Cet article cherche à préciser, à partir de la foi, dans quelle mesure le Christ peut être dit Norme de notre vie et de l'Histoire. L'auteur articule sa réponse à partir de la théologie de la grâce de Von Balthasar, de la morale théonome de Tillich et de la réflexion de Ricoeur sur le rapport à autrui. L'auteur soutient qu'il est possible de comprendre l'agapè comme un impératif catégorique non seulement formel, mais également concret. L'acte de la rencontre du Christ, (...) universalisé dans et par l'Esprit, est tout à la fois la forme et le contenu de l'impératif catégorique. Sous cet aspect la norme n'est plus imposition, mais interpellation eschatologique à laquelle le croyant répondra par une configuration de sa vie au Christ. (shrink)

This paper investigates the Argentinian “theology of the people” (“teología del pueblo”) and how it might run the risk of turning Catholic social thought into an ideology. The first part focuses on the political and theological notion of people and its link to the poor. The author recalls the Argentinian roots of this theology, summarizes its main tenets, and presents Pope Francis’s understanding of the theology of the people. The second part contrasts the theology of the people with the roots (...) of populism in Latin America. The author explores the historical construction of the notion of people in the modern nation-building process, turns to caciquism as the dominant cultural framework of political power, and reviews Nadia Urbinati’s definition of populist regimes. The conclusion proposes to build upon Francis’s principles of common good dynamics to avoid the capture and recycling of the theology of the people’s language by populist regimes. (shrink)

In this article, the authors articulate the question “From where do we speak?” They explain the status of this question and then discuss the question “From where do the authors of the document Justice in the World speak?” They identify four reference points: a pneumatologic commitment, a perception of injustice, a belief in the Gospel basis of action on behalf of justice, and a recognition of self-involvement. This part of the text has been written by Clemens Sedmak. In the second (...) part, they ask the question: “From where do we speak now?” After a few remarks on the climate crisis and the sexual abuse crisis, they focus on “the wounded sociality” of the present day. They explore the relationship between justice and this wounded sociality, taking the categories of social friendship and fraternity as points of reference (from Pope Francis’s encyclicals Laudato si’ and Fratelli tutti), and enter a conversation with three authors: Michael Sandel, Teresa Godwin Phelps, and Paul Ricoeur. This section has been authored by Mathias Nebel. (shrink)

I present a new argument for the repugnant conclusion. The core of the argument is a risky, intrapersonal analogue of the mere addition paradox. The argument is important for three reasons. First, some solutions to Parfit’s original puzzle do not obviously generalize to the intrapersonal puzzle in a plausible way. Second, it raises independently important questions about how to make decisions under uncertainty for the sake of people whose existence might depend on what we do. And, third, it suggests various (...) difficulties for leading views about the value of a person’s life compared to her nonexistence. (shrink)

Matthew Adler's Measuring Social Welfare is an introduction to the social welfare function (SWF) methodology. This essay questions some ideas at the core of the SWF methodology having to do with the relation between the SWF and the measure of well-being. The facts about individual well-being do not single out a particular scale on which well-being must be measured. As with physical quantities, there are multiple scales that can be used to represent the same information about well-being; no one scale (...) is special. Like physical laws, the SWF and its ranking of distributions cannot depend on exactly which of these scales we use. Adler and other theorists in the SWF tradition have used this idea to derive highly restrictive constraints on the shape of the SWF. These constraints rule out seemingly plausible views about distributive justice and population ethics. I argue, however, that these constraints stem from a simple but instructive mistake. The SWF should not be applied to vectors of numbers such as 1 and 2, but rather to vectors of dimensioned quantities such as 1 util and 2 utils. This seemingly pedantic suggestion turns out to have far-reaching consequences. Unlike the orthodox SWF approach, treating welfare levels as dimensioned quantities lets us distinguish between real changes in well-being and mere changes in the unit of measurement. It does this without making the SWF depend on the scale on which welfare is measured, and in a way that avoids the restrictive constraints on the shape of the SWF. (shrink)

The standard view of "believes" and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “S believes that p” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p; this proposition is the referent of the complement clause "that p." On this view, we would expect the clausal complements of propositional attitude verbs to be freely intersubstitutable with their corresponding proposition descriptions—e.g., "the proposition that p"—as (...) they are in the case of "believes." In many cases, however, intersubstitution of that-clauses and proposition descriptions fails to preserve truth value or even grammaticality. These substitution failures lead some philosophers to reject the standard view of propositional attitude reports. Others conclude that propositional attitude verbs are systematically ambiguous. I reject both these views. On my view, the that-clause complements of propositional attitude verbs denote propositions, but proposition descriptions do not. (shrink)

Phillips argues that blindsight is due to response criterion artefacts under degraded conscious vision. His view provides alternative explanations for some studies, but may not work well when one considers several key findings in conjunction. Empirically, not all criterion effects are decidedly non-perceptual. Awareness is not completely abolished for some stimuli, in some patients. But in other cases, it was clearly impaired relative to the corresponding visual sensitivity. This relative dissociation is what makes blindsight so important and interesting.

I defend the view that a reason for someone to do something is just a reason why she ought to do it. This simple view has been thought incompatible with the existence of reasons to do things that we may refrain from doing or even ought not to do. For it is widely assumed that there are reasons why we ought to do something only if we ought to do it. I present several counterexamples to this principle and reject some (...) ways of understanding "ought" so that the principle is compatible with my examples. I conclude with a hypothesis for when and why the principle should be expected to fail. (shrink)

Lara Buchak argues for a version of rank-weighted utilitarianism that assigns greater weight to the interests of the worse off. She argues that our distributive principles should be derived from the preferences of rational individuals behind a veil of ignorance, who ought to be risk averse. I argue that Buchak’s appeal to the veil of ignorance leads to a particular way of extending rank-weighted utilitarianism to the evaluation of uncertain prospects. This method recommends choices that violate the unanimous preferences of (...) rational individuals and choices that guarantee worse distributions. These results, I suggest, undermine Buchak’s argument for rank-weighted utilitarianism. (shrink)

The grounds of justice -- "Un pouvoir ordinaire": shared membership in a state as a ground of -- Justice -- Internationalism versus statism and globalism: contemporary debates -- What follows from our common humanity? : the institutional stance, human rights, and nonrelationism -- Hugo Grotius revisited : collective ownership of the Earth and global public reason -- "Our sole habitation" : a contemporary approach to collective ownership of the earth -- Toward a contingent derivation of human rights -- Proportionate use (...) : immigration and original ownership of the Earth -- "But the earth abideth for ever" : obligations to future generations -- Climate change and ownership of the atmosphere -- Human rights as membership rights in the global order -- Arguing for human rights : essential pharmaceuticals -- Arguing for human rights : labor rights as human rights -- Justice and trade -- The way we live now -- "Imagine there's no countries" : a reply to John Lennon -- Justice and accountability : the state -- Justice and accountability : the World Trade Organization. (shrink)

According to asymmetric comparativism, it is worse for a person to exist with a miserable life than not to exist, but it is not better for a person to exist with a happy life than not to exist. My aim in this paper is to explain how asymmetric comparativism could possibly be true. My account of asymmetric comparativism begins with a different asymmetry, regarding the (dis)value of early death. I offer an account of this early death asymmetry, appealing to the (...) idea of conditional goods, and generalize it to explain how asymmetric comparativism could possibly be true. I also address the objection that asymmetric comparativism has unacceptably antinatalist implications. (shrink)

Extensive measurement is the standard measurement-theoretic approach for constructing a ratio scale. It involves the comparison of objects that can be concatenated in an additively representable way. This paper studies the implications of extensively measurable welfare for social choice theory. We do this in two frameworks: an Arrovian framework with a fixed population and no interpersonal comparisons, and a generalized framework with variable populations and full interpersonal comparability. In each framework we use extensive measurement to introduce novel domain restrictions, independence (...) conditions, and constraints on social evaluation. We prove a welfarism theorem for these domains and characterize the social welfare functions that satisfy the axioms of extensive measurement at both the individual and social levels. The main results are simple axiomatizations of strong dictatorship in the Arrovian framework and classical utilitarianism in the generalized framework. (shrink)

According to the person-affecting restriction, one distribution of welfare can be better than another only if there is someone for whom it is better. Extant problems for the person-affecting restriction involve variable-population cases, such as the nonidentity problem, which are notoriously controversial and difficult to resolve. This paper develops a fixed-population problem for the person-affecting restriction. The problem reveals that, in the presence of incommensurable welfare levels, the person-affecting restriction is incompatible with minimal requirements of impartial beneficence even in fixed-population (...) contexts. (shrink)

Human Rights -- Universalism vs. Relativism -- Why States? -- Global Distributive Justice -- Environmental Justice -- Immigration -- Fairness in Trade.

Literary Materialisms addresses what has become a fundamental concern in the last decade: how do we today define literary studies as an academic discipline and literature as a relevant object of study? Avoiding unproductive proclamations, this volume unites new materialist critical thinking with a commitment to fundamental principles.

We argue that all comparative expressions in natural language obey a principle that we call Comparability: if x and y are at least as F as themselves, then either x is at least as F as y or y is at least as F as x. This principle has been widely rejected among philosophers, especially by ethicists, and its falsity has been claimed to have important normative implications. We argue that Comparability is needed to explain the goodness of several patterns (...) of inference that seem manifestly valid, that the purported failures of Comparability would have absurd consequences, and that the influential arguments against Comparability are less compelling than they may have initially seemed. (shrink)

Tsui and Weymark (Economic Theory, 1997) have shown that the only continuous social welfare orderings on the whole Euclidean space which satisfy the weak Pareto principle and are invariant to individual-specific similarity transformations of utilities are strongly dictatorial. Their proof relies on functional equation arguments which are quite complex. This note provides a simpler proof of their theorem.

von Lothar Brock Wer dieses Buch zur Hand nimmt, sollte sich einen Autor vorstellen, der einer Gruppe hartgesottener Geschäftsleute aus der Wüste von New Mexico morgens um sieben mit charmanter Leichtigkeit und spärlichen, aber Verbindung stiftenden Gesten einen Vortrag über die EU als einer vorgestellten Gemeinschaft hält und dafür überschwenglich gefeiert wird. Oder einen Theoretiker mit verblüffend praktischen Kenntnissen über Höhenmedizin und der unter bestimmten Umständen lebensrettenden Fähigkeit, panischen Berggefährten den Anblick der Tiefe erträglich zu machen. Oder den lead-Sänger einer (...) ziemlich professionellen Musikgruppe, die sich die öffentliche Pflege des Liedgutes der Rolling Stones zur Aufgabe gemacht hat und als Meister der Reproduktion die Bewunderer des Originals in Taumel versetzt - von Stockholm bis OfIenbach. Auf keinen Fall aber sollte man sich einen Autor vorstellen wie man ihn sich vorstellt, wenn man dieses Buch zur Hand nimmt. Oder doch? Doch! Es könnte ja sein, daß jemand dieses Buch nicht nur als lohnende Strapaze erlebt, sondern auch als Vergnügen, wenn er erst einmal über den Untertitel hinweggekommen ist. Zur Sache:,,Fallen der Welt-Ordnung" - die Fallen oder das Fallen? Das Thema verrät es nicht; denn zwischen Moderne und Postmoderne ist ein weites Feld, auf dem alles mögliche passieren kann. Worum also geht es? Mathias Albert versteht das Arbeitsgebiet der Internationalen Beziehungen (also der Lehre und Forschung über diesen Gegenstandsbereich) als jenen Teilbereich der Sozialwissenschaften, der sich mit der Weltordnung befaßt. (shrink)

Priority setting in health care is ubiquitous and health authorities are increasingly recognising the need for priority setting guidelines to ensure efficient, fair, and equitable resource allocation. While cost-effectiveness concerns seem to dominate many policies, the tension between utilitarian and deontological concerns is salient to many, and various severity criteria appear to fill this gap. Severity, then, must be subjected to rigorous ethical and philosophical analysis. Here we first give a brief history of the path to today’s severity criteria in (...) Norway and Sweden. The Scandinavian perspective on severity might be conducive to the international discussion, given its long-standing use as a priority setting criterion, despite having reached rather different conclusions so far. We then argue that severity can be viewed as a multidimensional concept, drawing on accounts of need, urgency, fairness, duty to save lives, and human dignity. Such concerns will often be relative to local mores, and the weighting placed on the various dimensions cannot be expected to be fixed. Thirdly, we present what we think are the most pertinent questions to answer about severity in order to facilitate decision making in the coming years of increased scarcity, and to further the understanding of underlying assumptions and values that go into these decisions. We conclude that severity is poorly understood, and that the topic needs substantial further inquiry; thus we hope this article may set a challenging and important research agenda. (shrink)

The associative theory of creativity states that creativity is associated with differences in the structure of semantic memory, whereas the executive theory of creativity emphasises the role of top-down control for creative thought. For a powerful test of these accounts, individual semantic memory structure was modelled with a novel method based on semantic relatedness judgements and different criteria for network filtering were compared. The executive account was supported by a correlation between creative ability and broad retrieval ability. The associative account (...) was independently supported, when network filtering was based on a relatedness threshold, but not when it was based on a fixed edge number or on the analysis of weighted networks. In the former case, creative ability was associated with shorter average path lengths and higher clustering of the network, suggesting that the semantic networks of creative people show higher small-worldness. (shrink)

This article highlights the continuing relevance of a classic bioethical text, “Bioethics as a Discipline,” published by the Hastings Center’s cofounder Daniel Callahan in 1973. Connecting the text’s programmatic recommendations with later reflections and interventions Callahan wrote about the development of bioethics illuminates how the vision Callahan established and the reality this vision helped create were interrelated—just not in the way Callahan had hoped for. Although this portrait relies on an individual perception of the development of bioethics, it might nevertheless, (...) through its unique linkage of different bioethical temporalities, contribute to a broader reassessment of what bioethics became and why. (shrink)

In a recent extended essay, philosopher Daniel Hausman goes a long way towards dismissing severity as a morally relevant attribute in the context of priority setting in healthcare. In this response, we argue that although Hausman certainly points to real problems with how severity is often interpreted and operationalised within the priority setting context, the conclusion that severity does not contain plausible ethical content is too hasty. Rather than abandonment, our proposal is to take severity seriously by carefully mapping the (...) possibly multiple underlying accounts to well-established ethical theories, in a way that is both morally defensible and aligned with the term’s colloquial uses. (shrink)

Poly(ADP‐ribosyl)ation is a post‐translational modification occurring in the nucleus. The most abundant and best‐characterized enzyme catalyzing this reaction, poly(ADP‐ribose) polymerase 1 (PARP1), participates in fundamental nuclear events. The enzyme functions as molecular “nick sensor”. It binds with high affinity to DNA single‐strand breaks resulting in the initiation of its catalytic activity. Activated PARP1 promotes base excision repair. In addition, PARP1 modifies several transcription factors and thereby precludes their binding to DNA. We propose that a major function of PARP1 includes the (...) silencing of transcription preventing expression of damaged genes. Concomitant stimulation of DNA repair suggests that PARP1 acts as a switch between transcription and DNA repair. Another PARP‐type enzyme, tankyrase, is involved in the regulation of telomere elongation. Tankyrase modifies a telomere‐associated protein and thereby prevents it masking telomeric repeats providing access of telomerase for telomere elongation. Therefore, poly(ADP‐ribosyl)ation reactions may act as molecular switches in DNA metabolism. BioEssays 23:543–548, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Many economists and philosophers assume that status quo bias is necessarily irrational. I argue that, in some cases, status quo bias is fully rational. I discuss the rationality of status quo bias on both subjective and objective theories of the rationality of preferences. I argue that subjective theories cannot plausibly condemn this bias as irrational. I then discuss one kind of objective theory, which holds that a conservative bias toward existing things of value is rational. This account can fruitfully explain (...) some compelling aspects of common sense morality, and it may justify status quo bias. (shrink)

Totalism is the view that one distribution of well-being is better than another just in case the one contains a greater sum of well-being than the other. Many philosophers, following Parfit, reject totalism on the grounds that it entails the repugnant conclusion: that, for any number of excellent lives, there is some number of lives that are barely worth living whose existence would be better. This paper develops a theory of welfare aggregation—the lexical-threshold view—that allows totalism to avoid the repugnant (...) conclusion, as well as its analogues involving suffering populations and the lengths of individual lives. The theory is grounded in some independently plausible views about the structure of well-being, identifies a new source of incommensurability in population ethics, and avoids some of the implausibly extreme consequences of other lexical views, without violating the intuitive separability of lives. (shrink)

This essay reconstructs the place of utopia in realist political theory, by examining the ways in which the literary genre of critical utopias can productively unsettle ongoing discussions about “how to do political theory.” I start by analyzing two prominent accounts of the relationship between realism and utopia: “real utopia” and “dystopic liberalism”. Elaborating on Raymond Geuss’s recent reflections, the essay then claims that an engagement with literature can shift the focus of these accounts. Utopian fiction, I maintain, is useful (...) for comprehending what is and for contemplating what might be. Ursula K. Le Guin’s novel The Dispossessed deploys this double function in an exemplary fashion: through her dynamic and open-ended portrayal of an Anarchist community, Le Guin succeeds in imagining a utopia that negates the status quo, without striving to construct a perfect society. The book’s radical, yet ambiguous, narrative hence reveals a strategy for locating utopia within realist political theory that moves beyond the positions dominating the current debate. Reading The Dispossessed ultimately demonstrates that realism without utopia is status quo–affirming, while utopia without realism is wishful thinking. (shrink)

The Rachels–Temkin spectrum arguments against the transitivity of better than involve good or bad experiences, lives, or outcomes that vary along multiple dimensions—e.g., duration and intensity of pleasure or pain. This paper presents variations on these arguments involving combinations of good and bad experiences, which have even more radical implications than the violation of transitivity. These variations force opponents of transitivity to conclude that something good is worse than something that isn’t good, on pain of rejecting the good altogether. That (...) is impossible, so we must reject the spectrum arguments. (shrink)

This chapter examines the role of parameterParametercalibrationCalibration in the confirmation and validation of complex computer simulation models. I examine the question to what extent calibration data can confirm or validate the calibrated model, focusing in particular on Bayesian approaches to confirmation. I distinguish several different Bayesian approaches to confirmation and argue that complex simulation models exhibit a predictivist effect: Complex computer simulation models constitute a case in which predictive success, as opposed to the mere accommodation of evidence, provides a more (...) stringent test of the model. DataData used in tuning do not validate or confirm a model to the same extent as data successfully predicted by the model do. (shrink)

Is well-being the kind of thing that can be summed across individuals? This paper takes a measurement-theoretic approach to answering this question. To make sense of adding well-being, we would need to identify some natural "concatenation" operation on the bearers of well-being that satisfies the axioms of extensive measurement and can therefore be represented by the arithmetic operation of addition. I explore various proposals along these lines, involving the concatenation of segments within lives over time, of entire lives led alongside (...) one another or in sequence, and of evaluatively basic propositions via conjunction. All of these proposals turn out to carry highly controversial commitments about the good. I do not claim that these commitments are unacceptable. But they suggest that we cannot simply take for granted, as many philosophers do, that there is any such thing as the sum of well-being. (shrink)

Der Philosoph Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) gilt mit seiner sogenannten ›Wissenschaftslehre‹ als einer der bedeutendsten Vertreter einer transzendentalen Theorie über – modern gesprochen – Wissenschaftstheorie. Könnten so seine Entdeckungen nicht auch für die Theologie systematische Bedeutung haben, insbesondere in der Frage, ob diese selber eine Wissenschaft sein kann? Mathias Müller versucht anhand einer systematischen Konstruktionsanalyse von Fichtes Schrift »Die Principien der Gottes- Sitten- u. Rechtslehre. Februar und März 1805« zu zeigen, dass und wie in der Wissenschaftslehre diese selber eine (...) Grundlegung bildet, die als eine Grundlagentheorie der Theologie eingesehen werden kann. Mittels des Modells des ›Transzensus‹ wird versucht, einen für das transzendentale Ich gangbaren Weg nachzuzeichnen und anzubieten, um so – performativ erlebbar – die Wissenschaftlichkeit einer Theologie als transzendentale Fundamentaltheologie zu erschliessen. (shrink)

This paper presents a new kind of problem in the ethics of distribution. The problem takes the form of several “calibration dilemmas,” in which intuitively reasonable aversion to small-stakes inequalities requires leading theories of distribution to recommend intuitively unreasonable aversion to large-stakes inequalities. We first lay out a series of such dilemmas for prioritarian theories. We then consider a widely endorsed family of egalitarian views and show that they are subject to even more forceful calibration dilemmas than prioritarian theories. Finally, (...) we show that our results challenge common utilitarian accounts of the badness of inequalities in resources. (shrink)

We defend three controversial claims about preference, credence, and choice. First, all agents (not just rational ones) have complete preferences. Second, all agents (again, not just rational ones) have real-valued credences in every proposition in which they are confident to any degree. Third, there is almost always some unique thing we ought to do, want, or believe.

This paper is about the role of interpersonal comparisons in Harsanyi's aggregation theorem. Harsanyi interpreted his theorem to show that a broadly utilitarian theory of distribution must be true even if there are no interpersonal comparisons of well-being. How is this possible? The orthodox view is that it is not. Some argue that the interpersonal comparability of well-being is hidden in Harsanyi's premises. Others argue that it is a surprising conclusion of Harsanyi's theorem, which is not presupposed by any one (...) of the premises. I argue instead that Harsanyi was right: his theorem and its weighted-utilitarian conclusion do not require interpersonal comparisons of well-being. The key to making sense of this possibility is to treat Harsanyi's weights as dimensional constants rather than dimensionless numbers. (shrink)

In this paper we present applications of the ACGT Master Ontology (MO) which is a new terminology resource for a transnational network providing data exchange in oncology, emphasizing the integration of both clinical and molecular data. The development of a new ontology was necessary due to problems with existing biomedical ontologies in oncology. The ACGT MO is a test case for the application of best practices in ontology development. This paper provides an overview of the application of the ontology within (...) the ACGT project thus far. (shrink)

Speech planning is a sophisticated process. In dialog, it regularly starts in overlap with an incoming turn by a conversation partner. We show that planning spoken responses in overlap with incoming turns is associated with higher processing load than planning in silence. In a dialogic experiment, participants took turns with a confederate describing lists of objects. The confederate’s utterances (to which participants responded) were pre‐recorded and varied in whether they ended in a verb or an object noun and whether this (...) ending was predictable or not. We found that response planning in overlap with sentence‐final verbs evokes larger task‐evoked pupillary responses, while end predictability had no effect. This finding indicates that planning in overlap leads to higher processing load for next speakers in dialog and that next speakers do not proactively modulate the time course of their response planning based on their predictions of turn endings. The turn‐taking system exerts pressure on the language processing system by pushing speakers to plan in overlap despite the ensuing increase in processing load. (shrink)

Christians, and those of the Roman Catholic Church, have made significant adjustments to their participation in Sunday liturgy in the wake of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. This is especially the case for Catholic Christians at the ‘Our Lady of Loreto’ (OLL) Church in Kempton Park in South Africa. Sunday Church services that used to be compulsory for most Catholic families and community members, are now attended by few and in some cases none from staunch Catholic families and communities. (...) However, this is not a new phenomenon in the Catholic Church. It signals the extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic has altered and continues to affect Christian families and their commitment to the Sunday liturgy. Drawing from qualitative interviews conducted with eight staunch Catholic community leaders of OLL Church in Kempton Park, Johannesburg, this paper explores the motivations for their continuous participation and/or non-participation in the Sunday liturgy in the wake of the pandemic. The findings reveal that certain behavioural patterns or activities associated with the COVID-19 pandemic motivate Catholic Christians and families to continue to participate and/or not participate in the Sunday liturgy. Contribution: The article explored and examined the way in which COVID-19 has affected Catholic Christians’ ability to attend Sunday liturgy. It discovered that while some Christians returned to church after the pandemic, others have continued to worship from home because of the influence of changes adopted during the pandemic. (shrink)

Much has been written on the role of causal notions and causal reasoning in the so-called 'special sciences' and in common sense. But does causal reasoning also play a role in physics? Mathias Frisch argues that, contrary to what influential philosophical arguments purport to show, the answer is yes. Time-asymmetric causal structures are as integral a part of the representational toolkit of physics as a theory's dynamical equations. Frisch develops his argument partly through a critique of anti-causal arguments and (...) partly through a detailed examination of actual examples of causal notions in physics, including causal principles invoked in linear response theory and in representations of radiation phenomena. Offering a new perspective on the nature of scientific theories and causal reasoning, this book will be of interest to professional philosophers, graduate students, and anyone interested in the role of causal thinking in science. (shrink)

In diesem Buch werden die zwei Grundsäulen der "Kritischen Patriarchatstheorie" - die Matriarchale Naturphilosophie und die Patriarchatskritische Geschichtsphilosophie - vorgestellt und im Rahmen einer kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit der Naturphilosophie Giordano Brunos sowie der Geschichtsphilosophie Martin Heideggers erläutert.