In their book on Descartes’s changing mind, Peter Machamer and J.E McGuire argue that Descartes discarded dualism to embrace a kind of monism. It is intriguing to investigate if the master of dualism could have changed his mind about the central aspect of his system. After reviewing the position of the authors, we will consider how and in what terms Descartes did not go back on his favorite doctrine but may have fooled himself about the nature of his dualism. It (...) is my contention that the so-called problematic Cartesian dualism has its origin in the lack of proper definition of mind and body as substances and the role of their respective attributes, thought and extension in the definition of the substances. The main answer to Machamer and McGuire’s thesis is that Descartes could develop his epistemology of mind and body independently of a metaphysics of substance and its attributes. In other words not only did Descartes not change his mind, but he persevered and enriched his dualist metaphysics. The subsidiary answer to the authors is that the concessions given by Descartes to the opponents of his dualism can be found in earlier works, but, pace the authors, they did not cause him not to develop his dualism in the first place. (shrink)

In their book on Descartes’s Changing Mind, Peter Machamer and J. E. McGuire argue that Descartes discarded dualism to embrace a kind of monism. Descartes famously proposed that there are two separate substances, mind and body, with distinct attributes of thought and extension. According to Machamer and McGuire, because of the limitations of our intellect, we cannot have insight into the nature of either substance. After reviewing their argument in some detail, I will argue that Descartes did not relinquish his (...) favorite doctrine but may have actually fooled himself about the nature of his dualism. It is my contention that the problem with Cartesian dualism stems from the definition of mind and body as substances and the role of their respective attributes—thought and extension—in the definition of substances. (shrink)

Henry More est le plus connu des Platoniciens de Cambridge et l’Enchiridion Metaphysicum, son dernier ouvrage, représente l’accomplissement de sa pensée. Il s’agit d’une enquête métaphysique dont le principal objectif est d’établir l’existence d’une substance immatérielle, d’une âme du monde, sorte d’intermédiaire entre Dieu et le monde par laquelle les choses agissent. More nous invite ainsi à découvrir la vraie métaphysique qui consiste en la découverte de la nature véritable de l’étendue des êtres spirituels comme Dieu, les anges et les (...) démons, l’espace, les âmes individuelles des hommes ou des bêtes. Ce manuel de métaphysique prend appui sur le mécanisme cartésien pour mieux le contredire et démontre que l’extension spirituelle est la principale qualité des esprits. Cette doctrine conduira More à re-diviniser l’espace pour l’instituer à l’instar des kabbalistes de l’école de Safed, comme lieu de la possibilité de l’existence du monde. More montre ainsi les limites des mécanismes d’Hobbes et de Descartes tout en essayant de composer avec d’autres savants mécanistes tels que Robert Boyle et Robert Hooke. Quelques années plus tard, à Cambridge, Newton, sur les pas d’Henry More, pensera la nature de son espace physique comme un espace de nature divine, comme un Sensorium Dei. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------- Biographie de l'auteur: Françoise Monnoyeur est Docent en philosophie (Associate Professor). Elle enseigne la philosophie et l’histoire des sciences en France, aux États-Unis et en Suède. Elle est chercheur associée au centre Jean Pépin, Paris, France. Ses principaux ouvrages portent sur Descartes, l’infini, la matière, la vie. (shrink)

In book: Infini des mathématiciens, infini des philosophes, Edition: 1992, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2008, 2011 ebook, Chapter: Introduction, Publisher: Belin, Paris, Editors: F. Monnoyeur, pp.9-16.

Descartes' philosophy contains an intriguing notion of the infinite, a concept labeled by the philosopher as indefinite. Even though Descartes clearly defined this term on several occasions in the correspondence with his contemporaries, as well as in his Principles of Philosophy, numerous problems about its meaning have arisen over the years. Most commentators reject the view that the indefinite could mean a real thing and, instead, identify it with an Aristotelian potential infinite. In the first part of this article, I (...) show why there is no numerical infinity in Cartesian mathematics, as such a concept would be inconsistent with the main fundamental attribute of numbers: to be comparable with each other. In the second part, I analyze the indefinite in the context of Descartes' mathematical physics. It is my contention that, even with no trace of infinite in his mathematics, Descartes does refer to an actual indefinite because of its application to the material world within the system of his physics. This fact underlines a discrepancy between his mathematics and physics of the infinite, but does not lead a difficulty in his mathematical physics. Thus, in Descartes' physics, the indefinite refers to an actual dimension of the world rather than to an Aristotelian mathematical potential infinity. In fact, Descartes establishes the reality and limitlessness of the extension of the cosmos and, by extension, the actual nature of his indefinite world. This indefinite has a physical dimension, even if it is not measurable. La filosofía de Descartes contiene una noción intrigante de lo infinito, un concepto nombrado por el filósofo como indefinido. Aunque en varias ocasiones Descartes definió claramente este término en su correspondencia con sus contemporáneos y en sus Principios de filosofía, han surgido muchos problemas acerca de su significado a lo largo de los años. La mayoría de comentaristas rechaza la idea de que indefinido podría significar una cosa real y, en cambio, la identifica con un infinito potencial aristotélico. En la primera parte de este artículo muestro por qué no hay infinito numérico en las matemáticas cartesianas, en la medida en que tal concepto sería inconsistente con el principal atributo fundamental de los números: ser comparables entre sí. En la segunda parte analizo lo indefinido en el contexto de la física matemática de Descartes. Mi argumento es que, aunque no hay rastro de infinito en sus matemáticas, Descartes se refiere a un indefinido real a causa de sus aplicaciones al mundo material dentro del sistema de su física. Este hecho subraya una discrepancia entre sus matemáticas y su física de lo infinito, pero no implica ninguna dificultad en su física matemática. Así pues, en la física de Descartes, lo indefinido se refiere a una dimensión real del mundo más que a una infinitud potencial matemática aristotélica. De hecho, Descartes establece la realidad e infinitud de la extensión del cosmos y, por extensión, la naturaleza real de su mundo indefinido. Esta indefinición tiene una dimensión física aunque no sea medible. (shrink)

Ce livre éclaire les étapes de la réflexion sur la notion philosophique et mathématique d'infini du XIVe au XIXe siècle. Un infini inaccessible qui n'a cessé de stimuler l'activité des mathématiciens, des théologiens, des philosophes et des artistes. Tous ont mis, à leur manière, leur art à son service, afin de nous permettre de mieux appréhender et transcender le fini. Ce livre éclaire, du xive au xixe siècle, les étapes de la réflexion sur la notion philosophique et mathématique d'infini.

L'astronomie se confronte à la réalité d'un cosmos fini ou infini. Au gré des théories astronomiques, physiques, mathématiques, philosophiques ou esthétiques, l'infini s'impose ou disparaît.

Quel est le rapport entre la matière qu'expérimente le physicien, celle avec laquelle travaille le chimiste, et la matière qui nourrit les spéculations du philosophe ? Pour répondre à cette question, nous avons demandé à d'éminents spécialistes de disciplines différentes de faire le point, à la lumière de leur pratique et de leurs connaissances. Les physiciens et des chimistes, qui représentent les « sciences dures » de la matière, et les philosophes (penseurs, alchimistes, psychanalystes et neurobiologistes), qui représentent les « (...) sciences molles » de la matière, ont accepté d'exposer leurs perspectives. Si physiciens et philosophes, alchimistes et chimistes, artistes et théologues, neurobiologistes et psychanalystes ne partagent pas, à ce sujet, la même conception, ils montrent le rôle important que la matière joue dans leur recherche ; ceux dont les théories s'affrontent, corme les alchimistes et les chimistes, les neurobiologistes et les psychanalystes, dévoilent également ce qu'ils partagent avec ceux qu'ils contredisent. Ce livre offre aussi la possibilité de comprendre le rapport des sciences à la matière tout en révélant, en même temps, la part de science, de savoir et même d'illusion que véhiculent toutes les expressions de ce concept, énigmatique entre tous. Full text available at: liu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:529757/FULLTEXT01.pdf. (shrink)

Si la science et la religion tentent de répondre à la question de l’origine de la vie, ni l’une ni l’autre ne s’interrogent vraiment sur sa nature. Certes, la vie est bien cet ensemble de mécanismes étudiés par les biologistes mais c’est aussi et avant tout un phénomène à part entière. Les sciences biologiques expliquent la vie en se référant à la théorie de l’évolution, à l’ADN et au rôle des protéines mais restent à l’extérieur de la vie proprement dite. (...) La vie ne se réduit donc ni à l’objet décrit par les biologistes ni à l’esprit invoqué par les religieux. Découvrir le phénomène vital, c’est comprendre comment l’externe s’articule à l’interne, le corps à l’âme, le biologique au psychique, le conscient à l’inconscient. Ce livre retrace les moments du nœud vital en prenant appui sur les sciences biologiques mais aussi sur celles de la conscience telles que la philosophie, la psychanalyse ou la phénoménologie, et révèle ainsi ce que l’on a coutume d’appeler la complexité de la vie. (shrink)

This article analyzes the value of geometric models to understand matter with the examples of the Platonic model for the primary four elements (fire, air, water, and earth) and the models of carbon atomic structures in the new science of crystallography. How the geometry of these models is built in order to discover the properties of matter is explained: movement and stability for the primary elements, and hardness, softness and elasticity for the carbon atoms. These geometric models appear to have (...) a double quality: firstly, they exhibit visually the scientific properties of matter, and secondly they give us the possibility to visualize its whole nature. Geometrical models appear to be the expression of the mind in the understanding of physical matter. (shrink)

Leibniz is well known for his formulation of the infinitesimal calculus. Nevertheless, the nature and logic of his discovery are seldom questioned: does it belong more to mathematics or metaphysics, and how is it connected to his physics? This book, composed of fourteen essays, investigates the nature and foundation of the calculus, its relationship to the physics of force and principle of continuity, and its overall method and metaphysics. The Leibnizian calculus is presented in its origin and context together with (...) its main contributors: Archimedes, Cavalieri, Wallis, Hobbes, Pascal, Huygens, Bernoulli, and Nieuwentijt. Many of us know and probably have used the Leibnizian formula: to .. (shrink)

The Mathematical Imagination focuses on the role of mathematics and digital technologies in critical theory of culture. This book belongs to the history of ideas rather than to that of mathematics proper since it treats it on a metaphorical level to express phenomena of silence or discontinuity. In order to bring more readability and clarity to the non-specialist readers, I firstly present the essential concepts, background, and objectives of his book...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Infinitesimal Differences: Controversies between Leibniz and his ContemporariesFrançoise Monnoyeur-BroitmanUrsula Goldenbaum and Douglas Jesseph, editors. Infinitesimal Differences: Controversies between Leibniz and his Contemporaries. Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008. Pp. vi + 327. Cloth, $109.00.Leibniz is well known for his formulation of the infinitesimal calculus. Nevertheless, the nature and logic of his discovery are seldom questioned: does it belong more to mathematics or metaphysics, and how is it (...) connected to his physics? This book, composed of fourteen essays, investigates the nature and foundation of the calculus, its relationship to the physics of force and principle of continuity, and its overall method and metaphysics. The Leibnizian calculus is presented in its origin and context together with its main contributors: Archimedes, Cavalieri, Wallis, Hobbes, Pascal, Huygens, Bernoulli, and Nieuwentijt.Many of us know and probably have used the Leibnizian formula: to calculate the area under a curve; this book considers the origin, nature, method, and metaphysics of this formula. The most fascinating question discussed in it is the fiction introduced to define the infinitesimal calculation: in his mature period, Leibniz himself referred to his calculus as “a well-founded fiction.” We learn that he gradually gave up the idea of an actual infinite in favor of describing infinitely small quantities. As a result, the quantities became fictive and finite or indefinite instead of real and infinite, and the process of calculation shifted towards mathematics rather than metaphysics.In the first essay, Richard Arthur compares the calculus of Leibniz and Newton and demonstrates how it was based for both on the development of continuously varying quantity. He also shows how the understanding of this quantity derived from the Archimedean axiom that excludes the existence of actual infinite quantity. Ursula Goldenbaum next demonstrates how Hobbes, with his conatus considered as point and instant, had a direct impact on the Leibnizian conception of continuity; to confirm her interpretation, she includes at the end of her article the “Marginalia or Leibniz comments” on Hobbes. Samuel Levey establishes a connection between the notion of the infinitesimal as a “well-founded fiction” and the law of continuity, arguing that the law of continuity, understood as an extension of Archimedes’ principle, gives a finite foundation to the infinitesimal calculation. O. Bradley Bassler discusses the idea of the differential in terms of infinitely small quantities and the use of proportions between infinitely small and finite quantities in order to measure [End Page 527] the infinitely small; here, differentials are also presented as fictions. Fritz Nagel discusses the methodological sophistication of the calculus and its opponents. His main questions concern the different grades of infinity, quantities regarded as zero, and the infinitesimal as a fiction that can be calculated. Douglas Jesseph considers the reality of the infinitesimal and the “well-founded fiction,” showing how Leibniz methodically constructs infinitesimal quantities without reality by returning to Hobbes’ notion of conatus. Hobbes is, for Jesseph, the initiator of these infinitely small quantities without existence.A second group of essays examines the connection between algebra and geometry in the calculus. Philip Beeley demonstrates how John Wallis, on the path of Cavalieri’s method of the indivisibles, found a way to transform geometric problems into sums of arithmetic sequences. Siegmund Probst expresses the different phases in the discovery of the Leibnizian method. He mentions that Leibniz coined the term ‘infinitesimal’ in 1673, and points out that he did not need the method of indivisibles to find a curve from its given arc, but only a series expansion using differences of higher order. Emily Grosholz looks at how, thanks to his algebraic and geometrical notations of curves, Leibniz could formulate the equation of his infinitesimal calculus. According to Grosholz, Leibniz exploits the ambiguity of notations in order to express the geometrical and dynamical aspect of the calculus. Herbert Breger underlines the novelty and abstract nature of Leibniz’s new method of calculation, showing how the theory of infinitesimals became an algebraic calculus independent of geometry.A final group of articles studies the relationship between the calculus and Leibniz’s physics. François Duchesneau shows how the differential and integral calculus provided a model for the integrative laws of Leibniz’s... (shrink)

Résumé – Nous nous intéressons à l’enseignement et l’apprentissage de l’infini en classe de mathématiques en considérant les différences et les relations entre infini potentiel et infini actuel. Nous présentons les principaux éléments de notre étude philosophique, épistémologique et didactique, ainsi que trois situations visant à conduire un travail explicite avec les élèves sur ces questions en début de lycée. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------- Abstract – We are interested in the teaching and learning of infinite in mathematics class, taking into account the relations (...) between potential infinite and actual infinite. We report the main elements of our current philosophical, epistemological and didactical study; we also present three mathematical situations that we consider relevant for this purpose and to be explored with 10 and 11 grade students. (shrink)

In January 2008, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority issued two 1-year licenses for cytoplasmic hybrid embryo research. This article situates the HFEA's decision in its wider scientific and political context in which, until quite recently, the debate about human embryonic stem cell research has focused narrowly on the moral status of the developing human embryo. Next, ethical arguments against crossing species boundaries with humans are canvassed. Finally, a new argument about the risks of harm to women egg providers resulting (...) from research involving the creation of humanesque cytoplasmic hybrid embryos is elaborated. Taken together these ethical concerns about the moral status of the human embryo, about the ethics of crossing species boundaries with humans, and about the potential harms to women, provide good reason to eschew humanesque cytoplasmic hybrid embryo research in favor of less ethically controversial means to the laudable end of successful regenerative medicine. (shrink)

: Françoise Dastur describes her efforts to practice history of philosophy in a (paradoxically) non-historical fashion. She discusses her concept of the historical, and argues that the only true way to be of one's time is to be against one's time.

Françoise Dastur describes her efforts to practice history of philosophy in a non-historical fashion. She discusses her concept of the historical, and argues that the only true way to be of one's time is to be against one's time.

Françoise Dastur describes her efforts to practice history of philosophy in a (paradoxically) non-historical fashion. She discusses her concept of the historical, and argues that the only true way to be of one's time is to be against one's time.

Françoise Dastur describes her efforts to practice history of philosophy in a non-historical fashion. She discusses her concept of the historical, and argues that the only true way to be of one's time is to be against one's time.

Most philosophers adopt an etiological conception of functions, but not one that uniformly explains the functions attributed to material entities irrespective of whether they are natural or man-made. Here, I investigate the widespread idea that a combination of the two current etiological theories, SEL and INT, can offer a satisfactory account of the proper functions of both organisms and artifacts.. Making explicit what a realist theory of function supposes, I first show that SEL offers a realist theory of biological functions (...) in which these are objective properties of a peculiar sort. I argue next that an artifact function demonstrates the same objective nature as a biological function when it is accounted for by SEL, but not when it is accounted for by INT. I explain why a dual theory of artifact functions admitting both INT and SEL functions is to be dismissed. I establish that neither INT nor SEL alone can account for all artifact functions. Drawing the conclusion that we need a new etiological theory of function, I show how one can overcome the apparent inevitability of INT for some artifact functions. Finally, I outline a new etiological theory of functions that applies equally to biological entities and to artifacts. (shrink)

oise Baylis, 1234 Le Marchant Street, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada B3H 3P7. Tel.: (902)-494–2873; Fax: (902)-494-2924; Email: francoise.baylis{at}dal.ca ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> . Abstract Recently, there has been a growing interest in public health and public health ethics. Much of this interest has been tied to efforts to draw up national and international plans to deal with a global pandemic. It is common for these plans to state the importance of drawing upon a well-developed (...) ethics framework and we argue that this framework should reflect the values and insights of feminist relational theory. More specifically, we argue that pandemic planning must be squarely situated in the larger realm of public health and that an ethics framework for public health will be one that recognizes the need to pay particular attention to the vulnerability of subpopulations lacking in social and economic power. We propose an ethics framework for public health that builds on the notions of relational personhood (including relational autonomy and social justice) and relational solidarity. In this way, we aim for a public health ethics that, as appropriate, promotes the public interest and the common good. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Chronique/critique de Françoise Favretto parue dans la revue L'intranquille. Revue de littérature, n° 20, St-Quentin-de-Caplong, L'Atelier de l'Agneau, 2021, p. 83. - Recensions.

How, asks Françoise Dastur, can philosophy account for the sudden happening and the factuality of the event? Dastur asks how phenomenology, in particular the work of Heidegger, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty, may be interpreted as offering such an account. She argues that the "paradoxical capacity of expecting surprise is always in question in phenomenology," and for this reason, she concludes, "We should not oppose phenomenology and the thinking of the event. We should connect them; openness to phenomena must be identified (...) with openness to unpredictability." The article offers reflections in these terms on a phenomenology of birth. (shrink)

How, asks Françoise Dastur, can philosophy account for the sudden happening and the factuality of the event? Dastur asks how phenomenology, in particular the work of Heidegger, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty, may be interpreted as offering such an account. She argues that the “paradoxical capacity of expecting surprise is always in question in phenomenology,” and for this reason, she concludes, “We should not oppose phenomenology and the thinking of the event. We should connect them; openness to phenomena must be identified (...) with openness to unpredictability.” The article offers reflections in these terms on a phenomenology of birth. (shrink)

How, asks Françoise Dastur, can philosophy account for the sudden happening and the factuality of the event? Dastur asks how phenomenology, in particular the work of Heidegger, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty, may be interpreted as offering such an account. She argues that the “paradoxical capacity of expecting surprise is always in question in phenomenology,” and for this reason, she concludes, “We should not oppose phenomenology and the thinking of the event. We should connect them; openness to phenomena must be identified (...) with openness to unpredictability.” The article offers reflections in these terms on a phenomenology of birth. (shrink)

Suddenly, COVID-19 has changed the world and the way people work. Companies had to accelerate something they knew was imminent in the future, but not immediate and extremely humongous. This situation poses a huge challenge for companies to survive and thrive in this complex business environment and for employees, who must adapt to this new way of working. An effective e-leadership, which promotes companies’ adaptability, is needed. This study investigates the existing knowledge on teleworking and e-leadership; and analyzes the supposed (...) challenges. The literature review shows that companies with effective e-leadership can view teleworking as an opportunity. It is advantageous for not only companies’ productivity but also the environment and people who work remotely. However, a traditional or no leadership can result in some risks. Thriving in remote work environments implies that managers must adjust the companies’ structure, making them less hierarchical, and developing new abilities to establish a strong and trustworthy relationship with their employees to maintain their competitiveness, while retaining a genuine concern for their employees’ well-being. Similarly, successful e-leadership must be able to consolidate and lead effective virtual teams to accomplish organizational goals. This study contributes to the literature and leaders during the pandemic. (shrink)

We outline a number of ethical objections to genetic technologies aimed at enhancing human capacities and traits. We then argue that, despite the persuasiveness of some of these objections, they are insufficient to stop the development and use of genetic enhancement technologies. We contend that the inevitability of the technologies results from a particular guiding worldview of humans as masters of the human evolutionary future, and conclude that recognising this worldview points to new directions for ethical thinking about genetic enhancement (...) technologies. (shrink)