about a state of affairs that is no less good than any other one could bring about. Welfarism is the view that what makes a state of affairs better or worse is some increasing function of the welfare for persons realized in it. I (...)
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  10. John R. Atherton, Elaine L. Graham & Ian Steedman (eds.) (2010). The Practices of Happiness: Political Economy, Religion and Wellbeing. Routledge.
    These essays explore the religious dimensions to a number of key features of well-being, including marriage, crime and rehabilitation, work, inequality, mental ...
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  11. Neera Badhwar (2009). Review of Daniel M. Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (10).
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  12. Kathy Behrendt (2011). Reasons to Live Versus Reasons Not to Die. Think 10 (28):67-76.
    ‘Any reason for living is an excellent reason for not dying’ (Steven Luper-Foy, 'Annihilation'). Some claims seem so clearly right that we don’t think to question them. Steven Luper-Foy’s remark is like that. It borders on the ‘trivially true’ (i.e. so obviously true as to be uninteresting). If I have a reason to live, surely I likewise have a reason not to die. It may then be surprising to learn that so many philosophers disagree with this claim—either directly or by (...)
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  13. Mark Bernstein (2001). L. W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics:Welfare, Happiness and Ethics. Ethics 111 (2):441-443.
  14. Paul Bloomfield (ed.) (2008). Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford University Press.
    The volume will act as a useful collection of scholarship by top figures, and as a resource and course book on an important topic.
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  15. Greg Bognar (2010). Authentic Happiness. Utilitas 22 (3):272-284.
    This article discusses L. W. Sumner's theory of well-being as authentic happiness. I distinguish between extreme and moderate versions of subjectivism and argue that Sumner's characterization of the conditions of authenticity leads him to an extreme subjective theory. More generally, I also criticize Sumner's argument for the subjectivity of welfare. I conclude by addressing some of the implications of my arguments for theories of well-being in philosophy and welfare measurement in the social sciences.
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  16. E. J. Bond (1988). `Good' and `Good For': A Reply to Hurka. Mind 97 (386):279-280.
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  17. Lisa Bortolotti (ed.) (2009). Philosophy and Happiness. Palgrave MacMillan.
    Philosophy and Happiness addresses the need to situate any meaningful discourse about happiness in a wider context of human interests, capacities and circumstances. How is happiness manifested and expressed? Can there be any happiness if no worthy life projects are pursued? How is happiness affected by relationships, illness, or cultural variants? Can it be reduced to preference satisfaction? Is it a temporary feeling or a persistent way of being? Is reflection conducive to happiness? Is mortality necessary for it? These are (...)
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  18. Matthew Braddock (2010). Constructivist Experimental Philosophy on Well-Being and Virtue. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (3):295-323.
    What is the nature of human well-being? This paper joins the ancient debate by rejuvenating an ancient claim that is quite unfashionable among moral philosophers today, namely, the Aristotelian claim that moral virtue is (non-instrumentally) necessary for human well-being. Call it the Aristotelian Virtue Condition (AVC). This view can be revived for contemporary debate by a state-of-the-art approach that we might call constructivist experimental philosophy, which takes as its goal the achievement of a reasonable constructivist account of well-being and takes (...)
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  19. Ben Bradley (2013). Asymmetries in Benefiting, Harming and Creating. Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):37-49.
    It is often said that while we have a strong reason not to create someone who will be badly off, we have no strong reason for creating someone who will be well off. In this paper I argue that this asymmetry is incompatible with a plausible principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives, and that a more general asymmetry between harming and benefiting is difficult to defend. I then argue that, contrary to what many have claimed, it is possible to harm (...)
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  20. Ben Bradley (2009). Well-Being and Death. Oxford University Press.
  21. Ben Bramble (2014). Whole-Life Welfarism. American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):63-74.
    In this paper, I set out and defend a new theory of value, whole-life welfarism. According to this theory, something is good only if it makes somebody better off in some way in his life considered as a whole. By focusing on lifetime, rather than momentary, well-being, a welfarist can solve two of the most vexing puzzles in value theory, The Badness of Death and The Problem of Additive Aggregation.
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  22. Bruce Brower (1998). Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics. Philosophical Review 107 (2):309-312.
  23. Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.) (1997). Morality and the Good Life. Oxford University Press.
    Contemporary moral philosophers have produced an enormous amount of rich and varied published work on virtually all the issues falling within the scope of ethics and moral philosophy. Morality and the Good Life is a comprehensive survey of contemporary ethical theory that collects thirty-four selections on morality and the theory of value. Emphasizing value theory, metaethics, and normative ethics, it is non-technical and accessible to a wide range of readers. Selections are organized under six main topics: Concepts of Goodness What (...)
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  24. Ruth Chang (2004). All Things Considered. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):1–22.
    One of the most common judgments of normative life takes the following form: With respect to some things that matter, one item is better than the other, with respect to other things that matter, the other item is better, but all things considered – that is, taking into account all the things that matter – the one item is better than the other. In this paper, I explore how all-things-considered judgments are possible, assuming that they are. In particular, I examine (...)
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  25. K. J. Clark (2010). Well-Being and Death * by Ben Bradley. Analysis 70 (3):592-593.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  26. Samuel Clark (2012). Pleasure as Self-Discovery. Ratio 25 (3):260-276.
    This paper uses readings of two classic autobiographies, Edmund Gosse's Father & Son and John Stuart Mill's Autobiography, to develop a distinctive answer to an old and central question in value theory: What role is played by pleasure in the most successful human life? A first section defends my method. The main body of the paper then defines and rejects voluntarist, stoic, and developmental hedonist lessons to be taken from central crises in my two subjects' autobiographies, and argues for a (...)
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  27. David Collard (2006). Research on Well-Being: Some Advice From Jeremy Bentham. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (3):330-354.
    Jeremy Bentham provided a comprehensive list of the sources of pleasure and pain, rather in the manner of modern researchers into human well-being. He explicitly used the term well-being and made both qualitative and quantitative proposals for its measurement. Bentham insisted that the measurement of well-being should be firmly based on the concerns and subjective valuations of those directly concerned, in the context of a liberal society. Those who wished to superimpose other judgements were dismissed as "ipsedixitists." He also addressed, (...)
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  28. Christian Coons (forthcoming). &Quot;the Best Expression of Welfarism&Quot;. In Mark C. Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (Vol. 2). Oxford University Press.
  29. S. Darwall (2006). Précis of Welfare and Rational Care. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):579 - 584.
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  30. Stephen Darwall (2006). Reply to Griffin, Raz, and Wolf. Utilitas 18 (4):434-444.
  31. Stephen Darwall (1998). Empathy, Sympathy, Care. Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3):261–282.
    In what follows, I wish to discuss empathy and sympathy’s relevance to ethics, taking recent findings into account. In particular, I want to consider sympathy’s relation to the idea of a person’s good or well-being. It is obvious and uncontroversial that sympathetic concern for a person involves some concern for her good and some desire to promote it. What I want to suggest is that the concept of a person’s good or well-being is one we have because we are capable (...)
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  32. Stephen L. Darwall (2002). Welfare and Rational Care. Princeton University Press.
    "This book proposes a new view on a central topic in contemporary ethics.
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  33. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (forthcoming). Emotions and Well-Being. Philosophical Topics.
    It is striking that for each major theory of well-being, there exists a companion theory of the emotions. Thus, to classical hedonic views of well-being, there corresponds no less classical pure feeling views of the emotions; to desire views that conceive of well-being in terms of desire satisfaction, there corresponds a variety of theories approaching the emotions in terms of the satisfaction/frustration of desires; and finally, to so called objective list theories of well-being, there corresponds a variety of theories that (...)
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  34. Dale Dorsey (2010). Preferences, Welfare, and the Status-Quo Bias. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):535-554.
    Preferences play a role in well-being that is difficult to escape, but whatever authority one grants to preferences, their malleability seems to cause problems for any theory of well-being that employs them. Most importantly, preferences appear to display a status-quo bias: people come to prefer what they are likely rather than unlikely to get. I try to do two things here. The first is to provide a more precise characterization of the status-quo bias, how it functions, and how it infects (...)
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  35. Daniel Doviak (2009). Virtue, Satisfaction and Welfare Enhancement. Utilitas 21 (1):59-71.
    In Wayne Sumner argues that (1) as a matter of necessity, virtue is intrinsically prudentially rewarding, and (2) if all else is equal, the virtuous will fare better than the non-virtuous. In this article, I reproduce and criticize those arguments. I offer several objections to the argument for the first thesis; each objection makes the same basic point: contrary to what Sumner assumes, certain contingent facts over and above a person's being virtuous have to obtain if virtue is to issue (...)
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  36. Ronald Dworkin (1981). What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare. Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (3):185-246.
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  37. Claire Edwards (2013). The Anomalous Wellbeing of Disabled People: A Response. Topoi 32 (2):189-196.
    Disabled people frequently find themselves in situations where their quality of life and wellbeing is being measured or judged by others, whether in decisions about health care provision or assessments for social supports. Recent debates about wellbeing and how it might be assessed (through subjective and/or objective measures) have prompted a renewed focus on disabled people’s wellbeing because of its seemingly ‘anomalous’ nature; that is, whilst to external (objective) observers the wellbeing of disabled people appears poor, based on subjective assessments, (...)
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  38. Jon Elster & John E. Roemer (eds.) (1991). Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being. Cambridge University Press.
    In this volume a diverse group of economists, philosophers, political scientists, and psychologists address the problems, principles, and practices involved in comparing the well-being of different individuals. A series of questions lie at the heart of this investigation: What is the relevant concept of well-being for the purposes of comparison? How could the comparisons be carried out for policy purposes? How are such comparisons made now? How do the difficulties involved in these comparisons affect the status of utilitarian theories? This (...)
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  39. Fred Feldman, What is the Rational Care Theory of Welfare? A Comment on Stephen Darwall's Welfare and Rational Care.
    When we speak of a “good life” there are several different things we might mean. We might mean a morally good life. We might mean a life good for others, or good for the world in general. We might mean a life good in itself for the one who lives it. This last may also be described as the life high in individual welfare.
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  40. Fred Feldman (2010). What is This Thing Called Happiness? Oxford University Press.
    Some puzzles about happiness -- Pt. I. Some things that happiness isn't. Sensory hedonism about happiness -- Kahneman's "objective happiness" -- Subjective local preferentism about happiness -- Whole life satisfaction concepts of happiness -- Pt. II. What happiness is. What is this thing called happiness? -- Attitudinal hedonism about happiness -- Eudaimonism -- The problem of inauthentic happiness -- Disgusting happiness -- Our authority over our own happiness -- Pt. III. Implications for the empirical study of happiness. Measuring happiness -- (...)
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  41. Fred Feldman (2006). What is the Rational Care Theory of Welfare? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 130 (3):585 - 601.
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  42. Fred Feldman (1992). Confrontations with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of Death. Oxford University Press.
    What is death? Do people survive death? What do we mean when we say that someone is "dying"? Presenting a clear and engaging discussion of the classic philosophical questions surrounding death, this book studies the great metaphysical and moral problems of death. In the first part, Feldman shows that a definition of life is necessary before death can be defined. After exploring several of the most plausible accounts of the nature of life and demonstrating their failure, he goes on to (...)
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  43. Simon D. Feldman & Allan Hazlett, In Defense of Ambivalence.
    Harry Frankfurt (1988, 1998, 2004) defends an ethical ideal of wholeheartedness. We follow Frankfurt in distinguishing between ambivalence (a species of incoherence in desire) and wholeheartedness (the absence of ambivalence), but part ways with him by arguing against the idea that wholeheartedness is an ethical ideal. Our argument is based on cases of ethically valuable ambivalence – cases in which ambivalence contributes to the wellbeing of the ambivalent person.
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  44. Simon D. Feldman & Allan Hazlett (2013). What's Bad About Bad Faith? European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):50-73.
    : Contemporary common sense holds that authenticity is an ethical ideal: that there is something bad about inauthenticity, and something good about authenticity. Here we criticize the view that authenticity is bad because it detracts from the wellbeing of the inauthentic person, and propose an alternative moral account of the badness of inauthenticity, based on the idea that inauthentic behaviour is potentially misleading.
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  45. Stephen Finlay (2004). The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgement. Journal of Ethics 8 (3):205-223.
    Analyses of moral value judgements must meet a practicality requirement: moral speech acts characteristically express pro- or con-attitudes, indicate that speakers are motivated in certain ways, and exert influence on others' motivations. Nondescriptivists including Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard claim that no descriptivist analysis can satisfy this requirement. I argue first that while the practicality requirement is defeasible, it indeed demands a connection between value judgement and motivation that resembles a semantic or conceptual rather than merely contingent psychological link. I (...)
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  46. John Martin Fischer (2009). Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction: "meaning in life and death : our stories" -- John Martin Fischer and Anthony B rueckner, "Why is death bad?", Philosophical studies, vol. 50, no. 2 (September 1986) -- "Death, badness, and the impossibility of experience," Journal of ethics -- John Martin Fischer and Daniel Speak, "Death and the psychological conception of personal identity," Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 24 -- "Earlier birth and later death : symmetry through thick and thin," Richard Feldman, Kris McDaniel, Jason R. Raibley, eds., (...)
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  47. Guy Fletcher (2012). The Locative Analysis of Good For Formulated and Defended. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (JESP) 6 (1).
    THE STRUCTURE OF THIS PAPER IS AS FOLLOWS. I begin §1 by dealing with preliminary issues such as the different relations expressed by the “good for” locution. I then (§2) outline the Locative Analysis of good for and explain its main elements before moving on to (§3) outlining and discussing the positive features of the view. In the subsequent sections I show how the Locative Analysis can respond to objections from, or inspired by, Sumner (§4-5), Regan (§6), and Schroeder and (...)
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  48. Guy Fletcher (2012). Resisting Buck-Passing Accounts of Prudential Value. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):77-91.
    This paper aims to cast doubt upon a certain way of analysing prudential value (or good for ), namely in the manner of a ‘buck-passing’ analysis. It begins by explaining why we should be interested in analyses of good for and the nature of buck-passing analyses generally (§I). It moves on to considering and rejecting two sets of buck-passing analyses. The first are analyses that are likely to be suggested by those attracted to the idea of analysing good for in (...)
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  49. Guy Fletcher (2009). Rejecting Well-Being Invariabilism. Philosophical Papers 38 (1):21-34.
    This paper is an attempt to undermine a basic assumption of theories of well-being, one that I call well-being invariabilism. I argue that much of what makes existing theories of well-being inadequate stems from the invariabilist assumption. After distinguishing and explaining well-being invariabilism and well-being variabilism, I show that the most widely-held theories of well-being—hedonism, desire-satisfaction, and pluralist objective-list theories—presuppose invariabilism and that a large class of the objections to them arise because of it. My aim is to show that (...)
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  50. Bruno S. Frey & Jana Gallus (2013). Subjective Well-Being and Policy. Topoi 32 (2):207-212.
    This paper analyses whether the aggregation of individual happiness scores to a National Happiness Index can still be trusted once governments have proclaimed their main objective to be the pursuit—or even maximization—of this National Happiness Index. The answer to this investigation is clear-cut: as soon as the National Happiness Index has become a policy goal, it can no longer be trusted to reflect people’s true happiness. Rather, the Index will be systematically distorted due to the incentive for citizens to answer (...)
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