Carl Schmitt is one of the most influential political and legal theorists of the 20th century. His ideas have long been familiar to intellectuals in Europe. Despite growing interest in Schmitt, the analysis of the metaphysical structure and logic of Schmitt's political thought is still missing. This book tries to redress this flaw. It focuses on Schmitt's conception of the concrete, which is seen as the "metaphysical core" of his writings. For Schmitt, the concrete is a condition of possibility of (...) any order. Rather that a concept, it is a name for a borderline or a passage between a concept and life, between a mediating idea and an immediate existence. In addition to the structure and logic of Schmitt's thought, the book is a short presentation of all central themes in Schmitt's writings from Political Theology (1922) to The Nomos of the Earth (1950). (shrink)

Mobility robots may soon be among us, triggering a need for safety regulation. Robot safety regulation, however, remains underexplored, with only a few articles analyzing what regulatory approaches could be feasible. This article offers an account of the available regulatory strategies and attempts to theorize the effects of simulation-based safety regulation. The article first discusses the distinctive features of mobility robots as regulatory targets and argues that emergent behavior constitutes the key regulatory concern in designing robot safety regulation regimes. In (...) contrast to many accounts, the article posits that emergent behavior dynamics do not arise from robot autonomy, learning capability, or code unexplainability. Instead, they emerge from the complexity of robot technological constitutions coupled with near-infinite environmental variability and non-linear performance dynamics of the machine learning components. Second, the article reviews rules-based and performance-based regulation and argues that both will fail adequately constrain emergent robot behaviors. The article claims that controlling mobility robots requires a simulation-based regulatory approach. Simulation-based regulation is a novelty with significant theoretical and practical implications. The article argues that the approach signifies a radical break in regulatory forms of knowledge and temporalities. Simulations enact virtual futures to create a new regulatory knowledge type. Practically, the novel safety knowledge type may destabilize the existing conceptual space of safety politics and liability allocation patterns. (shrink)

When empirical psychology mostly focuses on physiological processes and external behavior that have their own concepts, the meaning of psychological concepts becomes obscure. If there are only physical processes and external behavior, then why are psychological concepts needed in the empirical sciences? Since the late 19th century, empirical psychologists and cognitive scientists have argued that introspective information about normal psychological processes is not reliable. Furthermore, many philosophers consider that the physicalist theory of mind is true, which would imply that psychological (...) concepts are only words without explanatory power. However, without introspection, we would not be able to form concepts about other minds and psychological phenomena and understand the psychological states of other people or animals. The meaning of a psychological concept is neither its use for external behavior nor language use in context. (shrink)

In Western thought, it has been persistently assumed that in moral and political matters, people should rely on the inner voice of conscience rather than on external authorities, laws, and regulations. This volume investigates this concept, examining the development of the Western politics of conscience, from Socrates to the present, and the formation of the Western ethico-political subject. The work opens with a discussion of the ambiguous role of conscience in politics, contesting the claim that it is the best defense (...) against totalitarianism. It then look back at canonical authors, from the Church Fathers and Luther to Rousseau and Derrida, to show how the experience of conscience constitutes the foundation of Western ethics and politics. This unique work not only synthesizes philosophical and political insights, but also pays attention to political theology to provide a compelling and innovative argument that the experience of conscience has always been at the core of the political Western tradition. An engaging and accessible text, it will appeal to political theorists and philosophers as well as theologians and those interested in the critique of the Western civilization. (shrink)

The collection includes five short stories that do not look to the past, to modernism. They do not entertain but defend the philosophical thinking. The reader notices she or he considers Stoic and Nietzschean human views and moral values and the nature of language. The short stories ask what the relationship between the language and the world is and what proper names mean, for instance. Everyone needs piece of mind.

_Theological and Philosophical Responses to Syncretism: Beyond the Mirage of Pure Religion_ by Patrik Fridlund and Mika Vähäkangas elaborates the consequences of admitting the unavoidable syncretic nature of religions in theology and philosophy of religion.

I will use three simple arguments to refute the thesis that I appear to directly perceive a mind-independent material object. The theses I will use are similar to the time-gap argument and the argument from the relativity of perception. The visual object of imagination and the object of experience are in the same place. They also share common qualities such as the content, subjectivity, change in virtue of conditions of observers, and the like. This leads to the conclusion that both (...) a tree-image and a tree-experience are distinct from a material tree. Perception of an object is caused by human nature, the senses and consciousness, and mind may prevent the direct perception of the external world. The strongest objection against that consequence is that there is no extra entity called sense-datum or appearance between a subject-in-itself and a real external thing-in-itself. That is, we see books, not book-images. The possible reply would be that a person sees no mental pictures except that which they see via pictures. (shrink)

Much is known about homelessness from a quantitative perspective in Finland. However, the implications are often misleading and false. In this report, I present how prejudiced conclusions about the homeless are drawn in the City of Turku because there is no interest in grassroots experience. Targets to reduce homelessness still make sense.

Carl Mika claims in the symposium’s lead essay that we need more myth today. In fact, an “unscientific” attitude can potentially reorient the alienation from the world. For Mika, a philosophical mātauranga Māori incorporates such a way of being in the world. Through it, an unmediated and co-existent relationship with the world can be built up. Some of Mika’s co-symposiasts invite Mika to substantiate aspects about this bold claim. Carwyn Jones nudges Mika to discuss the (...) parallels between tikanga Māori—a system that seeks to incorporate Māori law—and the common-law tradition that is adopted in New Zealand today. W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz agrees with Mika that to understand the world through an indifferent “scientific” investigation is to understand the world only partially, while the Māori scientist Ocean Ripeka Mercier illustrates how she seeks to develop a third space in her work that reconciles the fear of the unknown with the propensity to control the world through knowing. Helen Verran invites Mika to think about whether, and how, his understanding of a philosophical mātauranga Māori can help to facilitate the cultivation of a naturalism that is able to generate a cosmopolitics in New Zealand. (shrink)

The paper is about the question whether we could know a person's moral character by observing his or her acts.

Little is known about when corporate social responsibility (CSR) leads to a sustainability case (i.e., to improvements in environmental and social performance). Building on various forms of decoupling, we develop a theoretical framework for examining pathways from institutional pressures through CSR management to sustainability performance. To empirically identify such pathways, we apply fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to an extensive dataset from 19 large companies. We discover that different pathways are associated with environmental and social performance (non)improvements, and that pathways (...) to success and failure are for the most part not symmetrical. We identify two pathways to improved environmental performance: an exogenous and an endogenous one. We find two pathways to improved social performance that both involve integrating social responsibility into the core business. Pathways to nonimprovements are multiple, suggesting that failure can occur in a number of ways, while there are only a few pathways to sustainability performance improvements. (shrink)

We start this article from Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between propositional knowledge, ‘knowing-that’, and procedural knowledge, ‘knowing-how’, and investigate how participants in interaction display orientation to the latter in various settings. As the knowledge of how things are done, know-how can be analyzed in terms of its relevance and consequentiality for parties in interaction. Similarly, as participants adjust their actions and understandings according to their sense of what they know and assume others to know, their know-how and its distribution may form (...) the basis for adjusting and reshaping their actions, forms of participation and identities. In this sense, we aim at opening an investigation of know-how, and its conventionalized form, expertise, in interaction. In as much as it forms a distinct domain, a new research object – expertise in interaction – is formulated. Methodological issues of how to study expertise in interaction are discussed. The data are in English and Finnish. (shrink)

ビラニスムと言われる彼の哲学について哲学史的な検討を加えたのち、その要諦である運動の哲学を、西田哲学を補助線として詳細に分析。.

In the earlier literature the importance of public policies and regulatory changes to firm performance and competitive position has been well established (e.g., Bonardi, 2004). However, little research has been done on the dynamics of this relationship. In this paper, we examine how and why regulatory changes can affect on the evolution of market and nonmarket strategies of a firm. We use a longitudinal case study on Finnish retail industry to illustrate the interactions between regulatory change, strategic responses and firm (...) performance. (shrink)

The paper is about the question whether we could know a person's moral character by observing his or her acts.

Generally speaking, the existence of experience is accepted, but more challenging has been to say what experience is and how it occurs. Moreover, philosophers and scholars have been talking about mind and mental activity in connection with experience as opposed to physical processes. Yet, the fact is that quantum physics has replaced classical Newtonian physics in natural sciences, but the scholars in humanities and social sciences still operate under the obsolete Newtonian model. There is already a little research in which (...) mind and conscious experience are explained in terms of quantum theory. This article argues that experience is impossible to be both a physical and non-physical phenomenon. When discussing causality and identity as transcendental, quantum theory may imply the quantum physical nature of conscious experience, where a person associates causality to conscious experience, and, thus, the result is that the double-aspect theory and the mind/brain identity theory would be refuted. (shrink)

In this study, I seek to contribute to the existing literature on corporate political activity by providing insights into how the content of corporate political strategy evolves over time within a single firm. A basic premise of the study is that the evolution of corporate political strategy is embedded within a broader social context that influences its pace and direction. Empirical evidence is based on a historical single case study of a large scale Finnish industrial conglomerate, Tampella Ltd., covering the (...) time period of 1944–1991. The results of the study show how the contextual forces shape the patterns of corporate political strategy. Moreover, an evolutionary model of intra-firm political strategies is introduced. (shrink)

In this paper we integrate the concept of institutional entrepreneurship to the literature on corporate political activity by examining how the attempts of private actors to influence a public policy domain is fundamentally constrained by the prevailing institutional logics in the field. By examining the role of financial actor, i.e, investment bankers in the commercialization process of Finnish water sector, we show how the political strategies of these actors evolved during the process. Moreover, we identify several factors explaining why the (...) financial actors were able to adapt to the institutional logics of local government actors. (shrink)

In this paper we draw from the literatures on corporate nonmarket strategies, resource-based view of the firm, and industry life-cycle to investigate how the market and nonmarket strategic resources of a firm change in the emergence of an industry lifecycle. We do this by examining the outsourcing business in Finnish primary healthcare from its inception in 2004 to 2009. Theoretically, we aim to contribute to the discussion of the importance of strategic resources (both market and nonmarket) in the early phase (...) of an industry life cycle, and how these resources evolve over time. (shrink)

The question of whether or not beauty exists in nature is a philosophical problem. In particular, there is the question of whether artworks, persons, or nature has aesthetic qualities. Most people say that they care about their own beauty. Moreover, they judge another person's appearance from an aesthetic point of view using aesthetic concepts. However, aesthetic judgements are not objective in the sense that the experience justifies their objectivity. By analysing Monroe C. Beardsley's theory of the objectivity of aesthetic qualities, (...) I examine whether there are really beautiful and ugly persons in the world. I will criticize the way analytic philosophers judge people and art from an aesthetic perspective. If there are no aesthetic qualities in the world, nobody can judge someone beautiful or ugly without oppression. Aesthetic judgement is exercise of power. (shrink)

This book explores the origins of western biopolitics in ancient Greek political thought. Ojakangas's argues that the conception of politics as the regulation of the quantity and quality of population in the name of the security and happiness of the state and its inhabitants is as old as the western political thought itself: the politico-philosophical categories of classical thought, particularly those of Plato and Aristotle, were already biopolitical categories. In their books on politics, Plato and Aristotle do not only deal (...) with all the central topics of biopolitics from the political point of view, but for them these topics are the very keystone of politics and the art of government. Yet although the Western understanding of politics was already biopolitical in classical Greece, the book does not argue that the history of biopolitics would constitute a continuum from antiquity to the twentieth century. Instead Ojakangas argues that the birth of Christianity entailed a crisis of the classical biopolitical rationality, as the majority of classical biopolitical themes concerning the government of men and populations faded away or were outright rejected. It was not until the renaissance of the classical culture and literature - including the translation of Plato's and Aristotles political works into Latin - that biopolitics became topical again in the West. The book will be of great interest to scholars and students in the field of social and political studies, social and political theory, moral and political philosophy, IR theory, intellectual history, classical studies. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyse the concept of advantage in sport. Advantage is often referred to in discussions of the philosophy of sport, but only a few analyses of the term exist. Sigmund Loland has discussed advantage most comprehensibly. Nevertheless, his view does not address all of the relevant kinds of advantage. I begin with a summary of Loland's view and then show its limitations. I continue by developing his ideas further to present what I call performance (...) advantage, a comparative relationship between numbers attributed to performances. For instance, the performance of a football team that beat its opponent 3?2 is given a numerical value. However, another kind of advantage exists, one that I label property advantage. This term refers to advantage as a comparative relationship between different properties that affect performances. For example, a runner may have more haemoglobin than his or her competitor. I then outline the relationship between the two meanings of advantage. Finally, I summarise by stating that advantage in sport is a relationship of superiority that can be divided into performance advantage and property advantage. (shrink)

The notion of logical construction was used by Bertrand Russell in the early 20th century, which originally comes from A. N. Whitehead. Russell said that matter as a mind-independent thing can only be known by description. He also argued that matter is a logical construction of sense-data. However, this leads to an incoherent view of the direct or indirect connection between a mind and the external world. The problem examining is whether a collapsing house is a logical construction of the (...) sense-data of rumbling sounds and collapsing shapes. Using Russell's writings between 1911 and 1918, I will analyze how Russell characterized logical constructions. Finally, I will show Russell’s view about the relation of logical constructions to matter and sense-data. A careful interpretation of Russell's thoughts shows that the contents of the statements of the physical world are not constructions being equivalent to the contents of the sense-datum statements. (shrink)

This paper argues that the sport of ski jumping possesses the untapped potential to empower women. It also recommends ways in which this potential should be realised. The untapped potential of ski jumping lies in the notion that, under two independent conditions, women are able to jump as far as men. The first condition is that women start from a higher gate than men. The second is that women and men start from the same gate, but compete on a ski (...) flying hill. In order to realise the untapped potential, it is recommendable to take two steps to transform the practice of ski jumping. The first step is to introduce a mixed-pair competition for the 2014–2015 season. The second step is to introduce a sex-integrated individual competition for the 2016–2017 season. The sex-integrated competition can be either compensated or non-compensated. (shrink)

I will use three simple arguments to refute the thesis that I appear to directly perceive a mind-independent material object. The theses I will use are similar to the time-gap argument and the argument from the relativity of perception. The visual object of imagination and the object of experience are in the same place. They also share common qualities such as the content, subjectivity, change in virtue of conditions of observers, and the like. This leads to the conclusion that both (...) a tree-image and a tree-experience are distinct from a material tree. Perception of an object is caused by human nature, the senses and consciousness, and mind may prevent the direct perception of the external world. The strongest objection against that consequence is that there is no extra entity called sense-datum or appearance between a subject-in-itself and a real external thing-in-itself. That is, we see books, not book-images. The possible reply would be that a person sees no mental pictures except that which they see via pictures. (shrink)

Our lives take place within specific time-space contexts, and in everyday life these contexts are taken as self-evident. Simultaneously, we have accepted the classical idea of fixed, permanent and acontextual truths. This paper argues that people use and are aware of various time-space contexts, and have implicitly created knowledge and approaches that work within them. The paper further argues that explicit consideration of time-space contexts should influence the tools, techniques and methods we use when making sense of each situation, and (...) determining the management interventions we make. (shrink)

Myth of Rebellious Angels: Studies in Second Temple Judaism and New Testament Texts. By Loren T. Stuckenbruck. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2017. Pp. xx + 427. $50.

In Maori thought, the possibility exists for a sort of lateral thinking that does not necessarily directly respond to another’s utterance or opinion but that considers some of the creative and arbitrary themes that arise. In this article, I employ this counter-colonial speculation, keeping in mind a Maori worldview whilst thinking in the wake of Elizabeth Rata’s “Ethnic Ideologies in New Zealand Education: What’s Wrong with Kaupapa Maori?” The speculative powers that Maori have at our disposal here have undoubtedly been (...) employed in a number of ways throughout Maori history; here, I use them in a way that does not directly respond to a prompt. Although Rata’s true aim is to critique kaupapa Maori, she inadvertently brings my attention to a particular characteristic of her writing—the suffix -ism. The fact that it saturates her writing in this article leads me to consider the broader issues associated with instrumentalist language, and the impact of the -ism on a Maori relationship with things in the world. It emerges that, although Rata may be controversial for Maori in her views, her writing is useful for some unintended reasons, as it prompts some thinking around the appropriateness of the -ism for Maori. (shrink)

In this article I will develop the first steps of a wholly general theory of how indexical and reflexive pronouns function in propositional attitude ascriptions. This will involve a theory of ascriptions of de se beliefs and de se utterances, which can probably be also generalized so as to apply to ascriptions of other attitudes. It will also involve a theory about the ascriptions of beliefs or other attitudes a person has at a time about what happens then (attitudes de (...) praesente, as they are sometimes called) and the beliefs of a person concerning the one whom he is addressing (which I might call beliefs de recipiente) etc.. The most distinctive aspect of the theory will be that I will argue that many phenomena associated with such ascriptions that are nowadays most often viewed as pragmatic are semantic. I will use a system of symbolic logic to formalize such ascriptions. I will start from David Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives and generalize it into a logic I call Doxastic Logic of Demonstratives, DLD. Crucial to the semantics of the logic will be an exact definition of the adjustments of a character from one context to another. (shrink)

In this article I want to investigate the concept of reliability employed in process reliabilist theories of justification and knowledge. What is essential to process reliabilist theories of justification is that there is a sense of the word ”justifi- cation” (a strong or an objective concept of justification) such that a belief is justified only if it is produced by a reliable process. Different versions of reliabilism may add different sufficient conditions to this to get a complete definition of justification (...) or knowledge, and disagree about whether there are other interesting concepts of justification, but all agree that reliability (global or local) is necessary for both justification (in some sense) and knowlede. This of course, raises the question of what reliability is. Reliabilist theories of justification cannot be said to have a very secure foundation if they do not address this question. However, reliabilists have not done very much to answer it as has of course been often pointed out by their opponents. The most famous reliabilist, Alvin Goldman, has in one place [6, page 63] suggested that the concept of reliability he uses should be understood so that reliability is a propensity; however, he does not formulate this idea very exactly nor develop it very far. However, I think that his suggestion is correct, and important; in this article I will try to clarify it by linking it to formal analyses of propensities that are found in the literature (as well as the whole discussion about interpretations of probability) and explore its consequences. (shrink)

No return to sweetness. The philosophical poem book Heavy Poems is drawn from splatter films and catalogs of violence and sex, but the language of poetry is the poet’s own. -/- The world of these poems is authentic, true, and sincere. Life and death measure each other. How is human value calculated? Which of us is valuable and who is worthless?

The question of what we immediately perceive from the first-person point of view has been an issue of philosophizing since the beginning of Western philosophy. However, many philosophers have not considered all theoretical and practical consequences concerning identity and causation in perceptual experience between a perceiver and the external world. Despite their meritorious studies, philosophers have failed to completely understand how the causal series of events affects what we immediately experience. Using facts relating to perceivers, logical reasoning, introspection, and philosophical (...) theories, the aim of this research is to show that objects of sense have been contradictorily and confusedly associated with several objects in philosophy of perception. The research problem is that of whether the entity external to a perceiver is identical to the immediate object of perceptual experience. The research starts from the basic beliefs that things appear in experience and that there is causality in perceptual experience. After presenting philosophical theories of perception, the concept ‘sense-datum’, a characterization of ‘perception’, and basic arguments for perceiving the inner private sense-datum, the study examines Bertrand Russell’s and G. E Moore’s arguments for a claim that we always perceive mind-internal sense-data. This claim is problematic if ‘sense-datum’ is considered as being under the category of substance. Nonetheless, evidence for a claim in direct realism and eliminative materialism that the immediate object of perception is an external entity leads to circularity and identity problems. Finally, by means of a demonstration based on understanding and facts in perceivers and perceptual phenomena, the research concludes that the external entity is not identical to the immediate object of perceptual experience. Perceptual experience does not directly reach the external world, and the objects of sense are not independent of the perceiver. (shrink)

The question of what we immediately perceive from the first-person point of view has been an issue of philosophizing since the beginning of Western philosophy. However, many philosophers have not considered all theoretical and practical consequences concerning identity and causation in perceptual experience between a perceiver and the external world. Despite their meritorious studies, philosophers have failed to completely understand how the causal series of events affects what we immediately experience. Using facts relating to perceivers, logical reasoning, introspection, and philosophical (...) theories, the aim of this research is to show that objects of sense have been contradictorily and confusedly associated with several objects in philosophy of perception. The research problem is that of whether the entity external to a perceiver is identical to the immediate object of perceptual experience. The research starts from the basic beliefs that things appear in experience and that there is causality in perceptual experience. After presenting philosophical theories of perception, the concept ‘sense-datum’, a characterization of ‘perception’, and basic arguments for perceiving the inner private sense-datum, the study examines Bertrand Russell’s and G. E Moore’s arguments for a claim that we always perceive mind-internal sense-data. This claim is problematic if ‘sense-datum’ is considered as being under the category of substance. Nonetheless, evidence for a claim in direct realism and eliminative materialism that the immediate object of perception is an external entity leads to circularity and identity problems. Finally, by means of a demonstration based on understanding and facts in perceivers and perceptual phenomena, the research concludes that the external entity is not identical to the immediate object of perceptual experience. Perceptual experience does not directly reach the external world, and the objects of sense are not independent of the perceiver. (shrink)

Questions concerning perception are as old as the field of philosophy itself. Using the first-person perspective as a starting point and philosophical documents, the study examines the relationship between knowledge and perception. The problem is that of how one knows what one immediately perceives. The everyday belief that an object of perception is known to be a material object on grounds of perception is demonstrated as unreliable. It is possible that directly perceived sensible particulars are mind-internal images, shapes, sounds, touches, (...) tastes and smells. According to the appearance/reality distinction, the world of perception is the apparent realm, not the real external world. However, the distinction does not necessarily refute the existence of the external world. We have a causal connection with the external world via mind-internal particulars, and therefore we have indirect knowledge about the external world through perceptual experience. The research especially concerns the reasons for George Berkeley’s claim that material things are mind-dependent ideas that really are perceived. The necessity of a perceiver’s own qualities for perceptual experience, such as mind, consciousness, and the brain, supports the causal theory of perception. Finally, it is asked why mind-internal entities are present when perceiving an object. Perception would not directly discern material objects without the presupposition of extra entities located between a perceiver and the external world. Nevertheless, the results show that perception is not sufficient to know what a perceptual object is, and that the existence of appearances is necessary to know that the external world is being perceived. However, the impossibility of matter does not follow from Berkeley’s theory. The main result of the research is that singular knowledge claims about the external world never refer directly and immediately to the objects of the external world. A perceiver’s own qualities affect how perceptual objects appear in a perceptual situation. (shrink)

In order to study whether there exist a period of activity in the human early visual cortex that contributes exclusively to visual awareness, we applied transcranial magnetic stimulation over the early visual cortex and measured subjective visual awareness during visual forced-choice symbol or orientation discrimination tasks. TMS produced one dip in awareness 60–120 ms after stimulus onset, while forced-choice orientation discrimination was suppressed between 60 and 90 ms and symbol discrimination between 60 and 120 ms. Thus, a time window specific (...) to visual awareness was found only in the orientation condition at 120 ms. The results imply that both conscious and unconscious perception depend on activity in early visual areas. On the basis of previous estimates of neural processing speed, we suggest that the late part of the activity period most likely involve local extrastriate–striate interactions which provide the contents for visual awareness but are not themselves sufficient for awareness to arise. (shrink)

Experience has been described as a mental state with properties that it represents and possesses. Nevertheless, the existence of experience as a mental entity has been questioned by eliminative materialism, which states that everything that goes on in the world is physical, and thus there are no mental states. Experience can be analysed as a dependent entity known introspectively by living subjects. However, when experience is necessary in order to be connected with the environment and informed of its facts, it (...) must also exist. However, a consequence of Paul M. Churchland‘s theory is that empirical knowledge means something other than knowledge based on experience. (shrink)

Providing an indigenous opinion on anything is a difficult task. To be sure, there is a multitude of possible indigenous responses to dominant Western philosophy. My aim in this paper is to assess dominant analytic Western philosophy in light of the general insistence of most indigenous authors that indigenous metaphysics is holistic, and to make some bold claims about both dominant Western philosophy in line with an indigenous metaphysics of holism. There will, of course, be different ways of expressing holism (...) according to the indigenous group, but most of the literature states, as a most basic concern, that a general indigenous philosophy is concerned with the groundedness of an individual as an entity related to and indivisible from the rest of the world.1 The consequences of any assertion about the holistic nature of metaphysics are vast, including for the interpretation of what is often perceived of as the antithesis: Western philosophy. (shrink)