Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

Blair, David What's the best policy to deal with the catastrophe that looms due to global warming? Fundamentally, we must quickly change our sources of energy away from fossil fuels to non-carbon emitting sources - namely nuclear power and the various renewable sources. 'What's nuclear doing in there?' you may respond. 'Isn't the news about nuclear all bad?' But a growing chorus of scientists and thinkers is warning that, not only is nuclear power quite safe, but that to (...) rule it out poses a grave danger. I quote: Renewables like wind and solar and biomass will certainly play roles in a future energy economy, but those energy sources cannot scale up fast enough to deliver cheap and reliable power at the scale the global economy requires. While it may be theoretically possible to stabilise the climate without nuclear power, in the real world there is no credible path to climate stabilisation that does not include a substantial role for nuclear power. (shrink)

A Dedekind-finite set is said to be divisible by a natural number n if it can be partitioned into pieces of size n. We study several aspects of this notion, as well as the stronger notion of being partitionable into n pieces of equal size. Among our results are that the divisors of a Dedekind-finite set can consistently be any set of natural numbers, that a Dedekind-finite power of 2 cannot be divisible by 3, and that a Dedekind-finite set can (...) be congruent modulo 3, to all of 0, 1, and 2 simultaneously. (shrink)

In 2014, Colonel M. Shane Riza published an article in this journal arguing that remotely piloted aircraft and robotic weapons threaten the US Air Force’s warrior ethos. Riza has clearly articulated the sentiments of one side of a vibrant debate within our service. This paper presents an alternative view; a view held by some who have experienced these new forms and tools of war, and who have wrestled with their implications first-hand. In this paper, we address some methodological concerns with (...) Riza’s approach and then engage some misunderstandings about RPA’s relationship to military history and to risk. The second part of this paper takes a close look at some of the early Just War thinkers to determine what implications the tradition may have on the warrior ethos. We propose, as an alternative to Riza’s position, a return to an ethos grounded in humility, charity, and a conception of war as a last resort; in short, a return to the Just Warrior Ethos. (shrink)

Blair, David David Tribe, in his article, 'On science, good, bad and ugly' (AH, No. 107, Spring 2012), criticises an earlier article by Victor Bien. Bien - rightly in my view - defends present-day science in respect of three areas where science is under attack; the most prominent of these three is anthropogenic global warming (AGW). Tribe claims that, Victor Bien appears to have inflated views on the sagacity, objectivity and probity of scientists, who can be called (...) our new priests. Much as I respected David Tribe for his work in philosophy, I must criticize much of what he says about science in his article. (shrink)

Blair, David Review of: Here on earth: An argument for hope, by Tim Flannery, Text Publishing Co. 2010 $35.

Blair, David Review of: Incognito: The secret lives of the brain, by David Eagleman, Text Publishing, Melbourne, 2011, paperback, $35.

Blair, David Review(s) of: Incognito: The secret lives of the brain, by David Eagleman, Text Publishing, Melbourne, 2011, paperback, $35.

Blair, David Concerning David Tribe's rejoinder to my 'Science works better than that' , it's pleasing to see that there are some points on which we agree. Unfortunately he continues to make a strong and unjustified attack on the scientific community as a whole-essentially on the grounds that, of the conclusions of science that later turned out to be false, virtually all of them were at some time 'believed' by most scientists. In reply, I shall show that (...) it is his underlying framework that needs to be altered-quite radically. He does not understand what the activity of scientists is like-indeed what it has to be like, when faced with the task of extracting knowledge from the real world. (shrink)

The past two decades have seen an explosion in the methods and directions of neuroscience research. Along with many others, complexity research has rapidly gained traction as both an independent research field and a valuable subdiscipline in computational neuroscience. In the past decade alone, several studies have suggested that psychiatric disorders affect the spatiotemporal complexity of both global and region-specific brain activity (Liu et al., 2013; Adhikari et al., 2017; Li et al., 2018). However, many of these studies have not (...) accounted for the distributed nature of cognition in either the global or regional complexity estimates, which may lead to erroneous interpretations of both global and region-specific entropy estimates. To alleviate this concern, we propose a novel method for estimating complexity. This method relies upon projecting dynamic functional connectivity into a low-dimensional space which captures the distributed nature of brain activity. Dimension-specific entropy may be estimated within this space, which in turn allows for a rapid estimate of global signal complexity. Testing this method on a recently acquired obsessive-compulsive disorder dataset reveals substantial increases in the complexity of both global and dimension-specific activity versus healthy controls, suggesting that obsessive-compulsive patients may experience increased disorder in cognition. To probe the potential causes of this alteration, we estimate subject-level effective connectivity via a Hopf oscillator-based model dynamic model, the results of which suggest that obsessive-compulsive patients may experience abnormally high connectivity across a broad network in the cortex. These findings are broadly in line with results from previous studies, suggesting that this method is both robust and sensitive to group-level complexity alterations. (shrink)

Grapheme-color synesthetes experience color, not physically present, when viewing symbols. Synesthetes cannot remember learning these associations. Must synesthetic percepts be formed during a sensitive period? Can they form later and be consistent? What determines their nature? We tested grapheme-color synesthete, MC2, before, during and after she studied Hindi abroad. We investigated whether novel graphemes elicited synesthetic percepts, changed with familiarity, and/or benefited from phonemic information. MC2 reported color percepts to novel Devanagari and Hebrew graphemes. MC2 monitored these percepts over 6 (...) months in a Hindi-speaking environment. MC2 and synesthete DN, reported synesthetic percepts for Armenian graphemes, or Cyrillic graphemes + phonemes over time. Synesthetes, not controls, reported color percepts for novel graphemes that gained consistency over time. Phonemic information did not enhance consistency. Thus, synesthetes can form and consolidate percepts to novel graphemes as adults. These percepts may depend on pre-existing grapheme-color relationships but they can flexibly shift with familiarity. (shrink)

This paper derives a mathematical expression giving the development of the probability of a scientific hypothesis with the number of confirming tests, as determined by Bayes's theorem, in a special case in which all the tests are "independent" of one another. The simple expression obtained shows clearly how the various factors influence the growth of the probability. The result is used to set a numerical lower bound on the probabilities representing the a priori beliefs of humans in generalizations that become (...) accepted. By making a comparison with the predictions of a "logical atomic" model in the case of physical laws, it is argued that humans have significant a priori "knowledge" in a weak sense. (shrink)

The following progress report views language acquisition as primarily the attempt to create processes that connect together in a fruitful way linguistic input and other activity. The representations made of linguistic input are thus those that are optimally effective in mediating such interconnections. An effective Language Acquisition Device should contain mechanisms specific to the task of creating the desired interconnection processes in the linguistic environment in which the language learner finds himself or herself. Analysis of this requirement gives clear indications (...) as to what these mechanisms may be. (shrink)

BackgroundThere is increasing need for peer reviewers as the scientific literature grows. Formal education in biostatistics and research methodology during residency training is lacking. In this pilot study, we addressed these issues by evaluating a novel method of teaching residents about biostatistics and research methodology using peer review of standardized manuscripts. We hypothesized that mentored peer review would improve resident knowledge and perception of these concepts more than non-mentored peer review, while improving review quality.MethodsA partially blinded, randomized, controlled multi-center study (...) was performed. Seventy-eight neurology residents from nine US neurology programs were randomized to receive mentoring from a local faculty member or not. Within a year, residents reviewed a baseline manuscript and four subsequent manuscripts, all with introduced errors designed to teach fundamental review concepts. In the mentored group, mentors discussed completed reviews with residents. Primary outcome measure was change in knowledge score between pre- and post-tests, measuring epidemiology and biostatistics knowledge. Secondary outcome measures included level of confidence in the use and interpretation of statistical concepts before and after intervention, and RQI score for baseline and final manuscripts.ResultsSixty-four residents (82%) completed initial review with gradual decline in completion on subsequent reviews. Change in primary outcome, the difference between pre- and post-test knowledge scores, did not differ between mentored (−8.5%) and non-mentored (−13.9%) residents (p = 0.48). Significant differences in secondary outcomes (using 5-point Likert scale, 5 = strongly agree) included mentored residents reporting enhanced understanding of research methodology (3.69 vs 2.61; p = 0.001), understanding of manuscripts (3.73 vs 2.87; p = 0.006), and application of study results to clinical practice (3.65 vs 2.78; p = 0.005) compared to non-mentored residents. There was no difference between groups in level of interest in peer review (3.00 vs 3.09; p = 0.72) or the quality of manuscript review assessed by the Review Quality Instrument (RQI) (3.25 vs 3.06; p = 0.50).ConclusionsWe used mentored peer review of standardized manuscripts to teach biostatistics and research methodology and introduce the peer review process to residents. Though knowledge level did not change, mentored residents had enhanced perception in their abilities to understand research methodology and manuscripts and apply study results to clinical practice. (shrink)

While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly few attempts to apply buck-passing analyses to specific normative domains such as aesthetics and epistemology. In particular, there have been very few works which have tried to provide complete and detailed buck-passing analyses of epistemic values and norms. These analyses are, however, both interesting and important. On the one hand, they can bring to the surface the advantages and difficulties of extending the buck-passing account to specific normative (...) spheres, either providing further support for the approach or highlighting substantive difficulties. On the other hand, epistemic buck-passing analyses can be beneficial for normative epistemology, providing new perspectives on traditional epistemological problems, and possibly providing fresh approaches to such problems. This paper aims at partially filling this gap. (shrink)

I argue that Donald Davidson's rejection of the notion of language, as commonly understood in philosophy and linguistics, is justified. However, I argue that his position needs to be supplemented by an account of the development and nurture of pre-linguistic communicative skills. Davidson argues (in 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs' and elsewhere) that knowledge of a language (conceived of as a set of rules or conventions) is neither sufficient nor necessary for 'linguistic' communication. The strongest argument against the initial formulation (...) is that while Davidson may have shown that knowledge of a language is not sufficient, he failed to show that it is not necessary. Subsequently, Davidson has invoked his 'triangulation' thesis, to show that understanding can rest on the apprehension of mutuality in a shared objective world, and does not presuppose the sharing of rules or practices. I argue that the starting position arrived at from the triangulation thesis itself presupposes the possibility of communication. The triangulation thesis needs, therefore, to be supplemented by a (non-reductive) naturalistic account of non-linguistic communicative skills. In such an account we must posit shared practices (practices of mutual engagement with a shared world), but not an account of practices conceived on the model of rules or conventions. I note, finally, that by adopting such an approach we offer a way of explicating the formulation of passing theories, which in Davidson's account are the point at which communicative understanding occurs. (shrink)

In this essay I want to take some metaphors seriously. I want to push at their limits and ask whether this exercise can help us think differently about photographs and their relationship to what they depict. (Should it be ‘what they depict’ or ‘what they are seen as depicting’? The choice of phrasing depends on theoretical position: is depiction inherent in the image, or is it seen by the viewer?). The moel of citationality based on Cadava’s work is developed by (...) exploring in more detail the variety of bibliographic ciataions. (shrink)

African Christians, not foreign missionaries, have been largely responsible for the spread of the Christian Gospel across the continent. African Initiated Churches were often formed in reaction to foreign control, especially where it involved cultural and colonial racism. The article challenges the prevailing idea in the ‘West’ of ‘mission’ being confined to professional missionaries. It draws on Ghana for examples of how indigenous churches, since 1970, have increasingly become sending agencies involved in both ‘cross-cultural’ and ‘reverse mission’. It concludes by (...) asking churches in Africa, and in the ‘West’, to think critically about how Gospel mission can be promoted and sustained. (shrink)

Scanlon suggests a buck-passing account of goodness. To say that something is good is not to give a reason to, say, favour it; rather it is to say that there are such reasons. When it comes to wrongness, however, Scanlon rejects a buck-passing account: to say that j ing is wrong is, on his view, to give a sufficient moral reason not to j. Philip Stratton-Lake 2003 argues that Scanlon can evade a redundancy objection against his (Scanlon’s) view of wrongness (...) by adopting a buck-passing account of wrongness. We argue that this manoeuvre does not succeed. Scanlon’s notion of wrongness rests on the idea of a reasonably rejectable principle. As Stratton-Lake points out, Scanlon offers two accounts, one in terms of permission, the other in terms of proscription. The permission account is tricky to formulate. Scanlon’s account (quoted in Stratton-Lake 2003: 71) might suggest any of the following four formulations (where the principles in question are principles ‘governing how one may act’ (Scanlon.. (shrink)

Many just war theorists (call them traditionalists) claim that just as people have a right to personal self-defense, so nations have a right to national-defense against an aggressive military invasion. David Rodin claims that the traditionalist is unable to justify most defensive wars against aggression. For most aggressive states only commit conditional aggression in that they threaten to kill or maim the citizens of the nation they are invading only if those citizens resist the occupation. Most wars, then, claimed (...) to be justified by the traditionalist fail to meet the proportionality criterion. Thus, a just war, for Rodin, is best conceived of as a punitive war of law enforcement, not as a war of national-defense. I argue that Rodin does not have a case against the traditionalist. If national-defense is a disproportionate response to conditional aggression, then punitive war is a disproportionate response as well. Furthermore, the belief that punitive war is a proportionate response to conditional aggression underscores the traditionalist’s view that self-determination, cultural identity and the like are of sufficient value to defend by means of lethal force. I end the paper by very briefly sketching an account, different from that of Rodin’s, of how individual nations can be justified in waging wars of law enforcement. (shrink)

Introduction by Christopher W. Tindale Argumentation Library, Volume 21. Dordrecht: Springer, 2012. Pp. xxi, 1-355. Hardcover US$149. Softcover US$24.95.

L'appartenance de Dilthey, de Husserl et de Heidegger à la même tradition philosophique (la tradition «phénoménologique» au sens le plus large de ce terme) les mène à des analyses très semblables de la temporalité humaine. Néanmoins, chacun privilégie dans son analyse une seule des trois « dimensions » du temps: Husserl, le présent ; Heidegger, le futur ; Dilthey, le passé. Dans cet article, cette divergence est l'occasion d'une réflexion sur le temps humain qui cherche à dépasser la question de (...) privilège en combinant les résultats les plus importants de ces trois auteurs. (shrink)

A nation commits mitigated aggression by threatening to kill the citizens of a victim nation if and only if they do not submit to being ruled in a non-egregiously oppressive way. Such aggression primarily threatens a nation’s common way of life . According to David Rodin, a war against mitigated aggression is automatically disproportionate, as the right of lethal self-defense only extends to protecting against being killed or enslaved. Two strategies have been adopted in response to Rodin. The first (...) strategy grants that CWL is insufficiently valuable to lethally defend, however, other considerations can satisfy the proportionality requirement. I argue that this strategy is not persuasive. The second strategy argues for the sufficient value of CWL. This, however, fails to answer the forceful ‘benign dictator’ objection. I respond to this objection by grounding the proportionality of a defensive war in the value of what Phillip Pettit calls ‘anti-power’. (shrink)

Two recent monographs re-examine the central elements of the just war tradition and its contemporary applications. David Rodin’s War and Self-Defense analyzes, and rejects, the common doctrine that just war is an instance of national self-defense, in parallel with the right of individuals to protect themselves against violent attack. This derivation fails, and it cannot justify resort to war. In contrast, Oliver O’Donovan’s The Just War Revisited dismisses the notion that there are rules for just war and calls instead (...) for careful and deliberate practical reasoning in particular contexts. Indeed, there can be no just wars, only specific acts that pass the tests of theological, historical, and practical scrutiny. (shrink)

There’s a widespread intuition that if the only way an innocent person can stop her villainous attacker from killing her is to kill him instead, then she is morally permitted to do so. But why is it that she is permitted to employ lethal force on an aggressor if that is what is required to save her life? My primary goal in this paper is to defend David Rodin's fairly recent and under-recognized account of self-defense that answers this question. (...) There are roughly two kinds of non-consequentialist accounts of self-defense:'forced-choice' accounts and 'rights-based' accounts. I first examine what I take to be the most plausible 'forced-choice' account of self-defense and I argue that it is unable to withstand two recent criticisms. I then proceed to adjudicate between two prominent 'rights-based' accounts of self-defense: call them the Thomson/Uniacke account and the Rodinian account. Any rights-based account of self-defense must explain how it is that X, who villainously tries to kill Y, forfeits his right to life. I argue both that Thomson/Uniacke's explanation cannot account for the clear permissibility of killing a certain kind of aggressor in self-defense, and that the attempts that could be made to account for this permissibility are either ad-hoc or permit the killing of persons that are morally on par with innocent bystanders. I point out how Thomson/Uniacke can evade the seeming difficulties that I raise by only permitting lethal defensive force against culpable aggressors. But allowing defensive force to be employed only on the culpable goes against one of their central tenets. I then discuss the Rodinian account, how it evades the criticisms I raise, as well as its other virtues. I conclude that while it has difficulties of its own, it is the more plausible one to adopt. (shrink)

Tribe, David The scientific disputation among Dr Victor Bien, Dr David Blair and myself in AH has, I hope, been of some interest to all readers. It smouldered with a dispute over the reality or unreality of anthropogenic global warming and climate change , with me for unreality in the minority, and flared with my assertion 'that scientific consensuses on all controversial issues are initially always wrong' . I adhere to both positions.

We are quickly passing through the historical moment when people work in front of a single computer, dominated by a small CRT and focused on tasks involving only local information. Networked computers are becoming ubiquitous and are playing increasingly significant roles in our lives and in the basic infrastructure of science, business, and social interaction. For human-computer interaction o advance in the new millennium we need to better understand the emerging dynamic of interaction in which the focus task is no (...) longer confined to the desktop but reaches into a complex networked world of information and computer-mediated interactions. We think the theory of distributed cognition has a special role to play in understanding interactions between people and technologies, for its focus has always been on whole environments: what we really do in them and how we coordinate our activity in them. Distributed cognition provides a radical reorientation of how to think about designing and supporting human-computer interaction. As a theory it is specifically tailored to understanding interactions among people and technologies. In this article we propose distributed cognition as a new foundation for human-computer interaction, sketch an integrated research framework, and use selections from our earlier work to suggest how this framework can provide new opportunities in the design of digital work materials. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 21 Guns occupy a major—sometimes terrible—place in contemporary American life. Do Americans have not only a legal right, but also a moral right, to own handguns? After introducing the topic, this paper examines what a moral right to private handgun ownership would amount to. It then elucidates the logical structure of the strongest argument in favor of such a right, an argument that appeals to physical security, before assessing its cogency and identifying two questionable assumptions. In (...) light of persisting reasonable disagreement about the argument’s soundness, the paper identifies two gun control measures—demonstrated need for a gun as a condition of eligibility and the requirement to pass a rigorous gun safety course—that reasonable disputants on both sides of the issue have principled reasons to accept. The paper also advances the thesis that, if anyone has an undefeated moral right to own handguns, it is precisely those individuals who have a special need and demonstrate the relevant safety-related competence. (shrink)

Barry Maguire argues that there are no reasons for affective attitudes. ‘There is no reason for your incredulous reaction to’ this thesis, he claims. In this paper, I argue that we have no reason to accept his thesis. I first examine Maguire's purported differences between reasons for action and so-called reasons for affective attitudes. In each case, I argue that the differences are exaggerated and that to the extent they obtain, they are best explained by differences between actions and affective (...) attitudes, not between kinds of normative support. In closing, I argue that even if Maguire were correct, the extent of the threat to one of his central targets—so-called ‘buck-passing’ views—would remain unclear. (shrink)

Guns occupy a major—sometimes terrible—place in contemporary American life. Do Americans have not only a legal right, but also a moral right, to own handguns? After introducing the topic, this paper examines what a moral right to private handgun ownership would amount to. It then elucidates the logical structure of the strongest argument in favor of such a right, an argument that appeals to physical security, before assessing its cogency and identifying two questionable assumptions. In light of persisting reasonable disagreement (...) about the argument’s soundness, the paper identifies two gun control measures—demonstrated need for a gun as a condition of eligibility and the requirement to pass a rigorous gun safety course—that reasonable disputants on both sides of the issue have principled reasons to accept. The paper also advances the thesis that, if anyone has an undefeated moral right to own handguns, it is precisely those individuals who have a special need and demonstrate the relevant safety-related competence. (shrink)

In a final, short summary of his life and works, David Hume wrote My Own Life as he suffered from gastrointestinal issues that ultimately killed him. Despite his bleak prognosis, Hume remains lighthearted and inspirational throughout. He discusses his life growing up, his family relationships, and his desire to constantly improve his works and his reputation as an author. He confesses, "I have suffered very little pain from my disorder; and what is more strange, have... never suffered a moment's (...) abatement of my spirits; insomuch that were I to name the period of my life which I should most choose to pass over again, I might be tempted to point to this later period." This short biography ends with a series of letters from Hume's close friend and fellow author Adam Smith to their publisher William Strahan, recounting Hume's death and giving a stirring eulogy in honor of their friend. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 21 Guns occupy a major—sometimes terrible—place in contemporary American life. Do Americans have not only a legal right, but also a moral right, to own handguns? After introducing the topic, this paper examines what a moral right to private handgun ownership would amount to. It then elucidates the logical structure of the strongest argument in favor of such a right, an argument that appeals to physical security, before assessing its cogency and identifying two questionable assumptions. In (...) light of persisting reasonable disagreement about the argument’s soundness, the paper identifies two gun control measures—demonstrated need for a gun as a condition of eligibility and the requirement to pass a rigorous gun safety course—that reasonable disputants on both sides of the issue have principled reasons to accept. The paper also advances the thesis that, if anyone has an undefeated moral right to own handguns, it is precisely those individuals who have a special need and demonstrate the relevant safety-related competence. (shrink)

This chapter explores the concept of time itself, as physicists understand it. Einstein's special theory of relativity requires worldlines of physical objects to be timelike; the field equations of his general theory of relativity predict that massive bodies such as stars and black holes distort space‐time and bend worldlines. Suppose space‐time becomes so distorted that some worldlines form closed loops. If one tried to follow such a closed timelike curve (or CTC) exactly, all the way around, one would bump into (...) ones former selves and get pushed aside. But by following part of a CTC, we could return to the past and participate in events there. According to a recent calculation by J. Richard Gott of Princeton, a cosmic string passing rapidly by another would generate CTCs. The chapter concludes that if time travel is impossible, then the reason has yet to be discovered. (shrink)