Ordinary language has no exact logic" - most philosophers agree with Peter Strawson's statement today. In the present volume, Christoph Schamberger proves otherwise. The rules of derivation in everyday life and in philosophy can be described in precise, simple terms. Using numerous examples, Schamberger first examines colloquial conditional sentences and arguments. He then presents a non-classic calculus of natural deduction with which the logical conclusion can be drawn and validated in ordinary language. The final capital comprises a (...) critical discussion of the principle of bivalence, which restricts the applicability of logic to sentences that are either true or false. Readers are required to have only a basic understanding of logic. Die Umgangssprache hat keine exakte Logik - diesem Urteil von Peter Strawson stimmen heute die meisten Philosophen zu. Dieses Buch beweist das Gegenteil: Die Schlussregeln des Alltags und der Philosophie lassen sich exakt und einfach beschreiben. Anhand zahlreicher Beispiele untersucht Schamberger zunachst umgangssprachliche Wenn-dann-Satze und Argumente. Anschliessend prasentiert er einen nicht-klassischen Kalkul des naturlichen Schliessens, mit dem sich die logische Folgerung in der Umgangssprache exakt erfassen und uberprufen lasst. Das letzte Kapitel setzt sich kritisch mit dem Zweiwertigkeitsprinzip auseinander, das den Anwendungsbereich der Logik auf Satze einschrankt, die entweder wahr oder falsch sind. Das Buch setzt von seinen Leserinnen und Lesern nur Grundkenntnisse der Logik voraus. (shrink)

Epistemic democracy aims to show, often by appeal to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, that democracy has a high chance of reaching correct decisions. It has been argued that epistemic democracy is compatible with various metaethical accounts, such as moral realism, conventionalism and majoritarianism. This paper casts doubt on that thesis and reveals the following metaethical dilemma: if we adopt moral realism, it is doubtful that voters are, on average, more than 0.5 likely to track moral facts and identify the correct (...) alternative. By contrast, if we adopt conventionalism or majoritarianism, we cannot expect that voters are both competent and sincere. Either way, the conditions for the application of Condorcet’s theorem are not met. (shrink)

The article considers the role of truth and objectivity in democracy. Democratic decisions usually take account of empirical truths and can be regarded as objectively correct according to various metaethical accounts such as moral realism, conventionalism, and majoritarianism. Epistemic theories of democracy aim to demonstrate the high reliability of democratic decisions. One of its main arguments rests on the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which can be applied if decision makers, e. g. members of parliaments, vote to some extent sincerely, independently, and (...) competently. However, under the assumption of moral realism, it is doubtful that they are sufficiently competent to track moral facts, since democratic legislatures make widely differing decisions. But even under the assumption of conventionalism or majoritarianism, we cannot expect decision makers to vote both competently and sincerely, because they often have differing motivations for voting the way they do. This casts doubts on the assumption that democracy is highly likely to reach objectively correct decisions. (shrink)

Proponents of conditional logics such as David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker reject inferences containing counterfactuals from "if A, B" and "if B, C" to "if A, C" due to ordinary language counterexamples. Contextualists defend this inference rule called "hypothetical syllogism" or "transitivity" on the basis of a possible word semantics, which, however, assigns implausible truth values to certain counterfactuals. My defence of hypothetical syllogism avoids this problem, as it rests on Nelson Goodman's uncontroversial, metaphysically parsimonious assumption that we accept counterfactuals (...) as true only under certain conditions from which, in conjunction with the antecedent, the consequent can be inferred. The counterexamples to hypothetical syllogism can be rebutted because their premises are doxastically noncotenable; that is, there is no set of conditions under which the premises can be accepted as jointly true. (shrink)

Apart from a passing reference to Kant, Grice never explains in his writings how he came to discover his conversational maxims. He simply proclaims them without justification. Yet regardless of how his ingenious invention really came about, one might wonder how the conversational maxims can be detected and distinguished from other sorts of maxims. We argue that the conversational maxims can be identified by the use of a transcendental argument in the spirit of Kant. To this end, we introduce Grice’s (...) account of conversational maxims and categories and compare it briefly with Kant’s thoughts on categories. Subsequently, we pursue a thought experiment concerning what would happen if speakers constantly broke one or another of the maxims. It seems that it would not be possible for children to recognize a significant number of lexical meanings under such circumstances. Hence, the conversational maxims are rules whose occasional application is a necessary condition of language and conversation. (shrink)

The traditional criteria for distinguishing philosophy from other disciplines have either proved too limited or too broad. Only in its method does philosophy differentiate itself from other disciplines. Philosophy’s point of departure is constituted by spontaneous convictions, which, in a first step, need to be articulated through conceptual analysis and then, in a second step, need to be justified; the third step comprises critiquing other philosophers’ thoughts and defending against others’ critique. This article proposes several metaphilosophical theses: Intuitions are not (...) a fundamental source of evidence for philosophical theses, but are instead themselves in need of justification. Consistency is more important than truth; the task of philosophy is to develop extensive and, at the same time, consistent theories about the conceptual background of experience. (shrink)

This paper discusses a definition of logical validity of arguments that is provided by Christoph Schamberger in his book Logik der Umgangssprache (2016). The paper identifies some problems of the given definition. It argues that any definition reducing the logical validity of ordinary arguments to the logical validity of their formalization does not meet the criteria of non-circularity, unambiguousness, correctness and completeness. Finally, the paper shows that Schamberger’s filter logic brings about that his definition does also not (...) meet the standards of formal precision and explanatory power. (shrink)

In science and philosophy, a relatively demanding notion of understanding is of central interest: an epistemic subject understands a subject matter by means of a theory. This notion can be explicated in a way which resembles JTB analyses of knowledge. The explication requires that the theory answers to the facts, that the subject grasps the theory, that she is committed to the theory and that the theory is justified for her. In this paper, we focus on the justification condition and (...) argue that it can be analyzed with reference to the idea of a reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

Humans’ attitudes towards an event often vary depending on whether the event has already happened or has yet to take place. The dread felt at the thought of a forthcoming examination turns into relief once it is over. People also value past events less than future ones – offering less pay for work already carried out than for the same work to be carried out in the future, as recent research in psychology shows. This volume brings together philosophers and psychologists (...) with a shared interest in such psychological past/future asymmetries. It asks questions such as: What different kinds of psychological past/future asymmetries are there, and how are they related? Under what conditions do humans exhibit them? To what extent do they reflect features of time itself, or particular beliefs people have about time? Are they rational, or at least rationally permissible, or should we aspire to being temporally neutral? What exactly does temporal neutrality consist in? (shrink)

Der Gedanke, der sich in der modernen Idee der Autonomie verdichtet, ist ein doppelter: Die Figur der Autonomie enthält zugleich eine neue Auffassung von Normativität und eine eigene Konzeption von Freiheit. Dem Gedanken der Autonomie zufolge ist ein Gesetz, das wahrhaft normativ ist, eines, als dessen Urheber wir uns selbst betrachten können; und eine Freiheit, die im vollen Sinne wirklich ist, drückt sich in Gestalt eben solcher selbstgegebener Gesetze aus. Die Idee der Autonomie artikuliert so die Einsicht, dass man Freiheit (...) und Gesetz nicht durch ihre Entgegensetzung bestimmen kann, sondern durcheinander erläutern muss. Wirkliche Freiheit ist nicht Freiheit von Gesetzen, sondern Freiheit in Gesetzen; verbindliche Normen sind nicht das, was Freiheit äußerlich beschränkt, sondern das, was Freiheit innerlich verwirklicht. Die Idee der Autonomie, die für die moderne praktische Philosophie seit Rousseau und Kant grundlegend ist, zielt so darauf, Freiheit und Verbindlichkeit in einem Zuge zu artikulieren: durch die Form selbstgegebener Gesetze. Mit Beiträgen von Robert Brandom, Judith Butler, Thomas Khurana, Christoph Menke, Terry Pinkard und Sebastian Rödl. (shrink)

RATIONAL ALTRUISM. A PRUDENTIAL THEORY OF RATIONALITY AND ALTRUISM - STRUCTURE: "Rational altruism" is the attempt to develop and rationally justify moral principles - with a very strong emphasis on this justification. The concept of justification is developed in a metaethical part (ch. 2); it requires recourse to prudential decisions and to information about our decision-making procedures. The actual normative ethics (Ch. 6 and especially 7) is therefore still based on a prudential desirability theory (Ch. 4 and Sections 5.5-5.6) and (...) this in turn on an empirical action theory (Ch. 3 and Sections 5.1-5.4). - METAETHICS (Ch. 2): In the metaethical part of the book, conditions of adequacy for cogent moral justifications are first developed and justified, which demand, among other things, an information-stable motivation through cogent moral justifications (internalist moral justification). After an examination of various approaches to justification in ethics with regard to this adequacy condition and the negative outcome of this examination, an alternative solution strategy is presented. Among other things, the rationality requirements of profane rational reasoning approaches in ethics are to be systematically reinforced by a prudential desirability theory that aims at information-stable evaluations. - EMPIRICAL THEORY OF ACTION (Chapter 3 and Sections 5.1-5.4): The empirical theory of action developed here therefore provides a detailed analysis of the regularities and leeway of our decisions, especially the influence of information on decision-making paths. - PRUDENTIAL DESIRABILITY THEORY (Chapter 4 and Sections 5.5-5.6): In the prudential desirability theory, the 'individual desirability' of events, especially actions, is then defined in such a way that, of the various evaluation possibilities, the one that is stable in terms of information is always chosen. This procedure far exceeds the rationality requirements of rational decision theory, for example. - NORMATIVE ETHICS (chap. 6 and especially 7): Finally, in the actual normative ethics, a prioritarian standard for the moral evaluation of actions, norms and entire social orders is developed, called "Utilex". Utilex is based on compassion and, like compassion, is partial to the worse off, the poor and unfortunate, but without neglecting the interests of the better off. (shrink)

Most contemporary legal philosophers tend to take force to be an accessory to the law. According to this prevalent view the law primarily consists of a series of demands made on us; force, conversely, comes into play only when these demands fail to be satisfied. This book claims that this model should be jettisoned in favour of a radically different one: according to the proposed view, force is not an accessory to the law but rather its attribute. The law is (...) not simply a set of rules incidentally guaranteed by force, but it should be understood as essentially rules about force. The book explores in detail the nature of this claim and develops its corollaries. It then provides an overview of the contemporary jurisprudential debates relating to force and violence, and defends its claims against well-known counter-arguments by Hart, Raz and others. This book offers an innovative insight into the concept of Pure Theory. In contrast to what was claimed by Hans Kelsen, the most eminent contributor to this theory, the author argues that the core insight of the Pure Theory is not to be found in the concept of a basic norm, or in the supposed absence of a conceptual relation between law and morality, but rather in the fundamental and comprehensive reformulation of how to model the functioning of the law intended as an ordering of force and violence. (shrink)

This volume develops a unique framework to understand India through indigenous and European perspectives, and examines how it copes with the larger challenges of a globalized world. Through a discussion of religious and philosophical traditions, cultural developments as well as contemporary theatre, films and media, it explores the manner in which India negotiates the trials of globalization. It also focuses upon India’s school and education system, its limitations and successes, and how it prepares to achieve social inclusion. The work further (...) shows how contemporary societies in both India and Europe deal with cultural diversity and engage with the tensions between tendencies towards homogenization and diversity. This eclectic collection on what it is to be a part of global network will be of interest to scholars and researchers of South Asian studies, philosophy, sociology, culture studies, and religion. (shrink)

Logik ist ein unveranderter, hochwertiger Nachdruck der Originalausgabe aus dem Jahr 1873. Hansebooks ist Herausgeber von Literatur zu unterschiedlichen Themengebieten wie Forschung und Wissenschaft, Reisen und Expeditionen, Kochen und Ernahrung, Medizin und weiteren Genres.Der Schwerpunkt des Verlages liegt auf dem Erhalt historischer Literatur.Viele Werke historischer Schriftsteller und Wissenschaftler sind heute nur noch als Antiquitaten erhaltlich. Hansebooks verlegt diese Bucher neu und tragt damit zum Erhalt selten gewordener Literatur und historischem Wissen auch fur die Zukunft bei.".

José Ángel Gascón’s essay "Where are dissent and reasons in epistemic justification?" is an exposition of a version of a social functionalist epistemology. I agree with Gascón's emphasis on reasons and on taking into account dissent as important parts of epistemology. But I think that these concerns do not require a social functionalist epistemology, but that, on the contrary, Gascón's social functionalist epistemology throws the baby out with the bathwater. It does so by excluding also a traditional, at its core (...) individualistic epistemology, which defines central concepts like 'justified', 'knowledge' still in individualistic terms as the result of a mental cognizing process but is open to social extensions, e.g. concerning cooperation in the acquisition of knowledge or the transfer of knowledge via argumentation. Such a socially open epistemology with an individualistic core – or "open individualistic epistemology" for short – is also the basis of the epistemological argumentation theory. In the following I want to explain and defend this open individualistic epistemology together with the epistemological argumentation theory (sect. 2) and explain on this basis some problems of Gascón’s theory (sect. 3). (shrink)

Instead of simply following the current neoliberal mantra of proclaiming economic growth as the single most important factor for maintaining well-being, Education and Schmid's Art of Living revisits the idea of an education focused on personal development and the well-being of human beings. Drawing on philosophical ideas concerning the good life and recent research in positive psychology, Teschers argues in favour of shifting the focus in education and schooling towards a beautiful life and an art of living for today's students. (...) Containing a thorough discussion of the ideas of contemporary German philosopher Wilhelm Schmid, this book considers the possible implications of developing a more humanistic and life-centred approach to educational policy, research and practice, showing that Schmid's concept of Lebenskunst provides a firm philosophical basis for this endeavour. Among others, this book draws on analytical and continental traditions to challenge current views and assumptions in regard to education and the role of schooling for contemporary societies. As a result, Teschers' work is sure to spark a debate about the direction of educational policy and practice in the 21st century. Education and Schmid's Art of Living is essential reading for academics and students with an interest in education. Given the importance of such topics as the relationship between education and society, teacher education and how best to structure schools and learning environments, Teschers' work will appeal to academics and students in a diverse range of fields, including education, philosophy, sociology and psychology. (shrink)

Leben und Werk des Berner Staatstheoretikers und politischen Schriftstellers Karl Ludwig von Haller sind bisher nur ungenugend untersucht. Die fruhere wissenschaftliche Betrachtung beschrankte sich einseitig auf sein Restaurationswerk. Weiter fehlt bis heute eine Biographie Hallers. Eine erneute Betrachtung seiner Anschauungen und eine Biographie erfordern aber zuerst eine vollstandige Sichtung und Auswertung der vorhandenen Quellen. Die Untersuchung von Hallers publizistischem Wirken bis 1815 zeigt, wie viele unbekannte und unbeachtete Quellen der Forschung bisher verschlossen waren. Weiter weist die Darstellung nach, dass Haller (...) zuerst als Gegenrevolutionar zu verstehen ist, der seine Staatstheorie als Antwort auf die Zerstorung der alten Ordnung durch Revolution formulierte.". (shrink)

L'esthétique moderne, tout éloignée qu'elle est de la conception religieuse de l’œuvre d'art dominante jusqu'à la Renaissance, reste traversée par une sourde inquiétude au sujet du sacré, qu'on est autorisé à interpréter comme une quête spirituelle, comme une ouverture vers une altérité innommée. Quelques théologiens contemporains, de leur côté, souvent influencés par la fréquentation des beaux-arts, tendent à substituer aux stratégies apologétiques ou dogmatiques du passé une approche esthétique du mystère du monde, de l'homme et de la révélation. La notion (...) de « style », entendue comme « manière d'habiter le monde » , semble propre à exprimer l'appréhension à la fois esthétique et théologique du mystère chrétien.Modern aesthetics, which is quite distant from the religious conception found in art until the Renaissance, remains effected by a deaf uneasiness towards the sacred. One can interpret the sacred as a spiritual quest, as an opening toward an unnamed alterity. Some contemporary theologians, on the other hand, who are often influenced by frequenting the fine arts, tend to substitute, in place of apologetic and dogmatic strategies, an aesthetic approach to the mystery of the world, man, and revelation. The notion of « style », understood as « manner of inhabiting the world » , seems proper for expressing an apprehension, at the same time aesthetic and theological of the Christian mystery. (shrink)

The article, first, reconstructs and criticizes Sandro Nannini’s incompatibilistic concept of freedom of decision and, second, develops a compatibilistic alternative, a synthesis of a rationalistic and an autonomous approach. Nannini justifies his conception primarily from a naturalistic point of view: it reflects our sense of agency, so he says. This is criticized as empirically wrong and methodically mistaken: The theory of freedom of decision is, actually, normative; it is about good decisions; naturalism cannot establish normative claims. The alternative is based, (...) methodically, on an idealizing hermeneutics, which tries to reconstruct the point of free decisions, and then justifies the resulting concept practically: Free decisions, conceived in this way, realize optimally our autonomous desires. (shrink)

This book examines the theoretical foundations of order ethics and discusses business ethics problems from an order ethics perspective. Order ethics focuses on the social order and the institutional environment in which individuals interact. It is a well-established paradigm in European business ethics. The book contains articles written by leading experts in the field and provides both a concise introduction to order ethics and short summary articles homing in on specific aspects of the order-ethical paradigm. It presents contributions describing fundamental (...) concepts, historical roots, and the economic, social, and philosophical background of the theory. The second part of the handbook focuses on the theory's application in business, society, and politics, casting new light on an array of topics that loom large in contemporary ethical discourse.​. (shrink)

Arguments for or against a trend in the evolution of complexity are weakened by the lack of an unambiguous definition of complexity. Such definitions abound for both dynamical systems and biological organisms, but have drawbacks of either a conceptual or a practical nature. Physical complexity, a measure based on automata theory and information theory, is a simple and intuitive measure of the amount of information that an organism stores, in its genome, about the environment in which it evolves. It is (...) argued that physical complexity must increase in molecular evolution of asexual organisms in a single niche if the environment does not change, due to natural selection. It is possible that complexity decreases in co‐evolving systems as well as at high mutation rates, in sexual populations, and in time‐dependent landscapes. However, it is reasoned that these factors usually help, rather than hinder, the evolution of complexity, and that a theory of physical complexity for co‐evolving species will reveal an overall trend towards higher complexity in biological evolution. BioEssays 24:1085–1094, 2002. © 2002 Wiley‐Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt's 1949 essay on the critique of human rights was published in English and German in the same year under two quite different titles: while in English the title asks the skeptical question: "'The Rights of Man'. What Are They?", the German title claims: "Es gibt nur ein einziges Menschenrecht " - "there is only one human right". The article shows that the English title's skepticism and the German title's assertion represent two internally connected moves of Arendt's argument. For (...) Arendt aims at a fundamental critique of the modern natural law tradition of human rights which, at the same time, hints at a possible alternative understanding of a " right to have rights" in terms of a political anthropology - a new understanding of human dignity. (shrink)

Fiction and truth : ancient stories about Pythagoras -- In search of the historical Pythagoras -- The Pythagorean secret society -- Thinkers influenced by Pythagoras and his pupils.

This article presents the working hypothesis which guided my research on the Reception of the Second Vatican Council, based on the partial results published in a first volume and in anticipation of a second. The principal arguments supporting this hypothesis are presented and possible objections are entertained. Having accounted for the presentation of the results in two volumes, details about the underlying notions informing this overall approach to Vat II follow, including a treatment of the concepts “corpus” and “pastoral style” (...) — the notion of “the pastoral” (la pastoralité) being precisely the principle which allows us to bring together two different approaches to the Council, one inspired by the tenets of church historiography and the other by reception criticism. Given that the first volume is interested in the Council’s practice of hermeneutics, a description of the reception theory suggested by this hermeneutical practice is offered. From this vantage point the inner logic of the entire project should become clear. (shrink)

A interlocution containing a stimulating lead essay on the relationship between law and violence by one of the key third-generation Frankfurt School philosophers, Christoph Menke, and engaged responses by a variety of influential critics.

The book argues that the theological motifs in Stoic philosophy are pivotal to our understanding of Stoic ethics. Part One offers an introductory overview of the religious world view of the Stoics. Part Two examines the Stoic characterizations of virtue and the virtues. Part Three deals with Stoic theories of how human beings can become virtuous. Part Four studies the practices of Stoic ethics. It shows inter alia how the Chrysippean table of virtues is still an (unacknowledged) influence behind Panaetius’ (...) matrix of kathekonta, but how little agreement on the practical implications of their virtue ethics the Stoics could reach. The book suggests that the identity over time and cohesion of the Stoic school depended less on a commitment to the school founder’s memory and writings than on a common core of shared theological principles. (shrink)

Practical arguments for actions are arguments which, besides their epistemic function, shall motivate an addressee to execute the justified action. First, a strategy is developed how this motivational and other requirements can be met. Part of this strategy is to identify a thesis for which holds that believing it motivates in the required manner. Second, relying on empirical decision theory, such a thesis is identified. Finally, precise validity criteria for the respective arguments are developed.